Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued February 5, 1942 Decided March 9, 1942
Full case name	Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire
Citations	315 U.S. 568 (more) 62 S. Ct. 766; 86 L. Ed. 1031; 1942 U.S. LEXIS 851
Prior history	Appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme Court
Holding
A criminal conviction for causing a breach of the peace through the use of "fighting words" does not violate the Free Speech guarantee of the First Amendment.
Court membership
Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone Associate Justices Owen J. Roberts · Hugo Black Stanley F. Reed · Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas · Frank Murphy James F. Byrnes · Robert H. Jackson
Case opinions
Majority	Murphy, joined by unanimous court
Laws applied
U.S. Constitution Amendment. I; NH P. L., c. 378, § 2 (1941)

Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.

Facts of the case

In late November 1941, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was using the public sidewalk as a pulpit in downtown Rochester, passing out pamphlets and calling organized religion a "racket." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and generally causing a scene, a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to police headquarters. Along the way he met the town marshal, who had earlier warned Chaplinsky to keep it down and avoid causing a commotion. Upon meeting the marshal for the second time, Chaplinsky attacked him verbally. The complaint against Chaplinsky charged that he had shouted: "You are a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" and was arrested. Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity.

For this, he was arrested under a New Hampshire statute preventing intentionally offensive speech being directed at others in a public place. Under NH.'s Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address another person with "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place...or to call him by an offensive or derisive name."

Chaplinsky was fined, but he appealed, claiming the law was "vague" and infringed upon his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech.

Alternate views

Some modern legal historians have disputed the generally accepted version of events that led to Chaplinsky's arrest. ^[1]

UCLA professor Gary Blasi's article on the topic describes the events thus: While preaching, Chaplinsky was surrounded by men who mocked the opposition of Jehovah's Witnesses to saluting the flag. One man attempted to hit Chaplinsky in full view of the town marshal, who warned Chaplinsky that he was in danger but did not arrest his assailant. After the marshal left, another man produced a flagpole and attempted to impale Chaplinsky; while Chaplinsky was pinned against a car by the pole, other members of the crowd struck him. A police officer arrived and, rather than dispersing the crowd, took Chaplinsky into custody.

En route to the station, the officer, as well as members of the crowd, insulted Chaplinsky and his religion. Chaplinsky responded by calling the town marshal, who had returned to assist the officer, a "damn fascist and a racketeer" and was arrested for the use of offensive language in public.

Decision of the Court

The Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the arrest. Writing the decision for the Court, Justice Frank Murphy advanced a “two-tier theory” of the First Amendment. Certain “well‐defined and narrowly limited” categories of speech fall outside the bounds of constitutional protection. Thus, “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,” and (in this case) insulting or “fighting” words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor possessed any “social value” in the search for truth.^[2]

Murphy wrote:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.

Significance

This two‐tier approach retains importance for those who believe that carefully crafted controls over certain categories of speech (such as pornography, commercial advertising, or abusive epithets) do not violate First Amendment guarantees.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 315

References

1. ^ See Blasi & Shiffrin (2004). The Real Story of West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette in Dorf, ed., 'Constitutional Law Stories' at 433.
2. ^ See Sullivan, Harold J. (2005). Civil Rights and Liberties: Provocative Questions and Evolving Answers. 2nd ed. N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2005 at 24.

Further reading

• Herbeck, Dale (2003). "Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire". In Parker, Richard A. (ed.). Free Speech on Trial: Communication Perspectives on Landmark Supreme Court Decisions. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press. pp. 85–99. ISBN 081731301X. 

External links

• Text of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) is available from: Justia · Findlaw

• "First Amendment Library entry on Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire". http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/faclibrary/case.aspx?case=Chaplinsky_v_NH.