Karađorđevo agreement

Map of the Karađorđevo Agreement of 1991.

In 1991, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and Serbian president Slobodan Milošević had a series of discussions which became known as the Karađorđevo agreement or, less commonly, the Karađorđevo meeting. These discussions commenced as early as March, 1991. They involved the redistribution of territories in the ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina^{[note 1]} between Croatia and Serbia, in the way that territories with either Croatian or Serbian majority (or plurality) would be annexed. This meeting did not include the third and the largest ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosniaks.^{[note 2]}

Overview

Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević at Karađorđevo.

An attempted Serb police coup at Pakrac caused a confrontation between Croat police forces (bolstered by paramilitaries loyal to Tuđman) and the Yugoslav army. Around a week later, on 9 March 1991, the Yugoslav army rushed to defend Milošević's government against political protests, or possibly riots, in Belgrade.^[1] These events brought about a meeting between Milošević and Tuđman at Karađorđevo, Vojvodina, Serbia.^[1][2] No Bosniak representative participated in these talks, which were held bilaterally between the Serbs and Croats.^[3] The ICTY case against Milošević noted, as a fact, that "On 25 March 1991, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman met in Karađorđevo and discussed the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia." ^[4] Later, in 1993, Slaven Letica recalled this meeting, stating "There were several maps on the table. The idea was close to the recent ideas on Bosnia-Herzegovina, either to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into 10 or 15 [sub]units, or three semi-independent states."^[1] Following Karađorđevo, Franjo Tuđman pointed out that it would be very difficult for Bosnia to survive and that the Croats were going to take over the Banovina plus Cazin, Velika Kladuša and Bihać.^[3]

Tuđman argued that Bosnia-Herzegovina should form part of the federal Croatian unit because it was linked historically to Croatia.^[3] Tuđman did not take a separate Bosnia seriously as shown by his comments to a television crew "Bosnia was a creation of the Ottoman invasion [...] Until then it was part of Croatia, or it was a kingdom of Bosnia, but a Catholic kingdom, linked to Croatia."^[1] From the view of Tuđman, expressed a decade before the meeting, a federal Bosnia-Herzegovina "was more often a source of new divisions between the Serb and Croat population than their bridge".^[5] Moreover, Tuđman observed that from an ethnic and linguistic viewpoint most Bosniaks were of Croatian origin.^[3] A Bosniak identity could only benefit the Serbs and hence advance the timing of Bosnia's "reasonable territorial division".^[5] It is possible that an "agreement with Milošević at Karađorđevo [...] was the final step in that direction".^[6] Although some politicians deny that there was a formal agreement on the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina at Karađorđevo, for example Hrvoje Šarinić.^[7]

A second meeting was held in Tikveš at the end of April 1991.^[8] It is possible that these meetings convinced Tuđman that Serbia would partition Bosnia and Herzegovina along a Serb-Croat seam with Serbia conceding to Croatia territory up to the borders of the 1939 Banovina.^[8] At a meeting with a Bosnian Croat delegation on December 27, 1991, Tuđman announced that the conditions allowed for an agreement to redraw the boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina.^[9]

The most immediate significance of the meeting was not a deal about Bosnia and Herzegovina but the absence of a deal about Croatia. Milošević made a speech one week after the Belgrade riots where he outlined plans which involved the incorporation of a large area of Croatia into the new Yugoslavia. This led to the start of hostilities and the Croatian War of Independence.^[1] However, Tuđman continued to pursue a settlement with Milošević, of which the cost was borne by Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a considerable part of Croatia itself.^[10]

The Milošević-Tuđman plans for Greater Serbia and Croatia are seen to have been implemented by ethnic cleansing, with over 97,000^[11] Bosnians (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina) killed and more than 1.5 million expelled.^[12] This can be regarded as going from a situation where no region could be described as purely Bosniak, Serb or Croat to a situation where the former Yugoslavia moved towards regions of ethnic homogeneity.^[6][12]

The policies of the Republic of Croatia and its leader Franjo Tuđman towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were never completely transparent, but always included Franjo Tuđman’s ultimate aim of expanding Croatia’s borders.^[13] In the Tihomir Blaškić verdict, the Trial Chamber found that "Croatia, and more specifically former President Tuđman, was hoping to partition Bosnia and exercised such a degree of control over the Bosnian Croats and especially the HVO that it is justified to speak of overall control."^[3] Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian government have denied there was an agreement at Karađorđevo on numerous occasions, stating that in 1991 the Serbs controlled all of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian rebellion in Croatia during the Croatian war of independence was just beginning.^[14] In this context the meeting can be viewed as an attempt by Tuđman to prevent a Serbo-Croatian war where Croatia would face the full might of the Yugoslav army. Discussion of the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina is therefore seen by some people as an attempt to avoid this conflict.^[15] However, the Bosnian leadership at the time viewed the meeting as part of a collusion between Milošević and Tuđman to destroy Bosnia.^[16]

Division of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Participant statements

The main participants of the meeting, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević, denied there was ever an agreement about division of Bosnia and Herzegovina, discussed or reached. In a joint statement in Geneva in 1993 by President Milošević and President Tuđman said, "All speculations about a partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia are entirely unfounded." But Milošević said of the partition, "It is a solution which is offering to the Muslims much more than they can ever dream to take by force."^[17]

Testimonies

After Tuđman's death some of the Croat politicians who worked with Franjo Tuđman such as counselor Dušan Bilandžić^[18][19][20] and former prime minister of Croatia Stjepan Mesić^[21] testified that at the meeting the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed and that was it the main topic of the discussions. Hrvoje Šarinić, Tuđman's emissary for contacts with Milošević, denied there had been a formal agreement with Milosević.^[7][22][23] The former prime minister of SFRY, Ante Marković, also testified in ICTY and confirmed an agreement was made to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia.^[24][25][26] Testimonies of American and British politicians such as US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann,^[27][28] and ambassador Herbert Okun (a US veteran diplomat),^[29] suggested that the meeting was about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lord Paddy Ashdown also confirmed that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and Serbia was a goal of Franjo Tuđman.^[30][31]

Counselors

Dušan Bilandžić, a counselor of Franjo Tuđman participated at the meeting and published a book claiming that "the essence of meeting was the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina".^[18][20] An interview with Bilandžić published on October 25, 1996 by the Croatian weekly Nacional confirmed that, following negotiations with Slobodan Milošević, "it was agreed that two commissions should meet and discuss the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina".^[3] Bilandžić's testimonies are seen as contradictory by some Croatian journalists.^[18][20]

In a court testimony and statements to the media Hrvoje Šarinić, counselor of Franjo Tuđman for foreign affairs, who was present during the negotiations denied there was a formal or concrete agreement, at Karađorđevo, about the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Milošević. He also questioned why most people were concentrating on Karađorđevo when there had been a follow up meeting at Tikveš where the two leaders had spent several hours together.^[7][22][23] When being examined by Milošević he (Šarinić) stated "The fact that you met was no secret but what you discussed was a secret. [...] As regards Bosnia and the division of Bosnia, there was a lot of speculation about it, but no one else except the two presidents, one of whom is here and the other in the other world, could know what they actually said."^[32] Šarinić, further went on to say that whilst Bosnia was discussed between the presidents only one side put any plan into practice and that was the Serbs in ethnically cleansing and preparing Republika Srpska for annexation.^[32] He claimed that whilst Tuđman was optimistic after Karađorđevo that he thought Milošević had his "fingers crossed in his pocket", Šarinić also claimed that he did "not believe that a formal agreement was reached"^[33]

Mario Nobilo, a senior advisor of Franjo Tuđman, confirmed to Tim Judah that talks "to resolve the Yugoslav conflict by carving up the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and creating an Islamic buffer-state between them" took place.^[34]

Professor Smilja Avramov, an advisor to Milošević, stated "I did not attend the Karađorđevo meeting [...] but the group that [...] I was a part of, I assume was formed based on the agreement from Karađorđevo. [...] I talked about how we discussed borders in principle, whether they can be drawn based on the revolutionary division of Yugoslavia or based on international treaties"^[35]

Borisav Jović, a close ally and advisor to Milošević was not present at the meeting but testified in the Milošević trial that he "was never informed by Mr. Milošević that at a possible meeting of that kind they discussed -- he discussed -- possibly discussed with Mr. Tuđman the partition of Bosnia" He also claimed he believed that Mesić was not telling the truth about the meeting because Mesić had a political clash with Tuđman."^[36]

Stjepan Mesić

Stjepan Mesić, former president of Croatia.

When Stjepan Mesić became the president of Croatia after the death of Tuđman, he testified in ICTY about existence of a plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into three parts, between Serbs and Croats and a small Bosniak state. Stjepan Mesić claims he was the one who organized the meetings.^[37] When Mesić suggested the meeting to Borisav Jović, Mesić confronted him and accused him of "arming the Croatian Serbs", Jović denied it and stated that they "were not interested in the Croatian Serbs, but only in 65% of Bosnia-Herzegovina."^[38]

Mesić held Milosević responsible for creating a Greater Serbia "on the ruins of the Former Yugoslavia".^[39][40]

Mesić revealed thousands of documents and audio tapes recorded by Franjo Tuđman about his plans during a case against Croat leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina for war crimes committed against Bosniaks.^[41][42] The tapes reveal that Tuđman and Milosević ignored pledges to respect Bosnia's sovereignty, even after signing the Dayton accord.^[41][42] In one conversation Tuđman told an official: "Let's make a deal with the Serbs. Neither history nor emotion in the Balkans will permit multinationalism. We have to give up on the illusion of the last eight years... Dayton isn't working. Nobody - except diplomats and petty officials - believes in a sovereign Bosnia and the Dayton accords."^[42] In another he is heard telling a Bosnian Croat ally: "You should give no indication that we wish the three-way division of Bosnia."^[41] The tapes also reveal Tuđman's involvement in atrocities against the Bosniaks in Bosnia including the Croatian president covering up war crimes at Ahmići where more than a hundred Bosniak men, women and children were terrorised, and then shot or burned to death.^[41][42]

When asked if "Tuđman's view was that Bosnia was a mistake and that it was a mistake to make it as a republic after the Second World War and that it should be annexed to Croatia", Mesić responded "Those were his ideas, that Bosnia was supposed to belong to Croatia on the basis of a decision that should have been adopted by AVNOJ."^[21]

Ante Marković

Ante Marković, the last Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, broke his 12-year long silence and at the trial of Slobodan Milošević stated: "I was informed about the subject of their discussion in Karađorđevo, at which Milošević and Tuđman agreed to divide Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, and to remove me because I was in their way. [...] They both confirmed that they had agreed on dividing Bosnia-Herzegovina. Milošević admitted this immediately, while Tuđman took more time", when questioned by chief prosecutor Geoffrey Nice.^[25][26]

According to Marković, both Tuđman and Milošević thought that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an artificial creation and the Bosniaks an invented nation, because in Tuđman’s view they were "converted Catholics" and in Milošević’s "converted Orthodox". Since the Serbs and the Croats combined constituted a majority, the two also believed that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina would not cause a war and conceived an enclave for the Bosniaks. Support from Europe was expected as they did not desire having a Muslim state. Tuđman also told him that history would repeat itself in that Bosnia and Herzegovina would again fall "with a whisper".^[25]

During the Prlić trial Marković specifically stated that Tuđman had informed him after the meeting "that they had reached an agreement in principle of their attitude towards Bosnia-Herzegovina and how they were to divide it, or how it was to be divided."^[43]

Marković declared that he warned both leaders that it would result in the transformation of Bosnia into a Palestine. He told this to the Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović, who gave him secretly made tapes of conversations between Milošević and Radovan Karadžić, discussing JNA support of the Bosnian Serbs, he went on to say that Milošević was "obviously striving to create a Greater Serbia. He said one thing and did another. He said that he was fighting for Yugoslavia, while it was clear that he was fighting for a Greater Serbia, even though he never said so personally to me."^[25]

Warren Zimmermann

Warren Zimmermann, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia.

According to the testimony of Warren Zimmermann, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Franjo Tuđman claimed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be divided between the Croats and the Serbs. "Tuđman admitted that he discussed these fantasies with Milošević, the Yugoslav Army leadership and the Bosnian Serbs," writes Zimmermann, "and they agreed that the only solution is to divide up Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia".^[27][28]

Zimmermann also testified about Tuđman's fears of an "Islamic fundamentalist state" who referred to Izetbegović as a "fundamentalist front man for Turkey" and accused them of "conspiring to create a Greater Bosnia" by "flooding Bosnia with 500,000 Turks."^[44]

Herbert Okun

Herbert Okun was the deputy of Cyrus Vance, UN special envoy to the Balkans. In this capacity, he attended a number of meetings where the division of Bosnia Herzegovina was discussed. As Okun described it, the aspirations of Croatia and Serbia for the annexation of parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina became evident after Tuđman and Milošević met in Karađorđevo in March 1991 and after the meeting of Mate Boban and Radovan Karadžić in May 1992 in Graz. Neither party kept their plans for the creation of separate states within Bosnia-Herzegovina and their annexation to Serbia and Croatia secret at their subsequent meetings with international diplomats.^[45]

Herbert Okun testified that on May 6, 1992, Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban met in Graz in Austria to discuss the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina along the boundaries of the Croatian Banovina.^[46] Herbert Okun also testified that during the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, held between September 1992 and May 1993, Franjo Tuđman was the de facto president of the Bosnian Croat delegation, including, among others, Mate Boban and Milivoj Petković.^[46] During that conference, Herbert Okun heard Franjo Tuđman make statements about extending the borders of Croatia, either directly or by including Herceg-Bosna within Croatia. He also heard him make statements about his support for the government of Mate Boban.^[46]

Bosnian Serb involvement

Radovan Karadžić, the first president of Republika Srpska.

Most of the Bosnian Serb wartime leadership Biljana Plavšić,^[47] Momčilo Krajišnik,^[48] Radoslav Brđanin,^[49] Duško Tadić^[50] were indicted and judged guilty for war crimes and ethnic cleansing. The former president of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadžić is currently under trial.^[51] The top military general Ratko Mladić is also under trial by the ICTY in connection with the siege of Sarajevo and the Srebrenica massacre.^[52] Serbian president Slobodan Milosević was also accused of genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and war crimes in Croatia.^[53] However he died before judgment concured.^[54]

“

The Amended Consolidated Indictment, [...] alleges that, between 1 July 1991 and 30 December 1992, in order to secure control of various municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including Momčilo Krajišnik, Biljana Plavšić and Radovan Karadžić, pursued a course of conduct involving the creation of impossible conditions of life, persecution and terror tactics in order to encourage non-Serbs to leave the area, deportation of those reluctant to leave, and the liquidation of others. From late March 1992, Bosnian Serb forces seized physical control of many of the municipalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been proclaimed part of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina".

”

The ICTY judged as follows:^[55]

“

The Chamber finds that a joint criminal enterprise existed throughout the territories of the Bosnian-Serb Republic. There was a centrally-based core component of the group, which included Mr Krajišnik, Radovan Karadžić, and other Bosnian-Serb leaders. The rank and file of the joint criminal enterprise was based in the regions and municipalities of the Bosnian-Serb Republic, and maintained close links with the leadership in the Bosnian-Serb capital of Pale. [...] The common objective of the joint criminal enterprise was to ethnically recompose the territories targeted by the Bosnian-Serb leadership by drastically reducing the proportion of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats through expulsion. The Chamber finds that the crimes of deportation and forced transfer were the original crimes of this common objective. Mr Krajišnik gave the go-ahead for the expulsion programme to commence during a session of the Bosnian-Serb Assembly when he called for [and I quote], "implementing what we have agreed upon, the ethnic division on the ground".

”

The Trial Chamber found that the strategic plan of the Bosnian Serb leadership consisted of "a plan to link Serb-populated areas in BiH together, to gain control over these areas and to create a separate Bosnian Serb state, from which most non-Serbs would be permanently removed".^[49] It also found that media in certain areas focused only on SDS policy and reports from Belgrade became more prominent, including the presentation of extremist views and promotion of the concept of a Greater Serbia, just as in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina the concept of a Greater Croatia was openly advocated.^[50]

Bosnian Croat involvement

On 13 October 1997, the Feral Tribune published a document drafted by the Bosnian HDZ in 1991 and signed by its leading members Mate Boban, Vladimir Šoljić, Bozo Raic, Ivan Bender, Pero Marković, Dario Kordić and others. It stated, among other things, that "[...] the Croat people in Bosnia-Herzegovina must finally undertake a decisive and active policy that should bring about the realisation of our centuries-old dream: a common Croatian state."^[56][57]

Based on the evidence of numerous Croat attacks against Bosniaks, the ICTY Trial Chamber concluded in the Kordić and Čerkez case that by April 1993 Croat leadership had a common design or plan conceived and executed to ethnically cleanse Bosniaks from the Lašva Valley.^[57] Dario Kordić, as the local political leader, was found to be the planner and instigator of this plan. Further concluding that the Croatian Army was involved in the campaign, the ICTY defined the events as an international conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.^[58] Kordić along with commander Mario Čerkez were sentenced to 25 years and 15 years respectively.^[59]

In the Tihomir Blaškić verdict, of March 2000, the Trial Chamber concluded "[...] that Croatia, and more specifically former President Tudjman, was hoping to partition Bosnia and exercised such a degree of control over the Bosnian Croats and especially the HVO that it is justified to speak of overall control."^[3]

Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Corić, and Berislav Pušić were all charged with being part of a joint criminal enterprise with a purpose of politically and military subjugating, permanently removing and ethnically cleansing Bosniaks and other non-Croats from certain areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina in an effort to join these areas as part of a Greater Croatia.^[60] It is stated in the amended indictment (Prlic et al. case) by the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia), that at a meeting with his closest advisers and a group of Croat nationalists from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Franjo Tuđman declared that "It is time that we take the opportunity to gather the Croatian people inside the widest possible borders." pointing out the opportunity to expand Croatia's border at the expense of Bosnia and Herzegovina's territory.^[61][62][63] The indictment regards not just Franjo Tuđman, but also other key figures from the Republic of Croatia including former Minister of Defence Gojko Šušak and senior General Janko Bobetko as participants.^[64] The amended indictment goes further to say:^[61][62]

“

[...] to about April 1994 and thereafter, various persons established and participated in a joint criminal enterprise to politically and militarily subjugate, permanently remove and ethnically cleanse Bosnian Muslims and other non-Croats who lived in areas on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were claimed to be part of the Croatian Community and later Republic of Herceg-Bosna; and to join these areas as part of a 'Greater Croatia' whether in the short term or over time and whether as part of the Republic of Croatia or in close association with it. [...] The territorial ambition of the joint criminal enterprise was to establish a Croatian territory with the borders of the Croatian Banovina, a territorial entity that existed from 1939 to 1941.

”

The Prosecution submitted that part of the Greater Croatia-Herceg-Bosna program had at least three important goals.^[61][62]

“

First, it was clear to probably anyone who looked at it with any sort of intellectual objectivity that some municipalities and areas claimed by Herceg-Bosna were more Croat than others and with some of the areas on the fringes more toward the east, more towards Central Bosnia not having a strong Croat majority or even plurality. [...] As a second reason, as a matter of political, military, and economic practicalities and part of the ultimate what I will call horse trading with the Serbs and the Muslims, Tudjman and the Herceg-Bosna leaders recognised that they might have to give up or trade away some of the areas furthest from the core Banovina territory. [...] Third and equally important and as already mentioned, relocating Croats from other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and moving them into houses and flats which had been seized from or abandoned by Muslim families or Muslim families which have been expelled would make it more difficult, if not impossible, for the Muslims to return to those areas, their houses having been taken over by Croats.

”

Aftermath

Main article: Bosnian War

Changes in the fronts of the Bosnian War

After the meeting at Karađorđevo the Croatian war of independence began with Croats and Serbs as the main antagonists. Also an international conflict began in Bosnia and Herzegovina, lasting until November 1995. During this time control of territory within Bosnia and Herzegovina changed hands between the predominantly Bosniak government and the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The internal structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina was discussed and was finally decided with the Dayton Agreement with some internal divisions remaining, most notably the Republika Srpska.

Graz agreement

Main article: Graz agreement

The Graz agreement was a pact signed between Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban on April 27, 1992 in the town of Graz, Austria, during a period when Serbian forces controlled 70% of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The treaty was meant to limit conflict between Serb and Croat forces and put them closer to annexation of territory under Croat and Serb control.^[65] The Graz agreement was seen as a sequel to the Karađorđevo agreement. In between the newly expanded Croatia and Serbia would be a small Bosniak buffer state, pejoratively called "Alija's Pashaluk" by Croatian and Serbian leadership, after Bosnian president Alija Izetbegović.^[66] The ICTY judgement in the Blaškić case suggests a reported agreement at the Graz meeting between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat leaders confirms a previous agreement between the Serbs and Croats (Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman) on the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, possibly from the Karađorđevo meeting.^[3]

Notes

1. ^ Croats and Serbs were 2 of 3 constitutive ethnic groups.
2. ^ In the English-speaking world, Bosniaks are also known as Bosnian Muslims.

References

1. ^ ^{a b c d e} Tanner, Marcus (2001). Croatia: A nation forged in war (second edition). New Haven and London: Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300091250. 
2. ^ "Posle tajnog susreta Milošević - Tuđman U Karađorđevo". Borba. 1991-03-27. http://82.117.206.29/Develop/NaslovneStraneNSF.nsf/WebSlikaFrameset?OpenFrameSet&Frame=centar&Src=%2FDevelop%2FNaslovneStraneNSF.nsf%2F2f27f250ee4fbb69c125743400397c66%2F208ccc62b923050cc12575520026d9cd%3FOpenDocument%26AutoFramed. Retrieved 2009-08-13. 
3. ^ ^{a b c d e f g h} "Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić - judgement". United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2000-03-03. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf. 
4. ^ "The prosecutor of the tribunal against Slobodan Milošević: Amended Indictment". United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2002-11-22. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/ind/en/mil-ai040421-e.htm. Retrieved 2009-08-14. 
5. ^ ^{a b} Tuđman, Franjo (1981). Nationalism in contemporary Europe. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0914710702. 
6. ^ ^{a b} Banac, Ivo (2006). "Chapter 3: The politics of national homogeneity". In Blitz, Brad. War and change in the Balkans. Cambridge University Press. pp. 30–43. ISBN 9780521677738. 
7. ^ ^{a b c} Robert Bajruši, (2004-01-27). "Trgovinu između Tuđmana i Miloševića spriječila je plitka Neretva" (in Croatian). Nacional. http://www.nacional.hr/articles/view/10862/. Retrieved 2008-02-14. 
8. ^ ^{a b} Magaš, Branka; Ivo Žanić, Noel Malcolm (November 2001). The war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995. Routledge. ISBN 0714652040. http://books.google.com/books?id=ccOWvqdxpVUC&pg=PA11. 
9. ^ Ramet, Sabrina P. (2006). The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2004. Indiana University Press. p. 343. ISBN 0271016299. 
10. ^ Magas, Branka (2006). "Chapter 10: The war in Croatia". In Blitz, Brad. War and change in the Balkans. Cambridge University Press. pp. 118–123. ISBN 9780521677738. 
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12. ^ ^{a b} Kurspahic, Kemal (2006). "Chapter 6: From Bosnia to Kosovo and beyond: mistakes and lessons". In Blitz, Brad. War and change in the Balkans. Cambridge University Press. pp. 76–86. ISBN 9780521677738. 
13. ^ "Prosecutor v. Naletilic and Martinovic - Judgement (Historical Background)". United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2001-02-22. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilic_martinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-e.pdf. Retrieved 2009-08-16. 
14. ^ "Franjo Tuđman - Poziv na obranu domovine, 5. listopada 1991". YouTube. October 5, 2009. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9-SNg1pUvs8. Retrieved 2009-08-16. 
15. ^ Hoare, Marko Attila (1997). "The Croatian project to partition Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1990-1994". East European Quarterly 31. http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5002233334. 
16. ^ Williams, Kristen (2001). Despite nationalist conflicts: theory and practice of maintaining world peace. Greenwood Publishing. p. 97. ISBN 9780275969349. http://books.google.com/?id=OYmurpH3ahsC&printsec=frontcover&dq=williams+nationalist+conflicts#v=onepage&q=%22earlier%20in%20march%22. 
17. ^ Burns, John F. (July 18, 1993). "Serbian Plan Would Deny the Muslims Any State". The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/18/world/serbian-plan-would-deny-the-muslims-any-state.html?pagewanted=all. Retrieved 2009-08-16. 
18. ^ ^{a b c} "Jeli (JAZU-)Akademik Dušan Bilandžić postao hrvatski Savo Štrbac?" (in Croatian). Hvratski. June 14, 2006. http://amac.hrvati-amac.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=196&Itemid=83. Retrieved 2009-08-17. 
19. ^ "Priznanje Buliću i Bilandžiću" (in Croatian). Algorithm Multimedia Bookshop. August 17, 2009. http://www.algoritam.hr/novosti.asp?id=1068&p=vijest. Retrieved 2009-08-17. 
20. ^ ^{a b c} "Dušan Bilandžić: Kameleon Za Sva Vremena" (in Croatian). Zamirzine. December 20, 2006. http://www.zamirzine.net/spip.php?article4100. Retrieved 2009-08-17. 
21. ^ ^{a b} "Testimony of Stjepan Mesić from a transcript of the Milošević trial". United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 2002-10-02. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/021002ED.htm. Retrieved 2009-08-17. 
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