RAF Coastal Command

Royal Air Force Coastal Command
RAF Coastal Command crest
Active	14 July 1936[1] – 27 November 1969[2]
Country	United Kingdom
Branch	Royal Air Force
Role	Anti-submarine warfare Commerce raiding Aerial reconnaissance Air-sea rescue Weather reconnaissance[3]
Part of	Royal Air Force
Headquarters	Northwood
Motto	Constant Endeavour
Engagements	World War II and Cold War

RAF Coastal Command was a formation within the Royal Air Force (RAF). Founded in 1936, it was the RAF's premier maritime arm, after the Royal Navy's secondment of the Fleet Air Arm in 1937. Naval aviation was neglected in the inter-war period, 1919–1939, and as a consequence the service did not receive the resources it needed to develop properly or efficiently. This continued until the outbreak of the Second World War, during which it came to prominence. But owing to the Air Ministry's concentration on RAF Fighter Command and RAF Bomber Command, Coastal Command was often referred to as the "Cinderella Service", a phrase first used by the First Lord of the Admiralty at the time A V Alexander.^[4]

Its primary task was to protect convoys from the German Kriegsmarine's U-Boat force, known as the "wolfpacks". It also protected Allied shipping from the aerial threat posed by the Luftwaffe. The main operations of Coastal Command were defensive, defending supply lines in the various theatres of war, most notably the Mediterranean, Middle East and African theatres and the battle of the Atlantic. It also served in an offensive capacity. In the Mediterranean theatre and the Baltic sea it carried out attacks on German shipping moving war materials from Italy to North Africa and from Scandinavia to Germany. By 1943 Coastal Command finally received the recognition it needed and its operations proved decisive in the victory over the U-Boats.

The service saw action from the first day of hostilities until the last day of the Second World War. It flew over one million flying hours,^[5] 240,000 operations and destroyed 212 U-boats.^[6] Coastal Command's casualties amounted to 2,060 aircraft to all causes and some 5,866 personnel killed in action. From 1940 to 1945 Coastal Command sank 366 German transport vessels and damaged 134. The total tonnage sunk was 512,330 tons^[7] and another 513,454 tons damaged.^[6] A total of 10,663 persons were rescued by the Command, including 5,721 Allied crews, 277 enemy personnel, and 4,665 non-aircrews.^[8]

After the war, the Command continued Anti-Submarine Warfare duties during the Cold War, to combat the threat posed by the Soviet Navy and those fleets of the Warsaw Pact.

Origins

Beginnings of maritime aviation

The Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) met in 1909 and decided the direction that British air power would take in the early 20th century. It was decided air attack (which become known as strategic bombing) was unlikely, as no civilised nation would resort to such barbarity and thus spending on military aviation was to be limited. Aircraft design was left to private firms, such as de Havilland, Handley-Page and the Short Brothers. As far as maritime air power was concerned, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, an advocate of the aircraft in military affairs, pushed for development. Under pressure from the services, both the Royal Navy and British Army, the Government increased spending and the aviation budget rose from £9,000 in 1909 to £500,000 by 1913.^[9]

Before the First World War the Naval Staff had a positive attitude to aviation and their interests were to grow during the course of the 1914–1918 conflict. Before the war budgetary concerns and constraints had kept the development of aviation low. While the War Office attempted to save money by encouraging civilian aviators such as Samuel Cody to carry out research on their behalf, mostly in the field of reconnaissance and artillery co-operation, the Admiralty undertook its own trials with aircraft built to its own specifications. Between 1909 and 1911 the Navy took advantage of huge strides in military development of aircraft, having a significant tradition in research and development and a strong regard to long-range navigation and reconnaissance. Attention swiftly turned to ship-borne aircraft. Lieutenant Charles Rumney Samson achieved the feat of flying off a ship in December 1911. On 2 January 1912 Lieutenant H.A Williamson, a submarine officer, who held a Royal Aero Club Certificate submitted a paper dealing with ship-borne aircraft and their use for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). The Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) factored these aspects of naval air warfare into its development of naval aviation.^[10]

The Navy was quick to begin experiments to see if surface vessels and submarines could be detected from the air, and started this research in July 1912 at Harwich and Rosyth. The use of Wireless telegraphy and bomb dropping was well in advance of the War Office. The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) carried out bomb dropping experiments but refused to respond to Admiralty requests for collaboration, this was as late as August 1914.^[11]

The Naval Air Wing was renamed the RNAS officially in July 1914 and affirmed its independence from any other air service. The Admiralty introduced new types of aircraft and was enthusiastic about continuing development and striving to improve all aspects of aircraft design. They encouraged competition among private firms within the design parameters set by the Admiralty. The RFC, on the other hand, was reliant on the Royal Aircraft Factory and a lack of competition led to its equipment being over-standardised, inflexible in design approach which generally retarded progress in development. The RNAS was better prepared to carry out effective detection operations at sea and to conduct attacks using bombs against naval and land targets than the RFC.^[12]

By 1918 the RNAS had made far more contributions to long-range maritime air operations than either the RFC or its successor the RAF. In August 1914 the primary role for the maritime services was air defence from enemy attack, maritime reconnaissance, and ASW. ASW was considered the most important.^[13] During the course of the coming war, the RFC would be mainly responsible for over-land operations, whilst the RNAS partook in all aspects of aerial warfare; strategic air defence, strategic bombing, ASW and fleet reconnaissance. Prior to the formation of Coastal Command in 1936, the role of the maritime naval operations fell to the RNAS. When the RAF was formed in April 1918, these operations became the domain of the separate service. In September 1919 the RAF Coastal Area organisation was formed as the Air Ministry's maritime arm.^[14] Before that the role was carried out by No. 10 Group RAF.^[15] After the formation of the Air Ministry and the RAF in April 1918, Coastal Area was subordinated to the new service but after the war received little encouragement or assistance from the Air Ministry for developing their service.^[16]

First World War

The Airco DH.6, the world's first ASW aircraft.

The First World War was the first indication that a specialised maritime service was needed. During the War, the RNAS was primarily responsible for operations at sea. There was some confusion and debate over what type of aircraft would be suitable for multi-purpose operations. The Germans favoured airships which carried the advantages of long-range, heavy lift capacity for maritime missions while the British were debating the use of flying boats and seaplanes. Seaplanes were smaller, handier and cheaper, while flying boats were long-range but more expensive to build and operate. Operating aircraft over sea created problems. Few forces had the doctrine or capability to deployment their charges on effective sea operations despite manoeuvres involving aircraft being carried out in 1913. Still, aircraft were the mainstay of British maritime air power during the First World War. The most important contribution made by aviation in maritime operations was ASW defence. It was in this role that the Coastal Area and RNAS proved decisive during the Great War.^[17]

The submarine, in the shape of the German U-Boat, and the aircraft, threatened the status quo of maritime warfare, threatening to displace the Battleship as the leading maritime weapon and the cornerstones of naval supremacy. For the British, this meant their vulnerable trade routes in the Atlantic Ocean could be threatened by submarines, and later aircraft. By 1916, after the Battle of Jutland, the Germans were forced to concede that the Imperial German Navy's surface fleet could not challenge the strength of the Royal Navy on the high seas, so great faith was placed in the U-Boat to strangle British supply lines in the Atlantic. The U-Boats achieved great success in the sinking of Merchant vessels. In 1916 Admiral John Jellicoe, 1st Earl Jellicoe claimed that the Germans could achieve victory in the Atlantic and force Britain to terms. The situation had become so bad, and militarily embarrassing, that the RNAS was ordered to concentrate solely on ASW.^[18] The turning point in the Atlantic came when escorted convoys systems came in, and merchant ships ceased sailing independently. Added to the system was aircraft, which although incapable of sinking a submarine, could render valuable psychological damage to U-Boat crews and provide reconnaissance support which eliminated the U-Boat threat.^[19]

Despite the preference for flying boats and seaplanes, non-rigid blimps were also developed for anti-submarine patrol, the airships being built in a number of types, such as the SS class, the SST class, the SSP class, and the SSZ class. For flying boats, having started initially with Curtiss H boats bought from the United States, a modified version with a new, more seaworthy hull, was designed by RNAS Commander John Porte at the Seaplane Experimental Station at Felixstowe, and these aircraft became known as the Felixstowe F.1, Felixstowe F.2, and Felixstowe F.3, culminating in the Felixstowe F.5 of 1918. These, along with the blimps, were to make a valuable contribution to the protection of convoys.^[20][21][22]

Unrestricted submarine warfare made aircraft more important than ever in the war against the U-Boats. By 1917 some 39 seaplane and 26 aircraft stations in Britain were all assigned to ASW operations. By December 1918 Britain's land-based coastal air forces was to have consisted of 353 flying boats and seaplanes and 920 land-based aircraft. The actual figures obtained were 305 and 382 respectively, but the clear intended expansion was an indication of air power's importance in trade and maritime defence.^[23]

The figures and statistics for the coastal air force's impact on the U-Boat fleet are disputed. Air Ministry figures claimed aircraft sighted 361 U-Boats, attacked 236 and sank 10. It is unlikely that these figures are correct owing to the lack of capable offensive weapons.^[24] But 'scarecrow' tactics did result in 96 sightings and 46 attacks.^[25] U-Boat crews, ignorant of aircraft's capabilities, were often forced to dive to escape observation and the attention of escorting destroyer screens which aircraft could direct for the kill. By 1918 only six convoys under escort by aircraft were attacked. One unnamed U-Boat captain stated that "aircraft are our worst enemy".^[26][27] By the end of the war, British maritime air power was the most advanced in the world. Totalling a maximum of 3,000 aircraft (in all services), 55,000 aircrew and 12 aircraft handling ships, such as the HMS Engadine, HMS Campania, and HMS Argus, (later called aircraft carriers), air power had indicated what it was capable of in naval warfare.^[28]

With wireless and new aircraft such as the DH.6 now available, effective ASW missions could be carried out to the extent that aircraft became one of the core instruments in trade defence. Co-operation was also a breeding ground for tactical doctrine. But the surrender of Germany in November 1918 and mass demobilisation saw maritime aviation enter terminal decline for the next 20 years.^[29]

The ebb of maritime aviation

Ignoring past lessons

Trenchard's struggle with the Admiralty resulted in the Air Ministry focusing more on strategic bombing, at the expense of ASW.

Despite the fact that Britain had been caused severe difficulty by the U-Boat campaign in the First World War, the Admiralty completely ignored the threat of the submarine until the late 1930s. The Royal Navy had founded its traditional defensive strength on the battleship, which was used to defend its waters and merchant fleets. This weapon had proved incapable of countering U-Boats during the war. The Admiralty also ignored the damage caused by submarines and regarded them as ineffective defensive weapons. Given the disarmament of Germany there seemed little offensive threat. Even after the rise of Adolf Hitler and the birth of the Third Reich, there seemed little inclination or will toward rearming Britain's ASW air forces. To the contrary, the Anglo-German Naval agreement signed in June 1935, allowed the Germans to build German U-Boat strength to one-third the displacement tonnage of the entire Royal Navy. In fact, the Germans had been developing submarines as early as 1922, despite the Treaty of Versailles and the banning of German military submarines.^[30][31]

In the RAF, which in April 1918 was created by merging the RNAS and RFC, there still existed a place for maritime aviation. However the Navy expected the RAF to hand back the naval component after the war, which was reasonable considering the indifference the RAF displayed towards the submarine campaign in the 1914–1918 conflict. The failure of the RAF to do so started a power struggle between the Air Ministry on one side and the Admiralty and War Office on the other. The Air Ministry found its existence threatened and resolved to fend off the attempts of the Admiralty and War Office to break up the RAF and recover the RFC and RNAS by offering a cheaper, innovative alternative strategy for British air power in the future.^[32] The RAF, under the direction of a new Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Hugh Trenchard, adopted the strategic bombing theory of air power theorists such as Giulio Douhet, who argued that air power could win wars on its own, bypassing the need for armies and navies.^[33][34][35] Maritime aviation and the valuable lessons of the First European war were cast aside,^[36] but crucially the appointment of Trenchard and his views, the removal of the weaker personalities such as CAS Frederick Sykes, and the continued support of Winston Churchill saved the Air Ministry from being disbanded.^[37] In July 1923, Trenchard sent a memorandum to AOC (Air Officer Commanding) Central and AOC Coastal Areas advising them the strategic area offensive would be the dominating policy of future conflicts, and the Coastal services would take part in such operations. In doing so Trenchard stated openly that the goals of the Air Arm in no way conflicted with either the Army or Navy. This meant that maritime, or "auxiliary" squadrons would be radically reduced to allow the focus on specialised land-based bombers and fighters for air attack and defence^[38] in line with the RAF's "non-specialisation policy".^[39] In the 1920s, Bomber and Fighter forces were expanded while Coastal Area was continually downgraded.^[40] By 1920 little remained of Coastal Area Air Forces.^[41]

With Trenchard’s policy unequivocal, for both military and political reasons, maritime aviation was in danger of being disbanded altogether. In April 1923 shore-based strength amounted to a solitary squadron. A year later all that remained was one flight of torpedo bombers. Only five squadrons of ship-borne aircraft remained by April 1924. These reductions were not uniform across the service. The percentage reduction of the maritime component was far greater than non-maritime elements. The ten year rule (that there would be no major war for ten years) laid down in 1919 ensured the RAF was to be reduced by 50 percent, which downsized the maritime squadrons on the RAF to just five percent of its November 1918 strength. The Air Ministry justified this reduction of maritime aviation in light of the 'breakthrough' in ASDIC (Sonar), and underwater detection technology capable of locating submarines. As 86 percent of the First World War maritime air effort had been expended on ASW it argued it was reasonable for a reduction in maritime expenditure in light of the technology now available.^[42][43][44]

The lack of ASW development during the 1920s and 1930s was not entirely the fault of the Air Ministry. The struggle between the Admiralty and Air Ministry continued into the 1930s and the Admiralty lost sight of why it was pursuing its own air service for the Navy. It became a matter of getting revenge over the RAF for its success in defeating earlier attempts to break up the Air Force. It succeeded in forcing the return of the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) from the RAF in 1937, but made no effort to develop ASW formations. Instead it continued to believe in the supremacy of the capital ship and the FAA was meant to be suitable for fleet actions only. It was a mistake most of the major powers, in particular the Imperial Japanese Navy, made during the lead up to the Second World War.^[45]

Throughout the inter war period, the Admiralty had been continually sceptical of the aircraft's ability to sink a surface vessel. It was regarded as merely a reconnaissance technology. This resulted in a lack of development of a maritime strike force and lost another early opportunity to garner support for Coastal Area/Coastal Command.^[46] In summation First Sea Lord David Beatty, 1st Earl Beatty proclaimed "[I] know of no operation in which the Navy and the Air [Service] have to co-operate in which the Navy would not play the more important role than the air service".^[47]

Formation and neglect

Philip Joubert de la Ferté, Coastal Command's second AOC-in-C. de la Ferté continually complained about the neglect of Coastal Command

In 1936, almost 18 years after the end of the First World War, there was a major change in the Command structure of the RAF. Several Expansion Schemes were heading at such pace to rearm the British military in face of the Nazi threat that "Area" formations were now to be called "Commands". Fighter and Bomber Areas became Fighter and Bomber Command and Coastal Area was renamed Coastal Command. Its Headquarters was located as Lee-on-Solent. Air Marshal Arthur Longmore, AOC Coastal Area oversaw the renaming and handed over command to Air Marshal Philip Joubert de la Ferté on 24 August 1936.^[48][49]

In March 1935 the threat from Nazi Germany prompted a series of expansion schemes which pushed the number of squadrons up to 163 (as per Expansion Scheme M, the last before the outbreak of war) and the number of aircraft to 2,549. But it was never fully implemented, and Scheme F, 124 Squadrons and 1,736 aircraft, was the only scheme that ran its full course. It did produce modern aircraft and it made adequate provision for reserves (75 percent), but again, the bomber forces received no less than 50 percent which averaged 57 percent over all schemes. Maritime air units never made more than 12 percent of British air strength. From a pre-expansion strength of just five squadrons, four of which were flying boats, the figure of maritime squadrons rose to 18 by September 1939, with a strength of just 176 aircraft. Some 16 of these were allocated to trade defence,^[50] but given Trenchard's policy (which was still in place after his retirement) of developing bombers for the maritime arm which could bolster the air offensive, most were unspecialised for ASW, and the Air Ministry were thoroughly uninterested in any aircraft which fell outside of the bomber function.^[51][52]

de la Ferté was highly critical of the Air Ministry's attitude to his service. In 1937 several exercises were carried out by Coastal Command in cooperation with submarines against the Home Fleet to judge the surface fleet's defence against submarine and air attack. However, despite the experiences of the First World War, no attention was paid to the problem of attacking submarines from the air as part of trade protection measures. Owing to the imperfect ASDIC invention, it appeared the Royal Navy no longer considered U-Boats were a threat to Britain's sea lanes. The Air Ministry, keen to concentrate on strategic air forces, did not dispute the Admiralty's conclusions and Coastal Command did not receive any guidance from the Air Ministry. The saving grace of both services was the construction of the Combined Headquarters which enabled rapid collaboration in maritime operations. This was one of the few successes in organisation and preparation made before the outbreak of war.^[53][54]

When the review of the role Coastal Command was to play in war was assessed in 1937, the then AOC Frederick Bowhill was informed by his senior Air Staff Officer Air Commodore Geoffrey Bromet that the other two commands (Bomber and Fighter) had clear mission objectives while Coastal Command had been given no clear mandate. It was assumed that Coastal Command was to keep sea communications open for merchant shipping and prevent seaborne raids on British coastlines and ports. No mention of U-Boats was made by either man. Both assumed aircraft and surface raiders presented the greater threat in British waters. Thus they followed the Admiralty line that U-Boats were no longer a danger.^[55] When Admiral Dudley Pound enquired about aerial assets in trade and commerce defence, Chief of the Air Staff Cyril Newall, replied that there was not enough "jam" [resources] to go around and stated it was more advisable to risk losses on trade routes than weaken the RAF's ability to protect Britain from air attack and bomb its enemies.^[56]

In March 1937, the then Director of Operations Group Captain Robert Saundby, complained that the role for Coastal Command in war, namely supporting the bomber offensive, and second, the support of naval forces along the British coastline, were too limited and was in danger of diverting the Command from its main concern; ASW. In October the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (DCAS) Air Vice Marshal Richard Peirse confirmed that there was no formal role for the service or location of its units. Peirse did reverse the decision to have strategic bombing support as the primary function. This was changed to trade defence. Coastal Command was only to be used for other purposes if trade routes were suffering little interference and the intensity of air attack on Britain or air attacks on enemy targets, required all available air units for those purposes. However, in December 1937, the Naval and Air Staffs met again, and changed the priority to North Sea reconnaissance. The Naval Staff insisted that commerce raiders presented the greatest danger, and aircraft could prove decisive only in locating enemy Warships.^[57] ASW remained in third place, behind direct co-operation with surface fleets. In December 1938, this was changed again, and ASW moved up to second priority. In August 1939, it was moved to first priority. When Coastal Command went to war, its first task was to co-operate with the Navy to prevent enemy vessels from escaping into the North Sea and Atlantic Oceans. Second, it was to provide ASW support where and when it could. These steps are significant as the language indicates a change from passive reconnaissance of enemy warships and submarines, to an active directive which involved the attack of the vessels by Coastal Command aircraft.^[58]

Since the late 1920s the tension between the air and naval services had declined. It arose briefly again in 1937 when the question of the FAA operational control arose. On this occasion the British Government sided with the Admiralty. Despite a spirited defence of its asset, once the Minister for Coordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip had decided to transfer the arm, the Air Ministry was content to let the matter rest. Any threat to the Air Ministry's existence had long since passed, budgetary constraint, and the reluctance to engage in another battle which would waste resources were also factors in the Air Ministry's decision not to contest the issue further. However, inter-Service squabbling assured maritime aviation's stagnation, especially in shore-based elements. Virtually no co-operation existed in the area of research and development.^[59] In the case of Coastal Command, it continued to come third in the Air Ministry's list of priorities, after Fighter and Bomber Commands, well into the late 1930s.^[60][61]

Second World War

Main article: RAF Coastal Command during World War II

Early war

From its formation in 1936 the Command did not receive the support it required to be an effective naval air service. In September 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland beginning the war in Europe. The Command's position was comfortable for the first nine months of the war, the period known as the Phoney War. German submarines were not able to reach the Atlantic unless they undertook a dangerous transit journey through the North Sea and around Britain's northern waters, or through the English Channel, which was guarded by the Royal and French Navies. The powerful French Navy was responsible for covering half of the Atlantic shipping routes, and thus contributed half of the Allied forces available.^[62]

However, the events of April to June 1940 overturned the balance of power, as the Germans conquered Denmark, Norway, The Netherlands, Belgium and France. This allowed the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to operate from French ports on the Atlantic coast, much closer to the Atlantic shipping lanes.^[63] It also put German air power within range of Britain's ports on all of its coasts. The advantage now enjoyed by the Germans allowed them to inflict heavy losses to merchant shipping supplying food and war materials to Britain, potentially threatening to starve Britain. While merchant shipping was suffering these high losses, Coastal Command had proven ineffective at countering air or sea attacks on Allied shipping.^[64] In particular, it was ineffective at protecting English Channel convoys, which were forced to abandon operations for a few months, starting in July 1940. RAF Fighter Command was given the task, as it enjoyed the majority of RAF resources at the time. The strategic air attack and defence predominated in the RAF, despite the warning signs of 1914 to 1918, that U-Boats were going to become a main opponent again, and aircraft were a suitable counter to their operationsa. Coastal Command became the "Cinderella service" until 1943.^[65]

The situation would not improve until 1942.^[66] In the meantime, however, Coastal Command did operate with effect alongside RAF Bomber Command in disrupting enemy shipping during the Battle of Britain in 1940. Coastal Command attacked shipping and mined waters around invasion ports. The German amphibious invasion of Britain in 1940, Operation Sea Lion, was eventually cancelled owing to the German defeat in the Battle of Britain.^[67]

During the first three years of the Second World War, Coastal Command and the Admiralty fought a continuous battle with the RAF and Air Ministry over the primacy of trade defence in relation to the bomber effort against mainland Germany, a strategic tussle which conceivably could have cost the Western Alliance the Battle of the Atlantic. The Air Staff and Bomber Command enjoyed the backing of Churchill and the maritime air effort struggled to receive the recognition it needed. On the outbreak of war, the order of battle listed just 298 aircraft, of which only 171 were operational.^[68]

Owing to the starvation of resources, even as late as March 1943 the Atlantic supply lines were being threatened. This situation arose as a direct result of the lack of very long-range aircraft. Despite the enormous losses of the disastrous 1940–1942 period, known to the Germans as the "First" and "Second Happy Time", the Air Ministry refused to invest in trade defence. Further delays in resource procurement might have led to German success, which could have defeated Britain and forced it out of the war, or at least caused a postponement of Operation Torch, the American-led landing in northwest Africa and Operation Overlord, the landing in France in 1942 and 1944.^[69][70] Other research indicates that losses unquestionably affected the build-up for Operation Neptune, the actual landing phase of the invasion of Europe.^[71]

Mid and later war

Eventually the Command was given the investment it needed. Radar and long-range aircraft enabled the Command to hunt down and destroy U-boats with growing efficiency.^[72] German submarines had been sinking a large number of Allied ships in the Atlantic Gap, which was a stretch of water in the central Atlantic beyond the range of most Allied aircraft. The covering of the gap by long-range aircraft equipped with radar helped reduce the effectiveness of U-boats.^[73] In May 1943 the campaign reached a peak, when a large number of U-boats were sunk with little loss to Allied shipping. During this time Coastal Command gained the initiative.^[74] It was known by the Germans as Black May. Thereafter the suppression of German submarines was made not only in the Atlantic, but also in their transit routes through the Bay of Biscay in 1942, 1943 and 1944.^[75] In June 1944 the Normandy landings and subsequent Operation Overlord liberated France and cost the Germans their air and submarine bases, won in 1940. The U-boats were thus forced to relocate to Norway and Germany in August, restoring the many of the difficulties faced by the Kriegsmarine in 1939 and early 1940.^[76][77]The entire strategic position, which had been the foundation of the U-Boat war since June 1940 had been undermined.^[78]

In the last three years of the war, Coastal Command sank more U-boats than any other service and continued to hold the technological advantage from 1943 onwards. A brief threat, in the shape of the German Type XXI submarine emerged, but was too late to alter the course of events.^[79] It was not until midnight, on the 4 June 1945 when official wartime operations ceased. The last mission was flown by Wing Commander J. Barret DFC, GOC No. 201 Squadron RAF. By that time over 2,000 decorations had been awarded. These included four Victoria Crosses, 17 George Medals, and 82 Distinguished Service Orders.^[80]

Cold War

Beginnings

A Neptune MR.1 of 217 Sqn Coastal Command RAF in 1953

The capitulation of Germany in May 1945 was followed by a rapid rundown of Coastal Command with the immediate disbandment of combat units and the transfer of aircraft to the RAF Transport Command. Commonwealth personnel were also sent back home and the powerful Bristol Beaufighter and de Havilland Mosquito wings were decimated.^[81] The Command still maintained strong Air-sea-rescue and reconnaissance forces but its ASW was lopsided. With a few exceptions, only a handful of Squadrons with ASW aircraft remained by January 1946.^[82]

While the command retained a minimum peacetime force and the Air Ministry had every intention of maintaining it as such , the fleet was further reduced and suffered from procurement problems. The Short Shetland and Short Seaford were rejected as replacements for the B-24 Liberator. A maritime version of the promising Avro Lincoln had yet to be ordered by the time the lend lease program ended in August 1945. The Short Sunderland was forced to continue as the main operational type until the end of 1946. Most of the aircraft that operated in the command were the Second World War types; the Spitfire, Lancaster, Mosquito and Beaufighter.^[83]

The command was kept busy in the late 1940s. Units were sent to the Middle East and Palestine as part of an air policing policy, in cooperation with the Israeli Air Force and Egyptian Air Force to prevent conflict between the two countries owing to the formation of the state of Israel in 1948. While there, they undertook a major operation, Operation Bobcat, to prevent floods of illegal Jewish immigrants coming into Israel.^[84] In May 1948 the variety of aircraft was reduced despite increasing demand for operations. In May Palestinian terrorists and their supporters began attacking British military installations throughout the region. In the largest British post-war action, Operation Dawn (13 to 14 May 1948) was launched with the support of Coastal Command. ^[85]

On 28 June 1948 Coastal Command was also involved in the Berlin Airlift. The Soviet Union attempted to cut off all aid to the city which was jointly occuppied by the four major powers; the Soviets in the east, and the Americans, French and British in the west. The joint American-British operation continued for almost a year. Coastal Command aircraft were involved as flying boats were the only aircraft with internal anti-corrosion treatment allowing bulk salt to be transported. The Command's operations grew in intensity. By 13 July, daily sorties had risen to 16. By October it was 214 sorties (other RAF Commands were also flying in supplies). The flying boats made their flight in using the Elbe river, but these operations came to a close on 14 December 1948, when the hazard from uncharted sandbanks and wreckage, which, in some cases had been deliberately placed there by the Soviets to prevent the Western Allies from supplying the city, made operations impractical. Over 1,000 sorties had been made, and 4,500 tons of supplies were flown in and 1,113 people, mainly children, evacuated.^[86]

Soviet threat

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) began preparations for a military defence of Western Europe by incorporating most West European nations into a defence pact against Soviet aggression in April 1951. The led to the militarisation of West Germany in 1955 and was met with the militarisation of East Germany soon after, and its merger into the Warsaw Pact alliance with the Soviet Union. The purpose of Coastal Command was to help bolster the defence and guard against a potential Soviet naval threat in Altantic and European waters.

Avro Shackleton, the mainstay of Coastal Command in the 1950s.

For Coastal Command the main concern was the Atlantic. On 1 March 1950 it had lost the photo reconnaissance units to RAF Bomber Command. The transfer was not complete when North Korea invaded South Korea beginning the Korean War. The Handley Page Hastings was hastily modified and ready for operations but were not sent, owing to the need for ASW aircraft in the Eastern Atlantic.^[87]

The Avro Shackleton was the main operational aircraft 1950s, replacing the wartime Liberator GRs, along with the Neptune MR.1s. At the end of August 1951, No. 201 Squadron RAF became the first unit to complete training on the type.^[88] In mid-1953, Coastal Commands order of Battle consisted of eight Shackleton Squadrons; one at Gibraltar, four covering the South West Approaches in the Atlantic, and three more covering the North Western Approaches. This force numbered 64 aircraft. A further four Sunderland Squadrons numbering 20 aircraft were split between the North and South West Approaches. The Neptune Squadrons, numbering 32 aircraft in four Squadrons, covered the North East and Eastern Approaches. The Helicopter also joined Coastal Command. Bristol Sycamores entered service in 1953 and 16 aircraft were dispersed in Britain for ASW. In March, the Avro Lancaster was finally phased out of Coastal Command service.^[89]

The Command was too expensive to maintain and cost cuts were made during the 1950s which caused a reduction in strength. By mid-1957, the Command had been cut to 82 aircraft. By mid-1958 it had shrunk to just 67. The Shackletons dominated the core of this force numbering 54 aircraft. The Neptune was cut from the service altogether, beginning on 31 August 1956.^[90] There was little operational action for the Command at this point. It airlifted British Army forces into Egypt during the Suez Crisis which its major action during this period. The lack of funds and any active conventional military role saw the Command struggle to keep its frontline strength high.^[91] There was a brief alert in October 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis and all six Squadrons it then possessed were but on high alert. But nothing came of the crisis.^[92]

In the early 1960s the Soviet Navy and Communist Block's fishing fleets began operating around the British Isles in increasing numbers. The British public began taking an interest in their operations as civilian fisherman began complaining about their presence. Operation Chacewater began, in which Coastal Command began monitoring their movements, in particular other vessels that loitered in areas covering the arrival and departure routes for Royal Navy nuclear submarine forces. Soon after, counter operations such as Operation Adjutant were carried out, which was aimed at searching for Soviet submarines.^[93] The main threat from the Soviets in the Atlantic came from the Soviet Northern Fleet and in early 1965 most of the Command's units were concentrated in No. 18 Group RAF, based in Scotland to monitor their activities. No recorded confrontation took place between Coastal Command and Soviet naval forces during this time.^[94]

In 1969 the special-purpose Hawker-Siddeley Nimrod, based on the de Havilland Comet airliner, was introduced into RAF service and Coastal Command duties were passed on to general squadrons. The Nimrod was a replacement for Shackleton and it began to do so on 2 October 1969. However, under eight weeks later, Coastal Command was disbanded and ceased to exist on 27 November 1969, when it was subsumed into RAF Strike Command.^[95]

Organisation

Main article: Coastal Command Orders of Battle

Commanders in Chief

Frederick Bowhill was the longest serving C-in-C, serving three years and ten months.

The following persons commanded the service:^[96]

Name	From	To
Air Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore	14 July 1936	1 September 1936
Air Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté	1 September 1936	18 August 1937
Air Marshal Sir Frederick Bowhill	18 August 1937	14 June 1941
Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferté	14 June 1941	5 February 1943
Air Marshal Sir John Slessor	5 February 1943	20 January 1944
Air Chief Marshal Sir William Sholto Douglas	20 January 1944	30 June 1945
Air Marshal Sir Leonard Slatter	30 June 1945	1 November 1948
Air Marshal Sir John Baker	1 November 1948	1 January 1950
Air Marshal Sir Charles Steele	1 January 1950	8 June 1951
Air Marshal Sir Alick Stevens	8 June 1951	8 November 1953
Air Marshal Sir John Boothman	15 November 1953	5 April 1956
Air Marshal Sir Brian Reynolds	5 April 1956	1 June 1959
Air Marshal Sir Edward Chilton	1 June 1959	10 August 1962
Air Marshal Sir Anthony Selway	10 August 1962	22 January 1965
Air Marshal Sir Paul Holder	22 January 1965	2 September 1968
Air Marshal Sir John Lapsley	2 September 1968	28 November 1968

Depiction in film

The work of Coastal Command was immortalised in a 1942 wartime propaganda documentary named Coastal Command with a score by Ralph Vaughan Williams.^[97]

References

Citations

1. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 13.
2. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 222.
3. ^ Saunders and Richards 1975, pp. 72–79.
4. ^ Hendrie 2006, p. 60.
5. ^ Bowyer 1979, p.43.
6. ^ ^{a b} Hendrie 2006, p. 179.
7. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 353.
8. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 179.
9. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 35.
10. ^ Goulter 1995, pp. 2–3.
11. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 3.
12. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 8.
13. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 9.
14. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 46.
15. ^ Bowyer 1979, p. 157.
16. ^ de La Ferte 1960, p. 78.
17. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 57.
18. ^ de la Ferté 1960, p. 37.
19. ^ Buckley 1998, pp. 58–59.
20. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 14.
21. ^ Bowyer 1976, p. 10.
22. ^ de la Ferté 1960, pp. 38, 44, 46, 75.
23. ^ Buckley 1995, pp. 16–17.
24. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 17.
25. ^ de la Ferté 1960, pp. 39–40.
26. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 17.
27. ^ de la Ferté 1960, pp. 39–40.
28. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 58.
29. ^ Buckley 1995, pp. 17–18.
30. ^ Bowyer 1979, pp. 14–15.
31. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 71.
32. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 41.
33. ^ Hyde 1977, p. 137.
34. ^ Franklin 2003, p. 103.
35. ^ Buckley 1995, pp. 92–93.
36. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 34.
37. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 36.
38. ^ Hyde 1977, pp. 137–138.
39. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 97.
40. ^ de la Ferté 1960, pp. 74–75.
41. ^ de la Ferté 1960, p. 72.
42. ^ Goulter 1995, pp. 38–40.
43. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 93.
44. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 79.
45. ^ Terraine 1989, pp. 181–182.
46. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 38, 92.
47. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 48.
48. ^ de la Ferté 1960, p. 108.
49. ^ Hyde 1977. pp. 385–386.
50. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 76.
51. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 77.
52. ^ Buckley 1995, p. 101.
53. ^ de la Ferté 1960, p. 109.
54. ^ Terraine 1989, pp. 176–177.
55. ^ Hendrie 2006, p. 64.
56. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 64–65.
57. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 91.
58. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 92.
59. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 53.
60. ^ Goulter 1995, p. 57.
61. ^ Goutler 1995, p. 90.
62. ^ Milner 2005, p. 40.
63. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 60, 74.
64. ^ Hendrie 2006, p. 69.
65. ^ Hewitt 2009, p. 39-41.
66. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 103-104.
67. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 28.
68. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 18.
69. ^ Buckley 1995, pp. 115–116.
70. ^ Terraine 1989, p. 612.
71. ^ Leighton in Blumenson & Greenfield 1984, pp. 199–224.
72. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 68-69.
73. ^ Hendrie 2006, p. 116.
74. ^ Hendrie 2006, p. 68.
75. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 77-78, 113-114.
76. ^ Hendrie 2006, pp. 121-122.
77. ^ Hessler 1989, p. 83.
78. ^ Terraine 1989, p. 632.
79. ^ Buckley 1998, p. 136.
80. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 147.
81. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 196.
82. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 196-199.
83. ^ Ashworth 1992, pp. 196-199.
84. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 200.
85. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 202.
86. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 202.
87. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 204.
88. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 204.
89. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 204, 207.
90. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 210.
91. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 212.
92. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 218.
93. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 219.
94. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 220.
95. ^ Ashworth 1992, p. 222.
96. ^ Ashworth 1992, pp. 223–225.
97. ^ Coastal Command at the Internet Movie Database

Bibliography

• Ashworth, Chris. RAF Coastal Command: 1936–1969. Patrick Stephens Ltd. 1992. ISBN 1-85260-345-3.
• Blumenson, Martin & Greenfield, Ken. Command Decisions. United States Government Printing. 1984. ISBN 978-0160019128.
• Buckley, John. The RAF and Trade Defence, 1919–1945: Constant Endeavour. Ryburn Publishing. 1995. ISBN 1-85331-069-7.
• Buckley, John. Air Power in the Age of Total War. UCL Press. 1998. ISBN 1-85728-589-1.
• Blair, Clay. Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters 1939–1942. Cassel & Co. 1996. ISBN 0-304-35260-8.
• Blair, Clay. Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunted 1942–1945. Cassel & Co. 1996. ISBN 0-304-35261-6.
• Bowyer, Chaz. Coastal Command at War. Shepperton, Surrey, UK: Ian Allan Ltd., 1979. ISBN 0-7110-0980-5.
• Corum, James. The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940. Kansas University Press. 1997. ISBN 9780700608362.
• de la Ferté, Philiip Joubert. The Birds and the Fishes: The Story of Coastal Command. Hutchinson. 1960. (No ISBN) OCLC 223965469.
• Delve, Ken. The Source Book of the RAF. Shrewsbury, Shropshire, UK: Airlife Publishing Ltd., 1994. ISBN 1-85310-451-5.
• Forczyk, Robert. Fw 200 Condor Vs Atlantic Convoys, 1941–1943. Osprey Publications. 2010. ISBN 978-1-84603-917-1.
• Goulter, Christina. A Forgotten Offensive: Royal Air Force Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940–1945. Frank & Cass. London. 2005. ISBN 0-714-64147-2.
• Hendrie, Andrew. The Cinderella Service: RAF Coastal Command 1939–1945. Pen & Sword Aviation. 2006. ISBN 978-1-84415-346-6.
• Hewitt, Nick. Coastal Convoys 1939-1945: The Indestructible Highway. Pen & Sword Maritime, London. ISBN 978-1844158614
• Hyde, H. Montgomery. British Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918–1939. Heineman 1977. ISBN 434 -47983-7.
• Kessler, Gunther. German Naval History: U-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939-45. Ministry of Defence, Stationery Office Books. London. 1989. ISBN 978-0117726031
• March, Daniel J. British Warplanes of World War II. Rochester, Kent, UK: Grange Books, 1998. ISBN 1-84013-391-0.
• Milner, Marc. Battle of the Atlantic. NPI Media Group, London. 2005. ISBN 978-0752433325
• Nesbit, Roy Conyers. Coastal Command in Action, 1939–1945. Budding Books. 2000 (2nd Edition). ISBN 1-84015-112-9.
• Rawlings, John D.R. Coastal, Support and Special Squadrons of the RAF and their Aircraft. London, Jane's Publishing Company Ltd., 1982. ISBN 0-7106-0187-5.
• Saunders, Hilary Aidan St. George and Denis Richards. Royal Air Force, 1939–1945. Volume III: The Fight is Won. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975. ISBN 0-11771-594-8.
• Terraine, John. Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars, 1916–1945. Leo Cooper. London. 1989. ISBN 0-85052-7600.

External links

• Northwood Headquarters – The Coastal Command Era
• Air of Authority – Coastal Command

Preceded by Coastal Area

Coastal Command 1936–1969

Succeeded by Strike Command