Ralph Waldo Christie

Infobox Military Person
name=Ralph W. Christie
lived=1893-1987
placeofbirth=Somerville, Massachusetts
placeofdeath=Honolulu, Hawaii


caption=Ralph W. Christie
nickname=
allegiance= United States of America
branch= United States Navy
serviceyears=1915-1949
rank= Rear Admiral
commands=Commander, Submarines, Southwest Pacific Area
Task Force 42
Newport Torpedo Station
Submarine Division 15
USS "Octopus" (SS-9)
USS "R-6" (SS-83)
USS "S-1" (SS-105)
unit=
battles=World War II
awards=Navy Cross
Silver Star
relations=
laterwork=

Ralph Waldo Christie (August 30, 1893ndashDecember 19, 1987) was an admiral of the United States Navy. Christie played a pivotal role in the development of torpedo technologies between the wars, and commanded submarine operations out of Brisbane and Perth-Fremantle during World War Two.

Early career

Ralph W. Christie graduated from Annapolis in 1915 and served on a variety of warships beginning with the battleship USS|New Jersey|BB-16|2. Aboard the cruiser USS|Montana|ACR-13|2 in 1916, he was trained in torpedo design and implementation.cite book |title=Death at a Distance: The Loss of the Legendary USS Harder |last=Sturma |first=Michael |year=2006 |publisher=US Naval Institute Press |isbn=1591148456 |pages=53 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=NrV33S6h8tcC ] Christie was one of the first members of the Submarine School at New London. He subsequently went on to command the submarines "Octopus", "R-6", and "S-1". In 1923 Christie graduated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology with a Master's degree in Mechanical Engineering.

Development of the Mark VI magnetic detonator

In 1922, as Christie was finishing up his graduate studies, the Bureau of Ordinance implemented project G-53, a highly secret program to develop a magnetic influence detonator for torpedoes. Christie, became intimately involved in the project, and was substantially involved in the technical development of the weapon system. [Clay Blair, Jr., "Silent Victory: The U.S. Submarine War against Japan", Naval Institute Press, p.55]

Christie served as Commander, Submarines at Cavite from 1925 to 1926.

By 1926, the magnetic detonator was far enough along to allow for a first test. On 8 May 1926, the obsolete submarine "L-8" was used as a target, and destroyed with an influence torpedo. But despite this early success, the influence detonator, which would become the Mark VI magnetic detonator, needed significant refinement. Christie, who now directed torpedo development at the Newport Torpedo Station, oversaw the development of the Mark 14 torpedo. This wet-heater, compressed air, steam turbine torpedo, which would become the primary American submarine weapon in World War Two, was created specifically for the Mark VI magnetic detonator. [Blair, p.61] Christie urged the Navy Department to allocate a target ship for extensive field tests of the torpedo and detonator. [cite book |title=Iron Men and Tin Fish: The Race to Build a Better Torpedo during World War II |last=Newpower |first=Anthony |year=2006 |publisher=Praeger Security International |isbn=027599032X |pages=198 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=eFZb_BqP10UC ] The Chief of Naval Operations authorized the obsolete destroyer "Ericsson", but placed so many restrictions on the use of the hulk, Newport was forced to decline the offer. [Blair, p.62] As a result, the Mark VI detonator never underwent a live test, and its shortcomings would not become apparent until the outbreak of hostilities.

Other pre-War assignments

In 1939, Christie was given command of Submarine Division 15, consisting of all six "Salmon" class submarines. By 1941, Germany and Britain were contesting for control of the Atlantic. Although the United States was neutral, President Roosevelt ordered the United States Atlantic Fleet to enforce the Neutrality Patrol to assist UK-bound convoys. As part of secret agreements with the United Kingdom, the United States agreed to provide Britain with submarines under UK-control, should America enter the conflict. [Blair, p.79] Richard Edwards, Commander of Submarines, Atlantic Fleet, selected the now Captain Christie as tactical commander in the endeavor. [Blair, p.79] Christie wanted the new "Tambor" class submarines to be assigned to the Atlantic fleet, but he was overruled by Admiral Harold Stark, who ordered older S-boats and "Barracuda" class submarines to join the Atlantic Fleet instead. As war seemed increasingly likely toward the end of 1941, Christie placed his boats on full war footing. [Blair, p.80]

World War Two Service

Command of submarine operations out of Brisbane

At the outbreak of the Pacific War, remnants of the United States Asiatic Fleet fled to Australia. The S-boats from the Philippines were organized into a fighting force at Brisbane, and Admiral Ernest King ordered S-boats from the Atlantic Fleet to supplement the force in Australia. Christie went along with the boats and arrived in April 1942, just in time for the Battle of the Coral Sea. Throughout 1942, Christie ordered his boats to patrol around harbors which, while being key points for shipping, also tended to be heavily patrolled by aircraft and anti-submarine craft. In step with then-current US Navy submarine doctrine, he made capital ships the prime targets, rather than have his boats focus on shipping. [Blair, p.305-306]

Troubles with the Mark 14 torpedo

Almost as soon as the war began, submarine captains indicated there were problems with the Mark 14 torpedo and the Mark VI magnetic detonator. Torpedoes would fail to detonate, or would prematurely detonate. Despite these reports, Christie was not fully aware of the impact of the situation. The S-boats he commanded used the older Mark X torpedo, which was free of defects. Christie acknowledged that the Mark 14 torpedoes were running deeper than normal, but attributed the failures of the weapons to poor maintenance, and errors on the part of the captain and crew. He was also still convinced that the Mark VI detonator was fine, and ordered that all Fleet boats continue to use it. [Blair, pp. 304, 305]

Return to Newport

In November 1942, Christie was ordered to return to Newport as Inspector of Ordnance in Charge. Newport had become a bottleneck for torpedo manufacture, and the Bureau of Ordnance wanted to advance development of the Mark XVIII electric torpedo. Christie resisted leaving his command at Brisbane, but he was considered of more use to resolve the torpedo issue. [Blair, p.348] He was replaced by James Fife.

Christie was promoted to Rear Admiral as part of his move back to Newport. But in January 1943, Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarines, U.S. Pacific Fleet, was killed in a plane crash. Christie hoped to get the position, but the job went to Admiral Charles Lockwood, Commander of submarine operations out of Perth-Fremantle. [Blair, p.367] However, the Bureau of Personnel selected Christie to take over Lockwood's old command in Australia. Christie then lobbied Admiral Arthur 'Chips' Carpender, Douglas MacArthur's naval chief, to allow him to replace Fife as commander of the larger submarine force at Brisbane. Carpender refused, and Christie went on to Perth-Fremantle. However, Christie continued to try for some time to take the Brisbane force under his control. [Blair, p.367]

Deactivation of the Mark VI detonator

By the middle of 1943, Lockwood received enough reports from skippers to convince him that the Mark VI detonator was significantly flawed. On 24 June 1943, Lockwood formally ordered all submarines operating out of Pearl Harbor to deactivate the magnetic detonator. However, Christie was still committed to the detonator, and ordered Perth-Fremantle boats to continue using the Mark VI. Submarines operating between the two commands were required to either enable or disable the detonator, depending on which command area they were in. [Blair, p. 431] This difference of opinion strained relations between the two admirals. [Blair, p.414]

By the end of 1943, Carpender was replaced by Thomas Kinkaid, who ordered the final deactivation of the Mark VI detonator in all combat commands. Christie abided by the order starting 20 January 1944, but was still convinced the Mark VI had potential. He had Chester Nimitz, Jr. and James McCallum to continue technical studies of the Mark VI and to develop improvements. However, these revised detonators were just as unreliable as the earlier versions. [Blair, p.610]

Christie's issuance of decorations

It was common for Christie to greet a returning submarine pierside, and to award decorations to the crew on the spot. [Blair, p.584] [cite book |title=Death at a Distance: The Loss of the Legendary USS Harder |last=Sturma |first=Michael |year=2006 |publisher=US Naval Institute Press |isbn=1591148456 |pages=52 |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=NrV33S6h8tcC ] This bypassed military award boards, and caused annoyance among Kinkaid and Lockwood, [Blair, p. 584] possibly because confirmation of sinkings was accomplished by the reading of coded Japanese radio traffic — news of awards given so quickly could be a security breach. [ [http://pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/h/Christie_Ralph_W.htm Kent G. Budge. Pacific War Online. "Christie, Ralph W. (1890-?)"] ] Complicating the matter was the fact that MacArthur was awarding army decorations to naval personnel. Like Christie, MacArthur was taking it upon himself to authorize the decorations rather than to go through standard review procedures. These events compelled Kinkaid to forbid Christie to give pierside awards, and to keep Christie from recommending the award of army medals to navy personnel. These events would ultimately contribute to Christie's dismissal as Commander of Perth-Fremantle.

War patrols

In early 1944, Christie decided he wanted to make a war patrol and selected to ride with Walt Griffith in "Bowfin". [ [http://www.bowfin.org/website/bowfin/bowfin_history/patrols/p_3/patrol_3.htm Bowfin.org. Bowfin history, patrol 3. "An Admiral Aboard"] ] The admiral joined the boat on 29 January 1944 and during the patrol, Christie conducted standard duties such as standing watch. [ [http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_33/bowfin.html Undersea Warfare, Winter 2007. Thomas Holian. "Bowfin, The Pearl Harbor Avenger"] ] After an active 29-day patrol, Christie departed "Bowfin". [Blair, p.614]

In June 1944, Christie decided he wanted to make a second patrol, and selected "Guitarro". However, that boat was having engine troubles, so Christie decided to go on "Harder", commanded by Sam Dealey. Dealey had just finished up "Harder's" epic fifth war patrol, in which he was attributed to have sunk five Japanese destroyers (reduced postwar to three destroyers). Despite the fact that the crew was exhausted, Dealey agreed to extend his fifth patrol and take Christie on his second combat patrol.

When "Harder" returned to port on 3 July 1944, Christie was concerned about Dealey. Dealey was one of the leading submarine skippers, but he had completed five war patrols and was showing signs of strain. The admiral believed Dealey should step down from command of "Harder", but Dealey felt he should make one more patrol before leaving the boat. [Blair, p.672]

Increasingly strained relations with Lockwood

After Christie's return from his second combat patrol, Chester Nimitz recommend that he and Lockwood meet in Brisbane and discuss joint submarine operations. During the visit, Lockwood and Christie discussed technical issues, and the establishment of advanced bases in Mios Woendi and Saipan. However, the meeting also resulted in some kind of personal clash between the two men. The two men had already clashed over problems around the Mark VI detonator and the Mark 14 torpedo, and some of Lockwood's staff believed Christie's ride on "Harder" was a risky and unnecessary stunt. It was also possible that Lockwood was jealous of the fact that Christie conducted two combat patrols. [Blair, p.673, 674]

After meeting with Lockwood, Christie met with MacArthur and related the events of Dealey's fifth war patrol to the general. MacArthur then decided to award Dealey with an Distinguished Service Cross, and Christie the Silver Star. Additionally at this meeting, Christie found out that his earlier recommendation for an army decoration to Walter Griffith, captain of "Bowfin", had been apparently blocked by Kinkaid. Despite Kinkaid's order about army decorations, MacArthur insisted on granting the medals to the two men. Although Christie did not request the decorations, he was put on the spot and felt compelled to report the entire affair to Kinkaid. [Blair, p.674] In the end, the general awarded the medals, displeasing Kinkaid. [Blair, p.674]

Loss of Dealey and USS Harder

On 5 August, Dealey took "Harder" out for a sixth patrol. Dealey's former executive officer, Frank C. Lynch, believed Dealey was mentally exhausted. [Blair, p.717] Christie also had reservations, but Dealey seemed to recuperate while "Harder" was being refitted for her next patrol. As such, the admiral allowed Dealey to remain in command. [Blair, p.717] On 24 August, "Harder" was sunk with all hands off Dasol Bay, and the loss of Dealey was a great shock to Christie. The event led to worsened relations between Christie and Kinkaid.

Christie recommended Dealey for the Medal of Honor for "Harder's" fifth patrol and supposed sinking of five Japanese destroyers. [http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/text/christie.html "Box 1: Dealey, Samuel David, medal of honor for command of" Harder "(submarine), 1944-1945." Papers of Ralph W. Christie, Naval Historical Foundation Collection, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.] ] Kinkaid turned down the recommendation on grounds that Dealey had already received the Distinguished Service Cross for the same patrol. [Blair, p.720] Christie was angered by this, and sent dispatches to Admiral Edwards, MacArthur, and to Kinkaid himself. The radio dispatch to Kinkaid was sent in a low-order code that was easily decipherable; it criticized Kinkaid and urged him to reconsider. The message was so blunt and public, it was viewed as bordering on insubordination. [Blair, p.721]

Countering German U-boats

In October and November 1944, Christie received intelligence regarding German plans to operate a wolfpack of U-boats in Australian waters. Christie vectored Allied forces to detect and eliminate the threat, resulting in the Dutch submarine "Zwaardvisch" (swordfish) sinking "U-168" on 6 October near Surabaya and USS "Flounder"'s sinking of "U-537" on 10 November near the northern end of the Lombok Strait. Another U-boat disappeared en route and a fourth, "U-862", evaded searchers to slip around the south coast of Australia and sink a Liberty ship south of Sydney in late December. [ [http://www.navy.gov.au/w/images/PIAMA15_ch9.pdf Royal Australian Navy. Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No 15: A Critical Vulnerability. The Impact of the Submarine Threat on Australia's Maritime Defence 1915 -1954. Chapter 9, "The German Campaign — 1944-45"] ]

Relieved of command

On 30 December 1944, Kinkaid relieved Christie of command of submarine operations at Perth-Fremantle, giving the command to Fife. Although no specific reason was given, Christie was convinced it was because he pushed Kinkaid too hard for Dealey's Medal of Honor, and for his process of awarding decorations in general. [Blair, p.814] It has been speculated that Kinkaid may have blamed Christie for the loss of Manning Kimmel, Kinkaid's nephew who was under Christie's command. [Blair, p.814]

ubsequent wartime service

Christie returned to the United States, and went on to command Puget Sound Navy Yard. Now that he was no longer in Kinkaid's command, Christie renewed his push to get Dealey awarded the Medal of Honor, this time by getting the endorsement for the decoration from MacArthur. The general agreed, and Dealey was posthumously awarded the medal. [Blair, p.815]

Post-war career

After the war Christie attempted to get command of operations for Atlantic submarines, but that job went to James Fife instead. However, Christie was given command of naval forces in the Philippines. He retired from the navy on 1 August 1949, and then sold life insurance and dabbled in other ventures for some time. In his final years, he lived on the west coast of the United States and in Hawaii. [Blair, p.880]

Admiral Christie died at the age of 94 in Honolulu, Hawaii on December 19, 1987. His wife, LaRene P. Christie, joined him at National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific after her death on May 31 2002. [ [http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=26207396 Find A Grave. "Adm Ralph Waldo Christie"] ]

Notes