- Battle of Kranji
Infobox Military Conflict
conflict= Battle of Kranji
caption= The Japanese invasion ofKranji in February 1942. The arrows indicate attacks by Japanese forces.
partof= theBattle of Singapore ,Pacific War
date= February 9–10, 1942
place=Kranji ,Singapore ,Straits Settlements
result= Japanese victory
combatant1= flagicon|Australia 27th Brigade
flagicon|Straits SettlementsDalforce (one coy) [cite web | last = Chua | first = Ransome | url = http://ransomechua.com.istemp.com/Pages/bosdalforce6.html| title = Chinese guerrilla forces | accessdate = 2007-09-28 | publisher = Ransome Chua's Frontline ]
combatant2= flagicon|Japan|alt Imperial Guards Major Yap, "The Japanese at Kranji", p. 16 ]
commander1= flagicon|Australia Duncan Maxwell [ Wigmore, "Defence of Western Area", p. 328. ]
commander2= flagicon|Japan|altTakuma Nishimura
strength1= ~2,000 [ An estimate figure of the Allied troops during the Battle of Kranji only. ]
strength2= ~10,000 [ An estimate figure as Yamashita had just over 30,000 men from three Divisions: the Imperial Guards Division, the 5th Division and the 18th Division. The elite Imperial Guard units included a light tank brigade. ]
casualties1=
casualties2=|The Battle of Kranji was the second stage of the
World War II Battle of Singapore . On 9 February 1942 the Japanese assaulted the north-western front of the British colony ofSingapore . Their primary objective was to secure a secondbeachhead after their successful assault at Sarimbun Beach on 8 February, in order to breach the Jurong-Kranji defence line as part of their southward thrust towards the heart of Singapore City. Defending theshoreline between the Kranji River and theJohor-Singapore Causeway was the Australian 27th Brigade, led byBrigadier Duncan Maxwell , and one irregular company. On 10 February the Japanese forces suffered their heaviest losses while moving up the Kranji River, which caused them to panic and nearly aborted the operation. However, a series of miscommunications and withdrawals byAllied forces in the ensuing battles allowed the Japanese to swiftly gain strategic footholds, which eventually led to the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942. Owen, "The Fall of Singapore", p. 170. ]Background
The terrain around Kranji was primarily
mangrove swamps andtropical forest intersected by streams and inlets. Theshoreline between the Kranji River and theJohor-Singapore Causeway , nearly fourkilometer s long, was defended by the Australian 27th Brigade, led by AustralianBrigadier Duncan Maxwell. The 27th Infantry Brigade consisted of threebattalion s—the 2/30th, 2/29th, and 2/26th and was supported by the 2/10th Field Artillery Regiment, as well as oneplatoon from the 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion. [ Thompson, "Phoney Fortress", pp. 262—269. ]They were supported by one company from
Dalforce (named after its commander,Lieutenant-Colonel John Dalley of the Malayan Police Special Branch),National Heritage Board , "Kranji Beach Battle", p. 2. ] a local Chinesemilitia consisting of Communists,Kuomintang supporters, and other volunteers. As the war intensified, the Dalforce volunteers were given only three to four days of training and sent to the war front with elementary weapons. [ Major Yap, "The Northwestern Tour - Kranji River Park", p. 38. ] Lacking uniforms, the volunteers improvised by wearing a red triangle on their blue shirts to avoid being mistaken for Japanese by the Australians.The Allied forces at Kranji were to be assaulted by the Imperial Guards Division led by
Major General Takuma Nishimura . 400 Imperial Guards had landed and takenPulau Ubin , an island in the north-east of Singapore, in afeint attack on 7 February, where they encountered minimal resistance. [ Major Yap, "Invasion of Singapore", p. 14. ]Battle
9 February 1942: Japanese landings
On 9 February, two divisions of the Japanese Twenty Fifth Army, led by
Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki , landed on the northwestern coast of Singapore, in theSarimbun area. Yamashita's headquarters (HQ) was in theSultan of Johore 's palace on Bukit Serene which offered him and his officers a bird's eye view of virtually every key target in the northern sector of Singapore Island, only 1.6 kilometres (one mile) across theStraits of Johor .Sultan Ibrahim 's palace was not fired upon by the British because any damage caused would have extensive repercussions for British-Johore ties. [ Major Yap, "Yamashita's Assault Plans", p. 14. ]The primary objective of the Japanese at Kranji was to capture Kranji village; this would let them repair the demolished Causeway in order to facilitate easy flow of reinforcements and supplies down the roads of Woodlands and Mandai, and to the rest of the island for their vanguard force. [ Thompson, "Death of an Empress", pp. 283—284. ] Once the leading wave of Japanese was safely ashore, the massed Japanese artillery switched their fire to the defensive positions at Kranji.
Telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed in the bombardment and communications between thefront line and command HQ were broken. At 8:30pm that night, the men of the Imperial Guards Division began the crossing from Johore in special armoured landing-crafts, collapsible boats and by swimming.10 February 1942: Heavy losses
In the early hours of 10 February, Japanese forces suffered their heaviest losses during the Battle of Singapore. While moving up the Kranji River, advance landing parties from the 4th Regiment of the Imperial Guard Division found themselves under heavy fire from Australian machine gunners and mortar teams. They also found themselves surrounded by oil slicks, which had been created by Allied personnel emptying the nearby Woodlands oil depot, to prevent its capture. A scenario feared by Yamashita came to pass by accident; the oil was set alight by Allied small arms fire, [ Based on various references, different account of the event was given on whether the setting of fire to the oil slicks was intentional or accidental. The on-site commemorative monument erected by the
National Heritage Board in 1995 reads: "They were stuck in the mud and were caught in the oil slicks created by Allied troops releasing oil from the nearby Woodlands depot. The first wave of Japanese troops were burnt when Allied troops set fire to the oil." ] causing many Japanese soldiers to be burnt alive. Sustaining heavy losses, Nishimura requested permission to abandon the operation. However, Yamashita denied the request.Maxwell, who had limited communications with his division headquarters, was concerned that his force would be cut off by fierce and chaotic fighting at Sarimbun and Jurong to the south west, involving the Australian 22nd Brigade. Maxwell's force consequently withdrew from the seafront. This allowed the Japanese to land in increasing strength and take control of Kranji village. They also captured Woodlands, and began repairing the Causeway, without encountering any Allied attacks.
Japanese light tanks, which had good buoyancy, were towed across the straits to Lim Chu Kang Road where they joined the battle at dusk. Bose, "The Battlebox and the Malayan Campaign", p.100. ] With reinforced troops and tanks advancing down Choa Chua Kang Road, the Australian troops were no match for the tanks and fled to the hills of
Bukit Panjang . The Japanese 5th Division capturedBukit Timah village by the evening of 11 February.Jurong-Kranji defence line
Lieutenant-General Arthur Ernest Percival , General Officer Commanding of HQ Malaya Command, drew a defence perimeter coveringKallang aerodrome , MacRitchie and Peirce reservoirs and theBukit Timah supply depot area to ensure the integrity of the city's defence. One line of the north-western defence perimeter was the Jurong-Kranji defence line, a narrow ridge connecting the sources of the Jurong and the Kranji Rivers, forming a natural defence line protecting the north-west approach to the Singapore City. (Its counterpart was the Serangoon Line, which was sited betweenKallang Airport and Paya Lebar village on the eastern part of Singapore). [ Thompson, "Phoney Fortress", p. 262. ] The troops were to defend this Line strongly against the invading Japanese force. The Line was defended by the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade which covered milestone 12 on Jurong Road, the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade and the reinforced 22nd Australian Brigade which guarded the northern part of the Line and maintained contact with the 44th Indian Brigade.National Heritage Board , "Jurong-Kranji Defence Line", p. 3. ] The 15th Indian Infantry Brigade was re-positioned nearBukit Timah Road to guard the island's vital food and petrol supplies. A secret instruction to protect this area was issued to Percival's generals.Miscommunication
Percival's secret orders to withdraw to the last defence line around the city only if necessary were misunderstood by Maxwell, who took this to be an order for an immediate withdrawal to the Line. [ Elphick, "Retreat in the West", p. 430. ] As a result, the 44th Indian Infantry Brigade, the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade and the 22nd Australian Brigade, reinforced after their withdrawal from Sarimbun beach in the north-west, abandoned the Line on 10 February. Fearing that the large supplies depot would fall into Japanese hands should they make a rush for Bukit Timah too soon, General Sir Archibald Wavell, Allied Commander-in-Chief of the Far East sent an urgent message to Percival:
Aftermath
By 11 February, the Jurong-Kranji defence line was left undefended which allowed the Japanese forces to sweep through the Line to attack Bukit Timah.
National Heritage Board , "Jurong-Kranji Defence Line", p. 3. ] On the same day, Percival finally moved his Combined Operations Headquarters in Sime Road to the undergroundbunker , "The Battle Box " atFort Canning .Despite their fighting spirit, the Dalforce fighters suffered from poor training and the lack of equipment. A further blow was delivered when the 27th Australian Brigade withdrew southwards. As a result, the Japanese established a stronghold in the northern Woodlands area and secured a relatively easy passage into the island. General Wavell left Singapore for
Java early on 11 February and sent a cable to Prime MinisterWinston Churchill in London on his assessment of the war front in Singapore:By 12 February, the Imperial Guards had captured the reservoirs and Nee Soon village. The defending troops, by this time, were badly shaken. Thousands of exhausted and frightened stragglers left the fighting to seek shelter in large buildings. On the same night, British forces in the east of the island had begun to withdraw towards the city. [ Major Yap, "Further Retreat of the Defenders", p. 19. ]
On 13 February, the Japanese 5th Division continued its advance and reached Adam and Farrer Roads to capture the Sime Road Camp. Yamashita moved his HQ forward to the bomb-damaged Ford Factory in Bukit Timah. Heading southwards, the Japanese 18th Division advanced into
Pasir Panjang , where the last major battle of Singapore would be fought with the Malay Regiments atBukit Chandu . [ Major Yap, "The Pasir Panjang Battle", pp. 62—63. ]Commemoration
In 1995, the former battle sites of
Kranji and the defence line were gazetted by theNational Heritage Board as two of the eleven World War II sites of Singapore. [National Heritage Board , "World War II Sites of Singapore - In Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the End of WWII". ]ee also
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Battle of Malaya
*Kent Ridge Park
*Ee Hoe Hean Club References
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