- James Longstreet
Infobox Military Person
born= birth date|mf=yes|1821|1|8
died= death date and age|mf=yes|1904|01|2|1821|01|08
placeofburial=Alta Vista Cemetery
allegiance= United States of America
Confederate States of America
serviceyears=1842 - 1861 (USA), 1861 - 1865 (CSA)
rank= Major (USA)
Lieutenant General (CSA)
First Corps, Army of Northern Virginia
Mexican-American War American Civil War
laterwork=Surveyor of Customs in New Orleans U.S. Ambassador to the
Ottoman EmpireU.S. Commissioner of Railroads U.S. Marshal for Northern Georgia
James Longstreet (January 8, 1821 – January 2, 1904) was one of the foremost Confederate
generals of the American Civil Warand the principal subordinate to General Robert E. Lee, who called him his "Old War Horse." He served under Lee as a corps commander for many of the famous battles fought by the Army of Northern Virginiain the Eastern Theater, but also with Gen. Braxton Braggin the Army of Tennesseein the Western Theater. Biographer and historian Jeffry D. Wert wrote that "Longstreet ... was the finest corps commander in the Army of Northern Virginia; in fact, he was arguably the best corps commander in the conflict on either side." [Wert, p. 405.]
Longstreet's talents as a general made significant contributions to the Confederate victories at Second Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and Chickamauga, in both offensive and defensive roles. He also performed strongly during the
Seven Days Battles, the Battle of Antietam, and until he was seriously wounded, at the Battle of the Wilderness. His performance in semiautonomous command at Knoxville, Tennessee, resulted in a Confederate defeat. His most controversial service was at the Battle of Gettysburg, where he disagreed with General Lee on the tactics to be employed and reluctantly supervised the disastrous infantry assault known as Pickett's Charge.
He enjoyed a successful post-war career working for the U.S. Government as a diplomat, civil servant, and administrator. However, his conversion to the Republican Party and his cooperation with his old friend, President
Ulysses S. Grant, as well as critical comments he wrote in his memoirs about General Lee's wartime performance, made him anathema to many of his former Confederate colleagues. Authors of the Lost Cause movement focused on Longstreet's actions at Gettysburg as a primary reason for the Confederacy's loss of the war. His reputation in the South was damaged for over a century and has only recently begun a slow reassessment.
Early life and career
Longstreet was born in Edgefield District,
South Carolina. He was the fifth child and third son of James and Mary Ann Dent Longstreet, originally from New Jersey and Maryland respectively, who owned a cotton plantation close to where the village of Gainesville would be founded in northeastern Georgia. James's ancestor Dirck Stoffels Langestraet immigrated to the Dutch colony of New Netherlandin 1657, but they became Anglicized over the generations. [Longstreet wrote in his memoirs, p. 13, that "It is difficult to determine whether the name sprang from France, Germany, or Holland."] James's father was impressed by his son's "rocklike" character on the rural plantation, giving him the nickname Peter, and he was known as Pete or Old Pete for the rest of his life. [Wert, pp. 19-22; Longstreet, p. 13; Dickson, p. 1213.]
James's father decided a military career for his son, but felt that the local education available to him would not be adequate preparation. At the age of nine, James was sent to live with his aunt and uncle in
Augusta, Georgia. His uncle, Augustus Baldwin Longstreet, was a newspaper editor, educator, and a Methodist minister. James spent eight years on his uncle's plantation, Westover, just outside the city, while he attended the Richmond County Academy. His father died from a choleraepidemic while visiting Augusta in 1833; although James's mother and the rest of the family moved to Somerville, Alabama, following his father's death James remained with uncle Augustus. [Wert, pp. 22-26; Dickson, p. 1213.] James Longstreet went to west point. he graduated in 1842.In 1837 Augustus attempted to obtain an appointment for James to the United States Military Academy, but the vacancy for his congressional district had already been filled so James was appointed in 1838 by a relative, Reuben Chapman, who represented the First District of Alabama (where Mary Longstreet lived). James was a poor student academically and a disciplinary problem at West Point, ranking 54th out of 56 cadets when he graduated in 1842. He was popular with his classmates, however, and befriended a number of men who would become prominent during the Civil War, including George Henry Thomas, William S. Rosecrans, John Pope, D.H. Hill, Lafayette McLaws, George Pickett, John Bell "Sam" Hood, and his closest friend, Ulysses S. Grantof the class of 1843. Longstreet was commissioned a brevet second lieutenantin the 4th U.S. Infantry. [Longstreet, pp. 16-17; Wert, pp. 26-31; Eicher, p. 353.]
Longstreet spent his first two years of service at Jefferson Barracks,
Missouri, where he was soon joined by his friend, Lieutenant Grant. Longstreet introduced Grant to his fourth cousin, Julia Dent, and the couple eventually married. Longstreet would serve as Grant's "best man" at the wedding. [Smith, p. 73.] Soon after that introduction Longstreet met Maria Louisa Garland, called Louise by her family. She was the daughter of Longstreet's regimental commander, Lt. Col. John Garland. They were married in March 1848, after the Mexican-American War. Although their marriage would last for over 40 years and produce 10 children, Longstreet never mentioned Louise in his memoirs and most anecdotes about their relationship came to historians through the writings of his second wife. [Wert, pp. 26-31.]
Longstreet served with distinction in the Mexican War with the 8th U.S. Infantry. He received brevet promotions to captain for Contreras and Churubusco and to major for Molino del Rey. In the
Battle of Chapultepecon September 12, 1847, he was wounded in the thigh while charging up the hill with his regimental colors; falling, he handed the flag to his friend, Lt. George E. Pickett, who was able to reach the summit. [Wert, pp. 35-45; Eicher, p. 353.]
After the war and his recovery from the Chapultepec wound, Longstreet and his new wife served on frontier duty in Texas, primarily at
Fort Bliss. He performed scouting missions and also served as major and paymaster for the 8th Infantry from July 1858. [Wert, pp. 47-51; Eicher, p. 353.]
Longstreet was not enthusiastic about
secessionfrom the Union, but he had learned from his uncle Augustus about the doctrine of states' rightsearly in his life and had seen his uncle's passion for it. Although he was born in South Carolina and raised in Georgia, he offered his services to the state of Alabama, which had appointed him to West Point and where his mother still lived. Furthermore, he was the senior West Point graduate from that state, which implied a commensurate rank in the state's forces would be available. He resigned from the U.S. Army in June 1861 to cast his lot with the Confederacy in the Civil War. [Dickson, p. 1213; Wert, pp. 51-53.]
First Bull Run and the Peninsula
Longstreet arrived in
Richmond, Virginiawith a commission as a lieutenant colonelin the Confederate States Army. He met with Confederate President Jefferson Davisat the executive mansion on June 22, 1861, where he was informed that he had been appointed a brigadier generalwith date of rank on June 17, a commission he accepted on June 25. He was ordered to report to Brig. Gen. P.G.T. Beauregardat Manassas, where he was given command of a brigade of three Virginia regiments—the 1st, 11th, and 17th Virginia. [Wert, pp. 58-61. Longstreet, pp. 32-33, claimed that he sought only appointment as a paymaster, but historians such as Wert believe this was falsely modest and that he sought the glory of infantry command from the earliest days.]
Longstreet assembled his staff and trained his brigade incessantly. They saw their first action at Blackburn's Ford on July 18, resisting a
Union Armyreconnaissance in force that preceded the First Battle of Bull Run. When the main attack came at the opposite end of the line on July 21, the brigade played a relatively minor role, although it endured artillery fire for nine hours. Longstreet was infuriated that his commanders would not allow a vigorous pursuit of the defeated Union Army. His trusted staff officer, Moxley Sorrel, recorded that he was "in a fine rage. He dashed his hat furiously to the ground, stamped, and bitter words escaped him." He quoted Longstreet as saying, "Retreat! Hell, the Federal army has broken to pieces." [Tagg, p. 204; Wert, pp. 62-77; Dickson, p. 1214; Longstreet, pp 37-57.] Longstreet was promoted to major generalon October 7 and assumed command of a division in the Confederate Army of the Potomac—four infantry brigades and Hampton's Legion. [Wert, pp. 90-91; Eicher, p. 353.]
Tragedy struck the Longstreet family in January 1862. A
scarlet feverepidemic in Richmond claimed the lives of his one-year-old daughter Mary Anne, his four-year-old son James, and six-year-old Augustus ("Gus"), all within a week. His 13-year-old son Garland almost succumbed. The losses were devastating for Longstreet and he became withdrawn, both personally and socially. In 1861 his headquarters were noted for parties, drinking, and poker games. After he returned from the funeral the headquarters social life became more somber, he rarely drank, and he became a devout Episcopalian. [Tagg, p. 205; Wert, p. 97.]
Longstreet turned in a mixed performance in the
Peninsula Campaignthat spring. He executed well as a rear guard commander at Yorktown and Williamsburg, delaying the advance of Union Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's army toward Richmond. At the Battle of Seven Pineshe marched his men in the wrong direction down the wrong road, causing congestion and confusion with other Confederate units, diluting the effect of the massive Confederate counterattack against McClellan. His report unfairly blamed fellow general Benjamin Huger for the mishaps. [Wert, pp. 110-25; Dickson, p. 1214.] General Joseph E. Johnstonwas wounded during the battle and he was replaced in command of the Army of Northern Virginiaby Gen. Robert E. Lee.
Seven Days Battlesthat followed in late June, Longstreet had operational command of nearly half of Lee's army—15 brigades—as it drove McClellan back down the Peninsula. Longstreet performed aggressively and well in his new, larger command, particularly at Gaines' Mill and Glendale. Lee's army in general suffered from weak performances by Longstreet's peers, including, uncharacteristically, Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson, and was unable to destroy the Union Army. Moxley Sorrel wrote of Longstreet's confidence and calmness in battle: "He was like a rock in steadiness when sometimes in battle the world seemed flying to pieces." Gen. Lee said, "Longstreet was the staff in my right hand." He had been established as Lee's principal lieutenant. [Dickson, p. 1214; Tagg, p. 204; Wert, pp. 134-52.]
econd Bull Run, Maryland, and Fredericksburg
The military reputations of Lee's corps commanders are often characterized as Stonewall Jackson representing the audacious, offensive component of Lee's army, whereas Longstreet more typically advocated and executed defensive strategies and tactics. Jackson has been described as the army's hammer, Longstreet its anvil. [Wert, p. 206.] In the
Northern Virginia Campaignof August 1862, this stereotype did not hold true. Longstreet commanded the Right Wing (later to become known as the First Corps) and Jackson commanded the Left Wing. Jackson started the campaign under Lee's orders with a sweeping flanking maneuver that placed his corps into the rear of Union Maj. Gen. John Pope's Army of Virginia, but he then took up a defensive position and effectively invited Pope to assault him. On August 28 and August 29, the start of the Second Battle of Bull Run, Pope pounded Jackson as Longstreet and the remainder of the army marched north to reach the battlefield. Postwar criticism of Longstreet claimed that he marched his men too slowly, leaving Jackson to bear the brunt of the fighting for two days, but they covered roughly convert|30|mi|km|-1 in a little over 24 hours and Gen. Lee did not attempt to get his army concentrated any faster. [Wert, p. 164.]
When Longstreet's men arrived around midday on August 29, Lee ordered a flanking attack on the Union Army, which was concentrating its attention on Jackson. Longstreet delayed for the rest of the afternoon, requesting time for personal reconnaissance, forcing a frustrated Lee to issue his order three times. By 6:30 p.m. the division of Brig. Gen.
John Bell Hoodmoved forward against the troops of the Union V Corps, but Longstreet withdrew them at 8:30 p.m. Once again Longstreet was criticized for his performance and the postbellum advocates of the Lost Cause claimed that his slowness, reluctance to attack, and disobedience to Gen. Lee were a harbinger of his controversial performance to come on July 2, 1863, at the Battle of Gettysburg. Lee's biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, wrote: "The seeds of much of the disaster at Gettysburg were sown in that instant—when Lee yielded to Longstreet and Longstreet discovered that he would." [Gallagher, pp. 140-57; Tagg, p. 205; Wert, pp. 166-72.]
Despite this criticism, the following day, August 30, was one of Longstreet's finest performances of the war. Pope came to believe that Jackson was starting to retreat and Longstreet took advantage of this by launching a massive assault on the Union army's left flank with over 25,000 men. For over four hours they "pounded like a giant hammer" [Wert, p. 177.] with Longstreet actively directing artillery fire and sending brigades into the fray. Longstreet and Lee were together during the assault and both of them came under Union artillery fire. Although the Union troops put up a furious defense, Pope's army was forced to retreat in a manner similar to the embarrassing Union defeat at First Bull Run, fought on roughly the same battleground. Longstreet gave all of the credit for the victory to Lee, describing the campaign as "clever and brilliant." It established a strategic model he believed to be ideal—the use of defensive tactics within a strategic offensive. [Dickson, p. 1214; Longstreet, pp. 180-98; Wert, p. 179.]
Longstreet's actions in the final two major Confederate defensive battles of 1862 would be the proving grounds for his development of dominant defensive tactics. In the
Maryland Campaignof September, at the Battle of Antietam, Longstreet held his part of the Confederate defensive line against Union forces twice as numerous. After the delaying action Longstreet's corps fought at South Mountain, he retired to Sharpsburg to join Stonewall Jackson, and prepared to fight a defensive battle. Using terrain to his advantage, Longstreet validated his idea that the the tactical defense was now vastly superior to the exposed offense. While the offense dominated in the time of Napoleon, the technological advancements had overturned this. Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen claims that Longstreet was one of the few Civil War officers truly aware of this. [Knudsen, pp. 35-42.] At the end of that bloodiest day of the Civil War, Lee greeted his subordinate by saying, "Ah! Here is Longstreet; here's my old "war-horse!" On October 9, a few weeks after Antietam, Longstreet was promoted to lieutenant general. Lee arranged for Longstreet's promotion to be dated one day earlier than Jackson's, making the Old War-Horse the senior lieutenant general in the Confederate Army. In an army reorganization in November Longstreet's command, now designated the First Corps, consisted of five divisions, approximately 41,000 men. [Longstreet, pp. 239-78; Dickson, p. 1215; Wert, pp. 200, 205, 208.]
In December, Longstreet's First Corps played the decisive role in the
Battle of Fredericksburg. Since Lee moved Longstreet to Fredericksburg early, it allowed Longstreet to take the time to dig in portions of his line, methodically site artillery, and set up a kill zone over the axis of advance he thought the Union attack would come. Remembering the slaughter at Antietam, in which the Confederates did not construct defensive works, Longstreet ordered trenches, abatis, and fieldworks to be constructed, which would set a precedent for future defensive battles of the Army of Northern Virginia. Additionally, Longstreet positioned his men behind a stone wall at the foot of Marye's Heights and held off fourteen assaults by Union forces. About 10,000 Union soldiers fell; Longstreet lost only 500. His great defensive success was not based entirely on the advantage of terrain; this time it was the combination of terrain, defensive works, and a centralized coordination of artillery. [Wert, pp. 215-23; Longstreet, pp. 297-321; Alexander, pp. 166-87; Dickson, p. 1215.]
In the early spring of 1863, Longstreet suggested to Lee that his corps be detached from the Army of Northern Virginia and sent to reinforce the
Army of Tennessee, where Gen. Braxton Braggwas being challenged in Middle Tennesseeby Union Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Longstreet's roommate at West Point. It is possible that Longstreet believed that an independent command in the West offered better opportunities for advancement than a corps under Lee's shadow. [Wert, p. 228.] Lee did detach two divisions from the First Corps, but ordered them to Richmond, not Tennessee. Seaborne movements of the Union IX Corps potentially threatened vital ports on the mid-Atlantic coast. The division of George Pickett started for the capital in mid-February, was followed by John Hood's, and then Longstreet himself was ordered to take command of the detached divisions and the Departments of North Carolina and Southern Virginia. [Wert, p. 228; Eicher, p. 353.]
In April, Longstreet besieged Union forces in the city of
Suffolk, Virginia, a minor operation, but one that was very important to Lee's army, still stationed in war-devastated central Virginia. It enabled Confederate authorities to collect huge amounts of provisions that had been under Union control. However, this operation caused Longstreet and 15,000 men of the First Corps to be absent from the Battle of Chancellorsvillein May. Despite Lee's brilliant victory at Chancellorsville, Longstreet once again came under criticism, claiming that he could have marched his men back from Suffolk in time to join Lee. [Tagg, p. 205; Alexander, p. 190; Wert, pp. 234-41; Longstreet, pp. 322-33.] However, from the Chancellorsville and Suffolk scenario, Longstreet brought forward the beginnings of a new Confederate strategy. These events proved that the Army of Northern Virginia could manage with fewer troops for periods of time, and units could be shifted to create windows of opportunity in other theaters. Longstreet advocated the first strategic movements to utilize rail, interior lines, and create temporary numerical advantages in Mississippi or Tennessee prior to Gettysburg. [Knudsen, pp. 62-65.]
Following Chancellorsville and the death of
Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet and Lee met in mid-May to discuss options for the army's summer campaign. Longstreet advocated, once again, detachment of all or part of his corps to be sent to Tennessee. The justification for this course of action was becoming more urgent as Union Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grantwas advancing on the critical Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi River, Vicksburg. Longstreet argued that a reinforced army under Bragg could defeat Rosecrans and drive toward the Ohio River, which would compel Grant to break his hold on Vicksburg. Lee was opposed to a division of his army and instead advocated a large-scale offensive or raid into Pennsylvania. [Wert, pp. 242-46.] In his memoirs, Longstreet described his reaction to Lee's proposal:
This was written years after the campaign and is affected by hindsight, both of the results of the battle and of the postbellum criticism of the Lost Cause authors. In letters of the time Longstreet made no reference to such a bargain with Lee. In April 1868, Lee said that he "had never made any such promise, and had never thought of doing any such thing." Yet in his post-battle report, Lee wrote, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy." [Coddington, p. 11; Wert, p. 246.]
Army of Northern Virginiawas reorganized after Jackson's death. Two division commanders, Richard S. Ewelland A.P. Hill, were promoted to lieutenant general and assumed command of the Second and the newly created Third Corps respectively. Longstreet's First Corps gave up the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Andersonduring the reorganization, leaving him with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws, George Pickett, and John Hood. [Coddington, p. 12; Wert, p. 248.]
In the initial movements of the campaign, Longstreet's corps followed Ewell's through the
Shenandoah Valley. A spy he had hired, Harrison, was instrumental in warning the Confederates that the Union Army of the Potomacwas advancing north to meet them more quickly than they had anticipated, prompting Lee to order the immediate concentration of his army near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. [Coddington, pp. 188-90.]
Battle of Gettysburg
Longstreet's actions at the
Battle of Gettysburgwould be the centerpiece of the controversy that surrounded him for over a century. Ahead of his troops he arrived on the battlefield late in the afternoon of the first day, July 1, 1863. By then, two Union corps had been driven by Ewell and Hill back through the town into defensive positions on Cemetery Hill. Lee had not intended to fight before his army was fully concentrated, but chance and questionable decisions by A.P. Hill brought on the battle, which was an impressive Confederate victory on the first day. Meeting with Lee, Longstreet was concerned about the strength of the Union defensive position and advocated a strategic movement around the left flank of the enemy, to "secure good ground between him and his capital," which would presumably compel the Union commander, Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, to attack defensive positions erected by the Confederates. Instead, Lee exclaimed, "If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him." [Longstreet, pp. 346-61; Coddington, pp. 360-61; Tagg, p. 206.]
Lee's plan for July 2 called for Longstreet to attack the Union's left flank, which would be followed up by Hill's attack on
Cemetery Ridgenear the center, while Ewell demonstrated on the Union right. Longstreet was not ready to attack as early as Lee envisioned. He received permission from Lee to wait for Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law's brigade (Hood's division) to reach the field before he advanced any of his other brigades; Law marched his men quickly, but did not arrive until noon. Three of Longstreet's brigades were still in march column, and some distance from the attack positions they would need to reach. [Fuller, p. 198.] All of Longstreet's divisions were forced to take a long detour while approaching the enemy position, mislead by inadequate reconnaissance that failed to identify a completely concealed route. [Coddington, pp. 378-79; Sears, pp. 258-61.]
Postbellum criticism of Longstreet claims that he was ordered by Lee to attack in the early morning and that his delays were a significant contributor to the loss of the battle. [Dickson, p. 1215.] However, Lee agreed to the delays for arriving troops and did not issue his formal order for the attack until 11 a.m. Although Longstreet's motivations have long been clouded by the vitriol of the Lost Cause partisans (see Legacy), many historians agree that Longstreet did not aggressively pursue Lee's orders to launch an attack as early as possible. Biographer Jeffry D. Wert wrote, "Longstreet deserves censure for his performance on the morning of July 2. He allowed his disagreement with Lee's decision to affect his conduct. Once the commanding general determined to assail the enemy, duty required Longstreet to comply with the vigor and thoroughness that had previously characterized his generalship. The concern for detail, the regard for timely information, and the need for preparation were absent." [Wert, p. 268] Military historians Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones wrote, "Unenthusiastic about the attack, Longstreet consumed so much time in properly assembling and aligning the corps that the assault did not commence until 4 p.m. During all the time that passed, Meade continued to move in troops to bring about a more and more complete concentration; by 6 p.m. he had achieve numerical superiority and had his left well covered." [Hattaway and Jones, pp. 406-07.] Campaign historian Edwin Coddington presents a lengthy description of the approach march, which he described as "a comedy of errors such as one might expect of inexperienced commanders and raw militia, but not of Lee's "War Horse" and his veteran troops." He called the episode "a dark moment in Longstreet's career as a general." [Coddington, pp. 378-80.] Gettysburg historian Harry Pfanz concluded that "Longstreet's angry dissidence had resulted in further wasted time and delay." [Pfanz, p. 123.] David L. Callihan, in a 2002 reassessment of Longstreet's legacy, wrote, "It is appalling that a field commander of Longstreet's experience and caliber would so cavalierly and ineptly march and prepare his men for battle." [Callihan, p. 14.] An alternative view has been expressed by John Lott, "General Longstreet did all that could be expected on the 2nd day and any allegations of failing to exercise his duty by ordering a morning can be repudiated. It would have been impossible to have commenced an attack much earlier than it occurred, and it is doubtful that the Confederacy could have placed the attack in any more secure hands than General Longstreet." [Lott, p. 27.] Regardless of the controversy regarding the preparations, however, once the assault began around 4 p.m., Longstreet pressed the assault by McLaws and Hood (Pickett's division had not yet arrived) competently against fierce Union resistance, but it was largely unsuccessful, with significant casualties. [Coddington, pp. 359-441; Longstreet, pp. 362-84; Tagg, pp. 206-07.]
On July 3, Lee ordered Longstreet to coordinate a massive assault on the center of the Union line, employing the division of George Pickett and brigades from A.P. Hill's corps. Longstreet knew this assault had little chance of success. The Union Army was in a position reminiscent of the one Longstreet had harnessed at Fredericksburg to defeat Burnside's assault. The Confederates would have to cover almost a mile of open ground and spend time negotiating sturdy fences under fire. The lessons of Fredericksburg and Malvern Hill were lost to Lee on this day. In his book, Longstreet claims to have told Lee:
During the artillery barrage that preceded the infantry assault, Longstreet began to agonize over an assault that was going to cost dearly. He attempted to pass the responsibility for launching Pickett's division to his artillery chief, Col.
Edward Porter Alexander. When the time came to actually order Pickett forward, Longstreet could only nod in assent, unable to verbalize the order. The assault, known as Pickett's Charge, suffered the heavy casualties that Longstreet anticipated. It was the decisive point in the Confederate loss at Gettysburg and Lee ordered a retreat back to Virginia the following day. [Alexander, pp. 254-65; Longstreet, pp. 385-425; Coddington, pp. 493-534; Wert, pp. 280-97; Tagg, p. 208.]
Criticism of Longstreet after the war was based not only on his reputed conduct at the Battle of Gettysburg, but also intemperate remarks he made about Robert E. Lee and his strategies, such as:
In mid-August 1863, Longstreet resumed his attempts to be transferred to the Western Theater. He wrote a private letter to Secretary of War
James Seddon, requesting that he be transferred to serve under his old friend Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. He followed this up in conversations with his congressional ally, Senator Louis Wigfall, who had long considered Longstreet a suitable replacement for Braxton Bragg. Since Bragg's army was under increasing pressure from Rosecrans outside of Chattanooga, Lee and President Davis agreed to the request on September 5. In one of the most daunting logistical efforts of the Confederacy, Longstreet, with the divisions of Lafayette McLaws and John Hood, a brigade from George Pickett's division, and Porter Alexander's 26-gun artillery battalion, traveled over 16 railroads on a convert|775|mi|km|0|sing=on route through the Carolinas to reach Bragg in northern Georgia. Although the entire operation would take over three weeks, Longstreet and lead elements of his corps arrived on September 17. [Wert, pp. 300-05.]
The First Corps veterans arrived in the early stages of the
Battle of Chickamauga. Bragg had already begun an unsuccessful attempt to interpose his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga before the arrival of Longstreet's corps. When the two met at Bragg's headquarters in the evening, Bragg placed Longstreet in command of the Left Wing of his army; Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polkcommanded the Right. On September 20, 1863, Longstreet lined up eight brigades in a deep column against a narrow front, an attack very similar to future German tank tactics in World War II. [Knudsen, pp. 81-87.] By chance, a mistaken order from General Rosecrans caused a gap to appear in the Union line and Longstreet took additional advantage of it to increase his chances of success. The organization of the attack was well suited to the terrain and would have penetrated the Union line regardless. The Union right collapsed and Rosecrans fled the field, as units began to retreat in panic. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomasmanaged to rally the retreating units and solidify a defensive position on Snodgrass Hill. He held that position against repeated afternoon attacks by Longstreet, who was not adequately supported by the Confederate right wing. Once night fell, the battle was over, and Thomas was able to extricate the units under his control to Chattanooga. Bragg's failure to coordinate the right wing and cavalry to further envelope Thomas prevented a total rout of the Union Army. Bragg also neglected to pursue the retreating Federals aggressively, resulting in the futile siege of Chattanooga. Nevertheless, Chickamauga was the greatest Confederate victory in the Western Theater and Longstreet deserved a good portion of the credit. [Wert, pp. 308-20; Longstreet, pp. 445-79; Alexander, pp. 284-92.]
Longstreet soon clashed with the much maligned Bragg and became leader of the group of senior commanders of the army who conspired to have him removed. Bragg's subordinates had long been dissatisfied with his leadership and abrasive personality; the arrival of Longstreet (the senior lieutenant general in the Army) and his officers, added credibility to the earlier claims, and was a catalyst toward action. Longstreet wrote to Seddon, "I am convinced that nothing but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have our present commander." The situation became so grave that President Davis was forced to intercede in person. What followed was one of the most bizarre scenes of the war, with Bragg sitting red faced as a procession of his commanders condemned him. Longstreet stated that Bragg "was incompetent to manage an army or put men into a fight" and that he "knew nothing of the business." Davis sided with Bragg and did nothing to resolve the conflict. [Wert, pp. 325-28.]
Bragg retained his position, relieving or reassigning the generals who had testified against him, and retaliated against Longstreet by reducing his command to only those units that he brought with him from Virginia. Despite the dysfunctional command climate under Bragg, and the lack of support from the War Department and President Davis concerning Bragg's removal, Longstreet did the best he could to continue to seek options in the Chattanooga Campaign. [Knudsen, pp. 83-87.] While Bragg resigned himself and his army to the siege of the Union
Army of the Cumberlandin Chattanooga, Longstreet devised a strategy to prevent reinforcement and a lifting of the siege by Grant. He knew this Union reaction was underway, and that the nearest railhead was Bridgeport, Alabama, where portions of two Union corps would soon arrive. After sending his artillery commander, Porter Alexander, to reconnoiter the Union-occupied town, he devised a plan to shift most of the Army of Tennessee away from the siege, setting up logistical support in Rome, Georgia, go after Bridgeport to take the railhead, possibly catching Maj. Gen. Joseph Hookerand arriving Union troops from the Eastern Theater in a disadvantageous position. The plan was well-received and approved by President Davis, [Longstreet, pp. 460-65.] but it was disapproved by Bragg, who objected to the significant logistical challenges it posed. Longstreet accepted Bragg's arguments [Wert, p. 338.] and agreed to a plan in which he and his men were dispatched to East Tennessee to deal with an advance by Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside. Longstreet was selected for this assignment partially due to enmity on Bragg's part, but also because the War Department intended for Longstreet's men to return to Lee's army and this movement was in the correct direction. [Wert, pp. 330-39; Longstreet, pp. 467-81.]
Longstreet was criticized for the slow pace of his advance toward Knoxville in November and some of his troops began using the nickname Peter the Slow. [Wert, p. 357.] Burnside evaded him at the
Battle of Campbell's Stationand settled into entrenchments around the city, which Longstreet besieged unsuccessfully. The Battle of Fort Sandersfailed to bring a Confederate breakthrough. When Bragg was defeated by Grant at Chattanooga on November 25, Longstreet was ordered to join forces with the Army of Tennessee in northern Georgia. He demurred and began to move back to Virginia, soon pursued by Maj. Gen. William T. Shermanin early December. The armies went into winter quarters and the First Corps rejoined the Army of Northern Virginia in the spring. The only real effect of the minor campaign was to deprive Bragg of troops he sorely needed in Chattanooga. Longstreet's second independent command (after Suffolk) was a failure and his self-confidence was damaged. He reacted to the failure of the campaign by blaming others, as he had done at Seven Pines. He relieved Lafayette McLaws from command and requested the court martial of Brig. Gens. Jerome B. Robertsonand Evander M. Law. He also submitted a letter of resignation to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper on December 30, 1863, but his request to be relieved was denied. [Wert, pp. 340-59, 360-75; Longstreet, pp. 480-523.]
As his corps suffered through a severe winter in Eastern Tennessee with inadequate shelter and provisions, Longstreet again developed strategic plans. He called for an offensive through Tennessee into Kentucky in which his command would be bolstered by P.G.T. Beauregard and 20,000 men. Although he had the concurrence of Gen. Lee, Longstreet was unable to convince President Davis or his newly appointed military adviser, Braxton Bragg. [Wert, pp. 369-71; Longstreet, pp. 544-46.]
Wilderness to Appomattox
Finding out that his old friend Ulysses Grant was in command of the Union Army, he told his fellow officers that "he will fight us every day and every hour until the end of the war." [Rhea, p. 42.] Longstreet helped save the Confederate Army from defeat in his first battle back with Lee's army, the
Battle of the Wildernessin May 1864, where he launched a powerful flanking attack along the Orange Plank Road against the Union II Corps and nearly drove it from the field. Once again he developed innovative tactics to deal with difficult terrain, ordering the advance of six brigades by heavy skirmish lines, which allowed his men to deliver a continuous fire into the enemy, while proving to be elusive targets themselves. Wilderness historian Edward Steere attributed much of the success of the Army to "the display of tactical genius by Longstreet which more than redressed his disparity in numerical strength." [Wert, pp. 385-87.] After the war, the Union II Corps commander that day, Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, said to Longstreet of this flanking maneuver: "You rolled me up like a wet blanket." [Foote, p. 177.]
Longstreet was wounded during the assault—accidentally shot by his own men only about convert|4|mi|km away from the place where Jackson suffered the same fate a year earlier. A bullet passed through his shoulder, severing nerves, and tearing a gash in his throat. The momentum of the attack subsided without Longstreet's active leadership and Gen. Lee delayed further movement until units could be realigned. This gave the Union defenders adequate time to reorganize and the subsequent attack was a failure. E.P. Alexander called the removal of Longstreet the critical juncture of the battle: "I have always believed that, but for Longstreet's fall, the panic which was fairly underway in Hancock's [II] Corps would have been extended & have resulted in Grant's being forced to retreat back across the Rapidan." [Wert, pp. 385-89; Alexander, p. 360.]
Longstreet missed the rest of the 1864 spring and summer campaign, where Lee sorely missed his skill in handling the army. He was treated in
Lynchburg, Virginia, and recuperated in Augusta, Georgia, with his niece, Emma Eve Lonstreet Sibley, the daughter of his brother Gilbert. [Sawyer, p. 63.] He rejoined Lee in October 1864, with his right arm paralyzed and in a sling, initially unable to ride a horse. He had taught himself to write with his left hand; by periodically pulling on his arm, as advised by doctors, he was able to regain use of his right hand in later years.Welsh, p. 144.] For the remainder of the Siege of Petersburghe commanded the defenses in front of the capital of Richmond, including all forces north of the James River and Pickett's Division at Bermuda Hundred. He retreated with Lee in the Appomattox Campaign, commanding both the First and Third Corps, following the death of A.P. Hill on April 2. As Lee considered surrender, Longstreet advised him of his belief that Grant would treat them fairly, but as Lee rode toward Appomattox Court Houseon April 9, 1865, Longstreet said, "General, if he does not give us good terms, come back and let us fight it out." [Wert, pp. 390-403; Alexander, p. 538; Longstreet, pp. 573-631.]
After the war, Longstreet and his family settled in New Orleans, a location popular with a number of former Confederate generals. He entered into a cotton brokerage partnership there and also became the president of the newly created Great Southern and Western Fire, Marine and Accident Insurance Company. He actively sought the presidency of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad but was unsuccessful, and also failed in an attempt to get investors for a proposed railroad from New Orleans to
Monterrey, Mexico. (In 1870, he was named president of the newly organized New Orleans and Northeastern Railroad.) He applied for a pardon from President Andrew Johnson, endorsed by his old friend Ulysses S. Grant. Johnson refused, however, telling Longstreet in a meeting: "There are three persons of the South who can never receive amnesty: Mr. Davis, General Lee, and yourself. You have given the Union cause too much trouble." The United States Congress restored his rights of citizenship in June 1868. [Wert, pp. 407-10, 413-14; Longstreet, p. 634.]
Longstreet was the only senior Confederate officer to become a
scalawagand join the Republican party during Reconstruction. He endorsed Grant for president in 1868, attended his inauguration ceremonies, and six days later received an appointment as surveyor of customs in New Orleans. For these acts he lost favor with many Southerners. His old friend Harvey Hill wrote to a newspaper: "Our scalawag is the local leper of the community." Unlike a Northern carpetbagger, Hill wrote, Longstreet "is a native, which is so much the worse." The Republican governor of Louisiana appointed Longstreet the adjutant general of the state militia and by 1872 he became a major general in command of all militia and state police forces within New Orleans. During riots in 1874 protesting election irregularities, Longstreet rode to meet protesters but was pulled from his horse, shot by a spent bullet, and taken prisoner. Federal troops were required to restore order. Longstreet's use of African-American troops during the disturbances increased the denunciations by fellow Southerners. [Wert, pp. 413-16.]
In 1875 the Longstreet family left New Orleans with concerns over health and safety, returning to
Gainesville, Georgia. By this time Louise had given birth to ten children, five of whom lived to adulthood. He applied for various jobs through the Rutherford B. Hayesadministration and was briefly considered for Secretary of the Navy. He served briefly as deputy collector of internal revenue and as postmaster of Gainesville. In 1880 Hayes appointed Longstreet as his ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, and later he served from 1897 to 1904, under Presidents William McKinleyand Theodore Roosevelt, as U.S. Commissioner of Railroads. [Eicher, p. 353; Wert, pp. 417-19.]
On one of his frequent return trips to New Orleans on business, Longstreet converted to Catholicism in 1877 and was a devout believer until his death. [CathEncy|wstitle=James Longstreet] He served as a
U.S. marshalfrom 1881 to 1884, but the return of a Democratic administration ended his political careers and he went into semiretirement on a 65 acre farm near Gainesville, where he raised turkeys and planted orchards and vineyards on terraced ground that his neighbors referred to jokingly as "Gettysburg." A devastating fire on April 9, 1889 (the 24th anniversary of Lee's surrender at Appomattox) destroyed his house and many of his personal possessions, including his personal Civil War documents and memorabilia. That December Louise Longstreet died. He remarried in 1897, in a ceremony at the governor's mansion in Atlanta, to Helen Dortch, age 34. Although Longstreet's children reacted poorly to the marriage, Helen became a devoted wife and avid supporter of his legacy after his passing. She outlived him by 58 years, dying in 1962. [Wert, pp. 418-25; Eicher, p. 353.]
After Louise's death, and after bearing criticism of his war record from other Confederates for decades, Longstreet refuted most of their arguments in his memoirs entitled "From Manassas to Appomattox", a labor of five years that was published in 1896. His final years were marked by poor health and partial deafness. In 1902 he suffered from severe
rheumatismand was unable to stand for more than a few minutes at a time. His weight diminished from 200 to 135 pounds by January 1903. Cancerdeveloped in his right eye, and in December he had X-ray therapy in Chicago to treat it. He contracted pneumoniaand died in Gainesville, where he is buried in Alta Vista Cemetery. He outlived most of his detractors, and was one of only a few general officers from the Civil War to live into the 20th century. [Wert, pp. 422-27.]
Because Longstreet became a "reconstructed rebel", embraced equal rights for blacks, unification of the nation, and reconstruction, he became the target of those who wanted to maintain racist policies and otherwise could not accept the verdict of the battlefield.Knudsen, pp. 7-19.] Criticism from authors in the Lost Cause movement attacked Longstreet's war career for many years after his death. The attacks formally began on January 19, 1872, the anniversary of Robert E. Lee's birth, and less than two years after Lee's death. Jubal Early, in a speech at Washington College, exonerated Lee of his failure at Gettysburg and falsely accused Longstreet of attacking late on the second day and of being responsible for the debacle on the third. The following year
William N. Pendleton, Lee's artillery chief, claimed in the same venue that Longstreet disobeyed an explicit order to attack at sunrise on July 2. Both of these allegations were fabrications, however, Longstreet failed to challenge these lies publicly until 1875. The delay was damaging to his reputation, as the Lost Cause mythology had taken hold in common opinion by this time. In the 20th century, Lost Cause "disciple" Douglas Southall Freeman, kept criticism of Longstreet foremost in Civil War scholarship in his biography of Lee. [Gallagher, p. 62. Gallagher cites Freeman's description on the end of fighting on July 1 at Gettysburg: "The battle was being decided at that very hour in the mind of Longstreet, who at his camp, a few miles away, was eating his heart away in sullen resentment that Lee had rejected his long cherished plan of a strategic offensive and a tactical defensive." He called Longstreet's performance on July 2 so sluggish "it has often been asked why Lee did not arrest him for insubordination or order him before a court-martial." Gallagher notes that Freeman comes to different conclusions in his later three-volume set, "Lee's Lieutenants: a Study in Command", stating that Longstreet's "attitude was wrong but his instinct was correct. He should have obeyed orders, but the order should not have been given."] Clifford Dowdey, a Virginia newspaperman and novelist, was noted for his severe criticism of Longstreet in the 1950s and 1960s. [Gallagher, p. 207; Connelly and Bellows, pp. 32-38; Hartwig, p. 34; Wert, pp. 422-23.]
After Longstreet's death, Helen Longstreet privately published "Lee and Longstreet at High Tide" in his defense, in which she stated "the South was seditiously taught to believe that the Federal Victory was wholly the fortuitous outcome of the culpable disobedience of General Longstreet." [ [http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-881 "New Georgia Encyclopedia"] ]
The publication of
Michael Shaara's novel " The Killer Angels" in 1974, based in part on Longstreet's memoirs, followed by its 1993 film adaptation, "Gettysburg", have been credited with helping to restore Longstreet's reputation as a general and to dramatically raise his public visibility. [Hartwig, p. 2.] The 1982 work by Thomas L. Connolly and Barbara L. Bellows, "God and General Longstreet", provided a "further upgrading of Longstreet through an attack on Lee, the Lost Cause, and the Virginia revisionists." [Wakelyn, p. 258.]
Longstreet Bridge, a portion of
U.S. Route 129near Gainesville, Georgia, crosses the Chattahoochee River(which later was dammed to form Lake Sidney Lanierin Georgia) and was named in honor of General Longstreet. [ [http://dlg.galileo.usg.edu/meta/html/dlg/vang/meta_dlg_vang_hal281.html?Welcome "Digital Library of Georgia"] ]
Longstreet Road is a major east-west road on
Fort Bragg, North Carolina. [ [http://maps.google.com/maps?q=Longstreet+Rd,+Fort+Bragg,+NC+28310,+USA&sa=X&oi=map&ct=title Google map] .]
In 1998 one of the last monuments erected at Gettysburg National Military Park was dedicated as a belated tribute to Longstreet, an equestrian statue by sculptor
Gary Casteel. He is shown riding on a disproportionately small depiction of his favorite horse, Hero, at ground level in a grove of trees in Pitzer Woods—unlike most generals, who are elevated on tall bases overlooking the battlefield—indicative of the continuing controversy surrounding him. [ [http://www.elohi.com/photo/longstreet/ Dedication of the James Longstreet Memorial at Gettysburg] ]
In popular media
Longstreet is a character in
Harry Turtledove's alternate history novel, " How Few Remain", and in Robert Conroy's alternate history novel, "1901". He is portrayed in the film "Gettysburg" by Tom Berenger, and in the prequel, " Gods and Generals", by Bruce Boxleitner. He was portrayed onstage in the world premiere of " The Killer Angels" at the Lifeline Theatrein Chicago by Brian Amidei. [ [http://www.performink.com/Archives/reviewroundup/2004/3-19ReviewRoundup.htm Review summaries of "The Killer Angels"] .]
* Alexander, Edward P., and Gallagher, Gary W. (editor), "Fighting for the Confederacy: The Personal Recollections of General Edward Porter Alexander", University of North Carolina Press, 1989, ISBN 0-8078-4722-4.
* Callihan, David L., "Neither Villain Nor Hero: A Reassessment of James Longstreet's Performance at Gettysburg," "The Gettysburg Magazine", issue 26, January 2002.
* Coddington, Edwin B., "The Gettysburg Campaign; a study in command", Scribner's, 1968, ISBN 0-684-84569-5.
* Connelly, Thomas L., and Barbara L. Bellows, "God and General Longstreet: The Lost Cause and the Southern Mind", Louisiana State University Press, 1982, ISBN 0-8071-1020-5.
* Dickson, Charles Ellis, "James Longstreet", "Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History", Heidler, David S., and Heidler, Jeanne T., eds., W. W. Norton & Company, 2000, ISBN 0-393-04758-X.
* Eicher, John H., and Eicher, David J., "Civil War High Commands", Stanford University Press, 2001, ISBN 0-8047-3641-3.
* Foote, Shelby, ", Vol. 3: Red River to Appomattox", Random House, 1974, ISBN 0-394-74913-8.
* Fuller, Maj. Gen. J. F. C., "Grant and Lee, A Study in Personality and Generalship", Indiana University Press, 1957, ISBN 0-253-13400-5.
* Gallagher, Gary, "Lee and His Generals in War and Memory", Louisiana State University Press, 1998, ISBN 0-8071-2958-5.
* Hartwig, D. Scott, "A Killer Angels Companion", Thomas Publications, 1996, ISBN 0-939631-95-4.
* Hattaway, Herman, and Jones, Archer, "How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War", University of Illinois Press, 1983, ISBN 0-252-00918-5.
* Knudsen, LTC Harold M., "General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Modern General", Word Association Publishers, 2007, ISBN 1-59571-188-0.
* Longstreet, James, [http://www.wtj.com/archives/longstreet/ "From Manassas to Appomattox"] , 2nd ed., Lippincott, 1912.
* Lott, John, "Could Longstreet's Delay Have Been Avoided?", "The Civil War Courier", February 2008.
* Rhea, Gordon C., "The Battle of the Wilderness May 5–6, 1864", Louisiana State University Press, 1994, ISBN 0-8071-1873-7.
* Sawyer, Gordon, "James Longstreet: Before Manassas & After Appomattox", Sawyer House Publishing, 2005, ISBN 0-9769331-0-1.
* Smith, Jean Edward, "Grant", Simon and Shuster, 2001, ISBN 0-684-84927-5.
* Tagg, Larry, [http://www.rocemabra.com/~roger/tagg/generals/ "The Generals of Gettysburg"] , Savas Publishing, 1998, ISBN 1-882810-30-9.
* Wakelyn, Jon L., "James Longstreet", "Leaders of the American Civil War: A Biographical and Historiographical Dictionary", Ritter, Charles F., and Wakelyn, Jon L., eds., Greenwood Press, 1998, ISBN 0-313-29560-3.
* Welsh, Jack D., "Medical Histories of Confederate Generals", Kent State University Press, 1999, ISBN 978-0873386494.
* Wert, Jeffry D., "General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier: A Biography", Simon & Schuster, 1993, ISBN 0-671-70921-6.
* [http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/nge/Article.jsp?id=h-881 "New Georgia Encyclopedia" biography of Helen Dortch Longstreet]
*Freeman, Douglas S., "Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command" (3 volumes), Scribners, 1946, ISBN 0-684-85979-3.
* Freeman, Douglas S., [http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Gazetteer/People/Robert_E_Lee/FREREL/home.html "R. E. Lee, A Biography"] (4 volumes), Scribners, 1934.
* Mendoza, Alexander, "Confederate Struggle For Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West", Texas A&M University Press, 2008. ISBN 1-60344-052-6.
* Piston, William G., "Lee's Tarnished Lieutenant: James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History", University of Georgia Press, 1990, ISBN 0-8203-0907-9.
* Sanger, Donald B., "James Longstreet, Vol. I: Soldier", Louisiana State University Press, 1952.
* [http://www.longstreetchronicles.org/ The Longstreet Chronicles]
* [http://www.longstreet.org/ The Longstreet Society]
* [http://www.library.ci.corpus-christi.tx.us/MexicanWar/longstreetj.htm Military biography of James Longstreet] from the Cullum biographies
* [http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/american_civil_war/3446371.html James Longstreet: Robert E. Lee's Most Valuable Soldier] article by Jeffry D. Wert
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