Southall rail crash

infobox UK rail accident


title= Southall rail crash
date= 19 September 1997
location= Southall
line = Great Western Main Line
cause= Signal passed at danger
trains= 2
pax=
deaths= 6
injuries= ~150The Southall rail crash was an accident on the British railway system that occurred on 19 September 1997, on the Great Western Main Line at Southall, west London. Seven people were killed and 139 were injured.

Incident

The crash occurred after the 10:32 Great Western Trains InterCity passenger train from Swansea to London Paddington, operating with a defective Automatic Warning System (AWS), went through a red signal (SPAD) and collided with a freight train leaving its depot shortly before 13:20 local time.

If the AWS equipment on the HST passenger train had been working, the chance of the accident occurring would have been very substantially reduced, though not completely eliminated, since the AWS is only an advisory system. The driver's attention had been distracted and he did not observe the preceding signals visually but AWS would have given him a clear audible warning. Automatic train protection equipment would have almost certainly prevented the accident. The train was fitted with ATP but this was also switched off. At the time of the accident, the ATP equipment was not required to be switched on and had proved troublesome in service, and drivers were not required to be trained in it.

Aftermath

Following this accident and the Ladbroke Grove rail crash, the train operating company First Great Western now requires all its HST trains to have ATP switched on (if the equipment is faulty the train is taken out of service).

The driver was initially charged with manslaughter but the case was dropped. Great Western Trains was fined £ 1.5 million for not having a system to ensure high speed trains were not operated for long journeys with AWS inoperative.

The action of the signalman in giving the freight train precedence over the HST with the faulty AWS has been criticised. However, this was a perfectly standard manoeuvre, and he would not have been aware that the HST's AWS was faulty. The key point, as identified in the report, was that drivers had become increasingly reliant on AWS with single-manning and high speeds, and that it was no longer acceptable to run trains at full speed if the equipment was inoperative. Operating rules were changed accordingly.

External links

* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/september/19/newsid_2524000/2524283.stm BBC News "On this day" article]
*Health and Safety Commission [http://www.railwaysarchive.co.uk/docSummary.php?docID=178 report by Professor John Uff] published 24 February 2000. 14 MB pdf file.
* [http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/incident-southall-hscprogressfeb02.pdf Report] by the Health and Safety Executive on progress made on the recommendations of the original report (February 2002). 333 kB pdf file.

References

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