CIA activities in Iran

Main article: CIA activities in the Near East, North Africa, South and Southwest Asia

1952

Britain, resentful of the nationalization of Iran's oil industry, came up with the idea for the coup in 1952 and pressed the U.S. to mount a joint operation to remove the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh^[1] and install the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to rule Iran autocratically. Partially due to fear of a Communist overthrow due to increasing influence of the Communist Tudeh party, and partly to gain control of a larger share of Iranian oil supplies, the US agreed. Brigadier General Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr. and CIA guru Kermit Roosevelt, Jr. were ordered to begin a covert operation to overthrow Mossadegh. A complex plot, codenamed Operation Ajax, was conceived and executed from the US Embassy in Tehran. Full details of the operation were released fifty years later, in 2003. Britain, who previously had controlled all of the Iranian oil industry, lost its monopoly and allowed U.S. oil companies to compete in Iran.

1953

Main article: 1953 Iranian coup d'état

The United States and the West backed the Shah's regime. Although it did much to develop the country economically, the Shah's government also repressed political dissent.

1957

CIA help form and train SAVAK, the internal security apparatus of the Shah. CIA provides SAVAK with lists of Communists who the Savak would either imprison or execute.^[2][3]

1975

The CIA worked with the SAVAK to covertly support uprisings of Iraqi Kurds in 1975 to destabilize Pre-Saddam Iraq.^[3][4]

1978

From August 1978 through beginning of 1979, CIA had excessive HUMINT on Iran.^[5]

1979

There are various different American and Non-American perspectives on the Iranian Revolution. The American perspective states that the CIA is caught unaware.^[5] Because the Shah had neutralized or assassinated all of his moderate political opposition, when the Shah was finally overthrown in 1979, it was by forces loyal to the Ayatollah Khomeini. Former CIA director Admiral Stansfield Turner had poor intelligence of the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran as, "It was a big gap in CIA coverage." Consequently the CIA engaged in numerous covert operations in an attempt to maintain control. William Engdahl and Richard Dreyfuss in his book Hostage of Khomeini states that the US was afraid of a communist takeover in Iran because many of the early protestors were Iranian communists. This is why the CIA secretly supported the overthrow the Shah and replace him with Pro-American Islamists like Dr. Yazdi, Mr.Bazargan and others all of whom were recruited by the CIA. The US had the same plan to surround the Soviet Union with hostile Islamic states that were friendly to the US.^{[citation needed]} The CIA was successful in overthrowing President Bhutto of Pakistan to install General Zia al Haq as the new leader, which changed Pakistan from a secular country into a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism. It is through Pakistan that the CIA fought the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The American plan backfired when Khomeini double-crossed the US because he had originally claimed that did not want to be a leader but he exacted revenge by having all the pro-American Islamists thrown out or killed after the US embassy takeover. Mr. Bazargan fled along with other pro-Western Islamists after the hostage takeover.^{[citation needed]}

1980

According to Kenneth R. Timmerman, the "Islamic revolution in Iran upset the entire strategic equation in the region. America's principal ally in the Persian Gulf, the Shah, was swept aside overnight, and no one else on the horizon could replace him as the guarantor of U.S. interests in the region."^[6]

During the crisis, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of the disorder of the Revolution, the weakness of the Iranian military and the revolution's antagonism with Western governments. The Iranian military had been disbanded during the revolt and with the Shah ousted, Hussein had ambitions to position himself as the new strong man of the Middle East. "He condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and signed an alliance with Saudi Arabia to block the Soviet-backed attempt to take over North Yemen. In 1979 he also allowed the CIA, which he had once so virulently attacked, to open an office in Baghdad."^[7] Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, "began to look more favorably toward Saddam Hussein as a potential counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini and as a force to contain Soviet expansionism in the region."^[6][8]

The hint of change in the U.S. attitude toward Iraq was warmly welcomed in Baghdad... Saddam Hussein believed that recognition by the United States of Iraq's role as a counter to radical, fundamentalist Iran would boost his ambition of becoming the acknowledged head of the Arab world. ... Saddam had an old score to settle with the Iranians over his southern border. He had never liked the agreement signed with the Shah in 1975. He felt confident he could regain the lost territory and probably topple the anti-American regime in Tehran by taking swift military action. He had no illusions that the United States would openly support the war he proposed to start. But getting rid of the Ayatollah Khomeini was clearly in the American interest, and in many other ways the United States and Iraq could benefit each other, Saddam believed. It was time to renew diplomatic relations with Washington and to move on quickly to more elaborate forms of strategic cooperation. ^{p. 75}

Biographer Said K. Aburish, author of Saddam Hussein: The Politics Of Revenge, says the Iraqi dictator made a visit to Amman in the year 1979, before the Iran–Iraq War, where he met with King Hussein and, very possibly, three agents of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Aburish says there is "considerable evidence that he discussed his plans to invade Iran with the CIA agents."^[9][10] Timmerman records American officials meeting only with King Hussein on precisely the same date, noting this "top-secret negotiating session was Brzezinski's idea." He quotes National Security Council staff member and former aide Gary G. Sick:^[6]

Brzezinski was letting Saddam assume there was a U.S. green light for his invasion of Iran, because there was no explicit red light. But to say the U.S. planned and plotted it all out in advance is simply not true. Saddam had his own reasons for invading Iran, and they were sufficient. ^{p. 76}

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski's memoir, the United States initially took a largely neutral position on the Iran–Iraq War, with some minor exceptions. First, the U.S. acted in an attempt to prevent the confrontation from widening, largely in order to prevent additional disruption to world oil supplies and to honor U.S. security assurances to Saudi Arabia. As a result, the U.S. reacted to Soviet troop movements on the border of Iran by informing the Soviet Union that they would defend Iran in the event of Soviet invasion. The U.S. also acted to defend Saudi Arabia, and lobbied the surrounding states not to become involved in the war. Brzezinski characterizes this recognition of the Middle East as a vital strategic region on a par with Western Europe and the Far East as a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic policy.^[11] Second, the United States explored whether the Iran–Iraq War would offer leverage with which to resolve the Iranian Hostage Crisis. In this regard, the Carter administration explored the use of both "carrots," by suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iran upon release of the hostages, and "sticks," by discouraging Israeli military assistance to Iran and suggesting that they might offer military assistance to Iraq if the Iranians did not release the hostages. Third, as the war progressed, freedom of navigation, especially at the Strait of Hormuz, was deemed a critical priority.^[11]

The U.S. has denied that it gave Iraq a "green light" for its September 22, 1980 invasion of Iran.

1983

The Soviet KGB defector, Vasili Mitrokhin stated in his book, ^[12] that the CIA continued to provide lists of Iranian Communists that the Islamic revolutionary government utilized to arrest, torture and execute Iranian communists.

1984

Beginning in August 1984, a small group within the US government, in the Iran-Contra affair, arranged for the indirect transfer of arms to Iran, as a means of circumventing the Boland Amendments that were intended, in part, to prevent the expenditure of US funds to support the Nicaraguan Contras. Since the arms-for-hostages deal struck by the Reagan Administration channeled money for to the Contras, the legal interpretation of the time was that the CIA, as an organization, could not participate in Iran-Contra.

The relationships, first to avoid the Boland Amendment restriction, but also for operational security, did not directly give or sell U.S. weapons to Iran. Instead, the Reagan Administration authorized Israel to sell munitions to Iran, using contracted Iranian arms broker Manucher Ghorbanifar.^[13] The proceeds from the sales, less the 41% markup charged by Ghorbanifar and originally at a price not acceptable to Iran, went directly to the Contras. Those proceeds were not interpreted as U.S. funds. The Administration resupplied Israel, which was not illegal, with munitions that replaced those transferred to Iran.

While Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey was deeply involved in Iran-Contra, Casey, a World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) clandestine operations officer, ran the Iran operation with people outside the CIA, such as White House/National Security Council employees such as John Poindexter and Oliver North, as well as retired special operations personnel such as John K. Singlaub and Richard Secord

2000

In a speech on March 17, 2000 before the American Iranian Council on the relaxation of U.S. sanctions against Iran, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said: "In 1953, the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons, but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development and it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."^[14]

2003

Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage gives testimony on US policy and Iran.^{[15][clarification needed]} This testimony will support the U.S. designation of portions of the Iranian government as terrorist organizations. In response, in 2007, Iran will designate the CIA as a terrorist organization.

2005

Intelligence analysis

Iran was described as a problem area in Porter Goss' early 2005 report to the Senate Intelligence Committee.^[16] "In early February, the spokesman of Iran's Supreme Council for National Security publicly announced that Iran would never scrap its nuclear program. This came in the midst of negotiations with EU-3 members (Britain, Germany and France) seeking objective guarantees from Tehran that it will not use nuclear technology for nuclear weapons.

"Previous comments by Iranian officials, including Iran's Supreme Leader and its Foreign Minister, indicated that Iran would not give up its ability to enrich uranium. Certainly they can use it to produce fuel for power reactors. We are more concerned about the dual-use nature of the technology that could also be used to achieve a nuclear weapon.

"In parallel, Iran continues its pursuit of long-range ballistic missiles, such as an improved version of its 1,300 km range Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), to add to the hundreds of short-range SCUD missiles it already has.

"Even since 9/11, Tehran continues to support terrorist groups in the region, such as Hizballah, and could encourage increased attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories to derail progress toward peace. Iran reportedly is supporting some anti-Coalition activities in Iraq and seeking to influence the future character of the Iraqi state. Iran continues to retain in secret important members of Al-Qai'ida-the Management Council—causing further uncertainty about Iran's commitment to bring them to justice.

"Conservatives are likely to consolidate their power in Iran's June 2005 presidential elections, further marginalizing the reform movement last year."

2006

Seymour Hersh reported that Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PEJAK) was a US proxy. Hersh said he was told, in November 2006, was a government consultant with close ties to the Pentagon civilian leadership of secret US support for PEJAK for operations inside Iran, stating that the group had been given "a list of targets inside Iran of interest to the U.S.".^[17]

2007

Various sources cite "support" for guerrillas operating in Iran, with US government avoiding financial support that would require a Presidential finding or Congressional oversight. There are unconfirmed reports of US troops operating there.^{[citation needed]}

In a nonbinding resolution of the Iranian parliament, the United States Army and the CIA has been labeled a terrorist organization by the Iranian parliament, for provoking war, supporting terrorism around the world and partly for its activities in the "War on Terror such as its treatment of suspected Muslim militants in prisons. The resolution appeared to be in response to the U.S. designation of the Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of Defense as terrorist organizations.^[18]

General guerrilla actions in Iran by ethnic minorities

"America is secretly funding militant ethnic separatist groups in Iran in an attempt to pile pressure on the Islamic regime to give up its nuclear programme. In a move that reflects Washington's growing concern with the failure of diplomatic initiatives, CIA officials are understood to be helping opposition militias among the numerous ethnic minority groups clustered in Iran's border regions.

"The operations are controversial because they involve dealing with movements that resort to terrorist methods in pursuit of their grievances against the Iranian regime. Such incidents have been carried out by the Kurds in the west, the Azeris in the north-west, the Ahwazi Arabs in the south-west, and the Baluchis in the south-east. Non-Persians make up nearly 40 per cent of Iran's 69 million population, with around 16 million Azeris, seven million Kurds, five million Ahwazis and one million Baluchis. Most Baluchis live over the border in Pakistan.

"Teheran has long claimed to detect the hand of both America and Britain in attacks by guerrilla groups on its internal security forces. Last Monday, Iran publicly hanged a man, Nasrollah Shanbe Zehi, for his involvement in a bomb attack that killed 11 Revolutionary Guards in the city of Zahedan in Sistan-Baluchistan.^[19]

...Iranian forces also claimed to have killed 17 rebels described as "mercenary elements" in clashes near the Turkish border, which is a stronghold of the Pejak, a Kurdish militant party linked to Turkey's outlawed PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party.

"John Pike, the head of the Global Security think tank in Washington, said: "The activities of the ethnic groups have hotted up over the last two years and it would be a scandal if that was not at least in part the result of CIA activity."

"Such a policy is fraught with risk, however. Many of the groups share little common cause with Washington other than their opposition to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, whose regime they accuse of stepping up repression of minority rights and culture. The Baluchistan-based Jundallah (Brigade of God)(TYYT group, which last year kidnapped and killed eight Iranian soldiers, is a volatile Sunni organisation that many fear could easily turn against Washington after taking its money.

"A row has also broken out in Washington over whether to "unleash" the military wing of the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iraq-based Iranian opposition group with a long and bloody history of armed opposition to the Iranian regime. The group is currently listed by the US state department as a terrorist organization, but Mr Pike said: "A faction in the Defence Department wants to unleash them. They could never overthrow the current Iranian regime but they might cause a lot of damage."^[19]

An Asia Times report states the U.S. has military units operating inside Iran.^[20]

Baluchi guerrillas in Iran

According to ABC news, citing U.S. and Pakistani intelligence sources, U.S. officials have been encouraging and advising a Pakistani Balochi militant group named Jundullah that is responsible for a series of deadly guerrilla raids inside Iran, reported ABC News online. The Jundullah militants "stage attacks across the border into Iran on Iranian military officers, Iranian intelligence officers, kidnapping them, executing them on camera", This militant group is led by a leader, Abd el Malik Regi, sometimes known as "Regi." The U.S. provides no direct funding to the group, which would require an official presidential order or "presidential finding" as well as congressional oversight. A CIA spokesperson said "the account of alleged CIA action is false".^[21]

According to the Christian Science Monitor, Jundallah, or "God's Brigade", composed of predominantly Sunni Muslim Baluchis which inhabits Pakistan's gas-rich province of Baluchestan, as well as neighboring regions in Iran and Afghanistan.^[22]

Regi was also claimed by Iran to be associated with al Qaida which the group denies. Hossein Ali Shahriari, the representative from Zahedan in Parliament, said the attack had been carried out by "insurgents and smugglers who are led by the world imperialism," a common reference to the United States and Britain.^[23]

MEK support

The PBS documentary series "Frontline", reported, in October 2007, CIA supports Anti-Iranian organizations such as the People's Mujahedin of Iran (also known as the MEK or MKO) which has been involved in terrorist activities within Iran. Iran has demanded that the US stop supporting the MEK in exchange for stopping its support of Shiite's in Iraq.^[24] The show quoted Vali Nasr, author of The Shia Revival as saying the Iranians had hoped that the fall of Saddam would destroy the MEK, which is generally unpopular in Iraq...the MEK operated in Iraq as an arm of Iraqi intelligence against Iranian operatives in Iraq, against Shi'ites and against the Kurds. And, in fact, one of the major pressures on the United States to round up the MEK and put them in a camp did not come from Iran; it came from [Iraqi President] Jalal Talabani.... And I think at a third level the Iranians look at the MEK issue as a test of U.S. goodwill...."

Richard Armitage disagreed that MEK was being supported. "Richard Armitage, U.S. deputy secretary of state, 2001-05, said... "I've heard through some interviews that in some of the discussions leading up to the invasion that Ryan Crocker had said to the Iranians that the MEK would be treated as part of Saddam's army, the implication being [it would be] on a target list, which wasn't exactly what happened after the war.

"I don't know about that specifically, but we had discussed the MEK more pointedly after the invasion. And there were some in the administration who wanted to use the Mujahideen-e Khalq as a pressure point against Iran, and I can remember the national security adviser, Dr. [Condoleezza] Rice, being very specific about it, saying no, a terrorist group is a terrorist group.

"That was exactly the point of view of the State Department as well. We wanted the U.S. military to disarm the MEK and contain them. ... And eventually we did disarm the major weapons [from] the MEK. Then we ... engaged in a broad effort to try to resettle these people, but we were very unsuccessful in getting them settled in foreign lands...."

2008

In response to an inquiry from the Washington Post regarding a story by Seymour Hersh appearing in the July 7, 2008 issue of The New Yorker, which claims that the Bush administration undertook a greatly expanded program of covert actions inside Iran beginning the previous year,^[25] agency spokesman George Little said, "The CIA does not, as a rule, comment on allegations regarding covert operations."^[26] Hersh detailed US covert action plans against Iran involving CIA, DIA and Special Forces. According to Hersh, the United States is materially supporting the following groups which are performing acts of violence inside Iran:

• Baluchi dissidents. Hersh writes:

The use of Baluchi elements, for example, is problematic, Robert Baer, a former C.I.A. clandestine officer who worked for nearly two decades in South Asia and the Middle East, told me. "The Baluchis are Sunni fundamentalists who hate the regime in Tehran, but you can also describe them as Al Qaeda," Baer told me

• Jundallah, a Sunni and Baluchi group. Hersh quotes Vali Nasr on Jundallah as stating that

"They are suspected of having links to Al Qaeda and they are also thought to be tied to the drug culture."

• These two separate claims are the same. The Jundullah is a Baloch militant group from Sistan - Baluchistan. Baloch people are Sunni.

• The leader of Jundallah was executed at Evin prison in Iran in 2010 after being taken off a flight from Dubai to Kyrgyzstan, where he claimed in an interview on Iranian TV he had a meeting with a "high ranking US official" at the Manas Air base (the US Military base in Kyrgyzstan).

• Expatriate nationalist group People's Mujahedin of Iran
• Kurdish separatist group PJAK

Journalist David Ignatius of the Washington Post asserts that U.S. covert action "appears to focus on political action and the collection of intelligence rather than on lethal operations".^[27] Iranian commentator Ali Eftagh wrote in the Washington Post that the covert actions that Hersh is reporting are being made public by the Bush administration as a form of psychological warfare.^[28]

References

1. ^ Wilber, Donald N.; Emmanuel Andrew Maldonado (April 16, 2000). Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/iran-cia-intro.pdf: The New York Times. 
2. ^ Ostrovsky, Victor (1990). By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a officer. St. Martin's Press. 
3. ^ ^{a b} Dreyfuss, Robert (2006). Devil's Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam. Holt. 
4. ^ Morris, Benny; Black, Ian (1994). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. 
5. ^ ^{a b} Weiner, Tim (2007). Legacy of Ashes. Doubleday. ISBN 978-0-385-51445-3. 
6. ^ ^{a b c} Timmerman, Kenneth R. The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq. New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1991.
7. ^ Lando, Barry Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, from Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush, Other Press, 2007.
8. ^ "Brzezinski maintained that with the right combination of blandishments, Iraq could be weaned away from Moscow. Encouraged by the suppression of the Iraqi Communist party, and perhaps believing that Iraq could, like Egypt after the October 1973 War, also be convinced to turn toward Washington, Brzezinski concluded that Iraq was poised to succeed Iran as the principle pillar of stability in the Persian Gulf. Although this notion remained very discreet for nearly a year, by the spring of 1980 Brzezinski and others in government and the media began to suggest publicly that Iraq was the logical successor to Iran as the dominant military power in the Persian Gulf. ... Indeed, in April, Brzezinski stated on national television that he saw no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq." Teicher, Howard. Twin Pillars To Desert Storm, William Morrow and Company, Inc. New York, 1993.
9. ^ Aburish, Said K. The survival of Saddam, PBS Frontline. January 25, 2000.
10. ^ "As it became increasingly clear that the dispute between Saddam and Khomeini could lead to war, Saddam also began looking for allies among his neighbors. ... The most important of these meetings was with Saudi Prince Fahd. As if contracting a mafia hit team, Fahd promised Saddam billions of dollars of support for any move to eliminate Khomeini. The United States followed all this with obvious approval. ... [T]he U.S. made certain that Saddam Hussein understood that an attack on Khomeini would be welcomed by Washington and supported by its allies in the Gulf. Indeed, when Iraqi forces swept into Iran on September 22, 1980, there were no indignant speeches from Western leaders or calls for a U.S. embargo, as there were when Saddam invaded Kuwait ten years later." Lando, Barry M. Web Of Deceit, Other Press, 2007.
11. ^ ^{a b} Brzezinski, Zbigniew. Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981, Farrar Straus Giroux. 1983.
12. ^ Mitrokhin,Vasili; Andrew, Christopher (2005). The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for The Third World. Basic Books. 
13. ^ Walsh, Lawrence (1993-08-04). "Vol. I: Investigations and prosecutions". Final report of the independent counsel for Iran/Contra matters. Independent Counsel appointed by the United States Department of Justice. http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/chap_16.htm. 
14. ^ Alexander's Gas and Oil Connection: Speeches
15. ^ US Policy and Iran, Richard L. Armitage, October 28, 2003
16. ^ Goss, Porter (16 February 2005). "Global Intelligence Challenges 2005". http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0503/doc09.htm 
17. ^ Hersh, Seymour M. (November 20, 2006). "The Next Act". The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061127fa_fact. Retrieved 2006-11-19 
18. ^ Associated Press (29 September 2007). "Iran: CIA, U.S. Army 'terrorist organizations': Lawmakers in Tehran take a diplomatic offensive against Washington". MSNBC. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21047176/ 
19. ^ ^{a b} "US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran". Telegraph (London). 25 February 2007. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/02/25/wiran25.xml. Retrieved April 30, 2010 
20. ^ Bhadrakumar, M K (February 24, 2007). "Foreign devils in the Iranian mountains". Asia Times 
21. ^ "ABC News Exclusive: The Secret War Against Iran". April 3, 2007. http://blogs.abcnews.com/theblotter/2007/04/abc_news_exclus.html 
22. ^ O'Carroll, (April 5, 2007). "US backing 'secret war' against Iran? The CIA disputes a report linking Washington and a Pakistani guerrilla campaign against Tehran". Christian Science Monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0405/p99s01-duts.html 
23. ^ Fathi, Nazila (15 February 2005). "Car bomb in Iran destroys a bus carrying Revolutionary Guards". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/world/middleeast/15tehran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. Retrieved April 30, 2010 
24. ^ "Showdown with Iran: the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK)". PBS Frontline. October 23, 2007. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/mek.html 
25. ^ Hersh, Seymour (2008-07-07). "Preparing the Battlefield: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran". The New Yorker. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/07/07/080707fa_fact_hersh?currentPage=all. 
26. ^ Warrick, Joby (2008-06-30). "U.S. Is Said to Expand Covert Operations in Iran". The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/29/AR2008062901881_pf.html. 
27. ^ "Spy Games in Iran: U.S. Half Steps Mask Indecisive Policy", by David Ignatius, Washington Post, July 2, 2008
28. ^ "Memo to Uncle Sam: Iran Is Not Your Enemy", Ali Eftagh, Washington Post, July 1, 2008

Further reading

• Blum, William (October 1, 2008). Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II--Updated Through 2003. Common Courage Press. ISBN 978-1567512526. http://books.google.com/?id=-IbQvd13uToC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Killing+Hope&cd=1#v=onepage&q=.