Motor cognition

The concept of motor cognition grasps the notion that cognition is embodied in action, and that the motor system participates in what is usually considered as mental processing, including those involved in social interaction.^[1] The fundamental unit of the motor cognition paradigm is action, defined as the movements produced to satisfy an intention towards a specific motor goal, or in reaction to a meaningful event in the physical and social environments. Motor cognition takes into account the preparation and production of actions, as well as the processes involved in recognizing, predicting, mimicking and understanding the behavior of other people. This paradigm has received a great deal of attention and empirical support in recents years from a variety of research domains including developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and social psychology.

Perception-action coupling

The idea of a continuity between the different aspects of motor cognition is not new. In fact, this idea can be traced to the work of the American psychologist William James and more recently, American neurophysiologist and Nobel prize winner Roger Sperry. Sperry argued that the perception–action cycle is the fundamental logic of the nervous system.^[2] Perception and action processes are functionally intertwined: perception is a means to action and action is a means to perception. Indeed, the vertebrate brain has evolved for governing motor activity with the basic function to transform sensory patterns into patterns of motor coordination.

More recently, there is growing empirical evidence from cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, cognitive neuroscience, as well as social psychology which demonstrates that perception and action share common computational codes and underlying neural architectures. This evidence has been marshaled in the "common coding theory" put forward by Wolfgang Prinz and his colleagues at the Max Planck Institute.^[3] This theory claims parity between perception and action. Its core assumption is that actions are coded in terms of the perceivable effects (i.e., the distal perceptual events) they should generate.^[4] Performing a movement leaves behind a bidirectional association between the motor pattern it has generated by and the sensory effects that it produces. Such an association can then be used backwards to retrieve a movement by anticipating its effects. These perception/action codes are also accessible during action observation.Other authors suggest a new notion of the phylogenetic and ontogenetic origin of action understanding that utilizes the motor system; motor cognition hypothesis. This states that motor cognition provides both human and nonhuman primates with a direct, prereflexive understanding of biological actions that match their own action catalog.^[5]

The discovery of mirror neurons in the ventral premotor and parietal cortices of the macaque monkey that fire both when it carries out a goal-directed action and when it observes the same action performed by another individual provides neurophysiological evidence for a direct matching between action perception and action production.^[6] An example of such coupling is the ease with which people can engage in speech repetition when asked to shadow words heard in earphones.^[7]

In humans, common neural activation during action observation and execution has been well documented. A variety of functional neuroimaging studies, using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), positron emission tomography, and magnetoencephalography have demonstrated that a motor resonance mechanism in the premotor and posterior parietal cortices occurs when participants observe or produce goal directed actions.^[8][9] Such a motor resonance system seems to be hard wired, or at least functional very early in life.^[10][11]

Shared representations between other and self

The common coding theory also states that perception of an action should activate action representations to the degree that the perceived and the represented action are similar.^[12] As such, these representations may be shared between individuals. Indeed, the meaning of a given object, action, or social situation may be common to several people and activate corresponding distributed patterns of neural activity in their respective brains.^[13] There is an impressive number of behavioral and neurophysiological studies demonstrating that perception and action have a common neuronal coding and that this leads to shared representations between self and others, which can lead to host of phenomena such as emotional contagion, empathy, social facilitation, and understanding others minds.^[14]

Motor priming

One consequence of the functional equivalence between perception and action is that watching an action performed by another person facilitates the later reproduction of that action in the observer. For instance, in one study, participants executed arm movements while observing either a robot or another human producing the same or qualitatively different arm movements.^[15] The results show that observing another human make incongruent movements interferes with movement execution but observing a robotic arm making incongruent movements does not.

Social facilitation

The fact that the observation of action can prime a similar response in the observer, and that the degree to which the observed action facilitates a similar response in the observer cast some light into the phenomenon called social facilitation, first described by Robert Zajonc, which accounts for the demonstration that the presence of other people can affect individual performance.^[16] A number of studies have demonstrated that watching facial expression of emotions prompts the observer to resonate with the state of another individual, with the observer activating the motor representations and associated autonomic and somatic responses that stem from the observed target.^[17]

Motor cognition and mental state understanding

Humans have a tendency to interpret the actions of others with respect to underlying mental states. One important question is whether the perception-action matching mechanism and its product, shared motor representations, can account (or to what extent it does) for the attribution of mental states to others (often dubbed theory of mind mechanism). Some authors have suggested that the shared representations network that stems from the perception-action matching mechanism may support mental state attribution via covert (i.e., non conscious) mental simulation.^[18] In contrast, some other scholars have argued that the mirror system and the theory of mind system are two distinct processes and it’s likely that the former cannot account for mental state understanding.^[19][20]

Selected works

• Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J., & Rapson, R. (1994). "Emotional Contagion." New York: Cambridge Press.
• Jeannerod, M. (1997). "The cognitive neuroscience of action." Wiley-Blackwell.
• Morsella, E., Bargh, J.A., & Gollwitzer, P.M. (Eds.) (2009). Oxford Handbook of Human Action. New York: Oxford University Press.
• Markman, K.D., Klein, W.M.P. & J.A. Suhr (Eds.), (2008). "The Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation." New York: Psychology Press.
• Thelen, E. (1995). "Motor development: A new synthesis." American Psychologist, 50, 79-95.

See also

• Common coding theory
• Empathy
• Motor imagery
• Social cognition
• Social neuroscience
• Theory of mind

References

1. ^ Sommerville, J. A., & Decety, J. (2006). Weaving the fabric of social interaction: Articulating developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience in the domain of motor cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 179-200.
2. ^ Sperry, R.W. (1952). Neurology and the mind-body problem. American Scientist, 40, 291-312.
3. ^ Prinz, W. (1997). Perception and action planning. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 9, 129-154.
4. ^ Hommel, B., Müsseler, Aschersleben, G. and Prinz, W. (2001). The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 849-937.
5. ^ Gallese,, Vittorio; Rochat, Magali; Cossu, Giuseppe., Sinigaglia, Corrado (2009). "Motor cognition and its role in the phylogeny and ontogeny of action understanding". Developmental Psychology 45. 
6. ^ Rizzolatti, G. & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169-92.
7. ^ Marslen-Wilson W. (1973). Linguistic structure and speech shadowing at very short latencies. Nature, 244, 522-523. PubMed
8. ^ Grèzes J., Armony J. L., Rowe J., & Passingham R. E. (2003). Activations related to "mirror" and "canonical" neuron in the human brain: an fMRI study. NeuroImage, 18, 928-937.
9. ^ Hamzei, F., Rijntjes, M., Dettmers, C., Glauche, V., Weiller, C. & Büchel, C. (2003). The human action recognition system and its relationship to Broca’s area: an fMRI study. NeuroImage, 19, 637-644.
10. ^ Sommerville, J.A., Woodward, A.L., & Needham, A. (2005). Action experience alters 3-month-old infants' perception of others' actions. Cognition, 96(1), B1-11.
11. ^ Nystrom, P. (2008). The infant mirror neuron system studied with high density EEG. Social Neuroscience, 3, 334-347.
12. ^ Knoblich, G. & Flach, R. (2001). Predicting the effects of actions: interactions of perception and action. Psychological Science, 12, 467-472.
13. ^ Decety, J. & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view. Trends in Cognitive Science, 12, 527-533.
14. ^ Blakemore, S.J. & Frith, C.D. (2005). The role of motor contagion in the prediction of action. Neuropsychologia, 43, 260-267.
15. ^ Kilner, J.M., Paulignan, Y., & Blakemore, S.J. (2003). An interference effect of observed biological movement on action. Current Biology, 13, 522-525.
16. ^ Chartrand, T.L., & Bargh, J.A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception-behavior link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 893-910.
17. ^ Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J.T., & Rapson, R.L. (1993). Emotional contagion. Current Direction in Psychological Science 2, 96-99.
18. ^ Gallese, V. & Goldman, A. (1998). Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, 493-501.
19. ^ Saxe, R. (2005). Against simulation: the argument from error. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9, 174-179.
20. ^ Decety, J., Michalska, K.J., & Akitsuki, Y. (2008). Who caused the pain? A functional MRI investigation of empathy and intentionality in children. Neuropsychologia, 46, 2607-2614.