- Angola–Soviet Union relations
Soviet-Angolan relations were close until the
Angolan government renouncedMarxist-Leninism in 1990 and adopted a pro-Western foreign policy. The close, personal relationship between PresidentAgostinho Neto andCuba n leaderFidel Castro complicated theU.S.S.R. 's involvement in theAngolan Civil War and foiled several assassination attempts against Neto.Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited Angola on May 25, 1959.cite book|last=Oyebade|first=Adebayo O|year=2006|title=Culture And Customs of Angola|pages=XI]
Angolan War for Independence
As the Portuguese presence in provincial Angola dwindled, the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), supported by theSoviet Union and theEastern bloc , fought against theNational Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), an organization based in theBakongo region of the north and allied with theUnited States , thePeople's Republic of China and theMobutu government inZaïre . TheUnited States ,apartheid South Africa , and several other African nations also supportedJonas Savimbi 'sNational Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), whose ethnic and regional base lies in theOvimbundu heartland of central Angola.cite book|last=Leonard|first=Thomas M.|year=2006|title=Encyclopedia of the Developing World|pages=1292] cite book|last=Scherrer|first=Christian P.|year=2002|title=Genocide and Crisis in Central Africa: Conflict Roots, Mass Violence, and Regional War|pages=335]1970s
The government of the
Soviet Union , well aware ofSouth African activity in southern Angola, flew Cuban soldiers intoLuanda one week beforeNovember 11 , the date on which Angolan nationalists had agreed to declare independence. While Cuban officers led the mission and provided the bulk of the troop force, 60 Soviet officers in the Congo joined the Cubans onNovember 12 . The Soviet leadership expressly forbid the Cubans from intervening in Angola's civil war, focusing the mission on containing South Africa.cite book|last=Westad|first=Odd Arne|year=2005|title=The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times|page=230–235]Cuba had a close eye on the development. Neto had asked the Soviet Union for support but the Russians did not have in mind to intervene before the elections. In contrast, Cuba was ready to help, as explained by
Fidel Castro : "When the invasion of Angola by regular South African troops started 23 October, we could not sit idle. And when the MPLA asked us for help, be offered the necessary aid to prevent Apartheid from making itself comfortable in Angola. ["Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri] Fact|date=January 2008The deployment of these troop was not pre-arranged with the USSR, as often reported and depicted by the US-administration. On the contrary, this took the USSR by surprise. [N. Broutens, Soviet Politbüro, dept. chief foreign affairs, in “Une Odyssee Africaine” (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri] Fact|date=January 2008
The Russians enforcedly had to go along as under no circumstances did they want to endanger relations with their most important outpost in close proximity to the USA, but tried to keep a lid on the extent of the Cuban engagement. It was only after two months that Moscow agreed to arrange for a maximum of 10 transport flights from Cuba to Angola. Of course the US assumed that the USSR was behind the Cuban interference. Only years later it became clear to them, that the Cubans acted on their own behalf [Frank Wisner Jr., Ambassador, US-Foreign Ministry , in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri ] . Due to the hostility between the USA and Cuba, the Americans regarded such an air by the Cubans as a defeat which could not be accepted. [Hermann Cohen, National Security Council, USA, in "Une Odyssee Africaine" (France, 2006, 59mn) directed by: Jihan El Tahri] Fact|date=January 2008
haba invasions
1,500 members of the
Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) invaded Shaba,Zaire from eastern Angola onMarch 7 ,1977 . The FNLC wanted to overthrow Mobutu and the Angolan government, suffering from Mobutu's support for the FNLA and UNITA, did not try to stop the invasion. The FNLC failed to captureKolwezi , Zaire's economic heartland, but took Kasaji, and Mutshatsha. Zairian troops were defeated without difficulty and the FNLC continued to advance. Mobutu appealed toWilliam Eteki ofCameroon , Chairman of theOrganization of African Unity , for assistance onApril 2 . Eight days later, the French government responded to Mobutu's plea and airlifted 1,500 Moroccan troops intoKinshasa . This troop force worked in conjunction with the Zairian army and theFNLA cite book|last=Garthoff|first=Raymond Leonard|year=1985|title=Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan|page=624] of Angola with air cover fromEgypt ian pilots flying French Mirage fighter aircraft to beat back the FNLC. The counter-invasion force pushed the last of the militants, along with a number of refugees, into Angola and Zambia in April.cite book|last=Schraeder|first=Peter J.|year=1999|title=United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change|page=87–88] cite book|last=Danopoulos|first=Constantine Panos|coauthors=Watson, Cynthia Ann|year=1996|title=The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook|page=451] cite book|last=Ihonvbere|first=Julius Omozuanvbo|coauthors=Mbaku, John Mukum|year=2003|title=Political Liberalization and Democratization in Africa: Lessons from Country Experiences|page=228] cite book|last=Tanca|first=Antonio|year=1993|title=Foreign Armed Intervention in Internal Conflict|page=169]Mobutu accused the Angolan government, as well as the Cuban and Soviet governments, of complicity in the war.cite book|last=Dunn|first=Kevin C|year=2003|title=Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity|page=129] While Neto did support the FNLC, the Angolan government's support came in response to Mobutu's continued support for Angola's anti-Communists.cite book|last=Mukenge|first=Tshilemalema|year=2002|title=Culture and Customs of the Congo|page=31]
John Stockwell , theCentral Intelligence Agency 's station chief in Angola, resigned after the invasion, explaining in an article for "The Washington Post " article "Why I'm Leaving the CIA", published onApril 10 ,1977 that he had warned Secretary of StateHenry Kissinger that continued American support for anti-government rebels in Angola could provoke a war with Zaire. He also said covert Soviet involvement in Angola came after, and in response to, U.S. involvement.cite book|last=Chomsky|first=Noam|coauthors=Herman, Edward S.|title=The political economy of human right|page=308]Nitista revolt
Neto's
Interior Minister ,Nito Alves , had successfully put downDaniel Chipenda 'sEastern Revolt and the Active Revolt during Angola's War of Independence. Factionalism within the MPLA became a major challenge to Neto's power by late 1975 and he gave Alves the task of once again clamping down on dissension. Alves shut down the Cabral and Henda Committees while expanding his influence within the MPLA through his control of the nation's newspapers and state-run television. Alves visited the Soviet Union in October 1976. When he returned, Neto began taking steps to neutralize the threat he saw in the Nitistas, followers of Alves. cite book|last=George|first=Edward|year=2005|title=The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale|page=127–128] Ten armored cars with the FAPLA's 8th Brigade broke into São Paulo prison at 4 a.m. onMay 27 , killing the prison warden and freeing more than 150 supporters, including 11 who had been arrested only a few days before.George (2005). Pages 129–131.]The government arrested tens of thousands of suspected Nitistas from May to November and tried them in
secret court s overseen by Defense MinisterIko Carreira . Those who were found guilty, including Van-Dunem, Jacobo "Immortal Monster" Caetano, the head of the 8th Brigade, and political commissar Eduardo Evaristo, were then shot and buried in secret graves. The coup attempt had a lasting effect on Angola's foreign relations. Alves had opposed Neto's foreign policy ofnon-alignment ,evolutionary socialism , and multiracialism, favoring stronger relations with theSoviet Union , which he wanted to grant military bases in Angola. WhileCuba n soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed theSoviet Union supported Neto's ouster.Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened. In December, the MPLA held is first party Congress and changed its name to the MPLA-PT. The Nitista coup took a toll on the MPLA's membership. In 1975, the MPLA boasted of 200,000 members. After the first party congress, that number decreased to 30,000.cite book|last=Hodges|first=Tony|year=2004|title=Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State|page=50] cite book|last=Fauriol|first=Georges A.|coauthors=Eva Loser|year=1990|title=Cuba: The International Dimension|page=164] cite book|last=Domínguez|first=Jorge I.|year=1989|title=To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy|page=158] cite book|last=Radu|first=Michael S.|year=1990|title=The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World|page=134–135] WhileCuba n soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed theSoviet Union supported Neto's ouster.Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened.Operation IA Feature
Two days prior to the U.S. government's approval of
Operation IA Feature ,Nathaniel Davis , the Assistant Secretary of State, toldHenry Kissinger , theSecretary of State , that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted theSoviet Union would respond by increasing involvement in the Angolan conflict, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program, Davis resigned.cite book|last=Brown|first=Seyom|year=1994|title=The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton|pages=303]Vietnam
The
Vietnam War tempered foreign involvement in Angola's civil war as neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to be drawn into an internal conflict of highly debatable importance in terms of winning theCold War .CBS News casterWalter Cronkite spread this message in his broadcasts to "try to play our small part in preventing that mistake this time."cite web|author=Unknown|year=1975|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945436-2,00.html|title=The Battle Over Angola|format=HTML|publisher=TIME Magazine|accessdate=2007-09-12|accessyear=2007] The Politburo engaged in heated debate over the extent to which the Soviet Union would support a continued offensive by the MPLA in February 1976. Foreign MinisterAndrei Gromyko and PremierAlexey Kosygin led a faction favoring less support for the MPLA and greater emphasis on preservingdétente with the West.Leonid Brezhnev , the then head of the Soviet Union, won out against the dissident faction and the Soviet alliance with the MPLA continued even as Neto publicly reaffirmed its policy of non-alignment at the 15th anniversary of the First Revolt.cite web|author=Unknown|year=1976|url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918018-1,00.html|title=Angola's Three Troubled Neighbors|format=HTML|publisher=TIME Magazine|accessdate=2007-09-12|accessyear=2007]Rise of dos Santos
The Soviets, trying to increase their influence in
Luanda , began sending busts ofVladimir Lenin , a plane full of brochures withBrezhnev 's speech at the February 1976 Party Congress, and two planes full of pamphlets denouncingMao , to Angola. They sent so many busts that they ran out in the summer of 1976 and requested more from the CPSU Propaganda Department. Despite the best efforts of the Soviet propaganda machine and persistent lobbying by G. A. Zverev, the Sovietchargé d'affaires , Neto stood his ground, refusing to grant the permanent military bases the Soviets so desperately wanted in Angola. Neto allies like Defense Minister Iko Carreira and MPLA General SecretaryLúcio Lara also irked the Soviet leadership through both for their policies and personalities. With Alves out of the picture, the U.S.S.R. promoted Prime MinisterLopo do Nascimento , another 'internationalist ', against Neto, a 'careerist,' for the MPLA's leadership.cite book|last=Westad|first=Odd Arne|year=2005|title=The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times|pages=239-241] Neto moved swiftly to crush his adversary. The MPLA-PT's Central Committee met fromDecember 6 to 9. The Committee concluded the meeting by firing Nascimento as both Prime Minister and as Secretary of thePolitburo , the Director of National Television, and the Director of "Jornal de Angola". Commander C. R. Dilolua resigned as Second Deputy Prime Minister and a member of the Politburo.cite book|last=Kalley|first=Jacqueline A.|coauthors=Elna Schoeman|year=1999|title=Southern African Political History: A Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to Mid-1997|pages=10] Later that month the Committee abolished the positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister. Paving the way for dos Santos, Neto increased the ethnic composition of the MPLA-PT's political bureau as he replaced the hardline Old Guard with new blood.cite book|last=Taylor & Francis Group|first=|year=2003|title=Africa South of the Sahara 2004|pages=41-42]1980s
In the 1980s, fighting spread outward from southeastern Angola, where most of the fighting had taken place in the 1970s, as the National Congolese Army (ANC) and
SWAPO increased their activity. The South African government responded by sending troops back into Angola, intervening in the war from 1981 to 1987,cite book|last=Stearns|first=Peter N.|coauthors=Langer, William Leonard|year=2001|title=The Encyclopedia of World History: Ancient, Medieval, and Modern, Chronologically Arranged|page=1065] prompting theSoviet Union to deliver massive amounts of military aid from 1981 to 1986. In 1981, newly electedUnited States President Ronald Reagan 's U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs,Chester Crocker , developed a linkage policy, tyingNamibia n independence to Cuban withdrawal and peace in Angola.cite book|last=Tvedten|first=Inge|year=1997|title=Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction|page=38–39] cite web|author=John Hashimoto|year=1999|url=http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/guides/debate/chats/crocker/|title=Cold War Chat: Chester Crocker, Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs|format=HTML|publisher=CNN|accessdate=2007-09-20|accessyear=2007]Democratic International
On
June 2 ,1985 , American conservative activists held theDemocratic International , a symbolic meeting of anti-Communist militants, atUNITA 's headquarters inJamba, Angola .cite book|last=Franklin|first=Jane|year=1997|title=Cuba and the United States: A Chronological History|page=212] Primarily funded byRite Aid founderLewis Lehrman and organized by anti-Communist activistsJack Abramoff and Jack Wheeler, participants included Savimbi,Adolfo Calero , leader of theNicaragua nContras ,Pa Kao Her ,Hmong Laotian rebel leader, U.S.Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North ,South Africa n security forces,Abdurrahim Wardak , AfghanMujahideen leader, Jack Wheeler, American conservative policy advocate, and many others.cite book|last=Easton|first=Nina J.|year=2000|title=Gang of Five: Leaders at the Center of the Conservative Crusade|page=165–167] While theReagan administration , though unwilling to publicly support the meeting, privately expressed approval. The governments ofIsrael andSouth Africa supported the idea, but both respective countries were deemed inadvisable for hosting the conference.The participants released a communiqué stating,
:"We, free peoples fighting for our national independence and human rights, assembled at Jamba, declare our solidarity with all freedom movements in the world and state our commitment to cooperate to liberate our nations from the Soviet Imperialists."
1990s
The National Assembly passed law 12/91 in May 1991, coinciding with the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops, defining Angola as a "democratic state based on the
rule of law " with amulti-party system .cite book|last=Hodges|first=Tony|year=2001|title=Angola|page=11] Observers met such changes with skepticism. American journalist Karl Maier wrote, "In the New Angola ideology is being replaced by the bottom line, as security and selling expertise in weaponry have become a very profitable business. With its wealth in oil and diamonds, Angola is like a big swollen carcass and the vultures are swirling overhead. Savimbi's former allies are switching sides, lured by the aroma of hard currency."cite book|last=Huband|first=Mark|year=2001|title=The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa After the Cold War|pages=46]References
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