The Great Train Wreck of 1918

Infobox rail accident


title=Great Train Wreck of 1918
date=July 9, 1918 7:20 a.m.
location=Nashville, Tennessee, United States
coordinates=coord|36|07|46|N|86|50|53|W|
line =Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad
cause=
trains=
pax=
deaths=101
injuries=171

The Great Train Wreck of 1918 occurred on July 9, 1918, in Nashville, Tennessee. Two passenger trains, operated by the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad ("NC&StL"), collided head-on, killing 101 people and injuring an additional 171. It is considered the deadliest rail accident in United States history.

The two trains involved were the No. 4, scheduled to depart Nashville for Memphis, Tennessee at 7:00 a.m., and the No. 1 from Memphis, about a half-hour late for a scheduled arrival in Nashville at 7:10 a.m. At about 7:20 a.m., the two trains collided while traversing a section of single track line known as "Dutchman's Curve" west of downtown, in the present-day neighborhood of Belle Meade. Traveling at an estimated 50/60 miles per hour, the impact derailed both trains and completely destroyed several wooden cars.

An investigation by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) attributed the cause of the accident to several factors, notably serious errors by the No. 4 crew and tower operators, all of whom failed to properly account for the presence of the No. 1 train on the line. The ICC also pointed to a lack of a proper system for the accurate determination of train positions, and noted that the wooden construction of the cars greatly increased the number of fatalities.

Incident

Departures

At 7:07 a.m. on the morning of the accident, the Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis ("NC&StL") No. 4 train left Union Station in Nashville, bound for Memphis, Tennessee. The train, pulled by the No. 282 locomotive, consisted of two mail and baggage cars and six wooden coaches.

Simultaneously, the No. 1 train, pulled by the No. 281 locomotive, was heading into Nashville from Memphis. Containing one baggage car, six wooden coaches, and two Pullman sleeping cars of steel construction, the No. 1 train had departed McKenzie four hours earlier, and passed Bellevue at 7:09 a.m., thirty-five minutes behind schedule.

Approach

Both trains required the use of a single-track section approximately convert|10|mi|km long in the western portion of Nashville. According to contemporary practices, the inbound train (the No. 1) retained the right-of-way. Thus, the railroad dispatch informed the crew of the opposing (No. 4) train of the locomotive number of the No. 1, with the orders to stop in the double-track section if the crew did not visually identify the passing No. 1 before they reached the interlocking tower known as "Shops Junction", where the single-track section began. The term "Shops" referred to the railroad's massive repair and refueling shops including its largest roundhouse. This was not a passenger stop but rather the junction where the road's mainline track to Memphis narrowed down to just one track.

While the No. 4 train traversed the double-track section, the conductor delegated the responsibility of identifying the No. 1 to the remainder of the crew. While collecting tickets, the conductor mistook the sound of a passing switch engine with empty passenger cars as the No. 1. The crew either made the same error or were negligent in properly identifying the train.

As the No. 4 approached the interlocking tower at Shops Junction, tower operator J. S. Johnson showed a clear signal from the tower's train order signals, indicating all was clear. As he stopped to record the train in his logs, he noticed that there was no entry showing that the No. 1 had passed. Johnson reported to the dispatcher who telegraphed back, "He meets No. 1 there, can you stop him?" Johnson sounded the emergency whistle, but there was no one at the rear of the No. 4 to hear it. The train passed on the assumption that the clear train order board indicated that the line ahead was clear. Also, the engineman and conductor failed to visually inspect the train register at Shops Junction to ascertain as to whether No. 1 had yet arrived. That was required by operating instructions issued by the railroad's management prior to the wreck.

Collision

Shortly after 7:15 a.m. the two trains collided at Dutchman's Grade near White Bridge Road. It is estimated that the westbound train was traveling at about 50 mph while the Nashville-bound train was running at 60 mph. Many of the wooden cars were crushed or hurled sideways. The sound of the collision could be heard two miles (3 km) away.

The irony is this was to have been the last trip before retirement of the engineer of the Nashville-bound train.

Aftermath

Although the final death toll is disputed, the Interstate Commerce Commission listed the dead at 101 though some reports listed the death toll as high as 121. At least 171 people were injured. Many of the victims were African American laborers from Arkansas and Memphis who were coming to work at the gunpowder plant in Old Hickory outside of Nashville. As many as 50,000 people came to the track that day to help rescue survivors, search for loved ones, or simply witness the tragic scene.

In its official report, the Interstate Commerce Commission was harsh on the railroad. A combination of less than sterling operating practices, human error and lax enforcement of operating rules led to this worst passenger train wreck in U.S. history. Had the signal tower operator properly left his signal at danger, the conductor monitored his train's progress rather than entrusting it to a subordinate, and had the crew inspected the train register at Shops Junction as required, the accident would not have happened.

Any yet, because the NC&StL, like all US railroads at the time were being run by the government under the guise of the United States Railroad Administration during World War I, government officials had completely scrambled the railroad's former passenger train schedules. In the past these two trains would have met safely far to the west of Nashville later in the morning. But because of the fiddling around with the timetables, these two trains now met somewhere, depending on timing, right around Nashville where the likelihood of tragic mistakes like this were possible. The USRA put, in essence, a gag order on the news of this wreck to try to play down public fears of having the US government run the country's railroads. Another serious accident involving a circus train had happened earlier that same year under the USRA's watch. The ICC failed to note the changes in scheduling that the USRA had wrought nor did they consider the effect those changes might have had as a contributing factor to this wreck.

This wreck provided the impetus for most railroads to switch to all-steel passenger cars versus wood and steel. The passengers would not have buckled in, accordion style had all of them been all-steel instead.

References

*cite news|first=Mike|last=Kilen|title=That Mournful Sound|date=July 5, 1998|work=The Tennessean
*cite news|title=N. & C. Wreck Near Nashville Takes Toll of Dead and Hurt|date=July 9, 1918|work=Nashville Banner
*cite news|title=Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis-The Dixie Line by Dain L. Schult, a/k/a Grandpa's Road, (the chapter entitled,"Wipe The Clock and Pray"), Copyright 2001 Dain L. Schult, TLC Publishing

Popular Culture

The 1980 single by David Allen Coe "The Great Nashville Railroad Disaster" written by Bobby Braddock and Rafe Vanhoy.

External links

* [http://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2007/7/6/nashville_now_and_then_off_the_rails 2007 article] on Dutchman's Curve accident
* [http://www.nashvillepost.com/news/1997/7/9/because_somebody_blundered_news_of_the_dutchmans_curve_disaster Text of 1918 local news story] on the accident
* [http://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2007/7/20/nashville_now_and_then_20jul07 2007 news article with links to audio recollections] of witness to aftermath of the crash
* [http://dotlibrary1.specialcollection.net/scripts/ws.dll?file&fn=6&name=*P%3ADOTRailroadWEBSEARCH535.PDF Official ICC Report]