- Battle of Tsushima
Battle of Tsushima Part of the Russo-Japanese War
Admiral Tōgō on the bridge of Mikasa, at the beginning of the Battle of Tsushima in 1905. The signal flag being hoisted is the letter "Z", which was a special instruction to the Fleet.
Date 27–28 May 1905 Location Straits of Tsushima
Result Decisive Japanese victory Belligerents Commanders and leaders Tōgō Heihachirō
Nikolai Nebogatov (POW)
Strength total: 89 ships
37 torpedo boats plus gunboats, and auxiliary vessels
total: 28 ships
3 coastal battleships
Casualties and losses 117 dead
3 torpedo boats sunk
21 ships sunk (7 battleships)
The Battle of Tsushima (Japanese: 対馬海戦, tsushima-kaisen, Russian: Цусимское сражение, Tsusimskoye srazheniye), commonly known as the “Sea of Japan Naval Battle” (Japanese: 日本海海戦, nihonkai-kaisen) in Japan and the “Battle of Tsushima Strait”, was the major naval battle fought between Russia and Japan during the Russo-Japanese War. This was naval history's only decisive sea battle fought by modern steel battleship fleets, the first naval battle in which wireless telegraphy played a critically important role, and has been characterized as the "dying echo of the old era – for the last time in the history of naval warfare ships of the line of a beaten fleet surrendered on the high seas."
It was fought on May 27–28, 1905 (May 14–15 in the Julian calendar then in use in Russia) in the Tsushima Strait between Korea and southern Japan. In this battle the Japanese fleet under Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō destroyed two-thirds of the Russian fleet, under Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, which had conducted a voyage of over 18,000 nautical miles (33,000 km) to reach the Far East. In London in 1906, Sir George Sydenham Clarke wrote, "The battle of Tsu-shima is by far the greatest and the most important naval event since Trafalgar"; decades later, historian Edmund Morris maintained that it remained the greatest naval battle since Trafalgar.
Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, countries constructed their battleships with mixed batteries of mainly 152 mm (6-inch), 203 mm (8-inch), 254 mm (10-inch) and 305 mm (12-inch) guns, with the intent that these battleships fight on the battle line in a close-quarter, decisive fleet action. The Battle of Tsushima demonstrated that battleship speed and big guns with longer ranges were more advantageous in naval battles than mixed batteries of different sizes.
The wireless telegraph was invented in the last half of the 1890s, and by the turn of the century all of the major navies were adopting this greatly improved means of communications. Although Alexander Stepanovich Popov of the Naval Warfare Institute had built and demonstrated a wireless telegraphy set in 1900, equipment from the firm Telefunken in Germany was initially adopted by the Imperial Russian Navy. In Japan, Professor Shunkichi Kimura was commissioned into the Imperial Navy to develop their own wireless system, and this was in place on many of the Japanese warships before 1904. Although both sides had early wireless telegraphy, the Russians were using German sets and had difficulties in their use and maintenance, while the Japanese had the advantage of using their own equipment. It is recognized today that this battle was the beginning of electronic warfare.
- 1 Background
- 2 Prelude
- 3 Battle
- 4 Contributing factors
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 Time line
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
- 10 Further reading
- 11 External links
Conflict in the Far East
On 8 February 1904 destroyers of the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on the Russian Far East Fleet anchored in Port Arthur; 3 ships—2 battleships and a cruiser—were damaged in the attack. The Russo-Japanese war had thus begun. Japan's first objective was to secure its lines of communication and supply to the Asian mainland, enabling it to conduct a ground war in Manchuria. To achieve this, it was necessary to neutralise Russian naval power in the Far East. At first, the Russian naval forces remained inactive and did not engage the Japanese, who staged unopposed Japanese landings in Korea. However, the Russians were revitalised by the arrival of Admiral Stepan Makarov and were able to achieve some degree of success against the Japanese. Unfortunately, Admiral Makarov's flagship, the battleship Petropavlovsk struck a mine, and Makarov was among the dead. His successors failed to challenge the Japanese Navy, and the Russians were effectively bottled up in their base at Port Arthur.
By May, the Japanese had landed forces on the Liaodong Peninsula and in August began the siege of the naval station. On 9 August, Admiral Wilgelm Vitgeft, commander of the 1st Pacific Squadron, was ordered to sortie his fleet to Vladivostok, link up with the Squadron stationed there, and then engage the IJN in decisive battle. However, both squadrons of the Russian Pacific Fleet would ultimately become dispersed during the battles of the Yellow Sea on 10 August and the Ulsan on 14 August 1904. What remained of Russian naval power would eventually be sunk in Port Arthur.
The Second Pacific Squadron
With the inactivity of the First Pacific Squadron after the death of Admiral Makarov and the tightening of the Japanese noose around Port Arthur, the Russians considered sending part of their Baltic Fleet to the Far East. The plan was to relieve Port Arthur by sea, link up with the First Pacific Squadron, overwhelm the Imperial Japanese Navy, and then delay the Japanese advance into Manchuria until Russian reinforcements could arrive via the Trans-Siberian railroad and overwhelm the Japanese land forces in Manchuria. As the situation in the Far East deteriorated, the Tsar (encouraged by his cousin Kaiser Wilhelm II), finally agreed to the formation of the Second Pacific Squadron. It would consist of five divisions of the Baltic Fleet, including 11 of its 13 battleships. The squadron departed on 15 October 1904 under the command of Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky.
The Second Pacific Squadron sailed through the North Sea. As there were rumours of Japanese torpedo boats in the North Sea, several Russian ships fired upon British fishing trawlers off Dogger Bank, causing the Royal Navy to shadow the Russian fleet until a diplomatic agreement was reached. Barred by Britain from using the Suez Canal, the Russians sailed all the way around Africa and by April and May 1905 had anchored at Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina. The voyage was long and arduous, and the morale of the crews plummetted. The Russians had been ordered to break the blockade of Port Arthur, but the city had already fallen on 2 January, so the Russian port of Vladivostok became the objective.
The Russians could have sailed through any one of three possible straits to reach Vladivostok: La Perouse, Tsugaru, and Tsushima. Admiral Rozhestvensky chose Tsushima in an effort to simplify his route. Admiral Tōgō, based at Pusan, Korea also believed Tsushima would be the preferred Russian course. Tsushima Strait is the body of water eastward of the Tsushima Island group, located midway between the Japanese island of Kyushu and the Korean Peninsula, the shortest and most direct route from Indochina. The other routes would have required the fleet to sail east around Japan. The Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Second and Third Pacific Squadrons, sent from Europe, would fight in the straits between Korea and Japan near the Tsushima Islands.
Because of the 18,000-mile journey, the Russian fleet was in relatively poor shape for a naval battle. Apart from the four newest Borodino class battleships, Admiral Nebogatov's 3nd Division consisted of older designed and poorly-maintained warships. Overall neither side had a significant maneuverability advantage. However, the long voyage, combined with a lack of opportunity for maintenance, meant Russian ship bottoms were heavily fouled, significantly reducing their speed. The Japanese ships could reach 15 knots (28 km/h), but the Russian fleet could reach only 14 knots (26 km/h) and even then in short bursts.
Tōgō was able to use the superior maneuverability of his fleet to advantage, "crossing the T" twice. Additionally, there were significant deficiencies in the Russian naval fleet's equipment and training. Russian naval tests with their torpedoes exposed major technological failings. Tōgō's greatest advantage was that of experience, being the only active admiral in any navy with combat experience aboard battleships. (The others were Russian Admirals Oskar Victorovich Stark, who had been relieved command following his humiliating loss in the Battle of Port Arthur, and Wilhelm Withöft, who had been killed in the Battle of the Yellow Sea.)
Battleships, cruisers, and other vessels were arranged into divisions, each division being commanded by a Flag Officer (i.e. Admiral). At the battle of Tsushima, Admiral Tōgō was the officer commanding in Mikasa (the other divisions being commanded by Vice Admirals, Rear Admirals, Commodores and Captains and Commanders for the destroyer divisions). Next in line after Mikasa came the battleships Shikishima, Fuji and Asahi. Following them were two armoured cruisers.
Admiral Tōgō, by using proper reconnaissance and choosing his position well, "secured beyond reasonable hazard his strategic objective of bringing the Russian fleet to battle, irrespective of speeds." When Tōgō decided to execute a turn to port in sequence, he did so in order to preserve the sequence of his battleline, i.e. with the flagship Mikasa still in the lead (which could indicate that Admiral Tōgō wanted his more powerful units to enter action first).
Turning in sequence meant that each ship would turn one after the other whilst still following the ship in front. Effectively each ship would turn over the same piece of sea (this being the danger in the maneuver as it gives the enemy fleet the opportunity to target that area). Tōgō could have ordered his ships to turn "together" i.e. each ship would have made the turn at the same time and reversed course. This manoeuvre, the same effected by the French-Spanish fleet in Trafalgar, would be quicker but would have disrupted the sequence of the battleline and caused confusion by altering the battle plans and placing the cruisers in the lead. This was something Tōgō wished to avoid.
Because the Russians desired to slip undetected into Vladivostok, as they approached Japanese waters they steered outside regular shipping channels to reduce the chance of detection. On the night of 26/27 May, the Russian fleet approached Tsushima Strait.
In the dark, misty night, a thick fog blanketed the straits, giving the Russians an advantage. At 2:45 AM, however, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano Maru observed three lights on what appeared to be a vessel in the distant horizon and closed in to investigate. These were lights on board the Russian hospital ship Oryol, who in compliance with the rules of war, had continued to burn them. At 4:30 AM, Shinano Maru approached the vessel, noting that the vessel carried no guns and appeared to be an auxiliary. The Oryol mistook the Shinano Maru for another Russian vessel and did not attempt to notify the fleet. Instead, she signaled to inform the Japanese ship that there were other Russian vessels nearby. The Shinano Maru then sighted the shapes of ten other Russian vessels in the mist. The Russian fleet had been discovered, and any chance of reaching Vladivostok undetected had disappeared.
Wireless telegraphy played an important role from the start. At 4:55am, Captain Narukawa of the Shinano Maru sent a wireless message to Admiral Tōgō in Masampo that "Enemy is in square 203". By 5 AM, intercepted wireless signals informed the Russians that they had been discovered and that Japanese scouting cruisers were shadowing them. Admiral Tōgō received his message at 5:05 AM, and immediately began to prepare his battle fleet for a sortie.
Beginning of the battle
I have just received news [via wireless] that the enemy fleet has been sighted. Our fleet will proceed forthwith to sea to attack the enemy and destroy him.
At the same time the entire Japanese fleet put to sea, with Admiral Tōgō from his flagship Mikasa leading over forty vessels to meet the Russians. Meanwhile, the shadowing Japanese scouting vessels sent wireless reports every few minutes as to the formation and course of the Russian fleet. There was still mist which reduced visibility and the weather was poor. Wireless gave the Japanese an advantage; in his report on the battle, Admiral Tōgō noted the following:
Though a heavy fog covered the sea, making it impossible to observe anything at a distance of over five miles, [through wireless messaging] all the conditions of the enemy were as clear to us, who were 30 or 40 miles distant, as though they had been under our very eyes.
At around 1:40 PM, both fleets sighted each other and prepared to engage each other. Also at 1:55 PM, Admiral Tōgō ordered the hoisting of the Z flag:
The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.
The Russians sailed from south-southwest to north-northeast; the Japanese fleet from west to northeast "continuing to a point of intersection which allowed only their bow guns to bear; enabling him to throw most of the Russian batteries successively out of bearing." Admiral Tōgō ordered the fleet to turn in sequence, which enabled his ships to take the same course as the Russians, though risking each battleship in turn. This U-turn was successful. Rozhestvensky had only two alternatives, "a charge direct, in line abreast", or to commence "a formal pitched battle." He chose the latter, and at 1408 hours (14:08 PM), the Japanese flagship Mikasa was hit at about 7,000 metres, with the Japanese replying at 6,400 metres. Superior Japanese gunnery then took its toll with most of the Russian battleships being crippled. As naval engagements traditionally began at a considerably closer range, Tōgō immediately gained the advantage of surprise.
Commander Vladimir Semenoff, a Russian staff officer aboard the flagship Suvorov, noted that "It seemed impossible even to count the number of projectiles striking us. Shells seemed to be pouring upon us incessantly one after another. The steel plates and superstructure on the upper decks were torn to pieces, and the splinters caused many casualties. Iron ladders were crumpled up into rings, and guns were literally hurled from their mountings. In addition to this, there was the unusually high temperature and liquid flame of the explosion, which seemed to spread over everything. I actually watched a steel plate catch fire from a burst."
A direct hit on the Borodino's magazines by the Japanese battleship Fuji caused her to explode, which sent smoke thousands of feet into the air and trapped all of her crew on board as the Borodino slid under the sea. The Japanese ships suffered only light damage. Admiral Rozhestvensky was knocked out of action by a shell fragment that struck his skull. In the evening, Rear Admiral Nebogatov took over command of the Russian fleet. The Russians lost the battleships Knyaz Suvorov, Oslyabya, Imperator Aleksander III and Borodino.
At night, around 8 PM, 37 Japanese torpedo boats and 21 destroyers were thrown against the Russians. The destroyers attacked from the vanguard while the torpedo boats from the east and south of the Russian fleet. The Japanese were aggressive, continuing their attacks for three hours without intermission, and as a result during the night there were a number of collisions between the small craft and Russian warships. The Russians were now dispersed in small groups trying to break northwards. By 11 PM, it appeared that the Russians had vanished, but they revealed their positions to their pursuers by turning on their searchlights — ironically, the searchlights had been turned on to spot the attackers. The old battleship Navarin struck a mine and was compelled to stop, and consequently was torpedoed four times and sunk. Out of a crew of 622, only three survived to be rescued by the Japanese.
The battleship Sisoy Veliki was heavily damaged by a torpedo in the stern, and was scuttled the next day. Two old armoured cruisers — Admiral Nakhimov and Vladimir Monomakh — were heavily damaged, the former by a torpedo hit to the bow, and the latter by colliding with a Japanese destroyer. They were both scuttled by their crews the next morning, the Admiral Nakhimoff off Tsushima Island, where she headed while taking on water. The night attacks had put a great strain on the Russians, as they had lost two battleships and two armoured cruisers, while the Japanese only lost three torpedo boats.
XGE signal and Russian surrender
During the night action, Admiral Tōgō was able to rest his main fleet of armoured ships. At 9:30 AM on 27 May, what remained of the Russian fleet was sighted heading northwards. Admiral Tōgō's battleships proceeded to surround Nebogatov's remaining squadron south of the island of Takeshima. At 10:34 AM, realising that his situation was hopeless, Admiral Nebogatov ordered the six ships remaining under his command to surrender. XGE, an international signal of surrender, was hoisted; at 10:53 AM the Japanese agreed accept to the surrender. Realising the battle had become futile, Nebogatov was unwilling to sacrifice the lives of his sailors simply to save his own honour. He decided instead to accept the shame of surrender, knowing full well he might be shot when he returned to Russia. He said to his men
You are young, and it is you who will one day retrieve the honour and glory of the Russian Navy. The lives of the two thousand four hundred men in these ships are more important than mine.
The wounded Admiral Rozhestvensky was a prisoner in a Japanese hospital. The victorious Admiral Tōgō would later visit him, comforting him with kind words:
Defeat is a common fate of a soldier. There is nothing to be ashamed of in it. The great point is whether we have performed our duty.
Neither Nebogatov nor Rozhestvensky were shot when they returned home to Russia. However, both were placed on trial. Rozhestvensky claimed full responsibility for the fiasco; as he had been wounded and unconscious during the last part of the battle, the Tsar commuted his death sentence. Nebogatov, having actually surrendered the fleet at the end of the naval engagement, was imprisoned for several years and eventually pardoned by the Tsar. Both men's reputations lay in tatters.
Until the evening of 28 May, single Russian ships were pursued by the Japanese until almost all were destroyed or captured. Three Russian warships reached Vladivostok. The cruiser Izumrud, which escaped from the Japanese despite being included in Nebogatov's surrender, was scuttled by her crew after running aground near the Siberian coast. Some ships returned to Russia or were interned in neutral ports.
The Japanese fleets had practised gunnery regularly since the beginning of the war, using sub-calibre adapters for their cannon. The Japanese had experienced gunners. Furthermore, the Japanese used mostly high-explosive shells with shimose (melinite), which was designed to explode on contact and wreck the upper structures of ships. The Russians used armour-piercing rounds with small guncotton bursting charges and unreliable fuses. Japanese hits caused more damage to Russian ships relative to Russian hits on Japanese ships, setting the superstructures, the paintwork and the large quantities of coal stored on the decks on fire. (The Russian fleet had to often buy coal at sea from merchant vessels on most of their long voyage due to the lack of friendly fuelling ports on the journey).
Japanese fire was also more accurate because they were using the latest issued (1903) Barr & Stroud FA3 coincidence rangefinder, which had a range of 6,000 yards (5,500 m), while the Russian battleships were equipped with Liuzhol rangefinders from the 1880s, which only had a range of about 4,000 yards (3,700 m). And finally, by 27 May 1905, Admiral Tōgō and his men had two battleship fleet actions under their belts, which amounted to over 4 hours of combat experience in battleship to battleship combat at Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea—experience which would eliminate the miscalculations and rash decisions made during those battles, while applying the learned lessons from those sea engagements with both finesse and ruthlessness at Tsushima.
The battle was a devastating loss for Russia, which lost all of its battleships, most of its cruisers and destroyers, and effectively ended the Russo-Japanese war in Japan's favor. The Russians suffered 4,380 killed and 5,917 captured, including two admirals, with 1,862 interned.
The Russians lost all eight battleships and all three of their smaller coastal battleships in the defeat, either sunk or captured by the Japanese, or scuttled by their crews to prevent capture. Four ships were lost to enemy action during the daylight battle on 27 May: Knyaz Suvorov, Imperator Aleksander III, Borodino and the Oslyabya. The Navarin was lost during the night action, on 27–28 May, while the Sissoi Veliky, Admiral Nakhimov and Admiral Ushakov were either scuttled or sunk the next day. Four other battleships under Rear Admiral Nebogatov were forced to surrender and would end up as prizes of war. This group consisted of only one modern battleship, Oryol, along with the old battleship Imperator Nikolai I and the two small coastal battleships General-Admiral Graf Apraksin and Admiral Senyavin. The small coastal battleship Admiral Ushakov refused to surrender and was scuttled by her crew.
The Russian Navy lost four of its eight cruisers in the battle, had three interned for the war by the Americans, with just one reaching Vladivostok. The Vladimir Monomakh and Svyetlana were sunk the next day, after the daylight battle. The cruiser Dmitri Donskoy fought against six Japanese cruisers and survived; however, due to heavy damage she was scuttled. The Izumrud ran aground near the Siberian coast. Three Russian protected cruisers, Aurora, Zhemchug, and Oleg escaped to the United States Navy base at Manila, where they were interned. The armed yacht classified as a cruiser, Almaz, alone was able to reach Vladivostok.
- Destroyers and Auxiliaries
Imperial Russia lost six of its nine destroyers in the battle, had one interned by the Chinese, with two escaping to Vladivostok. Five destroyers - the Buiny, Buistry, Bezupreshchny, Gromky and Blestyashchy - were sunk on 28 May, and the Byedovy surrendered that day. Bodry was interned in Shanghai. The Grosny and Bravy reached Vladivostok.
Of the auxiliaries, the Kamchatka, Ural and Rus were sunk on 27 May, Irtuish ran aground on 28 May, Koreya and Svir were interned in Shanghai and the Anadyr escaped to Madagascar. The hospital ships Oryol and Kostroma were captured, with the Kostroma released afterwards.
The Japanese lost only three torpedo boats (Nos. 34, 35 and 69), with 117 killed men and 500 wounded.
Imperial Russia's prestige was badly damaged and the defeat was a severe blow to the Romanov dynasty. Nearly the entire Russian fleet was lost in a single battle; the fast armed yacht Almaz (classified as a cruiser of the 2nd rank) and the destroyers (Grozny and Bravy) were the only Russian ships to make it through to Vladivostok. In The Guns of August Barbara Tuchman argued that Russia's loss destabilized the balance of power in Europe, emboldening the Central Powers and contributing to their decision to go to war in 1914.
The battle had a profound cultural and political impact upon Japan. It was the first defeat of a European power by an Asian nation, using the full breadth of then-modern industrial technology. It also weakened the notion of white superiority, widely accepted in Western society before that. The victory established Japan as the sixth greatest naval power while the Russian navy declined to one barely stronger than that of Austria-Hungary.
In The Guiness Book of Decisive Battles, Geoffrey Regan argues that the victory bolstered Japan's increasingly aggressive political and military establishment. According to Regan, the lopsided Japanese victory at Tsushima:
"created a legend that was to haunt Japan's leaders for forty years. A British admiral once said, 'It takes three years to build a ship, but 300 years to build a tradition.' Japan thought that the victory had completed this task in a matter of a few years ... It had all been too easy. Looking at Tōgō's victory over one of the world's great powers convinced some Japanese military men that with more ships, and bigger and better ones, similar victories could be won throughout the Pacific. Perhaps no power could resist the Japanese navy, not even Britain and the United States.
Regan believes the victory contributed to the Japanese road to later disaster, "because the result was so misleading. Certainly the Japanese navy had performed well, but its opponents had been weak, and it was not invincible... Tōgō's victory [helped] set Japan on a path that would eventually lead her" to the Second World War.
Dreadnought arms race
Britain's First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher argued the Japanese victory at Tsushima confirmed the importance of large guns and speed on modern battleships, and in October 1905 the UK government authorized the laying of the keel for HMS Dreadnought, which upon her launching in 1906 began a dreadnought naval arms race between Britain and Germany in the years before 1914. Ironically, the British and German fleets met in only one major action in World War I, the indecisive Battle of Jutland.
27 May 1905 (JST)
- 04:45 The Shinano Maru (Japan) locates the Russian Baltic Fleet and sends a wireless signal.
- 05:05 The Japanese Combined Fleet leaves port and sends a wireless signal to Imperial Headquarters: "Today's weather is fine but waves are high. (Japanese: 本日天気晴朗なれども波高し)".
- 13:39 The Japanese Combined Fleet gains visual contact with the Russian Baltic Fleet, and sends up the battle flag.
- 13:55 Distance (Range): 12,000 meters. The Mikasa sends up Z flag. (Z flag's meaning: The Empire's fate depends on the result of this battle, let every man do his utmost duty.).
- 14:05 Distance (Range): 8,000 meters. The Japanese Combined Fleet turns to helm aport (i.e. start U-turn).
- 14:07 Distance (Range): 7,000 meters. The Mikasa completes its turn. The Russian Baltic Fleet opens fire with their main batteries.
- 14:10 Distance (Range): 6,400 meters. All Japanese warships complete their turns.
- 14:12 Distance (Range): 5,500 meters. The Mikasa receives her first hit from the Russian guns.
- 14:16 Distance (Range): 4,600 meters. The Japanese Combined Fleet begins concentrating their return fire on the Russian flagship, the Knyaz Suvorov
- 14:43 The Oslyabya and Knyaz Suvorov are set ablaze and fall away from the battle line.
- 14:50 The Emperor Alexander III starts turning to the north and attempts to leave the battle line.
- 15:10 The Oslyabya sinks, and the Knyaz Suvorov attempts to withdraw.
- 18:00 The two fleets counter attack each other (distance (range): 6,300 m), and begin exchanging main battery fire again.
- 19:03 The Emperor Alexander III sinks.
- 19:20 The Knyaz Suvorov, Borodino, and Sisoy Veliki are sunk.
28 May 1905 (JST)
- 09:30 The Japanese Combined Fleet locates the Russian Baltic Fleet again.
- 10:34 The Russian commander signals "XGE", which is "I surrender" in the International Code of Signals used at the time.
- 10:53 Admiral Tōgō accepts the surrender.
- ^ Sterling, Christopher H. (2008). Military communications: from ancient times to the 21st century. ABC-CLIO. p. 459. ISBN 1851097325. http://books.google.com/books?id=RBC2nY1rp5MC&pg=PA459&dq=%22battle+of+tsushima%22+decisive+sea+battle#v=onepage&q=%22battle%20of%20tsushima%22%20decisive%20sea%20battle&f=false. "The naval battle of Tsushima, the ultimate contest of the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, was one of the most decisive sea battles in history."
- ^ Naval War College Press (U.S.), ed (2009). Joint Operational Warfare Theory and Practice and V. 2, Historical Companion. Government Printing Office. p. V-76. ISBN 188473362X. http://books.google.com/books?id=zUP23aBHLOwC&pg=SL22-PA76&dq=%22battle+of+tsushima%22+decisive+sea+battle#v=onepage&q=%22battle%20of%20tsushima%22%20decisive%20sea%20battle&f=false. "In retrospect, the battle of Tsushima in May 1905 was the last "decisive" naval battle in history."
- ^ Brown p. 10
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. ix
- ^ Morris, Edmund (2001). Theodore Rex. ISBN 0-394-55509-0.
- ^ Massie p. 470-480
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. 124, 135
- ^ Sarkar, Tapan K. (2006). History of Wireless. ISBN 100-471-71814-9. p. 459
- ^ Forczyk p. 48
- ^ Forczyk p. 26 & 54
- ^ Forczyk p. 66
- ^ Forczyk p. 33
- ^ Forczyk, p. 32
- ^ forczyk p. 33
- ^ In one such trial, of the seven torpedoes fired one jammed in the tube, two veered ninety degrees to port, one went ninety degrees to starboard, two kept a steady course but went wide of the mark, and the last went round in circles 'popping up and down like a porpoise', causing panic throughout the fleet." Regan, Geoffrey; The Guiness Book of Decisive Battles, 'The Battle of Tsushima 1905', p.176
- ^ Forczyk 8, 43, 73 & back cover
- ^ Mahan p. 456
- ^ Watts p. 22
- ^ Koenig, William, Epic Sea Battles, p. 140.
- ^ Admiral Togo’s report on the Battle of Tsushima, as published by the Japanese Imperial Naval Headquarters Staff, Sept. 1905; http://www.russojapanesewar.com/togo-aar3.html
- ^ Koenig, Epic Sea Battles, p. 141.
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. 70
- ^ Mahan p. 457, 458
- ^ Regan; The Guiness Book of Decisive Battles-The Battle of Tsushima 1905, pp.176-177
- ^ a b c d e f g Regan; The Guiness Book of Decisive Battles-The Battle of Tsushima 1905, p.177
- ^ a b Mahan p. 458
- ^ Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914, P.191
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. 62, 63
- ^ a b c d e Regan; The Guiness Book of Decisive Battles-The Battle of Tsushima 1905, p.178
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. 63
- ^ Semenoff (1907) p. 56
- ^ Forczyk p. 56, 57
- ^ Forczyk p. 43 & 73
- ^ Forczyk p. 22 & 77
- ^ Forczyk back cover
- ^ Pleshakov p. XVI
- ^ "the Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in Asia". The American Forum for Global Education. http://www.globaled.org/vietnamandcambodia/lessons/russojapanesewar.php. Retrieved 2010-04-25.
- ^ a b Sondhaus, Lawrence, Naval Warfare, 1815-1914, P.192
- ^ Massie, p. 471, 474, 480
- ^ The Rivalry of Germany and England, Edward Raymond Turner, The Sewanee Review, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1913), pp. 129-147
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- Hough, Richard Alexander (1960). The Fleet That Had to Die. New York: Ballantine Paperbacks.
- Jentschura, Hansgeorg; Dieter Jung, Peter Mickel (1977). Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1869-1945. Annapolis, Maryland: United States Naval Institute. ISBN 0-87021-893-X.
- Novikoff-Priboy, A (1936). Tsushima. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Olender, Piotr (2010). Russo-Japanese Naval War 1904-1905, Vol. 2, Battle of Tsushima. Sandomierz, Poland: Stratus s.c.. ISBN 978-83-61421-02-3.
- Seager, Robert (1977). Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man And His Letters. ISBN 0870213598.
- Semenoff, Vladimir (1910). Rasplata (The Reckoning). London: John Murray.
- Semenoff, Vladimir (1912). The Battle of Tsushima. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co..
- Tomitch, V. M. (1968). Warships of the Imperial Russian Navy. Battleships.
- Warner, Denis and Peggy (1975). The Tide at Sunrise. A History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. ISBN 0-7146-5256-3.
- Wilson, H. W. (1969, 1999 revised edition). Battleships in Action. Scholarly Press. ISBN 0-8517-7642-6.
- Woodward, David (1966). The Russians at Sea: A History of the Russian Navy. New York: Praeger Publishers.
- 1969 Film Battle of the Japan Sea—directed by Seiji Maruyama
- History.com— This Day In History: The Battle of Tsushima Strait
- Battlefleet 1900—Free naval wargame rules covering the pre-dreadnought era, including the Russo-Japanese War.
- Russojapanesewar.com—Contains a complete order of battle of both fleets. It also contains Admiral Tōgō's post-battle report and the account of Russian ensign Sememov.
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