Battle of the Eastern Solomons

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of the Eastern Solomons


caption=USS "Enterprise" (center left), maneuvering radically under aerial attack and afire on August 24, 1942. Anti-aircraft shell bursts directed at the attacking Japanese dive bombers are visible above the carrier.
partof=the Pacific Theater of World War II
date=August 24, 1942 – August 25, 1942
place=North of Santa Isabel, Solomon Islands
result= Allied strategic victory
combatant1=Allied forces including:
flagicon|USA|1912 United States,
flagicon|Australia Australia
combatant2=flagicon|Japan|alt Empire of Japan
commander1=flagicon|USA|1912 Robert Ghormley
flagicon|USA|1912 Frank Jack Fletcher
commander2=flagicon|Japan|naval Isoroku Yamamoto
flagicon|Japan|naval Chuichi Nagumo
strength1=2 fleet carriers, 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 176 aircraft [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 166–174. The U.S. carriers present for the battle carried 154 aircraft, 22 more fighter or attack aircraft of the Cactus Air Force were located at Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. The "176" number doesn't include B-17s based at Espiritu Santo or PBY Catalinas based in the Santa Cruz Islands.]
strength2=2 fleet carriers, 1 light carrier, 2 battleships, 16 cruisers, 25 destroyers, 1 seaplane tender, 4 patrol boats, 3 transports, 171–177 aircraft [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 166–174 (171 aircraft) and Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 106 (177 aircraft). This number doesn't include Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul or scout aircraft from the Japanese battleships, cruisers, and seaplane tender "Chitose" or Japanese aircraft based elsewhere in the Solomon Islands.]
casualties1=1 carrier heavily damaged, 25 aircraft destroyed, 90 killed [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 191–192.]
casualties2=1 light carrier, 1 destroyer, 1 transport sunk, 1 light cruiser, 1 seaplane tender heavily damaged, 75 aircraft destroyed, 290+ killed [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 191–193, No known records exist that record the losses from the sinking of "Kinryu Maru" and damage to "Chitose", and other Japanese ships. However, known casualties are: 120 killed on "Ryūjō", 40 on "Mutsuki", 24 on "Jintsu" (Parshall, [http://www.combinedfleet.com/jintsu_t.htm] ), six on "Shōkaku", and about 100 aircrew members. Total Japanese aircraft losses included 33 Zeros, 23 Vals, eight Kates, seven float planes (scouts), one Betty bomber, two Emilys, and one Mavis.]

The naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons (also known as the Battle of the Stewart Islands and, in Japanese sources, as the Nihongo|Second Battle of the Solomon Sea|第二次ソロモン海戦, took place on August 24, 1942 – August 25, 1942, and was the third carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and the second major engagement fought between the United States Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy during the Guadalcanal Campaign. As at Coral Sea and Midway, the ships of the two adversaries were never in direct visual range of each other. Instead, all of the attacks by either side were carried out by either carrier or land-based aircraft.

After several damaging air attacks, the naval surface combatants from both the United States of America (U.S.) and Japan withdrew from the battle area without either side securing a clear victory. However, the U.S. and its allies apparently gained a greater tactical and strategic advantage from the battle than Japan because the Allied forces suffered fewer losses than the Japanese, who lost a significant number of aircraft and experienced aircrews. Also, Japanese reinforcements intended for Guadalcanal were delayed and eventually delivered by warships rather than transport ships, giving the Allies more time to prepare for the Japanese counteroffensive and preventing the Japanese from landing heavy artillery, ammunition, and other logistical supplies that would have significantly assisted their forces in the struggle for the island.

Background

On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the U.S. and Australia, and secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign. The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign. [Hogue, "Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal", p. 235–236.]

, supporting the Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi against any Japanese counteroffensives, covering the movement of supply ships to Guadalcanal, and engaging and destroying any Japanese warships, that came within range. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 89 and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 106.]

Between August 15 and August 20, the U.S. carriers covered the delivery of fighter and bomber aircraft to the newly opened Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 111–129.] Henderson Field and the aircraft based there soon began having a telling effect on the movement of Japanese forces in the Solomon Islands and in the attrition of Japanese air forces in the South Pacific Area. In fact, Allied control of Henderson Field became the key factor in the entire battle for Guadalcanal. [Hammel, "Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea", 400]

Taken by surprise by the Allied offensive in the Solomons, Japanese naval (under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto) and army forces prepared a counteroffensive, with the goal of driving the Allies out of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The counteroffensive was called "Operation Ka" ("Ka" comes from the first syllable for "Guadalcanal" as pronounced in Japanese) with the naval portion having an additional objective of destroying Allied warship forces in the South Pacific area, specifically the U.S. carriers. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 121.]

Battle

Prelude

A convoy containing 1,411 Japanese soldiers from the "Ichiki" regiment as well as several hundred naval troops from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force, loaded on three slow transport ships, departed the major Japanese base at Truk (Chuuk) on August 16 and headed towards Guadalcanal. [Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 161–162, 169, Smith, "Bloody Ridge", p. 33–34. Tanaka says there were 1,000 SNLF troops.] The transports were guarded by light cruiser "Jintsu", eight destroyers, and four patrol boats, led by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka (flag in "Jintsu") [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 159, Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 160–162. Tanaka in "Jintsu" and "Kagero" had departed Japan for Truk on August 11 in response to the Allied landings on Guadalcanal. At Truk, Tanaka was given command of the Guadalcanal Reinforcement Force (later called Tokyo Express by the Allies), an ad hoc unit under the IJN 8th Fleet with ships from various units assigned to deliver reinforcements to Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. The four patrol boats were the former destroyers "Shimakaze", "Nadakaze", "Suzuki", and "Tsuta" converted to transport troops. The three transports were "Kinryu Maru", "Boston Maru", and "Daifuku Maru". A "First Element" of 917 soldiers from the Ichiki Regiment, including Ichiki himself, was delivered by six destroyers to Guadalcanal on the morning of August 19.] Also departing from Rabaul to help protect the convoy was a "Close Cover force" of four heavy cruisers from the 8th Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 122.] These were the same cruisers that had defeated an Allied naval surface force in the earlier Battle of Savo Island. Tanaka planned to land the troops from his convoy on Guadalcanal on August 24. [Coombe, "Derailing the Tokyo Express", p. 55, Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 148.]

On August 21, the rest of the Japanese "Ka" naval force departed Truk, heading for the southern Solomons. These ships were basically divided into three groups: the "Main Body" contained the Japanese carriers — "Shōkaku" and "Zuikaku", light carrier "Ryūjō", plus a screening force of one heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo in "Shōkaku"; the "Vanguard Force" consisted of two battleships, three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers, commanded by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe; the "Advanced Force" contained five heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, six destroyers, and a seaplane carrier ("Chitose"), commanded by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 167–172.] Finally, a force of about 100 IJN land-based bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance aircraft at Rabaul and nearby islands were positioned to support. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 123.] Nagumo's main body positioned itself behind the vanguard and advanced forces in order to more easily remain hidden from U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 160.]

The "Ka" plan dictated once U.S. carriers were located, either by Japanese scout aircraft or an attack on one of the Japanese surface forces, Nagumo's carriers would immediately launch a strike force to destroy them. With the U.S. carriers destroyed or disabled, Abe's Vanguard and Kondo's Advanced forces would close with and destroy the rest of the Allied naval forces in a warship surface action. The Japanese naval forces would then be free to neutralize Henderson Field through bombardment while covering the landing of the Japanese army troops to retake the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 124–125, 157.]

In response to an unanticipated land battle fought between U.S. Marines on Guadalcanal and Japanese forces on August 19–August 20, the U.S. carrier task forces under Fletcher headed back towards Guadalcanal from their positions 400 miles (640 km) to the south on August 21. The U.S. carriers were to support the Marines, protect Henderson Field, and to combat and destroy any Japanese naval forces, that arrived to support Japanese troops in the land battle on Guadalcanal. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 147.]

Both the Allied and Japanese naval forces continued to head towards each other on August 22. Although both sides conducted intense aircraft scouting efforts neither side located the other. Because of the disappearance of at least one of their scouting aircraft (shot down by "Enterprise" aircraft before it could send a radio report of what was happening), the Japanese strongly suspected the presence of U.S. carriers in the area. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 154–156.] The U.S., however, was unaware of the disposition and strength of approaching Japanese surface warship forces. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 158; Also early on August 22, U.S. destroyer "Blue" was torpedoed off Guadalcanal by Japanese destroyer "Kawakaze" which had been sent by Tanaka from his convoy along with "Yunagi" to try interdict a small Allied supply convoy to the island. "Blue" was heavily damaged, with eight crewmen killed, and sank the next day near Tulagi (coord|09|17|S|160|02|E). Because this action happened separately, it usually is not regarded as a direct loss as a result of the battle of August 24–25. (Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 165, Frank, "Guadalcanal", 163–166 and Coombe, "Derailing the Tokyo Express", p. 56–57.).]

At 09:50 on August 23, a U.S. PBY Catalina aircraft, based at Ndeni in the Santa Cruz Islands, sighted Tanaka's convoy. By late afternoon, with no further sightings of Japanese ships, two aircraft strike forces from "Saratoga" and Henderson Field took off to attack Tanaka's convoy. However, Tanaka, knowing that an attack would be coming his way after being sighted, reversed course once the Catalina left the area, and both the "Saratoga" and Henderson Field aircraft were unable to locate his ships. After Tanaka reported to his superiors that he had lost time because he turned north to avoid the Allied air attacks, the landings of his troops on Guadalcanal was pushed back to August 25. By 18:23 on August 23, with no Japanese carriers sighted and no new intelligence reporting their presence in the area, Fletcher detached "Wasp", which was getting low on fuel, and the rest of TF18 for the two-day trip south towards Efate to refuel. Thus, "Wasp" and her escorting warships did not take part in the upcoming battle. [Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 165–166, Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", p. 103, Frank, "Guadalcanal", 161–165, and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 160–167. Tanaka received conflicting orders this day. Mikawa ordered him to turn to the north to avoid Allied air attacks and land the troops on August 25, but Nishizō Tsukahara, commander of the 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul and Mikawa's superior officer ordered Tanaka to conduct the landing on August 24, which Tanaka replied was now impossible. Tsukahara and Mikawa apparently weren't coordinating their orders.]

Carrier action on August 24

At 01:45 on August 24, Nagumo ordered Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara with the light carrier "Ryūjō", along with the heavy cruiser "Tone" and destroyers "Amatsukaze" and "Tokitsukaze", to proceed ahead of the main Japanese force and send an aircraft attack force against Henderson Field at daybreak. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 168.] The "Ryūjō" mission was most likely in response to a request from Nishizo Tsukahara, the naval commander at Rabaul, for help from the combined fleet in neutralizing Henderson Field. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", p. 102, Coombe, "Derailing the Tokyo Express", p. 67.] The mission may also have been intended by Nagumo as a decoy to divert U.S. attention so that the rest of the Japanese force could approach the U.S. naval forces undetected [Hara, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", 107–115] as well as to help provide protection and cover for Tanaka's convoy.Frank, "Guadalcanal", 176] Most of the aircraft on "Shōkaku" and "Zuikaku" were readied to launch on short notice if the U.S. carriers were located. Between 05:55 and 06:30, the U.S. carriers (mainly "Enterprise"), augmented by Catalinas from Ndeni, launched their own scout aircraft to search for the Japanese naval forces. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 168–175.]

At 09:35 a Catalina made the first sighting of the "Ryūjō" force. Several more sightings of "Ryūjō" and ships of Kondo's and Mikawa's forces by carrier and other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft followed later that morning. Throughout the morning and early afternoon, U.S. aircraft also sighted several Japanese scout aircraft and submarines, leading Fletcher to believe that the Japanese knew where his carriers were, which, however, was not yet the case. Still, Fletcher hesitated to order a strike against the "Ryūjō" group until he was sure there were not other Japanese carriers in the area. Finally, with no firm word on the presence or location of other Japanese carriers, Fletcher launched a strike of 38 aircraft from "Saratoga" at 13:40 to attack "Ryūjō". However, he kept aircraft from both U.S. carriers ready just in case any Japanese fleet carriers were sighted. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 175–184.]

At 12:20, "Ryūjō" launched six "Kate" bombers and 15 A6M Zero fighters to attack Henderson Field in conjunction with an attack by 24 "Betty" bombers and 14 Zero fighters from Rabaul. However, unknown to the "Ryūjō" aircraft, the Rabaul aircraft had encountered severe weather and returned to their base at 11:30. The "Ryūjō" aircraft were detected on radar by "Saratoga" as they flew towards Guadalcanal, further fixing the location of their ship for the impending U.S. attack. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 116 and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 175, 186–187 and 192–193.] The "Ryūjō" aircraft arrived over Henderson Field at 14:23, and tangled with Henderson's fighter aircraft (members of the Cactus Air Force) while bombing the airfield. In the resulting engagement three Kates, three Zeros, and three U.S. fighters were shot down, and no significant damage was done to Henderson Field. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 119 and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 188–191.]

At 14:25, a Japanese scout aircraft from the cruiser "Chikuma" sighted the U.S. carriers. Although the aircraft was shot down, its report was transmitted in time, and Nagumo immediately ordered his strike force launched from "Shōkaku" and "Zuikaku". The two Japanese carriers' first wave of attack aircraft, 27 "Val" dive bombers and 15 Zeros, was off by 14:50 and on its way towards "Enterprise" and "Saratoga". About this same time, two U.S. scout aircraft finally sighted the main force. However, because of communication problems, these sighting reports never reached Fletcher. The two U.S. scout aircraft attacked "Shōkaku" before leaving the area, causing negligible damage. A second wave of 27 Vals and nine Zeros was launched by the Japanese carriers at 16:00 and headed south towards the U.S. carriers. Abe's Vanguard force also surged ahead in anticipation of meeting the U.S. ships in a surface action after nightfall. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 123 and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 202–208. Five of the Zeros turned-back to guard the Japanese carriers because of this attack by the U.S. scout aircraft. Seven B-17s from Espiritu Santo also attacked "Zuikaku" and "Shōkaku" between 17:50 and 18:19, but caused no damage except for shooting down one Zero (Frank, "Guadalcanal", 177)]

About this same time, the "Saratoga" strike force arrived and began their attacks on "Ryūjō", hitting her with three to five bombs, perhaps one torpedo, and killing 120 of her crew. Heavily damaged, the crew abandoned ship at nightfall, and she sank soon after. "Amatsukaze" and "Tokitsukaze" rescued "Ryūjō's" survivors as well as the aircrews from her returning strike force, who ditched their aircraft in the ocean nearby. During this time, several U.S. B-17 bombers attacked the crippled "Ryūjō" but caused no additional damage. [Before ditching, several "Ryūjō" Zeros attacked these B-17s, causing some damage but not shooting any of them down. After the B-17s returned to base at Espiritu Santo, one of them crashed upon landing, killing four of its crew. These four killed personnel are counted among the total losses from the battle.] After the rescue operations were complete, both Japanese destroyers and "Tone" rejoined Nagumo's main force. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 209–225.]

At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers' radar detected the first incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. Fifty-three F4F Wildcat fighters from the two U.S. carriers were directed by radar control towards the approaching Japanese aircraft. However, communication problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zero fighters, prevented all but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Vals before they began their attacks on the U.S. carriers. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 226–232, 240–245 and Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 127.] Just before the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks, "Enterprise" and "Saratoga" cleared their decks for the impending action by launching the aircraft that they had been holding ready in case the Japanese fleet carriers were sighted. These aircraft were told to fly north and attack anything they could find, or else to circle outside the battle zone, until it was safe to return. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 233–235]

, and six destroyers. (navweaps.com)] As many as four Wildcats were shot-down by U.S. anti-aircraft fire, as well as several Vals. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 278–279]

Because of the effective anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships, plus evasive maneuvers, the bombs from the first nine Vals missed "Enterprise". However, at 16:44, an armor-piercing, delayed-action bomb penetrated the flight deck near the after elevator and passed through three decks before detonating below the waterline, killing 35 men and wounding 70 more. Incoming sea water caused "Enterprise" to develop a slight list, but it was not a major breach of hull integrity.Frank, "Guadalcanal", 183]

Just 30 seconds later, the next Val to attack planted its bomb only 15 feet (4.5 m) away from where the first bomb hit. The resulting detonation ignited a large secondary explosion from one of the nearby convert|5|in|mm|sing=on gun's ready powder casings, killing 35 members of the nearby gun crews and starting a large fire.

About a minute later, at 16:46, the third and last bomb hit "Enterprise" on the flight deck forward of where the first two bombs hit. This bomb exploded on contact, creating a 10-foot (3 m) hole in the deck, but caused no further damage. Four Vals then broke-off from the attack on "Enterprise" to attack the U.S. battleship "North Carolina", but all of their bombs missed and all four Vals were shot down by anti-aircraft fire or U.S. fighters. The attack was over at 16:48, and the surviving Japanese aircraft reassembled in small groups and returned to their ships. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 266–276 and Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 137.]

Both sides thought that they had done more damage to each other during the attack than had actually occurred. The U.S. claimed to have shot down 70 Japanese aircraft in the attack, even though only 42 Japanese aircraft actually participated. Actual Japanese losses, from all causes, in the engagement were 25 aircraft, with most of the crews of the lost aircraft not being recovered or rescued. The Japanese, for their part, mistakenly believed that they had heavily damaged two U.S. carriers, instead of just one. The U.S. lost six aircraft in the engagement, with most of the crews being rescued. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 295]

Although "Enterprise" was heavily damaged and on fire, her damage-control teams were able to make sufficient repairs for the ship to resume flight operations at 17:46, only one hour after the engagement ended. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 185] At 18:05, the "Saratoga" strike force returned from sinking "Ryūjō" and landed without major incident. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 300–305] The second wave of Japanese aircraft approached the U.S. carriers at 18:15 but was unable to locate the U.S. formation because of communication problems and had to return to their carriers without attacking any U.S. ships, losing five aircraft in the process from operational mishaps. [Lundstrom, "Guadalcanal Campaign", 157 and Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 310–311] Most of the U.S. carrier aircraft launched just before the first wave of Japanese aircraft attacked failed to find any targets. However, five TBF Avengers from "Saratoga" sighted Kondo's advanced force and attacked the seaplane tender "Chitose", scoring two near misses which heavily damaged the unarmored ship. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 187–188. "Chitose" was towed back to Truk and then went to Japan for repairs which were completed on September 14, 1942 (Hackett, IJN Seaplane Tender CHITOSE: Tabular Record of Movement, "Imperial Japanese Navy page, [http://www.combinedfleet.com/chitosesp_t.htm] )] The U.S. carrier aircraft either landed at Henderson Field or were able to return to their carriers after dusk. [Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 318–319] The U.S. ships retired to the south to get out of range of any approaching Japanese warships. In fact, Abe's vanguard force and Kondo's advance force were steaming south to try to catch the U.S. carrier task forces in a surface battle, but they turned around at midnight without having made contact with the U.S. warships. Nagumo's main body, having taken heavy aircraft losses in the engagement, plus being low on fuel, also retreated from the area towards the north. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 187, Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 320]

Actions on August 25

Believing that two U.S. carriers had been taken out of action with heavy damage, Tanaka's reinforcement convoy again headed towards Guadalcanal and, by 08:00 on August 25, was within 150 miles (240 km) of their destination. At this time, Tanaka's convoy was joined by five destroyers which had shelled Henderson Field the night before, causing slight damage. [Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 167, Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 324. Tanaka in Evans gives 06:00 as the time, but this is apparently because Japanese naval forces used Japan Standard Time. The five destroyers who joined the convoy this morning included "Mutsuki", "Yayoi", "Kagero", "Kawakaze", and "Isokaze".] At 08:05, 18 U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field attacked Tanaka's convoy, causing heavy damage to "Jintsu", killing 24 crewmen, and knocking Tanaka unconscious. The troop transport "Kinryu Maru" was also hit and eventually sank. Just as the Japanese destroyer "Mutsuki" pulled-alongside "Kinryu Maru" to rescue her crew and embarked troops, she was attacked by four U.S. B-17s from Espiritu Santo which landed five bombs on or around "Mutsuki", sinking her immediately. A revived and uninjured but shaken Tanaka sent "Jintsu" back to Truk, transferred to the destroyer "Kagero", and took the convoy to the Japanese base in the Shortland Islands. [Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 168–169, Coombe, "Derailing the Tokyo Express", p. 58–59, Hammel, "Carrier Clash", 326–327, Parshall, HIJMS JINTSU: Tabular Record of Movement, "Imperial Japanese Navy page", [http://www.combinedfleet.com/jintsu_t.htm] . "Jintsu" was forced to go to Japan for repairs which were completed on January 9 1943.] Both the Japanese and the U.S. elected to completely withdraw their warships from the area, ending the battle. The Japanese naval forces lingered near the northern Solomons, out of range of the U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, before finally returning to Truk on September 5. [Hara, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", 119]

Aftermath

The battle is generally considered to be more or less a tactical and strategic victory for the U.S. because the Japanese lost more ships, aircraft, and aircrew, and Japanese troop reinforcements for Guadalcanal were delayed. [Hara, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", 114–115] Summing up the significance of the battle, historian Richard B. Frank states,

The U.S. lost only seven aircrew members in the battle. However, the Japanese lost about 100 veteran aircrew, who were hard for the Japanese to replace because of an institutionalized limited capacity in their naval aircrew training programs. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 191–193.] The troops in Tanaka's convoy were later loaded onto destroyers at the Shortland Islands and delivered piecemeal, without most of their heavy equipment, to Guadalcanal beginning on August 29, 1942. [Hara, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", 118–119, Frank, "Guadalcanal", 201–203.]

Emphasizing the strategic value of Henderson Field, in a separate reinforcement effort, Japanese destroyer "Asagiri" was sunk and two other Japanese destroyers heavily damaged on August 28, 70 miles (130 km) north of Guadalcanal in the "The Slot" by U.S. aircraft based at the airfield. [Evans, "Japanese Navy", p. 171, Frank, "Guadalcanal", 199–200.] The Japanese effort to retake Guadalcanal continued as the battle for the island settled into a two-month long stalemate, punctuated by an intense land battle at Edson's Ridge on September 13 and a large surface naval engagement at Cape Esperance in early October.

"Enterprise" traveled to Pearl Harbor for extensive repairs which were completed on October 15, 1942. [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 191.] She returned to the South Pacific on October 24, just in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and her rematch with "Shōkaku" and "Zuikaku". [Frank, "Guadalcanal", 370–371.]

Notes

References

*cite book
last = Coombe
first = Jack D.
authorlink =
year = 1991
title = Derailing the Tokyo Express
publisher = Stackpole
location = Harrisburg, PA
id = ISBN 0-8117-3030-1
*cite book
last = Evans
first = David C. (Editor)
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coauthors = Raizo Tanaka
year = 1986 (2nd Edition)
chapter = The Struggle for Guadalcanal
title = The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location = Annapolis, Maryland
id = ISBN 0-87021-316-4
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last = Frank
first = Richard B.
authorlink = Richard B. Frank
year = 1990
title = Guadalcanal : The Definitive Account of the Landmark Battle
publisher = Penguin Group
location = New York
id = ISBN 0-14-016561-4
*cite book
last = Hammel
first = Eric
authorlink = Eric M. Hammel
coauthors =
year = 1999
chapter =
title = Carrier Clash: The Invasion of Guadalcanal & The Battle of the Eastern Solomons August 1942
publisher = Zenith Press
location = St. Paul, MN, USA
id = ISBN 0-7603-2052-7
*cite book
last = Hammel
first = Eric
authorlink = Eric M. Hammel
year = 1988
title = Guadalcanal: Decision at Sea : The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Nov. 13–15, 1942
publisher = Pacifica Press
location = (CA)
id = ISBN 0-517-56952-3
*cite book
last = Hara
first = Tameichi
authorlink = Tameichi Hara
coauthors =
year = 1961
chapter =
title = Japanese Destroyer Captain
publisher = Ballantine Books
location = New York & Toronto
id = ISBN 0-345-27894-1 First-hand account of the battle by the captain of the Japanese destroyer "Amatsukaze".
*cite book
last = Lundstrom
first = John B.
coauthors =
year = 2005 (New edition)
chapter =
title = First Team And the Guadalcanal Campaign: Naval Fighter Combat from August to November 1942
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 1-59114-472-8
*cite book
last = Morison
first = Samuel Eliot
authorlink = Samuel Eliot Morison
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year = 1958
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title = The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943", vol. 5 of "History of United States Naval Operations in World War II
publisher = Little, Brown and Company
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*cite book
last = Smith
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External links

*cite web
last = Chen
first = C. Peter
year = 2004–2006
url = http://www.ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=8
title = "Battle of Eastern Solomons"
work = World War II Database
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Fung
first = James
year = 2003
url = http://www-inst.eecs.berkeley.edu/~jgf/carrier/cv1.html
title = "The Battle of the Eastern Solomons: August 24–25, 1942"
work = The Solomons Campaign (Part 1)
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Horan
first = Mark
year =
url = http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Eastern-Solomons.htm
title = "Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 23–25 August 1942"
work = Order of Battle
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Lanzendörfer
first = Tim
year =
url = http://www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/battles/eastern_solomons.htm
title = "The Carriers Meet Again: The Battle of the Eastern Solomons"
work = The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Office of Naval Intelligence
first =
year = 1943
url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN-CN-ESols/index.html
title = "The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 23–25 August, 1942"
work = Combat Narrative
publisher = Publications Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy (somewhat inaccurate on details, since it was written during the war)
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Parshall
first = Jon
coauthors = Bob Hackett, Sander Kingsepp, & Allyn Nevitt
year =
url = http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm
title = Imperial Japanese Navy Page
work =
accessdate = 2006-06-14
*cite web
last = Shepherd
first = Joel
year = 1998–2003
url = http://www.cv6.org/1942/solomons/solomons.htm
title = "1942 — The Eastern Solomons"
work = USS Enterprise CV-6
accessdate = 2006-05-17
*cite web
last = Stekovic
first = Srdjan
year = 1999–2003
url = http://www.everblue.net/1942/
title = "Battle of the Eastern Solomons"
work = Carrier Battles in the Pacific - 1942
accessdate = 2006-05-17

Further reading

*cite book
last = D'Albas
first = Andrieu
authorlink =
year = 1965
title = Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II
publisher = Devin-Adair Pub
location =
id = ISBN 0-8159-5302-X
*cite book
last = Dull
first = Paul S.
authorlink =
year = 1978
chapter =
title = A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1941–1945
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 0-87021-097-1
*cite book
last = Fry
first = John
authorlink =
year = 2000
chapter =
title = USS Saratoga (CV-3): An Illustrated History of the Legendary Aircraft Carrier 1927–1946
publisher = Schiffer Publishing
location =
id = ISBN 0-7643-0089-X
*cite book
last = Generous
first = William Thomas, Jr.,
year = 2003
title = Sweet Pea at War: A History of USS Portland (CA-33)
publisher = University Press of Kentucky
location =
id = ISBN 0-8131-2286-4
*cite book
last = Lacroix
first = Eric
authorlink =
coauthors = Linton Wells
year = 1997
chapter =
title = Japanese Cruisers of the Pacific War
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 0-87021-311-3
*cite book
last = Lundstrom
first = John B.
authorlink =
year = 2006
title = Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Seas, Midway & Guadalcanal
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location = Annapolis, Maryland, USA
id = ISBN 1-59114-475-2
*cite book
last = Smith
first = Douglas V.
authorlink =
coauthors =
year = 2006
chapter =
title = Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way
publisher = US Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 1591147948
*cite book
last = Stafford
first = Edward P.
authorlink =
coauthors = Paul Stillwell (Introduction)
year = 2002 (reissue)
chapter =
title = The Big E: The Story of the USS Enterprise
publisher = Naval Institute Press
location =
id = ISBN 1-55750-998-0