Battle of Edson's Ridge

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of Edson's Ridge
partof=the Pacific Theatre of World War II


caption=A United States Marine stands near some of the fighting positions on Hill 123 on "Edson's" Ridge after the battle. Edson's command post during the battle was located just to the right of where the Marine is standing.
date=September 12, 1942 – September 14, 1942
place=Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands
result=Allied victory
combatant1=Allied forces including:
flagicon|United States|1912 United States,
flagicon|United Kingdom British Solomon Islands Protectorate
combatant2=flagicon|Empire of Japan Empire of Japan
commander1=Alexander Vandegrift,
Merritt A. Edson
commander2=Harukichi Hyakutake,
Kiyotake Kawaguchi
strength1=12,500 [Morison, "Struggle for Guadalcanal", p. 15. Number reflects total Allied forces on Guadalcanal, not necessarily the number directly involved in the battle. 11,000 troops were landed initially and three battalions (about 1,500 troops) were moved to Guadalcanal from Tulagi later.]
strength2=6,217 [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 245. Number reflects the total Japanese forces under Kawaguchi's command on Guadalcanal, not necessarily the number actually involved in the battle.]
casualties1=104 killed [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 185. Frank ("Guadalcanal", p. 245) says 96 were killed.]
casualties2=850 killed [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 184 & 194 and Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 245.]

The Battle of Edson's Ridge, also known as the Battle of the Bloody Ridge, Battle of Raiders Ridge, and Battle of the Ridge, was a land battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II between Imperial Japanese Army and Allied (mainly United States Marine Corps) ground forces. It took place September 12–September 14, 1942 on Guadalcanal Island in the Solomon Islands, and was the second of three separate major Japanese ground offensives in the Guadalcanal campaign.

In the battle, U.S. Marines, under the overall command of U.S. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, repulsed an attack by the Japanese 35th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Japanese Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi. The Marines were defending the Lunga perimeter that guarded Henderson Field on Guadalcanal, which was captured from the Japanese by the Allies in landings on Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942. Kawaguchi's unit was sent to Guadalcanal in response to the Allied landings with the mission of recapturing the airfield and driving the Allied forces from the island.

Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, which at that time numbered about 12,000 personnel, Kawaguchi's 6,000 soldiers conducted several nighttime frontal assaults on the U.S. defenses. The main Japanese assault occurred around Lunga ridge south of Henderson Field that was manned by troops from several U.S. Marine Corps units, primarily troops from the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions under U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson. Although the U.S. Marine Corps defenses were almost overrun, Kawaguchi's attack was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers.

Because of the key participation by Edson's unit in defending the ridge, the ridge was commonly referred to as "Edson's" ridge in historical accounts of the battle in Western sources. [Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 224.] After Edson's Ridge, the Japanese continued to send troops to Guadalcanal for further attempts to retake Henderson Field, affecting Japanese offensive operations in other areas of the South Pacific.

Background

Guadalcanal campaign

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia. They were also intended to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign to isolate the major Japanese base at Rabaul and support the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign. [Hogue, "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal", p. 235–236.]

Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on August 8 the Allied landing forces had secured Tulagi and nearby small islands, as well as an airfield under construction at Lunga Point (coord|9|25|45|S|160|3|4|E|type:airport|name=Henderson Field) on Guadalcanal. [Morison, "Struggle for Guadalcanal", pp. 14–15.] Vandegrift placed his 11,000 troops of the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal in a loose perimeter around the Lunga Point area.

On August 12, the airfield was named Henderson Field after Major Lofton Henderson, a Marine aviator who had been killed at the Battle of Midway. The Allied aircraft and pilots that subsequently operated out of Henderson Field were called the "Cactus Air Force" after the Allied code name for Guadalcanal. [Shaw, "First Offensive", p. 13.]

. [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 88, Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 221, and Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 141–143. The 35th Infantry Brigade contained 3,880 troops and was centered on the 124th Infantry Regiment with various attached supporting units (Alexander, p. 139).]

Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's First Element conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early morning hours of August 21. Ichiki's assault was defeated with heavy losses for the Japanese attackers in what became known as the Battle of the Tenaru. In total, all but 128 of the original 917 men of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle. The survivors of Ichiki's force returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat in the battle and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 156–158 & 681.]

By August 23, Kawaguchi's unit reached Truk and was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal. Because of the damage caused by Allied air attack to a separate troop convoy during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, the Japanese decided not to deliver Kawaguchi's troops to Guadalcanal by slow transport ship. Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were sent to Rabaul. From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's men to Guadalcanal by destroyers, staging through a Japanese naval base in the Shortland Islands. The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make the round trip down "The Slot" to Guadalcanal and back in a single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to Allied air attack. However, delivering the troops in this manner prevented most of the soldiers' heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, and much food and ammunition, from being carried to Guadalcanal with them. These high speed destroyer runs to Guadalcanal, which occurred throughout the campaign, were later called the "Tokyo Express" by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese. [Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 113 and Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 198–199, 205, and 266.] The Japanese controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands during the nighttime and were not challenged by the Allies. However, any Japanese ship remaining within range of the aircraft at Henderson Field during the daylight hours (about 300 kilometers or 200 miles) was in great danger from damaging air attack. This "curious tactical situation" would exist for the next several months during the campaign. [Morison, "Struggle for Guadalcanal", p. 113–114.]

Troop movement

On August 28, 600 of Kawaguchi's troops were loaded onto the destroyers "Asagiri", "Amagiri", "Yugiri", and "Shirakumo", designated Destroyer Division 20 (DD20). Because of a shortage of fuel, DD20 could not make the entire round trip to Guadalcanal at high speed in one night. Instead, DD20 had to start the trip earlier in the day so that they could complete the trip by the next morning at a slower, fuel-conserving speed. At 18:05 that same day, 11 U.S. dive bombers from VMSB-232 under the command of Lt. Col. Richard Mangrum, [Hulbert and DeChant, "Flying Leathernecks", p. 49.] flew from Henderson Field, located and attacked DD20 about 110 kilometers (70 mi) north of Guadalcanal, sinking "Asagiri" and heavily damaging "Yugiri" and "Shirakumo". "Amagiri" took "Shirakumo" in tow and the three destroyers returned to the Shortlands without completing their mission. The attack on DD20 killed 62 of Kawaguchi's soldiers and 94 members of the destroyers' crews. [Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 114, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 199–200, and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 98.]

that were used to shuttle Allied troops around the Guadalcanal/Tulagi area. No match for the larger-gunned, more modern Japanese destroyers, the U.S. ships were sunk immediately, with 33 crewmen killed. [Frank, " Guadalcanal", p. 211–212, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 91–92, and Morison, "Struggle for Guadalcanal", p. 118–121.]

In spite of the successes of the destroyer runs, Kawaguchi insisted that as many soldiers of his brigade as possible be delivered to Guadalcanal by slow barges. Therefore, a convoy carrying 1,100 of Kawaguchi's troops and heavy equipment in 61 barges, mainly from the 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment under the command of Colonel Akinosuka Oka, departed the northern coast of Santa Isabel Island on September 2. On September 4 and September 5, aircraft from Henderson Field attacked the barge convoy, killing about 90 of the soldiers in the barges and destroying much of the unit's heavy equipment. Most of the remaining 1,000 troops were able to land near Kamimbo (coord|9|15|32|S|159|40|18|E|type:landmark|name=Komimbo), west of the Lunga perimeter over the next few days. [Alexander, p. 138–139, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 116–124, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 213, and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 106–109. Griffith says 400 troops were killed, Frank and Smith say 90 were killed. Oka commanded the entire 124th Regiment so his command section was attached to the 2nd Battalion at this time. The 2nd Battalion's commander, Major Takamatsu, was killed during the air attacks on the barge convoy. The Aoba or 4th Infantry Regiment was from the 2nd Infantry Divisioin.] By September 7, Kawaguchi had 5,200 troops at Taivu Point and 1,000 west of the Lunga perimeter. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 219.] Kawaguchi was confident enough that he could defeat the Allied forces facing him that he declined an offer from the 17th Army for delivery of one more infantry battalion to augment his forces. Kawaguchi believed that there were only about 2,000 U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 218.]

During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter. Between August 21 and September 3, he relocated three Marine battalions, including the 1st Raider Battalion, under U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson (Edson's Raiders), and the 1st Parachute Battalion from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal. These units added about 1,500 troops to Vandegrift's original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field. [Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 91, Morison, "Struggle for Guadalcanal", p. 15 and Hough, "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal", p. 298. One of the U.S. transport destroyers, "Colhoun", was sunk by Japanese aircraft off Guadalcanal on August 30, after delivering Company D of the 1st Raiders, with 51 of her crew killed.] The 1st Parachute battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu-Tanambogo in August, was placed under Edson's command. [Christ, p. 176, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 103. The Parachutists were delivered to Guadalcanal on September 2.]

Battle

Prelude

Kawaguchi set the date for his attack on the Lunga perimeter for September 12 and began marching his forces west from Taivu towards Lunga Point on September 5. He radioed 17th Army and requested air strikes on Henderson Field beginning September 9 and for naval warships to be stationed off Lunga Point on September 12 to "destroy any Americans who attempted to flee from the island." [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 112–113.] On September 7, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield." Kawaguchi's plan called for his forces to split into three divisions, approach the Lunga perimeter inland, and launch a surprise night attack. Oka's force would attack the perimeter from the west while Ichiki's Second Echelon, renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be by Kawaguchi's "Center Body," numbering 3,000 men in three battalions, from the south of the Lunga perimeter. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 219–220 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 113–115 & 243. Most of the men in Ichiki's second echelon were from Asahikawa, Hokkaidō. "Kuma" refers to the brown bears that lived in that area.] By September 7, most of Kawaguchi's troops had started marching from Taivu towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard the brigade's supply base at Taivu. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 220 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 121.]

Meanwhile, native island scouts told the Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu, near the village of Tasimboko, about 17 miles east of Lunga. (These scouts were directed by Martin Clemens, a British government official and officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force.) Edson launched a raid against the Japanese troops at Taivu. [Christ, p. 185, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 93–95, Zimmerman, "Guadalcanal Campaign", p. 80 and Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 125.] Two destroyer transports, "McKean" and "Manley", and two patrol boats took 813 of Edson's men to Taivu in two trips. [Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 95, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 220–221. Alexander, p. 118, says there were 833 men, including 605 Raiders and 208 Paramarines. Also accompanying the raid were correspondents Richard Tregaskis and Robert C. Miller. Jacob C. Vouza went along but remained on one of the boats as he was still recovering from wounds suffered during the Battle of the Tenaru (Alexander p. 119).] Edson and his first wave of 501 troops landed at Taivu at 05:20 (local time) on September 8. With support by aircraft from Henderson Field and gunfire from the destroyer transports, Edson's men advanced towards Tasimboko village, but were slowed by Japanese resistance. At 11:00, the rest of Edson's men landed. With this reinforcement and more support from the Henderson Field aircraft, Edson's force pushed into the village. The Japanese defenders, believing a major landing was underway after observing the concurrent approach of an Allied supply ship convoy heading towards Lunga Point, retreated into the jungle, leaving behind 27 dead. Two Marines were killed. [Alexander, p. 122–123, Hough, "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal", p. 298–299, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 221–222, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 129, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 129–130, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 95–96, Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 222. At this time Kawaguchi and most of his forces were about six miles west of Tasimboko near Tetere and had just begun to head into the island's interior (Alexander p. 124).]

In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered the supply base for Kawaguchi's forces, including large stockpiles of food, ammunition, and medical supplies, and a powerful shortwave radio. The Marines seized documents, equipment and food supplies, destroyed everything else in sight, and returned to the Lunga perimeter at 17:30. The mounds of supplies and intelligence from the captured documents revealed that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island and apparently planning an attack. [Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 130–132, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 221–222, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 96–97, and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 130. Three times during the day Gerald C. Thomas from Vandegrift's staff radioed Edson and ordered him to abandon the mission immediately and return to base. Edson ignored him (Alexander p. 129). Richard Tregaskis discovered most of the documents. "YP-346", a US Navy patrol boat, was attacked and damaged by a Tokyo Express force that night.]

Edson and Colonel Gerald Thomas, Vandegrift's operations officer, believed that the Japanese attack would come at the Lunga Ridge, a narrow, grassy, 1,000 meter long, coral ridge (coord|9|26|39|S|160|2|50|E|type:mountain|name=Edson's Ridge|display=title,inline) that paralleled the Lunga River and was located just south of Henderson Field. The ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area and was almost undefended at that time. Edson and Thomas tried to persuade Vandegrift to move forces to defend the ridge, but Vandegrift refused, believing that the Japanese were more likely to attack along the coast. Finally, Thomas convinced Vandegrift that the ridge was a good location for Edson's Raiders to "rest" from their actions of the preceding month. On September 11, the 840 men of Edson's unit, including the 1st Raiders and the Paramarines, deployed onto and around the ridge and prepared to defend it. [Alexander, p. 138, Christ, p. 193–194, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 223 & 225–226, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 132 & 134–135, Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 223, and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 130–131, 138. Edson's unit comprised about 600 Raiders and 214 Paramarines. Edson had personally scouted the ridge a week before the Tasimboko raid and told his assistant, "This is the place. This is where they'll hit" (Alexander, p. 141).]

Kawaguchi's Center Body of troops "was" planning to attack the Lunga perimeter at the ridge, which they called "the centipede" (mukade gata) because of its shape. On September 9, Kawaguchi's troops left the coast at Koli Point. Split into four columns, they marched into the jungle towards their predesignated attack points south and southeast of the airfield. Lack of good maps, at least one faulty compass, and thick, almost impenetrable jungle caused the Japanese columns to proceed slowly and zigzag, costing a lot of time. At the same time, Oka's troops approached the Lunga perimeter from the west. Oka had some intelligence on the Marine defenses, extracted from a U.S. Army pilot captured on August 30. [Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 226, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 224–225 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 131–136. This pilot was one of the two U.S. Army pilots shot down on August 30 (while flying P-400s from Henderson Field), and later declared killed in action (KIA). Their last names were Chilson and Wyethes [http://www.daveswarbirds.com/cactus/67thpurs.htm] .]

During the day of September 12, Kawaguchi's troops struggled through the jungle toward their assembly points for that night's attacks. Kawaguchi wanted his three Center Body battalions in place by 14:00 that day. The Center Body battalions, however, did not reach their assembly areas until after 22:00. Oka was also delayed in his advance towards the Marine lines in the west. Only the Kuma battalion reported that they were in place on time. Despite the problems in reaching the planned attack positions, Kawaguchi was still confident in his attack plan because a captured U.S. pilot disclosed that the ridge was the weakest part of the Marine defenses. Japanese bombers attacked the ridge during the day on September 11 and 12, causing a few casualties among Edson's men, including two killed. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 228–229 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 144–145, Alexander, p. 142. The name and fate of this U.S. pilot (who was not the Army pilot captured by Oka's men earlier) are unknown.]

First night's action

[

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225px|thumb|left|Action_on_September 12. The Japanese Kokusho battalion forces the U.S. Raider's Company C to retreat to the ridge.] Based on reports from native scouts and their own patrols, the Americans knew of the approach of the Japanese forces but did not know exactly where or when they would attack. The ridge around which Edson deployed his men consisted of three distinct hillocks. At the southern tip and surrounded on three sides by thick jungle was Hill 80 (so named because it rose 80 feet (24 m) above sea level). Six hundred yards north was Hill 123 (likewise named for its height in feet above sea level, which is 37 m), the dominant feature on the ridge. The northernmost hillock was unnamed and about 60 feet (18 m) high. Edson placed the five companies from the Raider battalion on the west side of the ridge and the three Parachute battalion companies on the east side, holding positions in depth from Hill 80 back to Hill 123. Two of the five Raider companies, "B" and "C", held a line between the ridge, a small, swampy lagoon, and the Lunga River. Machine-gun teams from "E" Company, the heavy weapons company, were scattered throughout the defenses. Edson placed his command post on Hill 123. [Alexander, p. 142 & 146, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 102, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 222–223 & 229 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 138–139, and 146.]

At 21:30 on September 12, the Japanese cruiser "Sendai" and three destroyers shelled the Lunga perimeter for 20 minutes and illuminated the ridge with a searchlight. Japanese artillery also began shelling the Marine lines but without doing much damage. At this same time, scattered groups of Kawaguchi's troops began skirmishing with Marines around the ridge. Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion, led by Major Yukichi Kokusho, attacked the Raider's "C" company between the lagoon and the Lunga River, overrunning at least one platoon and forcing the Marine company to fall back to the ridge. Kokusho's unit became entangled with troops from Kawaguchi's 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Kusunichi Watanabe, who were still struggling to reach their attack positions, and the resulting confusion effectively stopped the Japanese attack on the ridge that night. Kawaguchi, who was having trouble locating where he was in relation to the U.S. Marine lines as well as coordinating his troops' attacks, later complained, "Due to the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and was completely beyond my control. In my whole life I have never felt so disappointed and helpless." Twelve U.S. Marines were killed in the night's action, while Japanese casualties are unknown but perhaps somewhat greater. [Alexander, p. 150, Chirst, p. 208, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 231–232, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 140, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 102–103, and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 146–151. Kukusho's men attacked along both sides of the lagoon and captured at least six of the Marines' machine-guns (Alexander p. 166). Eleven of the Marines killed were actually listed as "missing" although none of them were ever seen alive again. The few Marine bodies recovered after the battle were so decomposed that identification was impossible. Some Marines reported hearing the sounds (screams) of one or more captured Marines being tortured throughout the night of September 12. Said Robert Youngdeer who was present on the ridge that night, "The sound of someone being worked over out there in the darkness remains with me until this day. The whole battalion could hear their screams" (Alexander, p. 153).] Although both Oka in the west and the Kuma unit in the east tried to attack the Marine lines that night, they failed to make contact and halted near the Marine lines at dawn. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 232 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 151–152.]

At first light on September 13, Cactus Air Force aircraft and Marine artillery fired into the area just south of the ridge, forcing any Japanese still out in the open to seek cover in the nearby jungle. The Japanese suffered several casualties, including two officers from Watanabe's battalion. At 05:50, Kawaguchi decided to regroup his forces for another attack that night. [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 151–151.]

econd night's action on the ridge

[

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275px|thumb|right|A_view_of_Hill_123_around_which_Edson_centered_his_defenses_for_the_battle_on_September 13. This view is from Hill 80 looking northwards.] Expecting the Japanese to attack again that night, Edson directed his troops to improve their defenses on and around the ridge. After a failed attempt by two companies to retake the ground on the Marine right flank lost to Kokusho the night before, Edson repositioned his forces. He pulled his front back about convert|400|yd|m to a line that stretched convert|1800|yd|m, starting at the Lunga River and crossing the ridge about convert|150|yd|m south of Hill 123. Around and behind Hill 123 he placed five companies. Any Japanese attackers surmounting Hill 80 would have to advance over convert|400|yd|m of open terrain to close with the Marine positions at Hill 123. With only a few hours to prepare, the Marines were only able to construct rudimentary and shallow fortifications. Also, the Marines were low on ammunition, with one or two grenades for each Marine. Vandegrift ordered a reserve force consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (2/5) to move into a position just to the rear of Edson's troops. In addition, a battery (four guns) of 105mm howitzers from the 11th Marine Regiment moved to a location from which it could provide direct fire onto the ridge, and a forward artillery observer was placed with Edson's front line units. [Christ, p. 212–215, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 141, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 233–237 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 152–158.]

Late in the afternoon, Edson stepped onto a grenade box and addressed his exhausted troops, saying,

:"You men have done a great job, and I have just one more thing to ask of you. Hold out just one more night. I know we've been without sleep a long time. But we expect another attack from them tonight and they may come through here. I have every reason to believe that we will have reliefs here for all of us in the morning." [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 158.]

Edson's speech "raised the spirits" of the Raiders and helped them prepare mentally for the night ahead. [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 158.]

[
225px|thumb|left|Action_on_September 13. Japanese attacks force Edson's troops into a small perimeter around Hill 123.] As the sun set on September 13, Kawaguchi faced Edson's 830 Marines with 3,000 troops of his brigade, plus an assortment of light artillery. The night was pitch black, with no moon. At 21:00, seven Japanese destroyers briefly bombarded the ridge. Kawaguchi's attack began just after nightfall, with Kokusho's battalion assaulting Raider Company B on the Marine right flank, just to the west of the ridge. The force of the assault caused Company B to fall back to Hill 123. Under Marine artillery fire, Kokusho reassembled his men and continued his attack. Without pausing to try to "roll-up" the other nearby Marine units, whose flanks were now unprotected, Kokusho's unit surged forward through the swampy lowlands between the ridge and the Lunga River, heading for the airfield. Kokusho's men came upon a pile of Marine supplies and rations. Not having eaten adequately for a couple of days, they paused to "gorge themselves" on the "C" and "K" rations. Kokusho ordered his men to continue the attack. At about 03:00, he led them against the Marine units around the northern portion of the ridge, just short of the airfield, as well as Hill 123. In the heavy fighting that followed, Kokusho and around 100 of his men were killed, ending that attack. [Alexander, p. 171–176, 179, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 161–167. The Marine defenders that finally defeated Kokusho's charge were most likely from the U.S. 11th Marine Regiment with assistance from the 1st Pioneer Battalion and Ampibious Tractor Battalion, as well as Edson's men on the ridge (Christ, p. 250, Smith, p. 167, Alexander, p. 179, and Frank, p. 235). Jersey states that Kokusho wasn't killed at this time, instead being killed on January 2, 1943 during the Battle of Mount Austen, the Galloping Horse, and the Sea Horse (Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 360).]

Meanwhile, Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion, under Major Masao Tamura, assembled for their planned assault against Hill 80 from the jungle south of the ridge. Marine observers spotted Tamura's preparations and called in artillery fire. At about 22:00 a barrage from twelve 105 mm cannons hit Tamura's position. In response, two companies of Tamura's troops, numbering about 320 men, charged up Hill 80 with fixed bayonets behind their own barrage of mortar fire and grenades. Tamura's attack hit Company B of the Marine Parachute battalion and also Raider Company B, pushing the Parachutists off the east side of the ridge into a draw below the ridgeline. To protect the exposed Raider Company B, Edson immediately ordered them to pull back onto Hill 123. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 237–238 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 162–165. Tamura's battalion was actually the 2nd Battalion of the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment was with Oka west of the Lunga perimeter. Alexander (p. 139) spells Tamura's given name as Masuro. During the battle, Major Charles A. Miller, commander of the Parachute battalion, was unresponsive to Edson's orders and failed to exercise effective command over his troops. Miller was subsequently relieved of command after the battle and sent back to the United States and discharged from the Marines.]

At the same time, a Japanese company from Watanabe's battalion infiltrated through a gap between the east side of the ridge and Parachute Company C. Deciding that their positions were now untenable, Parachute Companies B and C climbed onto the ridge and retreated to a position behind Hill 123. In the darkness and confusion of the battle, the retreat quickly became confused and disorganized. A few Marines began yelling that the Japanese were attacking with poison gas, scaring other Marines who no longer possessed their gas masks. After arriving behind Hill 123, some of the Marines continued on towards the airfield, repeating the word "withdraw" to anyone within earshot. Other Marines began to follow them. Just at the moment that it appeared that the Marines on the hill were about to break and head for the rear in a rout, Edson, Major Kenneth D. Bailey from Edson's staff, and other Marine officers appeared and, with "vivid" language, herded the Marines back into defensive positions around Hill 123. [Christ, p. 230–235, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 238 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 165–166. Smoke and the smell of magnesium flares plus the Japanese shouts of "Tsu-geki!" (Charge!) is probably what caused some Marines to believe that poison gas was being employed by the Japanese (Alexander, p. 179). Bailey reportedly physically restrained some Marines and threatened others with a pistol to stop their "stampede" for the rear (Alexander, p. 183). Parachute Captain Harry Torgerson also helped rally and stop the Marine's retreat behind Hill 123. Edson reportedly told the retreating Marines, "The only difference between you and the Japs is they've got more guts. Get back." (Christ, p. 235).]

to the top of Hill 80 in an effort to fire it directly at the Marines. This gun, which "could have turned the tide in favor of the Japanese," however, was disabled by a faulty firing pin. At midnight, during a short lull in the fighting, Edson ordered Parachute Companies B and C to advance from behind Hill 123 to strengthen his left flank. With fixed bayonets, the Paramarines swept forward, killing Japanese soldiers who had overrun the Marine lines and were apparently preparing to roll-up the Marine lines from the flank, and took position on the east side of the hill. Marines from other units, as well as members of Edson's command staff, including Major Bailey, brought forward ammunition and grenades under fire to the Marines around Hill 123, who were running critically low. Said Marine participant Captain William J. McKennan, "The Japanese attack was almost constant, like a rain that subsides for a moment and then pours the harder...When one wave was mowed down - and I mean mowed down - another followed it into death." [Alexander, p. 183, Christ, p. 237–244, 266, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 143, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 238–240 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 167–170. Some accounts state that the story of the faulty Japanese 75mm mountain gun is apocryphal, but Christ states that several Marines witnessed the gun being deployed but not fired.]

The Japanese hit Edson's left flank just after the Parachutists took position but were again stopped by Marine rifle, machine-gun, mortar, and grenade fire. Marine 105 mm and 75 mm artillery was also taking a heavy toll on the attacking Japanese. A captured Japanese soldier later said that his unit was "annihilated" by the Marine artillery fire, from which only 10% of his company survived. [Christ, p. 286, Peatross, "Bless 'em All", p. 105, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 169–170, Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 235. The 11th Marines 105 mm howitzers fired a total of 1,992 shells during the battle. In total, Marine artillery fired 2,800 rounds that night (Alexander, p. 181).]

By 04:00, after withstanding several more assaults, some of which resulted in hand-to-hand fighting, as well as severe sniper fire from all sides, Edson's men were joined by troops from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, who helped repulse two more Japanese attacks before dawn. Throughout the night, as Kawaguchi's men came close to, but not quite, overrunning the Marine defenses, Edson remained standing about convert|20|yd|m behind the Marine firing line on Hill 123, exhorting his troops and directing their defensive efforts. Said Marine Captain Tex Smith, who was in position to observe Edson for most of the night, "I can say that if there is such a thing as one man holding a battalion together, Edson did it that night. He stood just behind the front lines – stood, when most of us hugged the ground." [Alexander, p. 177, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 240 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 171–172.]

During the heavy fighting, portions of three Japanese companies, including two from Tamura's and one from Watanabe's battalions, skirted the Marine defenses on the ridge, while taking heavy losses from Marine gunfire, and reached the edge of "Fighter One," a secondary runway of Henderson Field. A counterattack by the Marine engineers stopped one Japanese company's advances and forced it to retreat. The other two companies waited at the edge of the jungle for reinforcements to arrive before attacking into the open area around the airfield. When no reinforcements joined them, both companies went back to their original positions south of the ridge after daybreak. Most of the rest of Watanabe's battalion did not participate in the battle because they lost contact with their commander during the night. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 240–242, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 175–176, Alexander, p. 171. Hobbled by old wounds, Watanabe spent most of the night vainly searching for Kawaguchi in the jungle south of the ridge. For unknown reasons, most of Watanabe's battalion remained in place and did not join the attack as ordered.]

As the sun rose on September 14, pockets of Japanese soldiers remained scattered along both sides of the ridge. But, with Tamura's battalion shattered, having lost three-quarters of its officers and men, and with heavy casualties to his other attacking units as well, Kawaguchi's assault on the ridge had effectively ended. About 100 Japanese soldiers still remained in the open on the south slope of Hill 80, perhaps preparing for one more charge on Hill 123. At first light, three U.S. Army fighter aircraft from the 67th Fighter Squadron at Henderson Field, acting on a request personally delivered by Bailey, strafed the Japanese near Hill 80 and killed most of them, with the few survivors retreating back into the jungle. [Alexander, p. 190–191, 197, Christ, p. 280, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 240–242, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 175–176 and Davis, "Lightning Strike", p. 153–155. The U.S. Army aircraft were P-400s and were led by US Army Captain John A. Thompson with Bryan W. Brown and B. E. Davis. Two of the aircraft were hit and damaged by Japanese ground fire but were able to make deadstick landings back on the airfield.]

Kuma and Oka attacks

As the battle on the ridge took place, Kawaguchi's Kuma and Oka units also attacked the Marine defenses on the east and west sides of the Lunga perimeter. The Kuma battalion, led by Major Takeshi Mizuno, attacked the southeastern sector of the Lunga perimeter, defended by Marines of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (3/1). Mizuno's attack started around midnight, with one company attacking through Marine artillery fire and engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the Marine defenders before being thrown back. Mizuno was killed in the attack. After daybreak, the Marines, believing that the rest of Mizuno's battalion was still in the area, sent forward six light tanks without infantry support to sweep the area in front of the Marine lines. Four Japanese 37 mm anti-tank guns opened fire on the tanks, destroying or disabling three of them. Several of the disabled tank's crewmembers were bayoneted and killed by the Japanese. One other tank tumbled down an embankment into the Tenaru River, drowning the tank's crew. [Gilbert, "Marine Tank Battles", p. 46, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 177–181. Alexander (p. 139) spells Mizuno's given name as "Eishi", as in Eishi Mizuno.]

At 23:00 on September 14, the remnants of the Kuma battalion conducted another attack on the same portion of the Marine lines, but they were repulsed. A final "weak" attack by the Kuma unit on the evening of September 15 was also defeated. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 242 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 181, Jersey, "Hell's Islands", p. 233. The Japanese anti-tank guns were from the 28th Regimental Antitank Company under 1st Lieutenant Yoshio Okubo. Eight Marine tank crewmen died in the engagement.]

Oka's unit, numbering about 650 men, attacked the Marines at several locations on the west side of the Lunga perimeter. At about 04:00 on September 14, two Japanese companies attacked positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment (3/5) near the coast and were thrown back with heavy losses. Another Japanese company captured a small ridge somewhat inland but was then pinned-down by Marine artillery fire throughout the day and took heavy losses before withdrawing on the evening of September 14. The rest of Oka's unit failed to find the Marine lines and did not participate in the attack. [Alexander, p. 180, Christ, p. 250, Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 243 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 181–184. Most of Oka's men were from the 2nd Battalion, 124th Infantry Regiment.]

Aftermath

, began to discard their heavy equipment and then their rifles. By the time most of them reached Oka's positions at Kokumbona five days later, only half still carried their weapons. The Kuma battalion's survivors, attempting to follow Kawaguchi's Center Body forces, became lost and wandered for three weeks in the jungle and almost starved to death before finally reaching Kawaguchi's camp. [Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 146–147 and Frank, "Guadalcanal", p. 245–246.]

In total, Kawaguchi's forces lost about 830 killed in the attack, including 350 in Tamura's battalion, 200 in Kokusho's battalion, 120 in Oka's force, 100 in the Kuma battalion, and 60 killed in Watanabe's battalion. A further but unknown number of wounded died during the withdrawal march to the Matanikau. On and around the ridge, the Marines counted 500 Japanese dead, including 200 on the slopes of Hill 123. The Marines suffered 80 killed between September 12 and September 14. [Christ, p. 281, Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 144 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 184–185. Only 86 Paramarines, out of the 240 originally deployed, walked off of the ridge the morning after the battle. The rest were all killed or seriously wounded. Christ states that 53 Marines total were killed on the ridge with 237 seriously wounded and that the Japanese suffered 1,133 killed or wounded. The Americans buried the Japanese bodies in mass graves or burned them.]

On September 17, Vandegrift sent two companies from the 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (1/1) to pursue the retreating Japanese. The Marines were ambushed by two Japanese companies acting as rear-guards for the withdrawal, and one Marine platoon was pinned down as the rest of the Marines retreated. The Marine company commander requested permission to attempt to rescue his platoon but was denied by Vandegrift. By nightfall, the Japanese overran and nearly annihilated the platoon, killing 24 Marines with only a few wounded members of the platoon surviving. On September 20, a patrol from Edson's Raiders encountered stragglers from Kawaguchi's retreating column and killed 19 of them with called-in artillery fire. [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 193–194. The Marine company commander of the annihilated platoon was Captain Charles Brush, the same officer who led the patrol that ambushed a patrol from Ichiki's First Echelon during the Battle of the Tenaru.]

As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On September 14, Vandegrift moved another battalion, the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment (3/2), from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. On September 18, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from the 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the U.S. 7th Marine Regiment augmented by additional support units) to Guadalcanal. These reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on September 19, to establish an unbroken line of defense completely around the Lunga perimeter. Vandegrift's forces' next significant clashes with the Japanese occurred along the Matanikau River from September 23 through September 27 and between October 6 and October 9. [Griffith, "Battle for Guadalcanal", p. 156 and Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 198–200. As the transport ships that delivered the 7th Marines departed, they took with them the remaining survivors of the 1st Parachute Battalion, now numbering about 100 out of the original 361 members of the battalion (Hoffman, "Silk Chutes").]

ignificance

, to withdraw until the Guadalcanal matter was resolved. The Japanese never were able to restart their drive towards Port Moresby. Thus, the defeat at Edson's Ridge not only contributed to Japan's ultimate defeat in the Guadalcanal campaign, but also to Japan's ultimate defeat throughout the South Pacific. [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 197–198.]

After delivering more forces during the next month, the next major Japanese ground offensive on Guadalcanal, led by Hyakutake, occurred in late October 1942 at the Battle for Henderson Field, but it resulted in an even more decisive defeat for the Japanese. Vandegrift later stated that Kawaguchi's assault on the ridge in September was the only time during the entire campaign he had doubts about the outcome and that had it succeeded, "we would have been in a pretty bad condition." [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 190–191.] Historian Richard B. Frank adds, "The Japanese never came closer to victory on the island itself than in September 1942, on a ridge thrusting up from the jungle just south of the critical airfield, best known ever after as Bloody Ridge." [Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. vii.]

Notes

References

* cite book
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year = 2000
title = Edson's Raiders: The 1st Marine Raider Battalion in World War II
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 1-55750-020-7
* cite book
last = Christ
first = James F.
coauthors =
year = 2007
title = Battalion of the Damned: The 1st Marine Paratroopers at Gavutu and Bloody Ridge, 1942
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 1591141141
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last = Davis
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year = 2005
chapter =
title = Lightning Strike: The Secret Mission to Kill Admiral Yamamoto and Avenge Pearl Harbor
publisher = St. Martin's Press
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*cite book
last = Frank
first = Richard
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year = 1990
title = Guadalcanal: The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
publisher = Random House
location = New York
id = ISBN 0-394-58875-4
*cite book
last = Gilbert
first = Oscar E.
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year = 2001
title = Marine Tank Battles in the Pacific
publisher = Da Capo
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id = ISBN 1580970508
*cite book
last = Griffith
first = Samuel B.
authorlink =
coauthors =
year = 1963
chapter =
title = The Battle for Guadalcanal
publisher = University of Illinois Press
location = Champaign, Illinois, USA
id = ISBN 0-252-06891-2
*cite book
last = Hubler
first = Richard G.
authorlink =
coauthors = Dechant, John A
year = 1944
chapter =
title = Flying Leathernecks - The Complete Record of Marine Corps Aviation in Action 1941–1944.
publisher = Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc
location = Garden City, New York
id =
*cite book
last = Jersey
first = Stanley Coleman
authorlink =
coauthors =
year = 2008
chapter =
title = Hell's Islands: The Untold Story of Guadalcanal
publisher = Texas A&M University Press
location = College Station, Texas
id = ISBN 1-58544-616-5
*cite book
last = Morison
first = Samuel Eliot
authorlink = Samuel Eliot Morison
coauthors =
year = 1958
chapter =
title = The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943", vol. 5 of "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II
publisher = Little, Brown and Company
location = Boston
id = ISBN 0-316-58305-7
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last = Peatross
first = Oscar F.
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coauthors = John P. McCarthy and John Clayborne (editors)
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title = Bless 'em All: The Raider Marines of World War II
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last = Smith
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year = 2000
chapter =
title = Bloody Ridge: The Battle That Saved Guadalcanal
publisher = Pocket
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id = ISBN 0-7434-6321-8

External links

*cite web
last = Anderson
first = Charles R.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1993
month =
url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/72-8/72-8.htm
title = GUADALCANAL
format = brochure
work =
pages =
publisher = U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
language =
accessdate = 2006-07-09
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Cagney
first = James
year = 2005
url = http://www.historyanimated.com/GuadalcanalPage.html
title = The Battle for Guadalcanal
format = javascript
work = HistoryAnimated.com
accessdate = 2006-05-17- Interactive animation of the battle
*cite web
last = Chen
first = C. Peter
year = 2004–2006
url = http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=9
title = Guadalcanal Campaign
work = World War II Database
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Flahavin
first = Peter
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 2004
month =
url = http://www.guadalcanal.homestead.com/index.html
title = Guadalcanal Battle Sites, 1942–2004
format =
work =
pages =
publisher =
language =
accessdate = 2006-08-02
accessyear =- Web site with many pictures of Guadalcanal battle sites from 1942 and how they look now.
*cite web
last = Hirose (full name not available)
first =
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 2007
month =
url = http://sitekreator.com/hirose/rep1_en.html
title = Report of a Japanese soldier who was wounded in this battle at hill 80
format =
work =
pages =
publisher =
language = English and German
accessdate = June 24
accessyear = 2007
*cite web
last = Hoffman
first = Jon T.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1995
month =
url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003130-00/sec7.htm
title = Edson's Ridge
format = brochure
work = FROM MAKIN TO BOUGAINVILLE: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War
pages =
publisher = Marine Corps Historical Center
language =
accessdate = 2006-11-21
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Hoffman
first = Jon T.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1995
month =
url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003130-00/sec6.htm
title = Tasimboko
format = brochure
work = FROM MAKIN TO BOUGAINVILLE: Marine Raiders in the Pacific War
pages =
publisher = Marine Corps Historical Center
language =
accessdate = 2006-11-21
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Hoffman
first = Jon T.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year =
month =
url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003147-00/sec6.htm
title = "SILK CHUTES AND HARD FIGHTING: US. Marine Corps Parachute Units in World War II": Edson's Ridge
format =
work = Commemorative series
pages = 1
publisher = Marine Corps History and Museums Division
language = English
accessmonthday = December 26
accessyear = 2006
*cite web
last = Hoffman
first = Jon T.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year =
month =
url = http://www.nps.gov/archive/wapa/indepth/extContent/usmc/pcn-190-003147-00/sec5.htm
title = "SILK CHUTES AND HARD FIGHTING: US. Marine Corps Parachute Units in World War II": Tasimboko
format =
work = Commemorative series
pages = 1
publisher = Marine Corps History and Museums Division
language = English
accessmonthday = December 26
accessyear = 2006
*cite web
last = Hough
first = Frank O.
authorlink =
coauthors = Ludwig, Verle E., and Shaw, Henry I., Jr.
date =
year =
month =
url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/I/index.html
title = Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal
format =
work = History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
pages =
publisher =
language =
accessdate = 2006-05-16
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Miller
first = John Jr.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1949
month =
url = http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/GuadC/GC-fm.htm
title = GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE
format =
work = UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
pages =
publisher =
language =
accessdate = 2006-07-04
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Shaw
first = Henry I.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1992
month =
url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Guadalcanal/index.html
title = First Offensive: The Marine Campaign For Guadalcanal
format =
work = Marines in World War II Commemorative Series
pages =
publisher =
language =
accessdate = 2006-07-25
accessyear =
*cite web
last = Zimmerman
first = John L.
authorlink =
coauthors =
date =
year = 1949
month =
url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-M-Guadalcanal.html
title = The Guadalcanal Campaign
format =
work = Marines in World War II Historical Monograph
pages =
publisher =
language =
accessdate = 2006-07-04
accessyear =

Further reading

*cite book
last = Rottman
first = Gordon L.
authorlink =
coauthors = Dr. Duncan Anderson (consultant editor)
year = 2005
chapter =
title = Japanese Army in World War II: The South Pacific and New Guinea, 1942–43
publisher = Osprey
location = Oxford and New York
id = ISBN 1-84176-870-7
* cite book
last = Tregaskis
first = Richard
authorlink = Richard Tregaskis
year = 1943
title = Guadalcanal Diary
publisher = Random House
location =
id = ISBN 0-679-64023-1