NATO Double-Track Decision

The NATO Double-Track Decision is the decision of NATO from December 12, 1979 to offer the Warsaw Pact a mutual limitation of Medium-range ballistic missiles and Intermediate-range ballistic missiles combined with the threat that in case of disagreement NATO would deploy more middle range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

Preceding events

The détente between the United States and the Soviet Union culminated in the signing of the SALT I (1972) and SALT II (1979) agreements which mostly reduced nuclear capacities, supposedly to prevent an ongoing arms race in this area.

The SALT agreements were not intended to be considered a form of mutual arms control, but merely referred to strategic carrier systems and their warheads, which did not include any tactical nuclear weapons, e.g. nuclear bombs delivered by bombers or midrange missiles (MRBMs & IRBMs). This was a loophole in the SALT agreements which existed because midrange missiles were only in use until the intercontinental ballistic missile was perfected. This loophole was exploited by the Soviet Union to develop and deploy a new modern midrange missile equipped with multiple nuclear warheads, the SS-20.

In December 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The relationship between the Eastern bloc and the Western bloc reached a new low in the Cold War.

The "Double-Track" decision

The European NATO members saw in the mobile launching platform-mounted SS-20 missiles no less a threat than the strategic intercontinental missiles, and on December 12, 1979 took on the so-called NATO Double-Track Decision. This decision intended the deployment of 572 equally mobile American middle-range missiles (Pershing II and BGM-109 Tomahawk Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles) to rebuild the state of Mutual Assured Destruction. NATO offered immediate negotiations with the goal to ban nuclear armed middle-range missiles from Europe completely, with the provision that the same missiles could be installed 4 years later should the negotiations fail. The Soviets were critical that the French nuclear weapons weren't considered in this treaty.

The opposition in the peace movement criticized mainly that the nuclear destructive potential was sufficient already to destroy the planet several times over, concluding that any additional armament would be senseless. Furthermore it was pointed out that this situation was similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis, since the time between the advance warning and the arrival of the missiles in case of a first strike from Europe was reduced to few minutes for the Soviet Union. The possibility of a "war by mistake" and nuclear holocaust was heightened significantly. One of the many slogans used by the peace movement referred to "Make Love Not War" and the name of the American middle range weapons: "Petting instead of Pershing".

Supporters of the Double-Track Decision pointed out that in case of a Russian SS-20, a counter strike by NATO could only be performed by American intercontinental ballistic missile, which would lead to an automatic escalation of the conflict. In any case, the Pershing II was unsuitable as a first strike weapon, since it couldn't reach Russian rocket facilities beyond the Ural Mountains and poses no threat to the strategic submarines.

The disarmament negotiations which started on November 30, 1981 remained without conclusion. The German Bundestag agreed to the deployment in 1983, whereupon the Soviet Union aborted the negotiations.

On December 8, 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union which provided the destruction of all middle range weapons and ended this episode of the Cold War.

External links

• Special Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers (The "Double-Track" Decision on Theatre Nuclear Forces) at nato.int