Monopoly on violence

The monopoly on violence (German: Gewaltmonopol des Staates) is the conception of the state expounded by Max Weber in Politics as a Vocation. According to Weber, the state is that entity which claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence, which it may therefore elect to delegate as it sees fit. Weber's conception of the state as holding a monopoly on violence has figured prominently in philosophy of law and political philosophy in the twentieth century.

It defines a single entity, the state, as exercising authority on violence over a given territory; territory was also deemed by Weber to be a prerequisite feature of a state. Such a monopoly, according to Weber, must occur via a process of legitimation, wherein a claim is laid which legitimises the state's use of violence.

According to Raymond Aron, international relations are characterized by the absence of the monopoly on violence in the relationship between states.^[1]

Max Weber's theory

Max Weber wrote in Politics as a Vocation that a necessary condition of statehood is the retention of such a monopoly. His expanded definition was that something is "a 'state' if and insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence (German: das Monopol legitimen physischen Zwanges) in the enforcement of its order."^[2][3]

According to Weber, the state is the source of legitimacy for any use of violence.^{[citation needed]} The police and the military are its main instruments, but this does not mean that only public force can be used: private force (as in private security) can be used too, as long as it has legitimacy derived from the state.

Weber applied several caveats to this basic principle.

• Weber intended his statement as an observation, stating that it has not always been the case that the connection between the state and the use of violence has been so close. He uses the examples of feudalism, where private warfare was permitted under certain conditions, and of Church courts, which had sole jurisdiction over some types of offenses, especially heresy (from the religion in question) and sexual offenses (thus the nickname "bawdy courts").
• The actual application of violence is delegated or permitted by the state. Weber's theory is not taken to mean that only the government uses violence, but that the individuals and organizations that can legitimize violence or adjudicate on its legitimacy are precisely those authorized to do so by the state. So, for example, the law might permit individuals to use violence in defense of self or property, but in this case, as in the example of private security above, the ability to use force has been granted by the state, and only by the state.

One implication of the above is that states that fail to control the use of coercive violent force (e.g., those with unregulated militias) are essentially not functional states. Another is that all such "functional" states function by reproducing the forms of violence that sustain existing social power relationships, and suppressing the forms of violence that threaten to disrupt them.^{[citation needed]}

See also

Philosophy portal

• Anarchism
• Libertarianism
• Franz Oppenheimer
• Albert Jay Nock
• Violent non-state actor
• Leviathan_(book)

References

1. ^ Raymond Aron. Paix et guerre entre les nations, Paris 1962; English: Peace and War, 1966. New edition 2003.
2. ^ Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1964). p. 154
3. ^ Weber, Max. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1921). p. 29