Anglo-Persian Oil Company

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was founded in 1908 following the discovery of a large oil field in Masjed Soleiman, Iran. It was the first company to extract petroleum from the Middle East. In 1935 APOC was renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and in 1954 it became the British Petroleum Company (BP), one of the antecedents of the modern BP plc.

The D'Arcy Oil Concession

Exploration and discovery

In 1901 William Knox D'Arcy, a millionaire London socialite, negotiated an oil concession with the Shah Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar of Persia. He assumed exclusive rights to prospect for oil for 60 years in a vast tract of territory including most of Iran. In exchange the Shah received £20,000, an equal amount in shares of D'Arcy's company, and a promise of 16% of future profits.^[1]

D'Arcy hired geologist George Bernard Reynolds to do the prospecting in the Iranian desert. Conditions were extremely harsh: "small pox raged, bandits and warlords ruled, water was all but unavailable, and temperatures often soared past 50°C".^[2] After several years of prospecting, D'Arcy's fortune dwindled away and he was forced to sell most of his rights to a Glasgow-based syndicate, the Burmah Oil Company.

By 1908 having sunk more than £500,000 into their Persian venture and found no oil, D'Arcy and Burmah decided to abandon exploration in Iran. In early May 1908 they sent Reynolds a telegram telling him that they had run out of money and ordering him to "cease work, dismiss the staff, dismantle anything worth the cost of transporting to the coast for re-shipment, and come home." Reynolds delayed following these orders and in a stroke of luck, struck oil shortly after on May 26, 1908.^[3]

Creation of APOC

Burmah Oil Company Ltd. created the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) as a subsidiary and also sold shares to the public.^[4]

Volume production of Persian oil products eventually started in 1913 from a refinery built at Abadan, for its first 50 years the largest oil refinery in the world (see Abadan Refinery). In 1913, shortly before World War I, APOC managers negotiated with a new customer, Winston Churchill, who was then First Lord of the Admiralty. At Churchill's suggestion, and in exchange for secure oil supplies for its ships, the British government injected new capital into the company and, in doing so, acquired a controlling interest in APOC. The British government became de facto hidden power behind the oil company.^[5]

APOC took a 50% share in a new Turkish Petroleum Company organized in 1912 by Calouste Gulbenkian to explore and develop oil resources in the Ottoman Empire. After a hiatus caused by World War I it reformed and struck an immense gusher at Kirkuk, Iraq in 1927, renaming itself the Iraq Petroleum Company.

During this period, Iranian popular opposition to the D'Arcy oil concession and royalty terms whereby Iran only received 16 percent of net profits was widespread. Since industrial development and planning, as well as other fundamental reforms were predicated on oil revenues, the government's lack of control over the oil industry served to accentuate the Iranian Government's misgivings regarding the manner in which APOC conducted its affairs in Iran. Such a pervasive atmosphere of dissatisfaction seemed to suggest that a radical revision of the concession terms would be possible. Moreover, owing to the introduction of reforms that improved fiscal order in Iran, APOC's past practice of cutting off advances in oil royalties when its demands were not met had lost much of its sting.

Renegotiating of terms by Iran

The attempt to revise the terms of the oil concession on a more favourable basis for Iran led to protracted negotiations that took place in Tehran, Lausanne, London and Paris between Abdolhossein Teymourtash, Iran's Minister of Court 1925-32 and its nominal Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Chairman of APOC, John Cadman, spanned 1928-32. The overarching argument for revisiting the terms of the D'Arcy Agreement on the Iranian side was that its national wealth was being squandered by a concession that was granted in 1901 by a previous non-constitutional government forced to agree to inequitable terms under duress. In order to buttress his position in talks with the British, Teymourtash retained the expertise of French and Swiss oil experts.

Iran demanded a revision of the terms whereby Iran would be granted 25% of APOC's total shares. To counter British objections, Teymourtash would state that "if this had been a new concession, the Persian Government would have insisted not on 25 percent but on a 50-50 basis. Teymourtash also asked for a minimum guaranteed interest of 12.5% on dividends from the shares of the company, plus 2s per ton of oil produced. In addition, he specified that the company was to reduce the existing area of the concession. The intent behind reducing the area of the concession was to push APOC operations to the southwest of the country so as to make it possible for Iran to approach and lure non-British oil companies to develop oilfields on more generous terms in areas not part of APOC's area of concession.

Apart from demanding a more equitable share of the profits of the Company, an issue that did not escape Teymourtash's attention was that the flow of transactions between APOC and its various subsidiaries deprived Iran of gaining an accurate and reliable appreciation of APOC's full profits. As such, he demanded that the company register itself in Tehran as well as London, and the exclusive rights of transportation of the oil be cancelled. In fact in the midst of the negotiations in 1930, the Iranian National Consultative Assembly approved a bill whereby APOC was required to pay a 4 percent tax on its prospective profits earned in Iran.

In the face of British prevarication, Iran decided to demonstrate Iranian misgivings by upping the ante. Apart from encouraging the press to draft editorials criticizing the terms of the D'Arcy concession, a delegation consisting of Reza Shah and other political notables and journalists was dispatched to the vicinity of the oilfields to inaugurate a newly constructed road, with instructions that they refrain from visiting the oil installation in an explicit show of protest.

In 1931, Teymourtash who was travelling to Europe to enroll Crown Prince Mohammed Reza Pahlavi at a Swiss boarding school, decided to use the occasion to attempt to conclude the negotiations. According to Cadman, Teymourtash worked feverishly and diligently to resolve all outstanding issues, and succeeded in securing an agreement in principle:

He came to London, he wined and he dined and he spent day and night in negotiating. Many interviews took place. He married his daughter, he put his boy to school [Harrow], he met the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a change took place in our government, and in the midst of all this maze of activities we reached a tentative agreement on the principles to be included in the new document, leaving certain figures and the lump sum to be settled at a later date.

However, while Teymourtash likely believed that after four years of exhaustive and detailed discussions, he had succeeded in navigating the negotiations on the road to a conclusive end; the latest negotiations in London were to prove nothing more than a cul de sac.

Matters came to a head in 1931, when the combined effects of overabundant oil supplies on the global markets and the economic destabilization of the Depression, led to fluctuations which drastically reduced annual payments accruing to Iran to a fifth of what it had received in the previous year. In that year APOC informed the Iranian government that its royalties for the year would amount to a mere £366,782 while in the same period the company's income taxes paid to the British Government amounted to approximately £1,000,000. Furthermore, while the company's profits declined 36 percent for the year, the revenues paid to the Iranian government pursuant to the company's accounting practices decreased by 76 percent. Such a precipitous drop in royalties appeared to confirm suspicions of bad faith, and Teymourtash indicated that the parties would have to revisit negotiations.

However, Reza Shah was soon to assert his authority by dramatically inserting himself into the negotiations. The Monarch attended a meeting of the Council of Ministers in November 1932, and after publicly rebuking Teymourtash for his failure to secure an agreement, dictated a letter to cabinet cancelling the D'Arcy Agreement. The Iranian Government notified APOC that it would cease further negotiations and demanded cancellation of the D'Arcy concession. Rejecting the cancellation, the British government espoused the claim on behalf of APOC and brought the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague, asserting that it regarded itself "as entitled to take all such measures as the situation may demand for the Company's protection." At this point, Hassan Taqizadeh, the new Iranian Minister entrusted with the task of assuming responsibility for the oil dossier, was to intimate to the British the cancellation was simply meant to expedite negotiations and that it would constitute political suicide for Iran to withdraw from negotiations.

After the dispute between the two countries was taken up at the Hague, the Czech Foreign Minister who was appointed mediator put the matter into abeyance to allow the contending parties to attempt to resolve the dispute. Ironically, Reza Shah who had stood firm in demanding the abolishment of the D'Arcy concession, suddenly acquiesced to British demands, much to the chagrin and disappointment of his Cabinet. A new agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was agreed to after Cadman visited Iran in April 1933 and was granted a private audience with the Shah. A new agreement was ratified by the National Consultative Assembly on May 28, 1933 and received Royal assent the following day.

1933 agreement

The terms of the new agreement provided for a new 60-year concession. The Agreement reduced the area under APOC control to 100,000 square miles (260,000 km²), required annual payments in lieu of Iranian income tax, as well as guaranteeing a minimum annual payment of £750,000 to the Iranian government. These provisions, while appearing favourable, are widely agreed to have represented a squandered opportunity for the Iranian government. The agreement extended the life of the D'Arcy concession by an additional 32 years, negligently allowed APOC to select the best 100,000 square miles (260,000 km²), the minimum guaranteed royalty was far too modest, and in a fit of carelessness the company's operations were exempted from import or customs duties. Finally, Iran surrendered its right to annul the agreement, and settled on a complex and tediously elaborate arbitration process to settle any disagreements that would arise.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company continued its large Persian operations although it changed its name to the AIOC in 1935. By 1950 Abadan had become the world's largest refinery. In spite of diversification the AIOC still relied heavily on its Iranian oil fields for three-quarters of its supplies, and controlled all oil in Iran.

Nationalisation and coup

Discontent in Iran

By 1951 Iranian support for nationalisation of the AIOC was intense. Grievances included the small fraction of revenues Iran received. In 1947, for example, AIOC reported after-tax profits of £40 million ($112 million) - and gave Iran just £7 million.^[6]

Conditions for Iranian oil workers and their families were very bad. The director of Iran's Petroleum Institute wrote that

Wages were 50 cents a day. There was no vacation pay, no sick leave, no disability compensation. The workers lived in a shanty town called Kaghazabad, or Paper City, without running water or electricity, ... In winter the earth flooded and became a flat, perspiring lake. The mud in town was knee-deep, and ... when the rains subsided, clouds of nipping, small-winged flies rose from the stagnant water to fill the nostrils .... Summer was worse. ... The heat was torrid ... sticky and unrelenting - while the wind and sandstorms shipped off the desert hot as a blower. The dwellings of Kaghazabad, cobbled from rusted oil drums hammered flat, turned into sweltering ovens. ... In every crevice hung the foul, sulfurous stench of burning oil .... in Kaghazad there was nothing - not a tea shop, not a bath, not a single tree. The tiled reflecting pool and shaded central square that were part of every Iranian town, ... were missing here. The unpaved alleyways were emporiums for rats.^[7]

Under the 1933 agreement with Reza Shah, AIOC had promised to give laborers better pay and more chance for advancement, build schools, hospitals, roads and telephone system. It had not done so.^[6]

In May 1949 Britain had offered a "Supplemental oil agreement" which guaranteed royalty payments would not drop below £4 million, reduced the area in which it would be allowed to drill, and promised more Iranians would be trained for administrative positions." The agreement, however, gave Iran no "greater voice in company's management" or right to audit the company books. When the Iranian Prime Minister tried to dicker with AIOC head Sir William Fraser. Fraser "dismissed him" and flew back to the UK.^[8]

In late December 1950 word reached Tehran that the American-owned Arabian American Oil Company had agreed to share profits with Saudis on a 50-50 basis. The UK Foreign Office rejected the idea of any similar agreement for AIOC.^[9]

By now expressions of Iranian anger against lack of support for nationalization included a distinct lack of mourning following the assassination of anti-nationalization prime minister Haj Ali Razmara,^[10] and a raucous walkout of protest by newspaper reporters when a visiting American diplomat urged 'reason as well as enthusiasm' to deal with the British embargo of Iran.^[11]

Nationalisation

In March 1951, the Iranian parliament (the Majlis) voted to nationalise the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and its holdings, and shortly thereafter elected a widely respected statesman and champion of nationalisation, Mohammed Mossadegh, Prime Minister.^[12] This led to the Abadan Crisis where foreign countries refused to take Iranian oil under British pressure and the Abadan refinery was closed. AIOC withdrew from Iran and increased output of its other reserves in the Persian Gulf.

Mossadeq broke off negotiations with AIOC in July 1951 when the AIOC threatened to pull its employees out of Iran and warned tanker owners that "the receipts from the Iranian government would not be accepted on the world market."^[13] The British ratcheted up the pressure on the Iranian government and explored the possibility of an invasion to occupy the oil area. US President Harry S. Truman and US ambassador to Iran Henry F. Grady opposed intervention in Iran but needed Britain's support for the Korean War. Efforts by the U.S. through the International Court of Justice were made to settle the dispute, but a 50/50 profit-sharing arrangement, with recognition of nationalization, was rejected by both the British government and Prime Minister Mossadegh.

As the months went on, the crisis became acute. By mid-1952, an attempt by the Shah to replace Mossadegh backfired and led to riots nationwide; Mossadegh returned with even greater power. At the same time however, his coalition was "fraying," as Britain’s boycott of Iranian oil eliminated a major source of government revenue, and made Iranians "poorer and unhappier by the day."^[14]

Coup

Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état

By 1953 both the US and the UK had new, more anti-communist and interventionist administrations and the United States no longer opposed intervention in Iran. Britain was unable to subvert Mossadegh as its embassy and officials had been evicted from Iran in October 1952, but successfully appealed in the U.S. to anti-communist sentiments, depicting both Mossadegh and Iran as unstable and likely to fall to communism in their weakened state. If Iran fell, the "enormous assets" of "Iranian oil production and reserves" would fall into Communist control, as would "in short order the other areas of the Middle East".^[15] In August the American CIA with the help of bribes to politicians, soldiers, mobs, and newspapers, and contacts/information from the British embassy and secret service, organized a coup. The Shah issued an edict removing Mosaddeq from power and General Fazlollah Zahedi led tanks to Mosaddeq's residence forcing him from office.

Consortium

With the new pro-Western Prime Minister, Fazlollah Zahedi, Iranian oil began flowing again and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which later changed its name to British Petroleum, tried to return to its old position. However, "public opinion was so opposed that the new government could not permit it." Instead, an international consortium under the nationalised name (National Iranian Oil Company) was created, with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company holding 40% of the shares. The consortium agreed to share profits on a 50-50 basis with Iran, "but not to open its books to Iranian auditors or to allow Iranians onto its board of directors."^[16]

Subsidiary companies

Scottish Oils Ltd

Scottish Oils Ltd (owned by Anglo-Persian) was a producer of shale oil. It was formed between 1918 and 1920 by the merger of five smaller Scottish oil shale companies: Youngs, Broxburn, Pumpherston, Oakbank and Philpstoun.^[17][18][19] Shale oil production in Scotland ceased in the early 1960s but there was an unsuccessful attempt to revive it in 1973.^[20] The company still exists^[21] but is no longer in the shale oil business.

Tanker fleet

The British Tanker Company Limited (BTC) was formed in 1915, after the Anglo-Persian Oil Company decided to become a fully self-contained operation, directly owning a fleet of tankers for sea transport. On formation, the BTC had an initial budget of $144,000 with which to build seven steam-powered tankers. The Company’s first tanker was the British Emperor, which was launched in 1916. The names of the first seven ships, and all later additions to the fleet, bore the prefix ‘British’. Over the next decade, the demand for oil grew throughout the developed world, and the BTC expanded accordingly. By 1924, the fleet numbered 60 ships, with the 60th being the flagship, 10,762 deadweight tonnes (dwt), British Aviator. She was the BTC’s first diesel engine oil tanker, and at that time was the most powerful single-screw motor ship in the world.

The economic depression of the early 1930s saw rising unemployment amongst merchant navies around the world. However, the BTC undertook a series of strategic mergers, and coupled with the continued support of the Shah of Iran, the APOC succeeded in strengthening its position within the industry. In 1939, the British government chartered the whole fleet of 93 tankers to supply fuel to its armed forces during the Second World War. The fleet lost a total of 42 ships sunk during the war.

Within a year of peace in 1945, the BTC fleet had returned to its pre-war total of 93 vessels. The recovery continued with the building of 57 new tankers, each 12,000 dwt, which increased the tonnage of oil transported from Abadan refinery in Iran, whilst remaining light enough for the tankers to pass through the shallow waters of the Suez Canal.

In 1951, however, the situation changed dramatically, when the Iranian oil industry was nationalised, and the APOC removed all its staff from Iran.

See also

• Anglo-Persian Agreement
• Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran
• National Iranian Oil Company
• Abadan Crisis timeline
• 1953 Iranian coup d'état
• Mohammad Mossadegh
• Hossein Fatemi
• Dariush Forouhar
• Operation Ajax
• Abdolhossein Teymourtash
• John Cadman, 1st Baron Cadman

References

1. ^ Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.48
2. ^ Longhurst, Henry, Adventures in Oil: the story of British Petroleum, London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 1959, p.21
3. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), pp.48-9
4. ^ Michael Gasson (Former Group Archivist, BP Archive). "Home: The BP Archive". Business History Links: Business Archives:. Association of Business Historians (abh). Archived from the original on 2007-02-10. http://web.archive.org/web/20070210043340/http://www.busman.qmul.ac.uk/abh/archive5.htm. Retrieved 2007-06-09. 
5. ^ "From Anglo-Persian Oil to BP Amoco" August 11, 1998 BBC
6. ^ ^{a b} Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.67
7. ^ (quoted in Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.67. source: Farmanfarmaian, Manucher, Blood and Oil: Inside the Shah's Iran, Modern Library, 1999, p.184-5 (Manucher Farmanfarmaian became director of Iran's petroleum institute in 1949)
8. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.68
9. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.76
10. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.78-80
11. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men, (2003), p.106
12. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (1982), pp.55-6
13. ^ Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions (1982), p.268
14. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), pp.135-6
15. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), p.158
16. ^ Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003), pp.195-6
17. ^ http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=PduotC73nh0C&pg=PA177&lpg=PA177&dq=%22Scottish+Oils+Ltd%22&source=web&ots=aqTFGGPn_b&sig=Enj0GAgWl3geT9h83D8oss_xe9s&hl=en
18. ^ http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=j_Yty5JG4uIC&pg=PT175&lpg=PT175&dq=%22Scottish+Oils+Ltd%22&source=web&ots=HViM0451zD&sig=BUGtroGLm9dEQ2TY2RrGCJT3i90&hl=en
19. ^ Uphall On The Web - Scottish Oils
20. ^ Shale Oil Industry (Scotland) (Hansard, 4 December 1973)
21. ^ WebCHeck - Select and Access Company Information