Japanese-planned Republic of the Far East

The term Japanese-planned Republic of the Far East refers to the planned organization of a Japanese puppet state in the Russian Far East during 1918-22 and the Pacific War period.

First attempt - Russian Far East (1918-22)

Japanese, Canadian and American forces intervened in the Russian Far East during the Russian Civil War and maintained control there and in Eastern Siberia. Japanese forces also landed in North Sakhalin and Kamchatka.

In 1917, Japan thought that the Russian Revolution was an opportunity to seize the Far East territory for themselves or at least establish a puppet state. Japan intervened in the revolution by deploying between 70,000 and 72,500 soldiers in the Russian Far East to occupy the Trans-Siberian rail line in the west leading to Chita.

It established a puppet government with Cossack "Ataman" Grigory Semyonov and Lieutenant Kalminov with the alleged purpose of "Aiding the Russian people". Japanese forces installed units in the Ussuri and Amur Basins, the East Baikal, North Sakhalin and the Kamchatka areas, along with assuming control of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria.

In accord with the Allied Siberian Command and the Soviet Government, it created the "Far Eastern Republic" with a temporary self-government in Verkhneudinsk in the Baikal region. Alexander Krasnoshchyokov, the "Ambassador" of the Soviet Government to the Far Eastern Republic was born the so-called "Republic of Littoral" with its capital in Vladivostok. The Japanese military chiefs immediately approved this government as it was seen as an instrument to use against the Soviets.

Japanese Siberian Expedition 1918-1925

From early May 1918, Vladivostok was occupied by the Japanese with 7,500 troops under the command of General Otani. Between May and August other troops ariived, including American (American Expeditionary Force) (5,000), Canadian (800 troops), British (829), French(10,076) and Italian (1,400) troops. By August 1918 the Japanese increased their original force by some 70,000. The ostensible and, for the first part of the campaign, the real objective of the American and European commanders was to rescue and deliver the Czech Legion to the Western front whose 70,000 strong force had been left stranded by the Russian withdrawal from the WWI.

The Americans and Europeans finally left Russia when the Czechs were finally evacuated, but it would not be until two years after the war. It happened in 1920 when a deal was made to allow a truce between the Czechs and Bolsheviks in exchange for gold. The Japanese, however, lingered for two more years in order to continue to fight along with the White Russians.

The Japanese took advantage of their position in Siberia at a very confusing time with the Czechs fighting to get out, the Whites fighting the Bolsheviks for control of the country and the Allies maintaining a defence of a railway and the port of Vladivostok for the evacuation. The Japanese advanced towards Lake Baikal while other advance groups penetrated into the Eastern Urals area and Central Asia, with American and Japanese technicians taking charge of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok to the Chita Area.

On May 11, General Ohi supported the government, always no convert in Soviets himself made speech in front of the Peoples Parliament meeting in Vladivostok: He announced, "we will not permit the establishment of any communist government in regions having Japanese troops detached". But Republic was supported by Vladivostok and recent independent formed Khabarovsk authorities. Later both states, littoral and Far East republics were merged to Soviets in 1925.

The Japanese supported the pro-Japanese regime of Cossack Ataman Grigory Semyonov and to aid General Kalminov with advising of Japanese General Ohi in Vladivostok, with the objective of eliminating the Communist danger in the country. Japanese over saw the birth of the Autonomous state in Transbaikal in 1920, theirs treated to approve such government in your objectives also. General Ohi said at the People Assembly there will not be permit the establishment of any Communist Government in lands where Japanese troops are detached".

Japanese forces in the period occupied Province Littoral or Maritime (which controlled Nikolayevsk sector, North Sakhalin and Kamchatka [until 1927] ), the Vladivostok-Khabarovsk Railway line, Amur Province (were watching Khabarovsk and town later called Komsomolsk) and poses important forces in the Transbaikal Province (in East Baikal area) Irkutsk and Yeniseysk Governments amongst envoyed some expeditionary groups to East Ural and Central Asia also amongst the poses the virtual control of the Sea of Okhotsk and surrounded coasts for sometime.

Moscow with some American support no delayed in divisions in the Foreign Expeditionary Group, for finally retiring such group, but Japanese kept its troops there until 1922, and spent US$700 billion for its attempt to take such lands. Later, under American and British pressure, Japan returned not only such lands, but also North Sakhalin (ceded in 1925) and later Kamchatka (in 1927).

Japanese planned client state in Republic of Far East (World War II)

The Emperor, in 1907, stipulated the objective of hostilities with Russia would be the destruction of enemy ground forces in a decisive campaign in Manchuria (Clause 1); To execute the basic war plans prepared against Russia, the Japanese Army would be built up to a strength necessary to occupy the Maritime Province and Sakhalin Island, while at the same time securing Manchuria. The changes in operational-priority emphasis assigned by the Japanese Army alone; i.e., anti-Russian, 1907-18 for again anti-Russian, after 1931.

In accord with Hakko Ichiu geopolitical doctrines, between Japanese strategic planning for mainland Asia (1905-1940), also theirs indeed, in success of Siberian Invasion, the foundation of a political entity in Russian Far East.

This was indeed an "independent" state attempt to established in Siberia east of Lake Baikal and Russian Far East on December 1941 or January 1942 It was planned by the Kwantung Army for ideological and strategic reasons, as a "bulwark state" and "watchtower nation" between the USSR and the Japanese held territories against Russian Communist influences led by White Russian chiefs Konstantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevsky and General Vladimir Kislitsin, with orders to establish a "counterrevolutionary anti Soviet" pro-Japanese movement and "new Asian order" government.

Directive Otsu or B

The annual operational plan was developed against the hypothetical foe Soviet Union (Operation OTSU or "B") was developed since 1931, derived from Japanese strategies during Russo-Japanese 1904-05 war and 1918-25 Japanese Siberian Intervention.

The Army concentrated upon strengthening the defenses of Manchukuo, with a view toward the Soviet Union as the hypothetical primary enemy of Japan.

In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, military operations had originally been predicated upon a struggle for vital North Manchuria, in two major sectors: the plains region between Harbin and the Upper Sungari River (which flows between Hsinking and Harbin); and the flatlands between Taonan and Tsitsihar. In the early summer of 1933, however, the Soviet Army began to erect tochka [pillbox] positions along the frontiers opposite the border forts, which the Kwantung Army then proceeded to build. Under the circumstances, Japanese operational planning was revised in 1934, whereby the opening rounds of a hypothetical war with the U.S.S.R. were contemplated in the neighborhood of the Manchurian frontiers.

While continuing the policies of taking strict precautions and strengthening its defensive posture vs. the Soviet Union, Japan would do her best to prevent war with Russia. In the event that the United States and the U.S.S.R. in concert - or the Soviets alone - challenged Japan to war, the Soviet Far Eastern Air, Land and Sea Forces would be knocked out as soon as possible. Required forces will be dispatched from both China and the Japanese homeland, without losing the chance.

Japanese Siberian operation planning in 1934

In the event of a war with the Soviet Union, military operations had originally been predicated upon a struggle for vital North Manchuria, in two major sectors: the plains region between Harbin and the Upper Sungari River (which flows between Hsinking and Harbin); and the flatlands between Taonan and Tsitsihar.

Under the circumstances, Japanese operational planning was revised in 1934 whereby the opening rounds of a hypothetical war with the U.S.S.R. were contemplated in the neighborhood of the Manchurian frontiers.

In a revision in 1934, the plan included a mobilizable force of 30 fully equipped ground divisions, some 24 were earmarked for commitment to operations against the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, great importance was to be attached to air operations from the very outset of war.

Japanese forces should seek to wage battle on Soviet soil from the beginning of hostilities with the primary axis of offensive operations eastward from Manchuria toward submarine bases and bomber aircraft sites aimed at Japan, which must be wiped out at the beginning.

After the success of the eastward operations, forces should be deployed for an offensive northward, the objective being the Lake Baikal district.

The idea of launching an eastern offensive was first conceived at the time of this new plan of 1934.

Japanese plans for Siberian invasion in 1937

Three years later, in 1937, the Japanese operational planning "Otsu or B" was again revised:

*At the very commencement of a war, the forces stationed in Manchuria will mount an offensive against the Soviet Union; reinforcements thereafter dispatched from the homeland will join in the attack. This plan differed from its predecessor, which had called for an offensive only after the reinforcements had arrived in Manchuria.

*After successfully concluding the eastern offensive, Japanese forces should not immediately drive toward the Lake Baikal region, but should instead consolidate along the Hsingan Mountain Range and prepare for subsequent operations.

*Operational planning against the U.S.S.R. must attach prime importance to action against both China and Soviet Russia.

Japanese plans against Siberia in 1939

Later in 1939, the General Staff's First Bureau (Operations) nevertheless paid no heed to these opinions. As before, it adhered to the policy of offensive operations in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In the operations plan drawn up in 1939, the axes of Kwantung Army offensive operations were altered to embrace offensives launched simultaneously eastward and northward (from the Heiho district) also introduced the propose to fighting in Soviet Siberian territory.

The Imperial Conference July 2, 1941

At the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the following policies were decided upon:
#Do not intervene in the Russo-German War;
#Proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations while consolidating secret preparations against the U.S.S.R.;
#If the Russo-German War turned out favorably for Japan, settle the Northern Problem by force and maintain stability in the north. Because of these decisions, which resulted from the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the Chungking operation had to be suspended.

The Army High Command had traditionally strong tendencies of watchfulness toward the Soviet Union. There thus arose criticism that the settlement of the China Incident by force had been incomplete because Japan was nailed down by Russia. At the root of the High Command's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. lay the following considerations: conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness toward the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia.

Mention has already been made that the Japanese Army had originally utilized the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact to contemplate the launching of an offensive against Chungking, by diverting part of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria to China. These plans had had to be abandoned, and the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers (KANTOKUEN) were instead instituted, with a view toward awaiting a good chance of participating in the war against the Soviet Union.

Japanese observations of Red Army countermeasures

In devising operational plans against the U.S.S.R., the hypothetical movements of the Soviet Far Eastern Army were a major consideration. The Japanese Army General Staff made the following estimate of the situation: The Soviets could be expected to commit 55-60 divisions for the Far Eastern operations (local divisions and newest reinforcements). They would launch simultaneous, converging offensives from the east, north, and west of Manchuria. The enemy would strive to cut off communications between the Japanese homeland and the Asiatic Continent.

The Kantokuen Plan (1941)

After the Imperial Conference of July 2, the High Command implemented the new policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing the large-scale reinforcement of the Kwantung Army. In that period, the Japanese High Command was informed why Germany and the Soviet Union already held 2,000,000 of the Soldiers around the frontiers and lasts poses in Ukraine ones 4,500 aircraft.

Mention has already been made that the Japanese Army had originally utilized the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact to contemplate the launching of an offensive against Chungking, by diverting part of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria to China. These plans had had to be abandoned, and the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers (KANTOKUEN) were instead instituted, with a view toward awaiting a good chance of participating in the war against the Soviet Union.

To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army," or KANTOKUEN for short. The 400,600 troops in the Kwantung Army were suddenly stepped up to over 700,000, and some billion Yen in military funds were expended only upon KANTOKUEN. Such maneuvers was realizing during July-August 1941,at time when the Red Army was desperately struggling against German Invasion were perceived as real threats: assessments that the U.S.S.R. would have been defeated had the Japanese attacked at this time, retrospectively frightened the Soviet government and helped build the image of a treacherous Japan as well.

By the spring of 1941, when the lion's share of the first-phase southern operations should be completed, the Indochina Occupation it was hoped, for that would be the best time for the Japanese Army to carry out operations in the north vs. the U.S.S.R. (It was estimated that the first-phase operations would last about five months).

The Kantokuen Plan was planned in next form, when finalizing the occupation of Indochina, for poses bases for next southern operations at same time was previously sent some reinforcements from Japan and China, awaiting the Soviet defeating the Japanese Strike against Soviet Union cominzed when German troops crossed or less arriving to Volga River, at east Moscow, during 30-31 July. If believing why how consequence of Russian falling the western democracies and United States was more preoccupied by an invasion of England, how launched a War on the Far East and Japanese awaiting taken of Southern lands without resistance for all, caused immediately after imperial conference, the Japanese Army sent a secret order for general mobilization and the central government presented a General Mobilization Law for instead the War State in nation.

The reinforcements was sent to Manchukuo and Indochina, last finally occupied during July 30, 1941.

The "Special Maneuvers" consisted of preparations for the use of force against the Soviet Union, based upon the outlook that the Russo-German War might take a rapidly favorable turn for Germany. KANTOKUEN, indeed, can be compared to running toward a bus stop in order not to miss the bus. In the event that force was used against the U.S.S.R., the operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted toward the north and the east from Manchuria.

Japanese desires to return to negotiations with United States after the Siberian campaign was finalizing in December 1941, for returning against Southern areas from Indochina. At another Imperial Conference, on September 6, the commencement of preparations for the southern operations was determined. As a consequence of this decision, the critical winter problem facing the Kwantung Army was solved after September: part of the forces in Manchuria was to be diverted to the southern operations. Thus the so-called "Special Maneuvers" did play an important role in "killing two birds with one stone." Military preparations against both the U.S.S.R. and the southern areas had been stepped up and reinforced.

Judging from such factors as national strength and geographical location. Besides, the Soviet Army had recovered from its setbacks in the war with Germany and had invincibly regained its feet now that winter (the Russians' most critical season) was over.

The Original Kantokuen Plan was demand the Russian collapse at Germans hands caused immediately Japanese forces finalized the Indochina occupation, for yours returned against Soviet rearguard; Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoye if was disaccord with any strike against Democracies before at Soviet was conquests previously.

In Manchuria, preparations were to be made for co-operation, at any time, with the progress of the German Army. Japanese no expect any prolonged and great scale war on Siberia; believing why Soviet Army stayed weakness your force for constant retiring of troops for making resistance at victorious German advance and very demoralized for defeat of Stalin Government, are was easy prey of Japanese Army accompanied by White Russian anti-communists and fascist leaders, charged of composed one new government in area along the Japanese forces, Buriat and Mongol supporters in subsequent operations against the Soviets and their Mongol allies in the Outer Mongolia and Buriat lands, amongst the Zionists Jewish Manchu supporters collaborated with the Japanese in actions during enter in Birobidjan territory also.

The excuse for strike having was why Soviet Union are one Chaos how consequence of Nazi invasion, for all Japan if poses debt to maintain the "Order" in Siberia.

The real motive of Japanese having the desire of taken of Russian Far East territory, before subsequent Nazi dominion with own "puppet" regime also prevented the United States (how occurred during 1918-25 period) supported at any Soviet Government refugee in Russian Far East why permit the American planes at bases in Vladivostok and other points to ease the bombing of Tokyo.

If the interests for Japanese was heavy opposed to the American envoy of war material at Vladivostok, for feared why these same material not only for Russians without American pilots.

Toward autumn of 1941, the Army High Command formulated certain estimates of the international situation. Concerning the outcome of the Russo-German War, the view prevailed that things would turn out favorably for Germany. Although the lightning war which Hitler had planned (of six weeks' duration) had not materialized, the Soviet Army had suffered undeniably critical losses at the outset of hostilities. The Germans still possessed so much military power that they could yet smash the Soviet Army.

Most of the units employed in the Russian defeat in Siberia until December 1941 when finalized these operations were to be returned to the homeland, while a portion would be diverted to Manchuria and China, to prepare for the Southern offensive during spring 1942.

Japanese analysis of U.S-Soviet relations in 1942-43

In 1942-43, American aid to the U.S.S.R. grew markedly. The number of planes which crossed the Bering Strait exceeded an average of about 200 per month, while the quantity of machinery and fuel unloaded in the harbor at Vladivostok appeared to be reaching approximately 500,000 tons a month. Judging from these observations, IGHQ feared that U.S.- Soviet relations had become very intimate and that the Americans would therefore, in all probability, be renting air bases in Soviet Far Eastern territory. Thence they could launch attacks against Japan - a threat to which constant attention was paid by Imperial General Headquarters, if was other alleged motive for cominzed any operation against Soviets in Siberia.

Japanese observation of 1941-42 Soviet strength in Siberia

The Army High Command estimated that the strength of the Soviet Far East Army (east of Lake Baikal) before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 totaled some 800,000 troops, built around:

*23 infantry divisions
*1,000 planes
*1,000 tanks
*105 submarines

In 1942, the Soviets' watch on Japan grew stricter. While the ground was still frozen solidly, for example, the Soviet Far Eastern Army vigorously reinforced its border positions. The number of area army headquarters was also increased, thus completing the Russians' emergency setup.

Great expectations were therefore held concerning the Germans' summer offensive slated to commence in 1942. The Russians had transferred several divisions from the Far East to the European battlefields, but the U.S.S.R. would never leave Siberia defenseless, even if the war with Germany turned out badly for her.

Ambassador Oshima states that the German request for Japan to enter the war against Russia (July 1942) was not repeated, the one proposal being turned down because Japan claimed that her military forces were "barely sufficient for the China and Pacific theaters".

After Japanese forces landed in the Attu area, the Soviets began to strengthen the defenses of Kamchatka Peninsula and northern Sakhalin. When the Germans commenced their summer offensive, the Russians moved troops westward to the European battlefront, from about July. By the end of the year, they had dispatched at least six divisions. Nevertheless, they never failed to plug gaps caused by the transfer of troops to the west; new army corps were created in every case.

trategies and tactics in Japanese plans of Siberian invasion

The lines of strategies and tactics in Japanese plans to Siberian invasion basically after the Indochina occupation, with some reinforcements from Japan proper, the Imperial forces planned the next operations:

*Naval bombardments preceded the subsequent disembarkations from Shumushuand Paramushiro in Kamchatka, to occupy Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky other forces from Karafuto enter in North Sakhalin and make some landings in Alexandrovsk and Ohka; optionally other forces landed in Kommadorsky islands and Anadyr in North Pacific area.

*As similar naval operations from Hokkaido and North Honshu against Nikolayevsk, Soviet Bay, and Vladivostok. Some naval forces navigated inside of Amur River against Konsomolsk and striking Khabarovsk.

*Later if followed with landings for occupying Ohkostk and Nagaevo; another option was possibly occupation of Southeast Yakutsk area also

*Aerial operations were leaving against Petropavlovsk, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Konsomolsk, Blagoveschesk, Chita, Ulan-Ude and possibly Ulan-Bator and Irkutsk. The principal points Trans-Siberian (Vladivostok/Ulan-Ude and/or Irkustk-Krasnoyarsk lines) and Baikal-Amur lines (incomplete in period) was taken with airborne or paratrooper forces

*Land operations was simultaneous leaving against Khabarovsk, Birobidjanand Blagoveschensk with massive artillery strikes and entering infantry accompanied with Armored forces at same time other forces advance from East Outer Mongolia to occupied Ulan Bator.

*Other advances were the entry in West Outer Mongolia, along the land incursion at Irkutsk area for taken the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur link.

*Another optative operation implied the finalizing the occupation of West Outer Mongolia, enter in Tannu-Tuva andinvasion at Krasnoyarsk how springboard of possibly operation against Novosibirsk and Central Asia.

Japanese observations over nature of Siberian front

Although the Kwantung Army had been reinforced, the Russo-German War-about which the Japanese Army had held such great expectations-was not turning out favorably for Germany, despite Hitler's boasts. A serious problem consequently demanded resolution: How could the beefed-up Kwantung Army pull through the rigorous cold of a Manchurian winter?

By their very nature, armaments must be perfectly adapted to combat methods and to battlefield topography; the optimum application of military force cannot otherwise be manifested.

There was thus a strong requirement that operations and armaments be linked together. In the Japanese Army, however, military material was geared to hypothetical mobile operations against the Soviet Union. This implied fighting on the Continent, in severe cold, amidst sparse population, and with inconvenient transportation facilities. Operations of such a type were characterized by light weapons, large-scale logistical systems, and a plethora of horses.

After the finish of Japanese operations in Siberia

If war broke out with the Soviet Union, a most important problem would arise: how to terminate hostilities? The General Staff feared that Russian territory was so boundless that Japan would be unable to deal a finishing blow to the enemy.

Within the Army, the prevailing and popular opinion concerning the solution to this problem was to employ stratagem (subversion) simultaneously with military operations-as Colonel Akashi had so successfully done during the Russo-Japanese War.

The Army therefore placed as much importance upon "political sabotage" as it did upon field operations, in planning for hypothetical operations against the Soviet Union. Research was pursued and preparations laid for implementing certain aspects of the over-all program.

Possible Japanese administrative division of Siberian occupied lands

Japanese administration was possibly decided to convert the next conquest Siberian lands in next political divisions:

*Outer Manchuria: (Amur, North Sakhalin and Maritime) (ancient Khabarovsk and Blagoveschensk) was presumably in New White Russian anti-Soviet Far East Republic under management of Russian anti-communist leaders, possibly returned at Manchukuo how your coastal provinces or in last instance was managed directly how another coastal Kens how Chosen, but Russian natives under Japanese rule.

*Occupied and unified Mongolia: (as Inner and Outer) converted into the unified Republic of Mengjiang with Japanese support.

*Birobidjan was pretend to convert in one Jewish autonomous territory in newly conquered lands or was possibly integrated to Zionists Jewish administration from Harbin with Japanese guidance.

*Yakutsk: in the case of occupation of this territory it would be converted in another autonomous territory with local administration with Japanese support.

*Buriat territory: (ancient Chita-Ulan Ude) one "independent State" Buriat with your own Buriat pro-Japanese servers under Japanese control or possibly unified under Mengjiangstate.

*Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk: in one pretend advance, was possibly why these lands if convert in Japanese military-controlled frontier territories for watching at Soviets in land, future springboard for next operations against Novosibirsk and Central Asia or any more probably other White Russian Pro-Japanese Country under more Japanese strict military control debt at your nearest of Soviets also.

Political structure of independent state in Russian Far East

Although nominally "independent", it was indeed heavily managed by Japanese Army. After the pretend Russian defeat in Soviet Far East, on December 1941 the all-newest Far Eastern Republic was enter into the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, pro-Japanese alliance. Another thing analyzed if the Far Eastern Republic was merged into Manchukuo Empire (this is Manchu ancestors lands) or treated how one "sovereign nation".

It suppose occupied the territory of:
*Modern Chita Oblast,
*Amur Oblast,
*Khabarovsk Krai,
*Primorsky Krai of Russia
*(was: Transbaikal, Amur, and Primorsky oblasts).

The capital of this puppet state was Khabarovsk, or Vladivostok; the North Sakhalin Oblast (convert in ken) if annexed under Japanese direct control inside of Karafuto administration.

Japanese planners discussed if renamed these lands with ancient Chinese or other ancient names how:
*"Hulun" in Amur area
*"East Tartary" or "Littoral" in Primorsky in provinces and some cities how:
*"Transbaikal"(for Chita-Ulan ude)
*"Haishenwei"(for Vladivostok)
*"Hailanpao"(for Blagoveschensk)
*"Gungking Cheng" (for Konsomolsk),
*"Tetyukhe"(for Dalnegorsk)
*"Bailim"(for Khabarovsk)
*"Miaoyie" or "Fuyiori"(for Nikolayevsk)
*"Deleng"
*And other similar oldest Toponymys

Japanese Army alleged interests in Soviet Siberian land

The Japanese Army (with roots of Chosu Clan) alleged that its ancient ancestors proceeded from the Amur Valley, Hulun and East Tartary (Outer Manchuria), Inner Manchuria and Kamchatka was more interested in recovering the motherland of their "fathers" to integrate into their own direct dominion. Inclusive with orders of "Strike North Group" as Army thought group, Japanese scientists and historians used some archaeological works in Manchuria and North Korean area to find some archaeological evidence to support the purpose of converting the ancient Russian Far East to a new Japanese land territory under Japanese Army control. Chosen, Kwantung arranged territory or Karafuto, to exploit its peoples and natural resources to their benefit and later served as a springboard for future actions in the North Asian mainland including watchtowers of Soviets inland.

On the other hand, the "local" Japanese establishment related at Kangde Emperor of Manchukuo why if possibly Imperial forces used some operations to return the Manchu ancestors' lands to Manchukuo as new coastal provinces; at the same time, the Kwantung Army was promised to White Russians leaders for the "liberation" from Soviet hands of their "legitimate territories" to establish a new anti-communist and pro-Japanese reformed government. With its capital in Khabarovsk, Vladivostok or possibly Irkutsk. At Manchu, the Kwantung Army also promised Jews the administration of Birobidjan territory with Japanese advice.

Japan also promised to Mongols and Buriats in similar terms the prompt return of their "legitimate lands" for their own management with Japanese aid.

Reasons for the creation of the "Far East Republic"

Alleged reasons for the creation of the "country" were:

*Such political entity are why at Japan poses debt to establish "order" in Siberia, debt at "chaos" provoked by the supposed Soviet defeat of victorious Nazi forces in the European Eastern Front.

*To prevent eventual American support to a demoralized Soviet Government, finding refuge in the territory, also preventing American Air units from establishing bases in Vladivostok to fly air raids against Tokyo.

*To solve the problem of excess population in Japan, to establish and develop such lands and the use of natural resources to the benefit of local Japanese private and Government Zaibatsus.

*Strategic interest as a "springboard", for the next anti-Stalinist operations in nearby Siberia, and Outer Mongolia.

*Japanese commanders, considered by Red Army detachments in the Far East, as "easy prey" in their situation, expecting total defeat of the forces in December 1941.

*Interest in taking territory before the German domination of Siberia for propaganda purposes or to establish their own puppet government.

Japan received information that Germany and the Soviet Union detached to their borders 2,000,000 soldiers and that the latter had based some 4,500 aircraft in Ukraine, which had been previously used as part of Operation Barbarossa.

These plans, originally conceived during the 1929-1939 Russo-Japanese Incidents, were later revised in the 1941-1942 period, during the European Eastern Front conflict (Operation Barbarossa), with less reliance on the Wehrmacht forces arriving at the Volga river by the end of July 1941, the time chosen to commence operations in the area, The "Kantouken Plan" or "Othsu or B Operation" the Kwantung Army operation against the Soviets in Siberia.

See also

*Siberian Intervention
*Far Eastern Republic
*Zeleny Klyn
*Green Ukraine
*Projected White Russian state in Outer Manchuria
*Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War
*Far Eastern Federal District
*Provisional Priamur Government
*Japanese strategic planning for mainland Asia (1905-1940)

Bibliography

* Newman, Joseph. "Goodbye Japan"(in Spanish "Adios al Japon") translated and published for Editorial Poseidon, Buenos Aires Arg, 1943,Chapter 10 "The Ball cominzed to Running" (p.193-226) and Chapter 11 "To New Order"" (p.227-245)
* Davies, Raymond Arthur & Steinger, Andrew J. "Soviet Asia", Chapter XI "The Soviet Far East, One land in Alert"(p.236-267) and Chapter XII "Siberia in world affairs"(p.268-299)

External links

* [http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Projected-White-Russian-state-in-Outer-Manchuria]