United States v. Williams

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=United States v. Williams
ArgueDate=October 30
ArgueDateB=
ArgueYear=2007
DecideDate=May 19
DecideYear=2008
FullName=United States v. Michael Williams
USVol=
USPage=
Citation=
Prior=Defendant convicted and sentenced, No. 04–20299, (S.D. Fla., Aug. 20, 2004); rev'd, 444 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2006)
Subsequent=
Holding=Federal statute prohibiting the pandering of child pornography was not unconstitutionally overbroad. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.
SCOTUS=2008
Majority=Scalia
JoinMajority=Roberts, Stevens, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito
Concurrence=Stevens
JoinConcurrence=Breyer
Dissent=Souter
JoinDissent=Ginsburg
LawsApplied=U.S. Const. amend. I; usc|18|2252A(a)(3)(B) (PROTECT Act of 2003)

"United States v. Williams", 553 U.S. ___ (2008) was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that a federal statute prohibiting the "pandering" of child pornography [usc|18|2252A(a)(3)(B)] (offering or requesting to transfer, sell, deliver, or trade the items) did not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, even if a person charged under the code did not in fact possess child pornography which to trade.

The Court overturned a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals that the statute was facially void for overbreadth and vagueness, having reasoned that there is no First Amendment protection for offers to engage in illegal transactions [see "Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations", ussc|413|376|1973] and that banning "the collateral speech that introduces such material into the child-pornography distribution network" does not in fact criminalise a "substantial amount of protected speech."

Background of Case

On April 26, 2004, as part of an undercover operationaimed at combating child exploitation on the Internet,Special Agent (SA) Timothy Devine, United States Secret Service, Miami Field Office, entered an Internet “chat” room using the screen name “Lisa n Miami” (LMN). SA Devineobserved a public message posted by a user employinga sexually graphic screen name, which was later tracedto the defendant Williams. Williams’s public messagestated that “Dad of toddler has ‘good’ pics of her an [sic] me for swap of your toddler pics, or live cam.” SADevine as LNM engaged Williams in a private Internetchat during which they swapped non-pornographicphotographs. Williams provided a photograph of a twoto three-year-old female lying on a couch in her bathingsuit, and five photographs of a one to two-year-oldfemale in various non-sexual poses, one of which de-picted the child with her breast exposed and her pantsdown just below her waistline. LNM sent a non-sexualphoto of a college-aged female digitally regressed toappear ten to twelve years old, who LNM claimed washer daughter.

After the initial photo exchange, Williams claimedthat he had nude photographs of his four-year-olddaughter, stating “I’ve got hc [hard core] pictures of meand dau, and other guys eating her out—do you? ?”Williams asked for additional pictures of LNM’sdaughter. When these pictures were not received,Williams accused LNM of being a cop. LNM respondedby accusing Williams of being a cop. After repeatingthese accusations in the public part of the chat room,Williams posted a message stating “HERE ROOM; I CANPUT UPLINK CUZ IM FOR REAL—SHE CANT.” The message was followed by a computer hyperlink, whichSA Devine accessed. The computer hyperlink contained,among other things, seven images of actual minorsengaging in sexually explicit conduct. The nude childrenin the photos were approximately five to fifteen yearsold, displaying their genitals and/or engaged in sexualactivity.

Secret Service agents executed a search warrant ofWilliams’s home. Two computer hard drives seizedduring the search held at least twenty-two images ofactual minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct orlascivious display of genitalia. Most of the images depicted prepubescent children and also depicted sado-masochistic conduct or other depictions of pain.Williams was charged with one count of promoting,or “pandering,” material “in a manner that reflects thebelief, or that is intended to cause another to believe,”that the material contains illegal child pornography inviolation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B), which carries asixty-month mandatory minimum sentence. Williamswas also charged with one count of possession of childpornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B).Williams filed a motion to dismiss the panderingcharge on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. While themotion was pending before the trial court, the partiesreached a plea agreement by which Williams wouldplead guilty to both counts but reserve his right to challenge the constitutionality of the pandering provision onappeal. The court sentenced Williams to sixty months.

Important Notes/Dicta

The Court further stated that usc|18|2252A(a)(3)(B) would not be construed to punish the solicitation or offering of "virtual" (computer generated/animated) child pornography, thus comporting with the holding of "Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition", ussc|535|234|2002.

United States v. Panfil, 338 F.3d 1299, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003).“Pandering” is defined as the catering to or exploitation of theweaknesses of others, especially “to provide gratification for others’desires.” See MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.m-w.com (last visited March 23, 2006). As a legal concept, pandering ismost commonly associated with prostitution. In that context,panderingprovisions are statutes penalizing various acts by intermediaries whoengage in the commercial exploitation of prostitution and are aimed atthose who, as agents, promote prostitution rather than against theprostitutes themselves. The term pandering, in some instances, isapplied by Congress and the courts to the promotion of obscenity. See,e.g., 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (prohibiting pandering advertisements of sexuallyprovocative materials by mail), Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,86 S. Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (1966) (considering obscene nature oferotically advertised publications). Congress has characterized boththe child pornography regulation at issue in this case (18 U.S.C.2252A(a)(3)(B)) and its unconstitutional predecessor (18 U.S.C.§ 2256(8)(D) (1996)) as “pandering” provisions.imprisonment for the pandering charge and sixtymonths for the possession charge, to be served concurrently.

The Court stated that "an offer to provide or request to receive virtual child pornography is not prohibited by the statute. A crime is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of the proposed transaction depicts real children. It is simply not true that this means 'a protected category of expression [will] inevitably be suppressed,' post, at 13. Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever." "Williams" at 17.

ee also

*PROTECT Act of 2003
*List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 553

References

External links

* [http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/05/06-694.pdf Full decision]
* [http://209.85.165.104/search?q=cache:_L8POGfGPnYJ:www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/7pet/2006-0694.pet.aa.pdf+%22lisa+n+miami%22&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=10&gl=us]