Viktor Suvorov

Viktor Suvorov ( _ru. Ви́ктор Суво́ров; is the pen name for Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun : Влади́мир Богда́нович Резу́н) (born April 20, 1947 in Ukraine), a Russian writer. He began his service in the Soviet Army's 41st Guards Tank Division [p.15, Isby] , and worked in Soviet military intelligence (GRU) before defecting to the United Kingdom in 1978, where he worked as an intelligence analyst and lecturer. Suvorov made his name writing books about Soviet history, the Soviet Army, GRU, and Spetsnaz. His testimony about the capabilities of the Russian Special Forces created concern in the West. It contributed to the formation of the Norwegian HV-016, an elite unit equiped to neutralize such a threat if ever deployed on Norwegian soil.

Suvorov's most controversial assurtion was that Stalin originally planned to use Nazi Germany as a proxy (the “Icebreaker”) against the West. For this reason Stalin provided significant material and political support to Adolf Hitler, while at the same time preparing the Red Army to “liberate” the whole of Europe from Nazi occupation. Suvorov argued that Hitler lost World War II from the moment he attacked Poland: not only was he going to war with the Allies, but it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union would take the most appropriate moment to attack him from the rear. This left Hitler with no choice but to launch a preemptive strike on the Soviet Union, while Stalin's forces were redeploying from a defensive to an offensive posture, providing Hitler with an important initial tactical advantage. But this was strategically hopeless since the Germans now had to fight on two fronts, a mistake Hitler himself had identified as Germany's undoing in the previous war. In the end, Stalin was able to achieve some of his objectives by establishing Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, China, and North Korea. According to Suvorov, this made Stalin the primary winner of World War II.

Suvorov's assurtions remain a matter of debate among historians. While most agree that Stalin made extensive preparations for an upcoming war and exploited the military conflict in Europe to his advantage, the assurtions that Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany in the summer of 1941, and that Operation Barbarossa was a preemptive strike by Hitler, is still under debate. [Glantz, David M., "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of War", Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998.]

Publications and ideas

Suvorov has written several books about his Soviet Army experiences and also joined the team led by the British General Sir John Hackett in writing the book "The Third World War: The Untold Story""The Third World War: The Untold Story" ISBN 0-283-98863-0] . Published in 1982, this book was the sequel to the 1978 original "The Third World War""The Third World War" ISBN 0-425-04477-7] , in which Hackett and his team had speculated about the possible course of a Soviet/NATO war in Germany.

Suvorov is best known for his books about Stalin's times written in a polemic, popular-science style. These books have been translated to more than 20 languages and hotly debated. The first work was "Icebreaker". Later books on this subject were "Day "M"", "Suicide", and "Last Republic". Suvorov used hundreds of Soviet-era memoirs and other publicly accessible sources to justify the following points.

1. Soviet Union was intrinsically unstable, as any other communist regime. It had to expand to survive. According to the permanent revolution theory the communist system must expand and occupy the entire world to survive. Otherwise, it will fail in a peaceful and military struggle with surrounding “capitalist” countries. Stalin and other Soviet leaders had always understood this. It was publicly declared by Stalin that "the ultimate victory of socialism... can only be achieved in international scale" [ "Pravda", February 14, 1938, cited from V. Suvorov "Last Republic" ( _ru. Последняя республика), ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-4, pages 75-76 ] . Therefore, Soviet leaders started preparations for a massive war of aggression. However to misled the West, they officially declared an adherence to a more peaceful theory of Socialism in One Country, according to which Socialism can win in a single country, without being immediately overthrown by hostile "capitalist" neighbors. This leading country would then help revolutionary movements in other countries. Either way, the Soviet pre-war doctrine was based on Marxism-Leninism theory that capitalism will be overthrown through Communist revolution.

2. Soviet Union made extensive preparations for the future war of aggression during 1920s and 30s. Suvorov provides an extensive analysis of Stalin's preparation for war. Stalin, the leader of the Communist party officially announced three phases that should lead to the final preparation for the war: three Five Year Plan phases, with the first one focused on collectivization, the second focused on industrialization, and the third phase emphasized the militarization of the country.

3. Stalin escalated tensions in Europe by providing a combination of economic and military support to Hitler. (see Soviet-German relations before 1941). Stalin's plan and vision was that Hitler's predictability and his violent reactionary ideas made him a candidate to the role of "icebreaker" for the Communist revolution. By starting wars with European countries Hitler would warrant the USSR joining World War II by attacking Nazi Germany and "liberating" and Sovietizing the entire Europe. It is generally accepted that "from the early 1920s until 1933, the Soviet Union was engaged in secret collaboration with the German military to enable it to circumvent the provisions of the Versailles Treaty", which prohibited Germany's military production . Moscow allowed the Germans to produce and test their weapons on Soviet territory, while some Red Army officers attended general-staff courses in Germany . In 1932-1933, "Stalin helped Hitler come to power, by forbidding German Communists to make common cause with the Social Democrats against the Nazis in parliamentary elections" . When concluding the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, Stalin "clearly counted on the repetition of the 1914-1918 war of attrition, which would leave the "capitalist" countries so exhausted that the USSR could sweep into Europe virtually unopposed" (see also Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939). Stalin always planned to exploit the military conflict between the "capitalist" countries to his advantage. He said as early as in 1925 that: "Struggles, conflicts and wars among our enemies are...our great ally...and the greatest supporter of our government and our revolution" and "If a war does break out, we will not sit with folded arms - we will have to take the field, but we will be "last" to do so. And we shall do so in order to throw the decisive load on the scale" Richard Pipes Communism: A History (2001) ISBN 0-812-96864-6, pages 74-75.] 4. World War II was initiated by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany which became allies after signing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The essence of this pact was in the secret protocols which divided Europe into zones of influence, and removed the Polish buffer between Germany and the USSR. Some countries that fell into the Soviet zone of influence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were occupied. The difference between these smaller nations, occupied and annexed by the USSR, and Poland initially attacked by Germany was that Poland had military assistance guarantees from Great Britain and France.

5. Stalin planned to attack Nazi Germany from the rear in July of 1941, only a few weeks after the date on which the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union took place. According to Suvorov, the Red Army had been already redeployed from a defensive to an offensive position. As described in Suvorov's books, Stalin had made no major defensive preparations. On the contrary, the Stalin line fortifications through Belarus-Ukraine were dismantled, and the new Molotov line was all but finished by the time of Nazi invasion.

5. Hitler's intelligence identified USSR's preparations to attack Germany. Therefore, the Wehrmacht had drafted a preemptive war plan based on Hitler's orders as early as 1940. On June 22, 1941 Hitler launched an assault on the USSR.

Criticism and support

Criticism

Among the noted critics of Suvorov's work are Israeli historian Gabriel Gorodetsky, American military historian David Glantz, and Russian military historians Makhmut Gareev, Lev Bezymensky and Dmitri Volkogonov.

One criticism of Suvorov's work is that the Red Army was not ready for war. While it may be possible that Suvorov is correct in discerning Stalin's true plans and exposing the huge hardware potential of the Soviet military machine, he does not address many of the arguments regarding the systemic problems plaguing the Red Army, such as: poor leadership after the purges of 1937-1938, poor logistics, poor training, and low morale. While Suvorov discussed some of these points in his later books, the dispute remains unsettled.

Much of Suvorov's thesis is based on circumstantial evidence: one of Suvorov arguments is that certain types of weapons were mostly suited for offensive warfare and that the Red Army had large numbers of such weapons. For example, he pointed out that the Soviet Union was outfitting large numbers of paratroopers — preparing to field entire parachute armies, in fact — and that paratroopers are only suitable for offensive action, which the Soviet military doctrine of the time recognized. Suvorov's critics say what 1) paratroopers were widely used in defensive actions by many armies (for example, by Soviet and Israeli) 2) Soviet paratroopers in 1941 were poorly trained and armed [Алексей Исаев. Вертикальный охват // Неправда Виктора Суворова. М.: Яуза, Эксмо, 2007, с. 257-289 ref- _ru. ru] ).

David M. Glantz disputes the argument that the Red Army was deployed in an offensive stance in 1941. Glantz shows that the Red Army was only in a state of partial mobilization in July 1941, from which neither effective defensive or offensive actions could be offered without considerable delay. Regarding Hitler's alleged pre-emptive intentions, Erickson has stated that “what really concerned Hitler was not Soviet aggression but Soviet concessions to Germany, which could frustrate his own grand design, depriving him of a pretext to attack.” ["Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" by John Erickson [http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=1704&sid=69c4ae71b491b63a743fefd84984c895] ] One of the major critics of the preventive war thesis is the American historian Gerhard Weinberg. In a scathing 1989 review of Ernst Topitsch’s book "Stalin’s War", Weinberg called all who argue that Operation Barbarossa was a preventive war believers in “fairy tales” [Weinberg, Gerhard Review of "Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War" by Ernst Topitsch pages 800-801 from "The American Historical Review", Volume 94, Issue # 3, June 1989 page 800] .

Another criticism of Suvorov's position includes the claim that Stalin had never "encouraged" Hitler to start World War II, even though he agreed with Germany about the invasion of Poland in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which had to trigger a general European war because of the military assistance guarantees given to Poland by Great Britain and France. In his official statements, Stalin was opposed to Trotsky's theory of Permanent Revolution, implementation of which regarded worldwide war and other countries' usurpation as necessary (because practice showed that war, the ultimate devastation, could create revolutionary conditions that usually did not occur in any natural way). Stalin instead officially proclaimed the theory of Socialism in One Country according to which Socialism can win in a single country, without being immediately overthrown by hostile "capitalist" neighbors. This leading country would then help revolutionary movements in other countries. According to Stalin, "The ultimate victory of socialism... can only be achieved in international scale" [ "Pravda", February 14, 1938, cited from V. Suvorov "Last Republic" ( _ru. Последняя республика), ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-4, pages 75-76 ]

Conventional theory states that Stalin prepared the Soviet Army for a general war because he knew he would have to free Europe from Fascism, and the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was nothing more than a way to delay the war with Nazism — to have time for such preparations as those that Suvorov discusses.

Middle positions

In a 1987 article in the "Historische Zeitschrift" journal, the German historian Klaus Hildebrand argued that both Hitler and Stalin separately were planning to attack each other in 1941 [ Evans, Richard "In Hitler's Shadow", New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989 page 43] . In Hildebrand’s opinion, the news of Red Army concentrations near the border led to Hitler engaging in a "flucht nach vorn" ("flight forward"-i.e responding to a danger by charging on rather then retreating) [ Evans, Richard "In Hitler's Shadow", New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989 page 43] . Hildebrand wrote "Independently, the National Socialist program of conquest met the equally far-reaching war-aims program which Stalin had drawn up in 1940 at the latest" [ Evans, Richard "In Hitler's Shadow", New York, NY: Pantheon, 1989 page 43] . Hildebrand's views could seen as a median viewpoint in the preventive war debate.

A middle position seems to be taken by the Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In an interview in the April 11, 2005 edition of the German news magazine "FOCUS", which is the second largest weekly magazine in Germany, he said: "I doubt that Stalin wanted to attack as early as autumn 1941, as some writers argue. But I have no doubt that sooner or later, if Germany would have been entangled in a war with Great Britain and the U.S., he would have taken what he wanted. Judging by the talks between Ribbentrop and Molotov in November 1940, this would have been Romania, Bulgaria, an access to the North Sea, the Dardanelles and probably those parts of Poland that were under German control at that time." Asked to what degree the leaders of the Wehrmacht needed to feel threatened by the Soviet military buildup, van Creveld replies "very much" and adds: "In 1941, the Red Army was the largest army in the world. Stalin may, as I said, not have planned to attack Germany in autumn 1941. But it would be hard to believe that he would not have taken the opportunity to stab the Reich in the back sometime." [http://www.focus.de/magazin/archiv/serie-und150-teil-vi_aid_212248.html]

Some of Suvorov's critics argue that the suggestion that Stalin regarded war with Nazi Germany as inevitable is at odds with the undisputed fact that the attack by the Axis in 1941 took Stalin completely by surprise. On the other hand, the fact that Stalin was taken completely by surprise contradicts the claims of some writers, who assert that Stalin was paranoid about a possible foreign invasion and so had concentrated on defensive policies. The criticism was addressed in detail in Suvorov's book "Suicide".

Support

While many Western researchers (the exception being Albert L. Weeks "Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941" ISBN 0-7425-2191-5 [http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/4/29/135936.shtml] ] ) ignored Suvorov's thesis [(e.g., according to Raack, arguments in favor of the thesis “have not so far been systematically reported in, for example, the "Journal of Slavic Military Studies". Indeed, one searches in vain in North America for a broad discussion of the issues of Soviet war planning” R. C. Raack [Review of] "Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffsplane 1940/41" by Walter Post "Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politische System der SBZ" by Stefan Creuzberger" "Slavic Review". Vol. 57, No. 1 (Spring, 1998), pp. 213] , he has gathered some support among Russian professional historians, starting in the 1990s. Support for Suvorov's claim that Stalin had been preparing a strike against Hitler in 1941 began to emerge as some archive materials were declassified. Authors supporting the Stalin 1941 assault thesis are V.D.DanilovДанилов.В.Д. Сталинская стратегия начала войны: планы и реальность—Другая война. 1939–1945 гг; or Danilоv V. "Hat der Generalsstab der Roten Armee einen Praventiveschlag gegen Deutschland vorbereitet?" "Österreichische Militarische Zeitschrift". 1993. №1. S. 41–51] , V.A.NevezhinНевежин В.А. Синдром наступательной войны. Советская пропаганда в преддверии "священных боев", 1939–1941 гг. М., 1997; "Речь Сталина 5 мая 1941 года и апология наступательной войны" Wayback| http://sscadm.nsu.ru/deps/hum/kirillov/ref-liter/nevezhin-95.html online text ] , Constantine Pleshakov and B.V. Sokolov [http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov2/index.html Соколов Б.В. Неизвестный Жуков: портрет без ретуши в зеркале эпохи.] (online text); Соколов Б.В. "Правда о Великой Отечественной войне" (Сборник статей). — СПб.: Алетейя, 1999 ( [http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/index.html online text] )] . As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all. Although the USSR attacked Finland, no documents found to date which would indicate November 26, 1939 as the previously assumed date for beginning of the provocations or November 30 as the date of the planned Soviet assault. [http://militera.lib.ru/research/sokolov1/02.html]

However Edvard Radzinsky noted that a document about the Soviet surprise attack on Nazi Germany was actually found and preserved in the Military-Memorial Center of the Soviet General Staff ["Stalin: The First In-depth Biography Based on Explosive New Documents from Russia's Secret Archives", Anchor, (1997) ISBN 0-385-47954-9, pages 454-459 ] . That was a draft drawn up by Georgy Zhukov, dated May 15 1941, and signed by Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Nikolai Vatutin. The plan of preemptive attack on Germany stated:

The plan drafted by the Soviet command included a secret mobilization of the Soviet forces at the Western frontier. The objective of the offensive operation was to cut Germany off its allies, and especially Romania with its oil required for the Germany to conduct the war. The document about attack on Germany and Romania was also mentioned by Dmitri Volkogonov who however did not consider it as a final proof of the Soviet intentions.

One of views was expressed by Mikhail Meltyukhov in his study "Stalin's Missed Chance" [ [http://militera.lib.ru/research/meltyukhov/index.html Мельтюхов М.И. Упущенный шанс Сталина.] (electronic version of the book) For a review of the book, see [http://www.russiamonitor.org/en/main.asp?menu_id=7_489] )] . The author states that the idea for striking Germany arose long before May 1941, and was the very basis of Soviet military planning from 1940 to 1941. Providing additional support for this thesis is that no significant defense plans have been found [Meltyukhov 2000:375] . In his argument, Meltyukhov covers five different versions of the assault plan (“Considerations on the Strategical Deployment of Soviet Troops in Case of War with Germany and its Allies” [http://osteuropa.bsb-muenchen.de/dig/1000doktest/0024_zuk/@Generic__BookTextView/502;cs=default;ts=default;pt=502 (Russian original)] ), the first version of which was developed soon after the outbreak of World War II. The last version was to be completed by May 1, 1941 [Meltyukhov 2000:370–372] . Even the deployment of troops was chosen in the South, which would have been more beneficial in case of a Soviet assault [Meltyukhov 2000:381] .

In "Stalin's War of Extermination", Joachim Hoffmann makes extensive use of interrogations of Soviet prisoners of war, ranging in rank from general to private, conducted by their German captors during the war. The book is also based on open-source, unclassified literature and recently declassified materials. Based on this material, Hoffmann argues that the Soviet Union was making final preparations for its own attack when the Wehrmacht struck. He also remarks that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941 has long been known and analyzed. Colonel Valeri Danilov and Dr. Heinz Magenheimer examined this plan and other documents which might indicate Soviet preparations for an attack almost ten years ago in an Austrian military journal ("Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift", nos. 5 and 6, 1991; no. 1, 1993; and no. 1, 1994). Both researchers concluded that Zhukov's plan of May 15, 1941, reflected Stalin's May 5, 1941 speech heralding the birth of the new offensive Red Army.

In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov") by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published. [Хмельницкий, Дмитрий (сост.). "Правда Виктора Суворова. Переписывая историю Второй Мировой." Москва: Яуза, 2006 (ISBN 5-87849-214-8); some of the articles are [http://tapirr.com/texts/history/suvorov/pravda/ind.htm here] :] It was followed by two more books, called "The Truth of Viktor Suvorov 2" and "3"

Several politicians have also made claims similar to Suvorov's. On August 20, 2004, historian and former Prime Minister of Estonia Mart Laar published an article in "The Wall Street Journal" titled "When Will Russia Say 'Sorry'?". In this article he said: "The new evidence shows that by encouraging Hitler to start World War II, Stalin hoped to simultaneously ignite a world-wide revolution and conquer all of Europe". Another former statesman to share his views of a purported Soviet aggression plan is Mauno Koivisto, who wrote: "It seems to be clear the Soviet Union was not ready for defense in the summer of 1941, but it was rather preparing for an assault....The forces mobilized in the Soviet Union were not positioned for defensive, but for offensive aims." Koivisto concludes: "Hitler's invasion forces didn't outnumber [the Soviets] , but were rather outnumbered themselves. The Soviets were unable to organize defenses. The troops were provided with maps that covered territories outside the Soviet Union." Koivisto, M. "Venäjän idea", Helsinki. Tammi. 2001]

ee also

* Operation Barbarossa
* Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939
* Soviet-German relations before 1941
* Causes of World War II

Bibliography

Books by Viktor Suvorov

* The series about the outbreak of the Nazi-Soviet War
**"Icebreaker" ( _ru. Ледокол) 1990, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-12622-3
**"Day "M"" ( _ru. День "М")
**"Suicide". For what reason Hitler attacked the Soviet Union? ( _ru. Самоубийство), Moscow, ACT, 2000, ISBN 5-17-003119-X
**"Last Republic", ACT, 1997, ISBN 5-12-000367-4.
*"Aquarium" ( _ru. Аквариум), 1985, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11545-0
*"Inside the Soviet Army," 1982, Macmillan Publishing Co.
*"The Liberators", 1981, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-10675-3
*"Shadow of Victory" ( _ru. Тень победы), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The first book of trilogy with the same name.
*"I Take My Words Back " ( _ru. Беру Свои Слова Обратно), questions the image of Georgy Zhukov. The second book of "Shadow of Victory" trilogy.
*"Cleansing" ( _ru. Очищение). Why did Stalin beheaded his army?, Moscow, 2002, ISBN 5-17-009254-7
*" [http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov8/index.html Inside Soviet Military Intelligence] ", 1984, ISBN 0-02-615510-9
*" [http://militera.lib.ru/research/suvorov6/index.html Spetsnaz] ", 1987, Hamish Hamilton Ltd, ISBN 0-241-11961-8
*"Tales of a Liberator" ( _ru. Рассказы освободителя), fiction
*"Control" ( _ru. Контроль), fiction
*"Choice" ( _ru. Выбор), fiction
* "The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II". Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2007 (hardcover, ISBN 1-59797-114-6).

Books and articles by other authors

"Pro"

* Dębski, Sławomir. "Między Berlinem a Moskwą: Stosunki niemiecko-sowieckie 1939–1941". Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2003 (ISBN 83-918046-2-3).
**Reviewed by R.C. Raack in "The Russian Review", 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 718–719.
*Edwards, James B. "Hitler: Stalin's Stooge". San Diego, CA: Aventine Press, 2004 (ISBN 978-1593301446, paperback).
* Hoffmann, Joachim. "Stalin's War of Extermination". Capshaw, AL: Theses & Dissertations Press, 2001 (ISBN 0-9679856-8-4).
*Maser, Werner "Der Wortbruch. Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg." Olzog, München 1994. ISBN 3-7892-8260-X
*Maser, Werner "Fälschung, Dichtung und Wahrheit über Hitler und Stalin", Olzog, München 2004. ISBN 3-7892-8134-4
* Pleshakov, Constantine. "Stalin's Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War Two on the Eastern Front". Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2).
** [http://washingtontimes.com/books/20050521-100529-9645r.htm Reviewed by Ron Laurenzo] in "The Washington Times", May 22, 2005.
** Reviewed by Robert Citino in "World War II", Vol. 21, Issue 1. (2006), pp. 76–77.
* Raack, R.C. "Did Stalin Plan a "Drang Nach Westen"?", "World Affairs". Vol. 155, Issue 4. (Summer 1992), pp. 13–21.
* Raack, R.C. "Preventive Wars?" [Review Essay of Pietrow-Ennker, Bianka, ed. "Präventivkrieg? Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion". 3d ed. Frankfurt-am-Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-596-14497-3; Mel'tiukhov, Mikhail. "Upushchennyi shans Stalina: Sovetskii Soiuz i bor'ba za Evropu 1939–1941". Moscow: Veche, 2000. ISBN 5-7838-1196-3; Magenheimer, Heinz. "Entscheidungskampf 1941: Sowjetische Kriegsvorbereitungen. Aufmarsch. Zusammenstoss". Bielefeld: Osning Verlag, 2000. ISBN 3-9806268-1-4] "The Russian Review", 2004, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 134–137.
* Raack, R.C. [Review of] "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945" by Joachim Hoffmann, "Slavic Review", Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
* Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: Opening the Closet Door on a Key Chapter of Recent History", "World Affairs". Vol. 158, Issue 4, 1996, pp. 198–211.
* Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II: The International Debate Goes On", "World Affairs". Vol. 159, Issue 2, 1996, pp. 47–54.
* Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War". Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995. (ISBN 0-8047-2415-6).
* Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Plans for World War Two Told by a High Comintern Source", "The Historical Journal", Vol. 38, No. 4. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1031–1036.
* Raack, R.C. " [Review:] "Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945", "Slavic Review", Vol. 55, No. 2. (Summer, 1996), pp. 493–494.
* Raack, R.C. " [Review:] "Unternehmen Barbarossa: Deutsche und Sowjetische Angriffspläne 1940/41" by Walter Post; "Die sowjetische Besatzungsmacht und das politishe System der SBZ" by Stefan Creuzberger", "Slavic Review", Vol. 57, No. 1. (Sring, 1998), pp. 212–214.
* Raack, R.C. "Breakers on the Stalin Wave: Review Essay [of Murphy, David E. "What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3); Pleshakov, Constantine. Stalin’s Folly: The Tragic First Ten Days of World War II on the Eastern Front. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 2005 (ISBN 0-618-36701-2)] ", "The Russian Review", Vol. 65, No. 3. (2006), pp. 512–515.
* Topitsch, Ernst. "Stalin's War: A Radical New Theory of the Origins of the Second World War". New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987 (ISBN 0-312-00989-5).
** [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE3DB153CF936A25752C1A961948260&sec=&pagewanted=print Reviewed] critically by Alexander Dallin in [http://www.nytymes.com/ "The New York Times"] , November 15, 1987.
* Weeks, Albert L. "Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939–1941". Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002 (hardcover; ISBN 0-7425-2191-5); 2003 (paperback, ISBN 0-7425-2192-3).

"Contra"

* Acton, Edward. "Understanding Stalin’s Catastrophe: [Review Article] ", "Journal of Contemporary History", 2001, Vol. 36(3), pp. 531–540.
* Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", "Europe–Asia Studies", Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100. [Review of Silvio Pons, "Stalin and the Inevitable War", 1936–1941. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002 and Albert L. Weeks, "Stalin's Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941". Oxford and Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.]
* Erickson, John. "Barbarossa June 1941: Who Attacked Whom?" "History Today", July 2001, Vol. 51, Issue 7, pp. 11–17. [http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=1704&sid=69c4ae71b491b63a743fefd84984c895 online text]
* Edmonds, Robin. " [Review: "Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", "International Affairs", Vol. 66, No. 4. (Oct., 1990), p. 812.
* Glantz, David M. "Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War". Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998 (ISBN 0-7006-0879-6).
** Reviewed by David R. Costello in "The Journal of Military History", Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1999), pp. 207–208.
** Reviewed by Roger Reese in "Slavic Review", Vol. 59, No. 1. (Spring, 2000), p. 227.
* Glantz, David M. " [Review: "Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War?", "The Journal of Military History", Vol. 55, No. 2. (Apr., 1991), pp. 263–264.
* Gorodetsky, Gabriel. "Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia". New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1999 (ISBN 0-300-07792-0).
** Reviewed by David R. Costello in "The Journal of Military History", Vol. 64, No. 2. (Apr., 1999), pp. 580–582.
** Reviewed by Stephen Blank in "The Russian Review", 2000, Vol. 59, Issue 2, pp. 310–311.
** Reviewed by Hugh Ragsdale in "Slavic Review", Vol. 59, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 466–467.
** Reviewed by Evan Mawdsley in "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 52, No. 3. (May, 2000), pp. 579–580.
* Harms, Karl. "The Military Doctrine of the Red Army on the Eve of the Great Patriotic War: Myths and Facts", "Military Thought", Vol. 13, No. 03. (2004), pp. 227–237.
* Haslam, Jonathan. "Soviet–German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: The Jury Is Still Out [Reivew Article] ", "The Journal of Modern History", Vol. 69, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 785–797.
* Humpert, David M. "Viktor Suvorov and Operation Barbarossa: Tukhachevskii Revisited." "The Journal of Slavic Military Studies", Vol. 18, Issue 1. (2005), pp. 59–74.
* Lukacs, John. "June 1941: Hitler and Stalin". New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2006 (ISBN 0-300-11437-0).
* McDermott, Kevin. "Stalin: Revolutionary in an Era of War (European History in Perspective)". New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-71121-1; paperback, ISBN 0-333-71122-X).
* Murphy, David E. "What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa". New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press, 2005 (ISBN 0-300-10780-3).
** Reviewed by Robert Conquest at "The American Historical Review", Vol. 111, No. 2. (2006), p. 591.
** Reviewed by Raymond W. Leonard in the "Journal of Interdisciplinary History", Vol. 37, No. 1. (2006), pp. 128–129.
* Neilson, Keith. "Stalin's Moustache: The Soviet Union and the Coming of War: [Review Article] ", "Diplomacy and Statecraft", Vol. 12, No. 2. (2001), pp. 197–208.
* Roberts, Cynthia A. "Planning for War: The Red Army and the Catastrophe of 1941", "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 47, No. 8. (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293–1326.
* Rotundo, Louis. "Stalin and the Outbreak of War in 1941", "Journal of Contemporary History", Vol. 24, No. 2, Studies on War. (Apr., 1989), pp. 277–299.
*Gerd R. Ueberschär, Lev A. Bezymenskij (Hrsg.): "Der deutsche Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Die Kontroverse um die Präventivkriegsthese" Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, Darmstadt 1998
* Uldricks, Teddy J. "The Icebreaker Controversy: Did Stalin Plan to Attack Hitler?" "The Slavic Review", 1999, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 626–643.

Neutral, cautious approach

* Keep, John L.H.; Litvin, Alter L. "Stalinism: Russian and Western Views at the Turn of the Millennium (Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions)". New York: Routledge, 2004 (hardcover, ISBN 0-415-35108-1); 2005 (paperback, ISBN 0-415-35109-X). See chapter 5, "Foreign policy".

Other

* "The Attack on the Soviet Union" ("Germany and the Second World War, Volume IV") by Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann, Ewald Osers, Louise Wilmott, Dean S. McMurray (Editors), Ernst Klink (Translator), Rolf-Dieter Müller (Translator), Gerd R. Ueberschär (Translator). New York: Oxford University Press (USA), 1999 (ISBN 0-19-822886-4).
* Carley, Michael Jabara. "Soviet Foreign Policy in the West, 1936–1941: A Review Article", "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 56, No. 7. (2004), pp. 1081–1100.
* Drabkin, Ia.S. "'Hitler’s War' or 'Stalin’s War'?", "Journal of Russian and East European Psychology", Vol. 40, No. 5. (2002), pp. 5–30.
* Ericson, Edward E., III. "Karl Schnurre and the Evolution of Nazi–Soviet Relations, 1936–1941", "German Studies Review", Vol. 21, No. 2. (May, 1998), pp. 263–283.
* Förster, Jürgen; Mawdsley, Evan. "Hitler and Stalin in Perspective: Secret Speeches on the Eve of Barbarossa", "War in History", Vol. 11, Issue 1. (2004), pp. 61–103.
* Haslam, Jonathan. "Stalin and the German Invasion of Russian 1941: A Failure of Reasons of State?", "International Affairs", Vol. 76, No. 1. (Jan., 2000), pp. 133–139.
* Isby, D.C., "Ten million bayonets: inside the armies of the Soviet Union", Arms and Armour Press, London, 1988
* Koch, H.W. "Operation Barbarossa—The Current State of the Debate", "The Historical Journal", Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 377–390.
* Litvin, Alter L. "Writing History in Twentieth-Century Russia: A View from Within", translated and edited by John L.H. Keep. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 (hardcover, ISBN 0-333-76487-0).
* Roberts, Geoffrey. "On Soviet–German Relations: The Debate Continues [A Review Article] ", "Europe-Asia Studies", Vol. 50, No. 8. (Dec., 1998), pp. 1471–1475.
* Vasquez, John A. "The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation", "International Political Science Review", Vol. 17, No. 2. (Apr., 1996), pp. 161–178.
* Ziemke, Earl F. "The Red Army, 1918–1941: From Vanguard of World Revolution to America's Ally". London; New York: Frank Cass, 2004 (ISBN 0-7146-5551-1).

References

External links

* [http://lib.ru/WSUWOROW/ Some online books] of Viktor Suvorov and links to related online publications at the [http://www.lib.ru/ Maxim Moshkov's Library]
* [http://militera.lib.ru/research/index.html#s Complete up-to-date collection] of Suvorov's online books (some in English), at [http://militera.lib.ru/ Militera Project]
** [http://plgalaxy.co.uk/suvorov/ Viktor Suvorov, "Ledokol"] , audio book (in Russian)
* [http://www.suvorov.com/ Viktor Suvorov's homepage] (in Russian)
* en icon* [http://www.carlonordling.se/ww2/didstalin.html "Did Stalin deliver his alleged speech of 19 August 1939?" by Carl O. Nordling]
* [http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/raack.htm Raack, R.C. "Stalin's Role in the Coming of World War II"] at Vincent Ferraro's web site (published in "World Affairs" (1996) vol. 158, no. 4
* [http://www.battlefield.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=208&Itemid=108&lang=en Criticism of "Last Republic"] (in English)
* [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0JAP/is_3_13/ai_n15627741 Criticism of Rezun's "Ledokol" in Russian Journal "Military Thought"]
* [http://www.historisches-centrum.de/forum/benz04-1.html Criticism of the Preventive War Theory by Wigbert Benz] (in German)
* [http://www.litportal.ru/index.html?a=2485&t=12047 Виктор Грызун - Как Виктор Суворов сочинял историю] .
* Andreea Tudorica, Ovidiu Ciutescu, Corina Andriuta, [http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/95756/giurgiulesti-piedica-in-calea-lui-stalin "Giurgiuleşti, piedică în calea lui Stalin"] , "Jurnalul Naţional", June 26, 2007
* [http://hedrook.vho.org/hoffmann Иоахим Гофман. "Сталинская истребительная война"] .