In the mathematical discipline of set theory, there are many ways of describing specific countable ordinals. The smallest ones can be usefully and non-circularly expressed in terms of their Cantor normal forms. Beyond that, many ordinals of relevance to proof theory still have computable ordinal notations. However, it is not possible to decide effectively whether a given putative ordinal notation is a notation or not (for reasons somewhat analogous to the unsolvability of the halting problem); various more-concrete ways of defining ordinals that definitely have notations are available.
Since there are only countably many notations, all ordinals with notations are exhausted well below the first uncountable ordinal ω1; their supremum is called "Church–Kleene ω1" or ω1CK (not to be confused with ω1), described below. Ordinal numbers below ω1CK are the recursive ordinals (see below). Countable ordinals larger than this may still be defined, but do not have notations.
Due to the focus on countable ordinals, ordinal arithmetic is used throughout, except where otherwise noted. The ordinals described here are not as large as the ones described in large cardinals, but they are large among those which have constructive notations (descriptions). Larger and larger ordinals can be defined, but they become more and more difficult to describe.
Generalities on recursive ordinals
Ordinal notations
Recursive ordinals (or computable ordinals) are certain countable ordinals: loosely speaking those which can be represented by a computable function. There are several equivalent definitions of this: the simplest is to say that a computable ordinal is the order-type of some recursive (i.e., computable) well-ordering of the natural numbers; so, essentially, an ordinal is recursive when we can present the set of smaller ordinals in such a way that a computer (Turing machine, say) can manipulate them (and, essentially, compare them).
A different definition uses Kleene's system of ordinal notations: briefly, an ordinal notation is either the name zero (describing the ordinal 0), or the successor of an ordinal notation (describing the successor of the ordinal described by that notation), or a Turing machine (computable function) which produces an increasing sequence of ordinal notations (describing the ordinal which is the limit of the sequence), and ordinal notations are (partially) ordered so as to make the successor of "o" greater than "o" and to make the limit greater than any term of the sequence (this order is computable; however, the set O of ordinal notations itself is highly non-recursive, owing to the impossibility of deciding whether a given Turing machine does indeed produce a sequence of notations); a recursive ordinal is then an ordinal which is described by some ordinal notation.
Any ordinal smaller than a recursive ordinal is itself recursive, so the set of all recursive ordinals forms a certain (countable) ordinal, the Church-Kleene ordinal (see below).
It is tempting to forget about ordinal notations and only speak of the recursive ordinals themselves: and some statements are made about recursive ordinals which, in fact, concern the notations for these ordinals. This can lead to difficulties, however, as even the smallest infinite ordinal, ω, has many notations, some of which cannot be proven to be equivalent to the obvious notation (the limit of the simplest program which enumerates all natural numbers).
Relation to systems of arithmetic
We briefly (and somewhat informally) mention an important relation between computable ordinals and certain formal systems (containing arithmetic, that is, at least a reasonable fragment of Peano arithmetic).
In a nutshell, the idea is that certain computable ordinals are so large that while they can be given by a certain ordinal notation "o", a given formal system might not be sufficiently powerful to show that "o" is, indeed, an ordinal notation: the system does not show transfinite induction for such large ordinals.
For example, the usual first-order Peano axioms do not prove transfinite induction for (or beyond) ε0: while the ordinal ε0 can easily be arithmetically described (it is countable), the Peano axioms are not strong enough to show that it is indeed an ordinal; in fact, transfinite induction on ε0 proves the consistency of Peano's axiom (a theorem by Gentzen), so by Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Peano's axiom cannot formalize that reasoning. (This is at the basis of the Kirby-Paris theorem on Goodstein sequences.) We say that ε0 measures the proof-theoretic strength of Peano's axioms.
But we can do this for systems far beyond Peano's axioms. For example, the proof-theoretic strength of Kripke-Platek set theory is the Bachmann-Howard ordinal (see below), and, in fact, merely adding to Peano's axioms the axioms which state the well-ordering of all ordinals below the Bachmann-Howard ordinal is sufficient to obtain all arithmetical consequences of Kripke-Platek set theory.
Specific recursive ordinals
Predicative definitions and the Veblen hierarchy
We have already mentioned (see Cantor normal form) the ordinal ε0, which is the smallest satisfying the equation , so it is the limit of the sequence 0, 1, , , , etc. The next ordinal satisfying this equation is called ε1: it is the limit of the sequence
: etc.
More generally, the -th ordinal such that is called . We could define as the smallest ordinal such that , but since the Greek alphabet does not have transfinitely many letters it is better to use a more robust notation: define ordinals by transfinite induction as follows: let and let be the -th fixed point of (i.e., the -th ordinal such that ; so for example, ), and when is a limit ordinal, define as the -th common fixed point of the for all