CIA activities in Afghanistan

Main article: CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan, War in Afghanistan (disambiguation), and Inter-Services Intelligence#Afghanistan Undated

See also: CIA transnational anti-crime and anti-drug activities#Southwest Asia

Since the 1970s, the CIA has engaged in multiple operations in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan 1973

Roger Morris, a former Foreign Service Officer and National Security Council staff member under presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, writing in the Asia Times, argues that as early as 1973-74, the CIA began offering covert backing to Islamic radical rebels in Afghanistan premised on the claim that the right-wing, authoritarian government headed by Mohammed Daoud Khan, might prove a likely instrument of Soviet military aggression in South Asia. Morris argues that this premise was without basis in fact; Daoud had always held the Russians, his main patron when it came to aid, at arm's length, and had purged local communists who supported him when he overthrew the Afghan monarchy in 1973. The Soviets had also shown no inclination to use the notoriously unruly Afghans and their army for any expansionist aim.^[1] Morris claims that during this period U.S. foreign policy leaders saw the Soviets as always being "on the march." U.S. secret backing of radical Islamic rebels ceased following an abortive rebel uprising in 1975.^[1]

Afghanistan 1978

See also: Soviet war in Afghanistan

One of the American intelligence community's biggest operations and initially considered a major success was the funding of the Mujahedeen (Islamist fighters) in Afghanistan and their training, arming, and supplying. The program was initiated under President Jimmy Carter and greatly expanded following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Under Reagan funding reached levels of $600 million/year.

Roger Morris, writing in the Asia Times, states that in April 1978, the crackdown by the regime of Daoud on Afghanistan's small Communist Party provoked a successful coup by Communist Party loyalists in the army. The coup occurred in defiance of a skittish Moscow, which had stopped earlier coup plans^{[citation needed]}.

According to Morris, by autumn 1978, an Islamic insurgency, armed and planned by the U.S., Pakistan, Iran and China, and soon to be actively supported, at Washington's prodding, by the Saudis and Egyptians, was fighting in eastern Afghanistan. The Black Book of Communism instead puts the blame on the Soviet Union who feared that Afghanistan was escaping its domination. There was little Muslim extremism before the Communist coup. After the coup, according to the Black Book, several anti-religion campaigns by the Communist regime, as well as the harsh repressions, soon caused a fierce insurgency.

Afghanistan 1979

Further information: Operation Cyclone

Intelligence analysis

The CIA National Foreign Assessment Center completed work on a report entitled "Afghanistan: Ethnic Divergence and Dissidence" in May 1979, although it was not formally published until March 1980. It is not known if the information was readily available to policymakers at the time of the December 1979 invasion.^[2]

Tribal insurgency, according to this report, began in 1978, with the installation of a pro-Soviet government. Even though the government tilted toward the Soviet Union, the analysis said that many tribal groups, especially Uzbek, saw the government as ethnically Pashtun, with hostility on ethnic and political grounds.

Covert action

President Carter reacted with "open-mouthed shock" to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and began promptly arming the Afghan insurgents.^[3] Vice-President Walter Mondale famously declared: "I cannot understand -- it just baffles me -- why the Soviets these last few years have behaved as they have. Maybe we have made some mistakes with them. Why did they have to build up all these arms? Why did they have to go into Afghanistan? Why can't they relax just a little bit about Eastern Europe? Why do they try every door to see if it is locked?"^[4] The Soviets, several times shortly before the invasion, had staged conversations with the Afghan leadership suggesting that they had no desire to intervene, even as the Politburo was—with much hesitation—considering such an intervention. Though some have argued that US financial assistance to Afghan dissidents, including Islamists and other militants, prior to the invasion; along with a Soviet desire to protect the leftist Afghan government, helped convince the Soviets to intervene, the Sovietts ironically brutally murdered the Afghan President and his son, replacing him with a puppet regime, immediately after the invasion for fear that the US had secretly been collaborating with him.^[5]

One of the CIA's longest and most expensive covert operations was the supplying of billions of dollars in arms to the Afghan mujahideen militants.^[6] The CIA provided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through the Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. Somewhere between $3–$20 billion in U.S. funds were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons.

According to the "Progressive South Asia Exchange Net," claiming to cite an article in Le Nouvel Observateur, U.S. policy, unbeknownst even to the Mujahideen, was part of a larger strategy of aiming "to induce a Soviet military intervention."^[7] The article includes a brief interview with Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in which he is quoted as saying that the US provided aid to the mujahideen prior to the Soviet invasion in order to delibrately provoke one. Brzezinski himself has denied the accuracy of the interview.^[8] According to Brzezinski, an NSC working group on Afghanistan wrote several reports on the deteriorating situation in 1979, but President Carter ignored them until the Soviet intervention destroyed his illusions. Brzezinski has stated that the US provided communications equipment and limited financial aid to the mujahideen prior to the "formal" invasion, but only in response to the Soviet deployment of forces to Afghanistan and the 1978 coup, and with the intention of preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region.^[8] Two declassified documents signed by Carter shortly before the invasion do authorize the provision "unilaterally or through third countries as appropriate support to the Afghan insurgents either in the form of cash or non-military supplies" and the "worldwide" distribution of "non-attributable propaganda" to "expose" the leftist Afghan government as "despotic and subservient to the Soviet Union" and to "publicize the efforts of the Afghan insurgents to regain their country's sovereignty," but the records also show that the provision of arms to the rebels did not begin until 1980.^[9][10]

The Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 significantly damaged the already tenuous relationship between Secretary of State Vance and Brzezinski. Vance felt that Brzezinski's linkage of SALT to other Soviet activities and the MX, together with the growing domestic criticisms in the United States of the SALT II Accord, convinced Brezhnev to decide on military intervention in Afghanistan. Brzezinski, however, later recounted that he repeatedly advanced proposals on how to maintain Afghanistan's "independence" and deter a Soviet invasion but was frustrated by the Department of State's opposition.

According to Eric Alterman of The Nation, Cyrus Vance's close aide Marshall Shulman "insists that the State Department worked hard to dissuade the Soviets from invading and would never have undertaken a program to encourage it" and President Carter has said it was definitely "not my intention" to inspire a Soviet invasion but to deter one.^[11] Bob Gates, in his book Out Of The Shadows, wrote that Pakistan had actually been "pressuring" the United States for arms to aid the rebels for years, but that the Carter administration refused in the hope of finding a diplomatic solution to avoid war. Brzezinski seemed to have been in favor of the provision of arms to the rebels, while Vance's State Department, seeking a peaceful settlement, publicly accused Brzezinski of seeking to "revive" the Cold War. Gates, however, has questioned if the US financial aid did increase the chances of the Soviets intervening, writing that some CIA officers involved assumed that that was President Carter's intention.

The Soviet invasion and occupation killed up to 2 million Afghans.^[12] Brzezinski defended the arming of the rebels in response, saying that it "was quite important in hastening the end of the conflict," thereby saving the lives of thousands of Afghans, but "not in deciding the conflict, because actually the fact is that even though we helped the mujaheddin, they would have continued fighting without our help, because they were also getting a lot of money from the Persian Gulf and the Arab states, and they weren't going to quit. They didn't decide to fight because we urged them to. They're fighters, and they prefer to be independent. They just happen to have a curious complex: they don't like foreigners with guns in their country. And they were going to fight the Soviets. Giving them weapons was a very important forward step in defeating the Soviets, and that's all to the good as far as I'm concerned." When he was asked if he thought it was the right decision in retrospect (given the Taliban's subsequent rise to power), he said: "Which decision? For the Soviets to go in? The decision was the Soviets', and they went in. The Afghans would have resisted anyway, and they were resisting. I just told you: in my view, the Afghans would have prevailed in the end anyway, 'cause they had access to money, they had access to weapons, and they had the will to fight." The interviewer then asked: "So US support for the mujaheddin only begins after the Russians invade, not before?" Brzezinski replied: "With arms? Absolutely afterwards. No question about it. Show me some documents to the contrary."^[13] Likewise; Charlie Wilson said: "The U.S. had nothing whatsoever to do with these people's decision to fight ... but we'll be damned by history if we let them fight with stones."^[14] The CIA provided assistance to the fundamentalist insurgents through the Pakistani secret services, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in a program called Operation Cyclone. Somewhere between $3–$20 billion in U.S. funds were funneled into the country to train and equip troops with weapons, including Stinger surface-to-air missiles.^[15]

The early foundations of al-Qaida were built in part on relationships and weaponry that came from the billions of dollars in U.S. support for the Afghan mujahadin during the war to expel Soviet forces from that country.^[16]

Afghanistan 1980

Intelligence analysis

A memorandum spoke of continued tribal rivalries as adding to the resistance to the Soviets.^[17]

Afghanistan 1985

While the actual document has not been declassified, National Security Decision Directive 166 of 27 March 1985, "US Policy, Programs and Strategy in Afghanistan" defined a US policy of using established the US goal of driving Soviet forces from Afghanistan "by all means available", including the provision of Stinger missiles.^[18]

Initially, this involved close cooperation with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence to assist mujahideen groups and in planning operations inside Afghanistan. This cooperation was already in place in 1984, prior to NSDD-166. Indeed, it was evident to residents in Islamabad and Peshawar in the 1980s that large numbers of Americans were present.

Covert action

See also: Reagan Doctrine

However, one of the main features of NSDD-166 was to allow CIA to enter Afghanistan directly and establish its own separate and secret relationships with Afghan fighters.^[19] The funding by ISI and CIA of Afghan anti-Soviet fighters created linkages among Muslim fighters worldwide.^[20]

At first, the US supported the effort cautiously, concerned that the Soviet Union would act against Pakistan. "Some time into the war, however, the US began to take a much more overt position, and US-supplied technology played a key role in defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan 1987

On July 20, 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country was announced pursuant to the negotiations that led to the Geneva Accords of 1988.^[21]

Afghanistan 1989

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1989-1992)

Intelligence analysis

A Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective",^[22] estimated that Najibullah government was "weak, unpopular, and factionalized", but would probably remain in power, with the war at a near impasse. It drew key judgments including:

• The mujahedin hold the military initiative, as long as they stay in the countryside, where government troops do not hinder them and they choose when and where to fight. As long as Soviet supplies continue, they will remain a guerilla force unable to seize major garrisons.
• As an insurgency, regime fragility, mujahedin disunity, and local tribal factors are as important to the outcome as strictly military aspects.
• While there is extensive popular support, the resistance will remain highly factionalized.
• The Afghan Interim Government and most major commanders will refuse direct negotiations with Najibullah, but indirect negotiations are possible.

Pakistan and the USSR remain the most important external powers. Pakistan will continue to support the resistance regardless of who is in power. The Soviets will seek a political settlement while providing massive support. Gorbachev would like to resolve the issue before the US summit next year.

Any of a number of changes in foreign support could break the impasse:

• Cessation of US support to the resistance
• Cessation of Soviet support to the government
• Mutual cuts by the US and USSR would be more harmful to the government

Aid cuts, however, will not stop the fighting.

Covert action

After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, CIA's objective was to topple the government of Mohammad Najibullah, which had been formed under the Soviet occupation, according to author Steve Coll.^[23] Among others, the two main factions that CIA was supporting were:

• Ahmed Shah Massoud, unilaterally.
• Gulbadin Hekmatyar, through the ISI.
• Jalaluddin Haqqani, through the ISI.

According to Coll, during this period of time, there was disagreement between CIA and the U.S. State Department regarding which Afghan factions to support. U.S. State Department Special Envoy to Afghanistan Edmund McWilliams, after numerous tours of the interior of Pakistan, found that Afghan people were unhappy with the Wahhabist-leaning and anti-American Hekmatyar contingent, and recommended pulling back support for fighting in favor of a political settlement involving more of the ex-pat Afghan professional class. In this McWilliams was supported by British Intelligence. CIA station chief Milton Bearden felt that McWilliams was misreading U.S. policy. Bearden did not want to get involved in Afghanistan internal politics, trusted the ISI to establish a stable regime in Afghanistan which was favorable to Pakistan, felt that Afghanistan was historically divided from Pakistan only by a line drawn by the British, and felt that the British didn't know what they were talking about, since they had lost two wars in Afghanistan already. The argument between Bearden and McWilliams in Islamabad was curtailed when Bearden cabled the State Department a "request for curtailment" of duty tour on McWilliams behalf, and McWilliams found himself called away.

Afghanistan 1990

BBC News reported "Al-Qaeda, meaning the base, was created in 1989 as Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan and Osama Bin Laden and his colleagues began looking for new jihads. The organisation grew out of the network of Arab volunteers who had gone to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight under the banner of Islam against Soviet Communism. During the anti-Soviet jihad Bin Laden and his fighters received American and Saudi funding. Some analysts believe Bin Laden himself had security training from the CIA."^[24] a charge denied by American and Pakistan intelligence officials and journalist Peter Bergen. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, has discussed U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in several magazines.^[25][26]

Covert action

The discussion below draws on author Steve Coll's account.^[27]

The policy dispute between CIA's Near East Division and the U.S. State Department, regarding political settlement versus continued fighting in Afghanistan, which was initiated between McWilliams and Bearden in 1989, continues with new protagonists, CIA's Thomas Tweeten and State's new special envoy to the Afghan resistance, Peter Tomsen.^[28]

Civil war develops as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and CIA-supported Gulbadin Hekmatyar seeks to violently eliminate all rivals, including the CIA-supported Ahmed Shah Massoud. In spite of this internecine warfare, ISI and CIA formulate a plan to topple the Najibullah government in a winter offensive on Kabul. As part of this offensive, CIA pays Massoud $500,000, over and above his monthly stipend of $200,000, to close the Salang Highway. Massoud fails to do so, and in consequence, his allowance is reduced to $50,000 per month.

In Spring of 1990, ISI hopes to install Gulbadin Hekmatyar contingent on defeating the Najibullah government. Hekmatyar also acquires millions of dollars in additional funding from Osama bin Laden, thus placing ISI, CIA and bin Laden in joint venture. On March 7, 1990, Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Shahnawaz Tanai attempts a coup, with Tanai, a member of Najibullah's government, orchestrating an attack using Najibullah's own forces against Najibullah's palace, with Hekmatyar's forces to follow up from outside Kabul. The money to buy the loyalty of Najibullah's troops comes in part from Osama bin Laden. This attempt fails.

At the same time, ISI asks "bin Laden for money to bribe legislators to throw Benazir Bhutto out of office". "That winter, then, bin Laden worked with Pakistani intelligence against both Najibullah and Bhutto, the perceived twin enemies of Islam they saw holding power in Kabul and Islamabad", according to author Steve Coll. Regarding the issue of whether bin Laden was acting alone or as an agent of Saudi intelligence, Coll writes (see the concept of plausible deniability):

"Did bin Laden work on the Tanai coup attempt on his own or as a semi-official liaison for Saudi intelligence? The evidence seems thin and inconclusive. Bin Laden was still in good graces with the Saudi government at the time of the Tanai coup attempt; his first explicit break with Prince Turki and the royal family lay months in the future. While the CIA's Afghan informants named bin Laden as a funder of the Hekmatyar-Tanai coup, other accounts named Saudi intelligence as the source of funds. Were these separate funding tracks or the same? None of the reports then or later were firm or definitive. "It was the beginning of a pattern for American intelligence analysts: Whenever bin Laden interacted with his own Saudi government, he seemed to do so inside a shroud."

Note that, in a grand historical coincidence, in the investigation following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27, 2007, Pakistan's Interior Minisry has laid the blame on "Baitullah Mehsud, a Taliban commander who holds sway across a large part of South Waziristan",^[29] i.e. on an Al Queda-linked group, while Bhutto herself, in a letter she wrote prior to her death and subsequent to two prior attempts, laid the blame at the ISI's doorstep. In light of the above, perhaps both assertions are correct.

Afghanistan 1991

According to Human Rights Watch,^[30] there was a dispute, inside the US government, with the State Department on one side, and the CIA and its Pakistani counterpart, ISI, on the other. HRW said The New York Times, in January 1991, said Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt had "battled with [CIA] officials who would like to unleash the guerrillas in Afghanistan in one last effort," while United States Secretary of State James Baker worked to "coax the rebels and the Najibullah regime into democratic elections." In the interview, Kimmitt complained that agency officials were "just bucking policy." In February, as negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained stalled, HRW again cited The New York Times reported that "the [CIA], in a long policy dispute with the State Department that it now appears to be winning, has been arguing that negotiations cannot end the war and that Washington should step up its efforts to help the guerrillas win a military victory."

Since the early 1980s, according to HRW, the ISI and CIA has used their control over the arms pipeline to run the war and favor abusive mujahedin parties, particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's faction, which used U.S.- and Saudi-financed weapons to launch indiscriminate attacks on Afghan cities, killing countless civilians.

Afghanistan 1992

See also: Civil war in Afghanistan (1992-1996) and Civil war in Afghanistan (1996-2001)

Afghanistan 2001

See also: War in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Timeline of the War in Afghanistan (2001-present)

Afghanistan 2006

Intelligence analysis

Speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee in early 2005, Porter Goss^[31] said Afghanistan is on the "road to recovery after decades of instability and civil war. Hamid Karzai's election to the presidency was a major milestone. Elections for a new National Assembly and local district councils—tentatively scheduled for this spring—will complete the process of electing representatives. President Karzai still faces a low-level insurgency aimed at destabilizing the country, raising the cost of reconstruction and ultimately forcing Coalition forces to leave.

"The development of the Afghan National Army and a national police force is going well, although neither can yet stand on its own.

Afghanistan 2009

Forward Operating Base Chapman attack

See also: Forward Operating Base Chapman attack

On December 30, 2009, a suicide attack occurred at Forward Operating Base Chapman, a major CIA base in the province of Khost, Afghanistan. Seven CIA officers, including the chief of the base, were killed and six others seriously wounded in the attack. The attack was the second most deadliest carried out against the CIA, after the 1983 United States Embassy bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, and was a major setback for the intelligence agency's operations.

References

1. ^ ^{a b} Morris, Roger (June 27, 2007), "THE GATES INHERITANCE, Part 3, The World that Bob made", Asia Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IF27Ak02.html, retrieved 2007-12-19 
2. ^ National Foreign Assessment Center, Central Intelligence Agency (1 March 1980), "Afghanistan: Ethnic Diversity and Dissidence", September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified, George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us1.pdf 
3. ^ http://www.slate.com/id/2166661
4. ^ http://www.csmonitor.com/1981/0310/031029.html
5. ^ http://www.zcommunications.org/the-rise-and-rise-of-robert-gates-by-roger-morris
6. ^ Time Magazine, 13 May 2003, "The Oily Americans," http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,450997-2,00.html
7. ^ The interview has been republished by Alexander Cockburn's CounterPunch website, but was first posted online here: http://www.proxsa.org/resources/9-11/Brzezinski-980115-interview.htm The link includes the following citation: "There are at least two editions of this magazine; with the perhaps sole exception of the Library of Congress, the version sent to the United States is shorter than the French version, and the Brzezinski interview was not included in the shorter version. The above has been translated from the French by Bill Blum, author of the indispensible "Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II" and "Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower."
8. ^ ^{a b} “”. "Brzezinski and the Afghan War Pt2". YouTube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGjAsQJh7OM&feature=channel. Retrieved 2010-07-10. 
9. ^ http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1581.jpg
10. ^ http://www.activistmagazine.com/images/stories/government/carter_79-1579.jpg
11. ^ http://www.thenation.com/article/blowback-prequel
12. ^ http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat2.htm#Afghanistan
13. ^ http://www.activistmagazine.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1110&Itemid=143
14. ^ Crile, 259–62.
15. ^ 1986-1992: CIA and British Recruit and Train Militants Worldwide to Help Fight Afghan War, Cooperative Research History Commons, http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a86operationcyclone, retrieved 2007-01-09 
16. ^ William D. Hartung (October 27, 2006). "We Arm The World". TomPaine.com. http://www.tompaine.com/articles/2006/10/27/we_arm_the_world.php. Retrieved 2008-11-21. 
17. ^ Office of Political Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (23 September 1980), "The Soviets and the Tribes of Southwest Asia", September 11 Sourcebooks, Volume II, Afghanistan: Lessons of the Last War. U.S. Analysis of the Soviet War in Afghanistan: Declassified, George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 57, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us2.pdf 
18. ^ Sullivan, Tim; Singer, Matt; Rawson, Jessica, What were policymakers' and intelligence services' respective roles in the decision to deploy Stinger Missiles to the anticommunist Afghan mujahedin during the rebels' struggle with the Soviet Union?, Georgetown University, http://www12.georgetown.edu/students/organizations/nscs/capitalscholar/Fall2006/Soviet%20Union%20and%20Stinger%20Missiles.htm 
19. ^ Coll,Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, pp. 125–128 
20. ^ Pervez Hoodbhoy (17–21 July 2003), "Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad" (^{[dead link]}), 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and Politics, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/53/hoodbhoy.htm 
21. ^ Afghanistan / Pakistan - UNGOMAP - Background United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/ungomap/background.html 
22. ^ Director of Central Intelligence (November 1989), Special National Intelligence Estimate 37-89, "Afghanistan: the War in Perspective", https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-cold-wars-end-us-intelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/16526pdffiles/SNIE11-37-89.pdf 
23. ^ Coll,Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, pp. 190–199 
24. ^ "Al-Qaeda's origins and links", BBC News, 20 July 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1670089.stm, retrieved 2009-12-31 
25. ^ Interview with Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, George Washington University National Security Archive, 13 June 1967, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-17/brzezinski1.html 
26. ^ "The CIA's Intervention in Afghanistan: interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski", Le Nouvel Observateur, 15–21 January 1998, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html 
27. ^ Coll,Steve (2005), Ghost Wars, Penguin, pp. 205–212 
28. ^ "Statement on Afghanistan: In Pursuit of Security and Democracy" by Peter Tomsen, statement to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 16, 2003
29. ^ "Bhutto's party rejects youth's assassination confession" by Declan Walsh, The Guardian, January 21, 2008
30. ^ Human Rights Watch (1991), Afghanistan: Human Rights Watch, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/WR92/ASW-01.htm#P105_37202 
31. ^ Goss, Porter (16 Februarytr 2006), Global Intelligence Challenges 2005, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0503/doc09.htm