Battle of Pea Ridge

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict = Battle of Pea Ridge


caption = "Battle of Pea Ridge, Ark.", by Kurz and Allison.
partof = the American Civil War
date = March 7ndash March 8, 1862
place = Benton County, Arkansas
result = Union victory
combatant1 = flagicon|USA|1861 United States (Union)
combatant2 = flagicon|CSA|1861 CSA (Confederacy)
commander1 = Samuel R. Curtis
commander2 = Earl Van Dorn
strength1 = Army of the Southwest
(approx. 10,500)
strength2 = Army of the West
(approx. 16,000)
casualties1 = 1,384 [Battles & Leaders, vol.1, p.337]
casualties2 = 2,000 [Shea, p.270]

The Battle of Pea Ridge (also known as Elkhorn Tavern) was a land battle of the American Civil War, fought on March 7 and March 8, 1862, at Pea Ridge in northwest Arkansas, near Bentonville. In the battle, Union Army forces led by General Samuel R. Curtis defeated Confederate troops under General Earl Van Dorn. The outcome of the battle essentially cemented Union control of Missouri. One notable fact of this battle is that it was one of the few in which a Confederate army outnumbered a Union army.

Background

Union

Union forces in Missouri during the latter part of 1861 and early 1862 had effectively pushed Confederate forces out of the state. By the spring of 1862, Union Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis determined to pursue the Confederates back into Arkansas with his Army of the Southwest.

Curtis moved his approximately 10,500 Union soldiers and 50 artillery pieces into Benton County, Arkansas, along a small stream called Sugar Creek. Union forces consisted primarily of soldiers from Iowa, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Ohio. Over half of the Federal soldiers were German immigrants.

Curtis found an excellent defensive position on the north side of the creek and proceeded to fortify it and place artillery for an expected Confederate assault from the south.

Confederacy

Confederate Major General Earl Van Dorn had been appointed overall commander of the Trans-Mississippi District to quell a simmering conflict between competing generals Sterling Price of Missouri and Benjamin McCulloch of Texas. Van Dorn's Army of the West totaled approximately 16,000 men, including 800 Cherokee Indian troops, contingents from the Missouri State Guard, Confederate cavalry, infantry and artillery from Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Missouri.

Van Dorn was aware of the Union movements into Arkansas and was intent on destroying Curtis's Army of the Southwest and reopening the gateway into Missouri.

Prelude

General Van Dorn did not wish to attack Curtis's entrenched position head on. On March 4 1862, he split his army into two divisions under Price and McCulloch and ordered them to march north along the Bentonville Detour with the hopes of getting behind Curtis and cutting off his lines of communication. Van Dorn left his supply trains behind in order to make better speed, a decision that later proved to be a crucial one.

The Confederates made an arduous three day forced march down the road leading from Fayetteville through Elm Springs and Osage Spring to Bentonville in the midst of a freezing storm. Many of the Confederate soldiers were ill-equipped and barefoot, and it was said that one could find the army by following the bloody footprints in the snow. The Confederates arrived at their destination strung out along the road, hungry and tired.

Compounding the Confederate problems was the late arrival of McCulloch, which led Van Dorn to split his forces in two. Van Dorn ordered McCulloch to circle around the western end of Pea Ridge, turn east along the south face and meet Price's division at Elkhorn Tavern. Van Dorn and Price would travel east along the north face of the ridge, secure Elkhorn Tavern, and wait for McCulloch.

These delays allowed Curtis to begin repositioning his army to meet the unexpected attack from his rear and get his forces between the two wings of Van Dorn's forces.

Action at Bentonville, Ark.

Warned of danger by scouts and Arkansas unionists, Curtis rapidly concentrated his outlying units behind Little Sugar Creek. (Note that Wild Bill Hickock did "not" scout for Curtis. [Shea, p 66] ) On March 6, William Vandever's 700-man brigade made a remarkable march of 42 miles in 16 hours from Huntsville to Little Sugar Creek. [Shea, p 67]

However, on Curtis' right flank, his second-in-command Brigadier Franz Sigel became careless. He sent off a 360-man task force to the west. These soldiers would miss the fighting of the next three days. Unwittingly, Sigel also withdrew a cavalry patrol from the road on which the Confederate army was advancing. Luckily, Colonel Frederick Schaefer of the 2nd Missouri, on his own initiative, extended his patrols to cover the gap. When Van Dorn's advance guard blundered into one of these patrols near Elm Springs, the Federals were alerted. Still, Sigel was so slow in evacuating Bentonville that his rear guard was nearly snared by Van Dorn on March 6.

Inexplicably waiting until the Southern advance was nearly upon him, Sigel ordered his 600 men and six guns to fall back on a road leading northeast toward Curtis' position. The 1st Missouri Cavalry led by Elijah Gates attacked Sigel's force from the south, trying to cut off the retreat. Gates' men surprised and captured a company of the 36th Illinois, but many were freed when Sigel's withdrawing men unexpectedly bumped into the group. Sigel managed his little force capably and managed fight his way through Gates' men, but he was helped by a blunder by Brigadier General James M. McIntosh.

The Confederate general planned to envelop Sigel's men from the northwest while Gates closed the trap on the south. However, McIntosh mistakenly took his 3,000-man cavalry brigade too far up a northerly road. After marching three miles out of his way, he turned his troopers onto the road leading east into the Little Sugar Creek valley. By the time they reached the place where Sigel's northeast road met McIntosh's east-bound road, the Union general's men had just passed the intersection. A Southern attempt to press the pursuit was repelled when the 3rd Texas Cavalry charged, only to run smack into Sigel's main line. The Conferates lost 10 killed and about 20 wounded to a sudden blast of Northern artillery and rifle fire. [Shea, p 77]

Geography

Curtis placed his four small divisions astride the Telegraph or Wire Road in a fortified position atop the bluffs north of Little Sugar Creek. From the creek, the Telegraph Road went northeast to Elkhorn Tavern where it intersected the Huntsville Road leading east, and Ford Road leading west. From Elkhorn, the Wire Road continued north and down into Cross Timber Hollow before crossing the border into Missouri. From there, the Union supply line followed the Telegraph Road northeast to St. Louis. The hamlet of Leetown lay north-west of the Telegraph Road, about halfway between Curtis' position on the bluffs and Ford Road. Curtis made his headquarters at Pratt's Store, located on the Wire Road between Elkhorn and Little Sugar Creek.

Van Dorn hoped to reach the Union rear by way of the Bentonville Detour. This started from Camp Stephens, which was west of Curtis' position. From there, the Detour led northeast onto the Pea Ridge plateau. At Twelve Corner Church, Ford Road branched off, leading east to Elkhorn. From there the Detour continued northeast, where it met the Wire Road just north of Cross Timber Hollow. South of the Bentonville Detour, west of Cross Timber Hollow and north of Ford Road lay the militarily impassable Big Mountain.

On the night of March 6, Colonel Grenville Dodge led several parties of soldiers in obstructing the Bentonville Detour. Dodge had suggested this to Curtis, who had approved of the idea. Between Twelve Corner Church and Cross Timber Hollow, they chopped trees down across the road. That same evening, Van Dorn's army, with Price's Division in the lead, began the long march to Cross Timber Hollow. The night march was slowed by the need to clear away Dodge's obstructions, Van Dorn's lack of an engineer corps, poor staff work and the exhaustion of the Confederate soldiers.

Battle, March 7

Contact

Van Dorn had planned for both of his divisions to reach Cross Timber Hollow, but by dawn, only the head of Price's division had made it that far. Because of the delay, the Confederate army commander instructed McCulloch's division to take the Ford Road from Twelve Corner Church and meet Price at Elkhorn.

Federal patrols detected both threats on the morning of March 7. Not knowing where the Confederate main body was located, Curtis reacted by sending Dodge's brigade of Col. Eugene A. Carr's 4th Division northeast up the Wire Road to join the 24th Missouri Infantry at Elkhorn Tavern. Luckily for Curtis, Dodge, still worried about the threat to the Union rear, had disobeyed orders and pulled his brigade back to Pratt's Store. This made it immediately available to reinforce Elkhorn. Curtis also sent a task force under the command of Col. Peter J. Osterhaus north to reconnoiter along Ford Road. Osterhaus' force consisted of Col. Nicholas Greusel's brigade of his own 1st Division, several cavalry units led by Col. Cyrus Bussey and 12 cannons.

Left wing

McCulloch's force consisted of a brigade of cavalry under General James McIntosh, a brigade of infantry under Col. Louis Hébert, and a brigade of Cherokee under Brigadier General Albert Pike. McCulloch's troops swung west on the Ford Road and plowed into elements of the Federal Army at a small village named Leetown, where a fierce firefight erupted.

McCulloch and McIntosh were killed in action soon after the clash began, and Colonel Hébert was captured. These events effectively shattered the Confederate command structure, and they were unable to organize an effective attack in the resulting chaos.

Leetown

At 11:30 am Osterhaus rode north through a belt of timber onto Foster Farm and witnessed an astonishing sight. McCulloch's entire division was marching east on Ford Road only a few hundred yards away. [Shea, p 95] In spite of the ridiculous odds, Osterhaus ordered Bussey's small force to attack in order to buy time for his infantry brigade to deploy. Three Federal cannon began shelling the Southerners, killing at least ten men. McCulloch wheeled McIntosh's 3,000 horsemen to the south and ordered them to attack. The massed Confederate charge simply mobbed the Yankees. They stampeded Bussey's force and captured all three cannons. A little further west, two companies of the 3rd Iowa ran into a Cherokee ambush and were similarly routed. The Iowa unit's unusual killed-to-wounded ratio, 24 killed and 17 wounded, suggests that the native American warriors killed a number of wounded Northerners. "Some, perhaps all, of Trimble's wounded Iowans were murdered and at least eight were scalped." [Shea, p 102]

South of the belt of timber lay Oberson's Field. Greusel had time to form his brigade and nine cannon on the edge of the forest on the south side of Oberson's Field. Sul Ross alertly led the 6th Texas Cavalry in pursuit of Bussey's force. But when Ross rode into the field, his men were fired on and quickly fell back. Greusel shook out two companies of skirmishers from the 36th Illinois and posted them along the southern edge of the belt of timber between Oberson's and Foster's fields. The Federal gunners began lobbing shells over the belt of timber. Though the howitzers were fired blindly, their first shellbursts panicked the Cherokees, who rapidly retreated and could not be rallied. Meanwhile, McCulloch had formed Louis Hébert's 4,000-man infantry brigade across a wide front and sent them south. Hébert took control of the four regiments east of the north-south Leetown Road, while McCulloch took charge of the four regiments west of the road.

The Texan general rode forward into the belt of timber to personally reconnoiter the Federal positions. While in the belt of timber he rode into range of the Illinois skirmishers and was shot through the heart. McIntosh was quickly notified that he was in command. But, fearing that the death of their popular leader would dishearten his soldiers, McCulloch's staff made the unwise decision not to share the bad news with many of the subordinate officers.

Without consulting Hébert, or anyone else, McIntosh impulsively led his former regiment, the dismounted 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles Regiment into the attack. As the unit reached the southern edge of the belt of timber, it was met with a massed volley from Greusel's brigade and McIntosh dropped dead with a bullet in him. In the meantime, unaware that he was now in command of the division, Hébert led the left wing of the attack south into the woods.

Meanwhile, the colonels of the right wing regiments, showing no initiative, decided to pull back and wait for orders from Hébert. It was about 2:00 pm. The blind Federal bombardment of Foster's Farm and the breakdown in the Confederate command structure began to destroy the morale of McCulloch's division.

Hébert's powerful attack was stopped in the nick of time by Col. Jefferson C. Davis and the 3rd Division. Davis was originally destined for Elkhorn, but Curtis diverted his troops to Leetown after Osterhaus' report reached him. The four Southern regiments nearly overran Davis' leading brigade under Col. Julius White. Davis ordered a cavalry battalion to charge, but this effort was easily routed by the Southern infantry. When Col. Thomas Pattison's brigade arrived, Davis sent them up a forest trail to envelop Hébert's open left flank. Untroubled by the inert Confederate units on Foster's Farm, Osterhaus was able to "box in" Hébert's right flank. [Shea, p 141] After very hard fighting in dense woods, the Confederates, pressed from three sides, were driven back to the Ford Road. In the smoky confusion, Hébert and a small party, having become separated from the rest of the left wing, blundered through a gap in the Union lines and got lost in the woods. Later that day, a Federal cavalry unit captured Hébert and his group.

At this point, command of McCulloch's division would normally have devolved upon Elkanah Greer, the commander of the 3rd Texas Cavalry Regiment, but due to the prevailing command confusion, he was not notified of his superior officers' death or capture for several hours. In the meantime, Brigadier General Albert Pike, technically outside the chain of command of McCulloch's division assumed command on the Leetown battlefield around 3:00 pm. At 3:30 pm, even as Hébert was still battling in the woods, Pike decided to lead the regiments nearest to him in retreat back to Twelve Corners Church. This movement took place in total confusion, several units being left behind on the field, some marching back towards Camp Stephens, others around Big Mountain towards Van Dorn and the rest of the army. At least one regiment was at this point ordered to discard its arms and bury them for later recovery. Only several hours later, Greer assumed command of the remaining forces and was at that point informed of Pike's actions. Initially, he considered remaining on the battle field but after consulting with Van Dorn decided to withdraw his forces as well and join the remainder of the army in Cross Timber Hollow.

Right wing

On the other side of Pea Ridge, Van Dorn and Price encountered the Federals near Elkhorn Tavern. Van Dorn ordered an attack, and by nightfall the Confederates succeeded in pushing the Union forces back. They seized the Telegraph and Huntsville Roads and succeeded in cutting Curtis's lines of communication at Elkhorn Tavern. The survivors from McCulloch's command joined Van Dorn at the tavern during the night.

Elkhorn Tavern

Around 9:30 am, Cearnal's cavalry battalion in Price's advance guard bumped into a company of the 24th Missouri in Cross Timber Hollow. Soon after, Carr arrived at Elkhorn with Dodge's brigade right behind. Carr spread out his regiments facing north along the edge of the plateau near the tavern and pulled the 24th Missouri back to cover their left flank at the base of Big Mountain. The Union 4th Division commander then sent the 1st Iowa Battery's four guns forward to slow the Confederate advance.

At this point, Van Dorn made a big mistake. Instead of rushing Carr's badly outnumbered force with all 5,000 of his available soldiers, he became cautious and ordered Price to fully deploy his division. When the Northern guns began firing, Van Dorn ordered his own artillery into action. Soon, 21 Southern guns were pounding the Iowa cannoneers. By the time Price's infantry finally began edging uphill toward the Yankee guns, they met Carr's men advancing downhill in an aggressive counterstroke. The Confederate advance stalled near Elkhorn, but Price's left flank units were marching up Williams Hollow further to the east. Once this force reached the plateau, Carr's right flank would be turned.

By 12:30 pm, Carr's second brigade, Vandever's, arrived at Elkhorn. The Union division commander immediately launched this unit in a counterattack on Price's right flank. Superior numbers of Southerners eventually forced Vandever to pull back a short distance uphill. At 2:00 pm Van Dorn found out that McCulloch's division would not be meeting Price's at Elkhorn. At this time, Henry Little, on his own initiative, waved his 1st Missouri Brigade forward and the Rebel advance began to roll uphill. These events finally convinced Van Dorn to take more aggressive action. [Shea, p 181] Price was wounded but remained in charge of his left wing while Van Dorn took tactical control of the Confederate right wing. But more time was lost in reorganizing Price's division to attack. Meanwhile, Curtis was rushing small units to Carr's assistance as quickly as he could.

When Price's left finally emerged from Williams Hollow and attacked about 4:30 pm, Carr's line was outflanked. On the right, Dodge's brigade collapsed after putting up a terrific fight at Clemon's farm. On the left, in equally hard fighting, Vandever's men were steadily pushed back to the tavern and beyond. In the center, Little led his men forward into the teeth of Federal artillery. After being forced back from position after position, Vandever's men finally halted the Confederate drive at Ruddick's field, over a quarter mile south of the tavern. There they were joined by Dodge's men, part of Alexander S. Asboth's 2nd Division and Curtis. At 6:30 pm, Curtis launched a brief counter-attack, but soon recalled his men in the dark.

Battle, March 8

Night

Temperatures fell rapidly after dark, making a very uncomfortable night for the men of both armies. Curtis called Davis' 3rd Division to Ruddick's field during the night. When Davis arrived he was put in line to the left of Carr. Sigel marched the 1st and 2nd Divisions in circles all night but finally had them camp near Pratt's Store. Asboth, who was wounded in the last action of the day, lost his nerve and pressed Curtis to retreat. Though his army was now cut off from Missouri, Curtis would have none of it and confidently predicted victory in the morning.

A number of regiments and artillery batteries from McCulloch's Division, led by Greer, reached Van Dorn via the Bentonville Detour and Cross Timber Hollow by a night march. Van Dorn did not yet realize that a mistaken order had caused his supply train to turn around and return to Camp Stephens during the previous afternoon and evening. In the morning, the Confederate reserve artillery ammunition would be hopelessly out of reach.

Federal counterattack

On the morning of March 8, Curtis massed his artillery near the tavern and launched a counterattack in an attempt to recover his supply lines. Leading the attack was Curtis's second-in-command, Franz Sigel. The massed artillery, combined with cavalry and infantry attacks, began to crumple the Confederate lines. By noon, Van Dorn realized that he was low on ammunition and that his supply trains were miles away with no hope of arriving in time to resupply his men. Despite outnumbering his opponent, Van Dorn withdrew down the Huntsville Road.

econd day

In the early morning, Sigel sent Osterhaus to scout the open prairie to the west of Elkhorn. The colonel discovered a knoll that promised to make an excellent artillery position and reported it to Sigel. Osterhaus also suggested that the 1st and 2nd Divisions simply march up the Telegraph Road and deploy on Davis' left, rather than retrace the muddled route of the previous evening. Sigel agreed with this good advice and his small corps was put into motion.

In the meantime, Davis ordered an Illinois battery to fire a few salvoes into the woods opposite his position. This provoked a sharp Confederate reaction. Three Southern batteries opened fire, causing two Federal batteries to retreat and Davis to pull his men out of the open and back into the woods. This was followed by a Confederate probe which was quickly driven back.

Soon Sigel's men extended in a long line to the left of Davis. By 8:00 am, Asboth's small division took its place on the far left, then came Osterhaus, Davis and Carr. Curtis' line faced generally north. Sigel now massed 21 cannon on the open knoll to the west of Elkhorn. With Sigel in personal control, the Federal artillery began an extremely effective fire against the 12 Southern guns opposed to them. When the Confederate gunners pulled back under the deadly fire, Van Dorn ordered two batteries to take their place. After one of the new batteries panicked and fled, Van Dorn put its commander under arrest. But the Southern commander was unable to counter Sigel's devastating fire. Return fire from the Confederate artillery was ineffective and few Federals were killed.

With the opposing guns rendered nearly harmless, Sigel directed his gunners to fire into the woods at the Confederate infantry. Near the base of Big Mountain the projectiles created a deadly combination of rock shrapnel and wood splinters, driving the 2nd Missouri Brigade from its positions. "It was one of the few times in the Civil War when a preparatory artillery barrage effectively softened up an enemy position and paved the way for an infantry assault." [Shea, p 236] During the bombardment, Sigel's infantry edged forward so that by 9:30 am his divisions had executed a right wheel and faced to the northeast.

By this time Van Dorn found that his reserve artillery ammunition was with the wagon train, a six hour march away. The Southern commander bitterly realized that he had no hope of victory and decided to retreat via the Huntsville Road. This route led east from the tavern, then turned south. With Price disabled by his wound, Van Dorn's army began to move toward the Huntsville Road in some confusion.

At 10:30 am, Sigel sent his two divisions forward into the attack. On the far left, Asboth's regiments drove the 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles from the point of Big Mountain. Osterhaus was resisted by Little's 1st Missouri Brigade. Soon, Curtis ordered Davis to attack in the center. Not realizing that the Confederate army was retreating past his right flank, Curtis held Carr's mauled division in position on the right.

Van Dorn joined the retreat about 11:00 am. Sometime around noon, Sigel's soldiers met Davis' men near Elkhorn Tavern and a great cry of "Victory" was sent up. A number of Southerners were cut off and escaped up the Wire Road into Cross Timber Hollow. From there the infantry retraced their steps on the Bentonville Detour. Several batteries marched northeast into Missouri then south through the Ozarks. In the confusion, Curtis failed to understand that Van Dorn had escaped on the Huntsville Road. Thinking that Van Dorn had retreated via Cross Timber Hollow, he sent Sigel and some cavalry to pursue in that direction.

igel's strange odyssey

Instead of taking the forces Curtis assigned for the pursuit, Sigel gathered both of his divisions and marched northeast toward Keetsville, Missouri. Near there, he requested that Curtis send his supply train to that place. "I am going forward not backward," remarked an annoyed Curtis to his staff. [Shea, p 257] On March 9, Sigel finally returned to the battlefield and admitted that the Southern main body had not retreated by way of Missouri.

Aftermath

Federal forces reported 203 killed, 980 wounded and 201 missing for a total of 1,384 casualties. [Battles & Leaders, vol. 1, p 337] Of these, Carr's 4th Division lost 682, almost all in its resolute stand on the first day, and Davis' 3rd Division lost 344. Asboth and Carr were wounded. Van Dorn counted his losses as 800 killed and wounded, with between 200 and 300 prisoners, but these are probably too low. A more realistic estimate is that the Confederates suffered 2,000 casualties in the Battle of Pea Ridge. These losses included a large proportion of senior officers. Generals McCulloch, McIntosh, and William Y. Slack were killed or mortally wounded, and Price wounded. Among colonels, Hébert was captured, and Benjamin Rives was mortally wounded.

Separated from their supply train, Van Dorn's main body retreated through very sparsely settled country for a week, living off what little food they could take from the inhabitants. They finally reunited with their supply train south of the Boston Mountains.

With the defeat at Pea Ridge, the Confederates never again seriously threatened the state of Missouri. Within weeks Van Dorn's army was transferred across the Mississippi River to bolster the Army of Tennessee, leaving Arkansas virtually defenseless.

With his victory, Curtis proceeded to move east to West Plains, Missouri. Then he turned south into undefended northeast Arkansas. He had hopes of capturing Little Rock, but this proved impossible because of a lack of supplies. Instead, following the approximate course of the White River, Curtis continued south and seized Helena, Arkansas on July 12.

Generalship

Curtis remained confident and exercised effective overall control of his outnumbered army. He was well served by three of his four division commanders, Osterhaus, Davis and Carr. His brigade commanders Dodge, Vandever and Greusel also performed well. Sigel's generalship on the morning of March 8 was "stellar". [Shea, p 311] However, his erratic behavior on other occasions and his attempt to claim credit for the victory led to a rift between him and Curtis. Sigel was soon transferred to a command in Virginia.

On the other side, Van Dorn ignored logistical matters and failed to exercise control of his army. When death struck down McCulloch, his division was allowed to fall apart while Van Dorn absorbed himself in the tactical details of Price's fight. His amateur staff lost contact with his wagon train at a critical moment and committed many other errors. Of all the officers on the Southern side, Henry Little showed the most ability, becoming the "de facto commander of Price's division" at the end of the battle. [Shea, p 312-3]

Today

The battlefield at Pea Ridge is now Pea Ridge National Military Park. The park is known as one of the best preserved Civil War battlefields. A reconstruction of Elkhorn Tavern, scene of the heaviest fighting, is present at its original location. The park also includes a 2.5 mile (4 km) section of the Trail of Tears.

See also

* Confederate order of battle
* Union order of battle

References

* "Battles and Leaders of the American Civil War, Vol. 1." ISBN 0-89009-569-8
* Shea, William & Hess, Earl, "Pea Ridge: Civil War Campaign in the West." University of North Carolina Press, 1992. ISBN 0-8078-4669-4
* [http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/abpp/battles/ar001.htm National Park Service battle description]

Footnotes

External links

* [http://www.civilwarbuff.org/pea_ridge.html Civil War in Arkansas]
* [http://www.anythingarkansas.com/arkapedia/pedia/Battle_of_Pea_Ridge/ Significance of The Battle at Pea Ridge]
* [http://www.nps.gov/peri/battle_intro.htm National Park Service Pea Ridge site]
* [http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/civilwar/articles/pearidge.aspx The Battle of Pea Ridge] by Allen Parfitt
* [http://www.historyanimated.com/PeaRidge.html Animated History of The Battle of Pea Ridge]
* [http://www.mudcat.org/@displaysong.cfm?SongID=10050 Lyrics to "The Battle of Pea Ridge" from The Digital Tradition]
* [http://www.mudcat.org/@displaysong.cfm?SongID=5861 Lyrics to "The Battle of Elkhorn Tavern" from The Digital Tradition]

Template group
list =