Eight-eight fleet

The nihongo|Eight-Eight Fleet Program|八八艦隊|Hachihachi Kantai was a Japanese naval strategy formulated for the development of the Imperial Japanese Navy in the first quarter of the 20th century, which laid down that the Japanese navy should include eight first-class battleships and eight armoured cruisers or battlecruisers.

History and Development

The 'Eight-Eight Fleet' concept originated in post-Russo-Japanese War period with the 1907 Imperial Defense Policy, which was a settlement reached by the competing Army and Navy factions of the Japanese government.

The Naval faction, inspired by the Mahanian doctrine of Satō Tetsutarō, argued that Japanese security could only be guaranteed by a strong navy. Satō argued that to ensure security, Japan should be capable of defeating the power which represented the greatest potential threat. In the 1907 Imperial National Defense Policy, the shift of Japan’s military focus shifted away from the defeated Imperial Russia and towards the United States as the primary threat to Japan's future security. In Japanese minds, the United States had proven to be an aggressive expansionist power in Asia, with its overthrow and annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii and suppression and colonization of the Republic of the Philippines. The Open Door Policy towards China was in conflict with Japanese aspirations on the Asian mainland, and its racist immigation policies indicated potential American racial enmity towards the Japanese. Furthermore, the United States had recently surpassed the United Kingdom's Royal Navy as the largest and most powerful fleet in the world.

Based on a theoretical United States Navy strength of 25 battleships and cruisers, Japanese naval theoreticians postulated that Japan would need a fleet of at least eight first-line battleships and eight cruisers for parity. When Naval Minister Admiral Yamamoto Gonnohyoe presented the budget request for this fleet to the Diet of Japan, the amount was more than twice that of the entire Japanese national budget at the time.

The Eight-Eight Fleet policy was controversial because of the enormous cost of battleships, and only once was authorization given by the Diet of Japan for a building program which would have reached the 'Eight-Eight Fleet' ideal. To complicate matters further, while the 'Eight-Eight Fleet' plan lasted over a decade, the ships required for it changed; by 1920 the ships which had been ordered in 1910 to start to fulfill the plan were becoming obsolete.

Various alternative plans were discussed, including a reduction in the plan to 'Eight-four Fleet' program, of later to an 'Eight-Six Fleet' program.

First 'Eight-Eight'

The first serious attempt to build an 'Eight-Eight Fleet' came in 1910, when the Naval General Staff proposed a building program of eight battleships and eight armored cruisers (by that time, they would inevitably become battlecruisers). The Navy Ministry cut back this request for political reasons, to seven battleships and three armored cruisers. The Cabinet eventually recommended one battleship and four battlecruisers, and the Diet authorized these ships in 1911. The battlecruisers became the "Kongō" class and the battleship was "Fusō" - all technologically advanced ships of admirable design.

The 1913 program saw a further three battleships authorized, making a total of 'four-four'. These ships, "Yamashiro", "Ise" and "Hyūga", were sister ships or cousins of "Fusō".

In 1915, the Navy proposed another four battleships, to reach an 'Eight-Four Fleet'. This was rejected by the Diet. However, in 1916 the Diet agreed to an additional battleship and two battlecruisers. In 1917, in response to the U.S. Navy's plan to build an additional ten battleships and six battlecruisers, the Diet authorized a further three battleships; and in 1918 the Cabinet authorized another two battlecruisers. In total, the authorization existed for an 'Eight-Eight Fleet'.

The new ships started were the two "Nagato" battleships, the two "Kaga" battleships, and a total of four "Amagi" battlecruisers - all modern, capable ships carrying 16-inch guns. Few of these ships were eventually completed in their intended role.

econd 'Eight-Eight Fleet'

So great was the difference in capability between this generation of ships and those of five years previously that the 'Eight-Eight Fleet' plan was restarted: "Nagato" was now regarded as Ship No.1 in the new project, and planners now began to write off the older battleships and battlecruisers. On this revised basis the Navy was back down to a 'Four-Four Fleet'.

A further impetus to achieve the Eight-Eight Fleet ideal came from an additional expansion of the U.S. Navy under American President Woodrow Wilson's 1919 plan to build another set of 16 capital ships (on top of the 16 already authorized in 1916). In 1920, under Prime Minister Hara Takashi, a reluctant Diet was persuaded to accept a plan to bring the 'Four-Four' set of modern ships up to 'Eight-Eight' strength by 1927. This would have involved augmenting the "Amagi" battlecruisers with an additional four fast battleships of the new "Kii" class, which were marginally slower and more powerful. A further four battleships No. 13-16 would have been built, with 18-inch guns. If completed, this would have been an 'Eight-Eight Fleet' in full; if one included the oldest ships of the navy, the "Fuso" and "Kongō" classes, then the even higher goal of an 'Eight-Eight-Eight Fleet' with not two but three eight-ship battle squadrons could be realized.

Washington Naval Treaty

Japan was spared the possibly ruinous expense of following through on this construction plan by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Under the terms of the treaty all the ships still being built - which meant all ships started after "Nagato", the first ship of the 1916 building program - had to be broken up or converted into aircraft carriers. A special exemption was made for the battleship "Mutsu", which was nearing completion and which had a special place in many Japanese hearts, with many of the funds for her construction raised by public subscription.

The treaty established a maximum tonnage for the Japanese navy as 60% of the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy. For this reason, it was vociferously opposed by many Imperial Japanese Navy officers, including Admiral Satō Tetsutarō. This group formed the influential Fleet Faction which later achieved Japan's withdrawal from the treaty.

Although Japanese Navy procurement still proceeded along the lines of initial 'Eight-Eight Fleet' plans for several years, changes in naval strategy and the development of naval aviation made the term an anachronism by the 1930s.

References

*cite book | last = Breyer | first = Siegfried | coauthor= Alfred Kurti | year = 2002
title = Battleships and Battle Cruisers, 1905-1970: Historical Development of the Capital Ship | publisher = Doubleday & Company | id = ISBN 0385072473
*cite book | last = Evans　| first = David | year = 1979 | title = Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 | publisher = US Naval Institute Press | id = ISBN 0-87021-192-7
*