Effects-Based Operations

Effects-Based Operations (EBO) is a United States military concept which emerged after the 1991 Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. The doctrine was developed in light of the emergence of new threats in irregular or small-scale fourth generation warfare, and a shift towards Operations Other Than War (OOTW), as opposed to formally-declared wars and major force-on-force third generation warfare doctrines of the Cold War. Most recently, Joint Forces Command, the caretaker of US Military Joint Warfighting doctrine, issued memorandum and a guidance documents from the commander, Marine General James Mattis, on Effects Based Operations. In these documents dated 14 August, 2008 Mattis says, "Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor or export the terms and concepts related to EBO...in our training, doctrine development and support of JPME (Joint Professional Military Education)." Mattis went on to say, "...we must recognize that the term "effects-based" is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations and is at odds with the very nature of war to the point it expands confusion and inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver." See Defense Daily piece in references below. [http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/dd/3661.html]

Definition

As defined by the United States military Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), effects-based operations are "a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict." This description of the doctrine is quoted by LTC (now BG) Allen Batschelet, author of the April 2002 study "Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?"cite web
title=Effects-based operations: A New Operational Model?
url=http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/effect-based-ops/ebo.pdf
date=2002-04-09
accessdate=2007-11-14 (PDF)] He was later appointed in 2004 as commander of the Fires Brigade, the newly-reorganized 4th Infantry Division Artillery Brigade which deployed to Iraq to implement such theories in practice.

Rather than focus specifically at the causing of casualties and physical destruction, resulting in annihilation or attrition of enemy forces, effects-based operations emphasize end-state goals first, and then focus on the means available to achieve those goals. For instance, psychological operations, electronic warfare, logisitical disruptions and other non-lethal means can be used to achieve the demoralization or defeat of an enemy force while minimizing civilian casualties or avoiding the destruction of infrastructure. While effects-based operations do not rule out lethal operations, it places them as options in a series of operational choices for military commanders.

even Attributes of EBO

According to Batschelet's paper, seven elements comprise and differentiate EBO:

1. Focus on Decision Superiority
2. Applicability in Peace and War (Full-Spectrum Operations)
3. Focus Beyond Direct, Immediate First-Order Effects
4. Understanding of the Adversary’s Systems
5. Ability of Disciplined Adaptation
6. Application of the Elements of National Power
7. Ability of Decision-Making to Adapt Rules and Assumptions to Reality

Center of Gravity

The core of the doctrine, to support superior decision-making and to understand the enemy's systems, is in determining and calculating the philosophical (not physical) center of gravity (COG) of the combatants. "COGs are those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight" (such as leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and field military). A similar modeling scheme refers to these as National Elements of Value (NEV). A relative weighting is made as to which of the elements are most critical to be targeted by operations.cite web
title=Effects-Based Operations: Application of new concepts, tactics, and software tools support the Air Force vision for effects-based operations
url=http://www.afrlhorizons.com/Briefs/June01/IF00015.html
date=June 2001
publisher=Air Force Research Laboratory
accessdate=2007-01-30 ]

EBO in Practice

The January–February 2004 issue of "Field Artillery" magazine featured a report on the implementation of Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan "to help shape an environment that enables the reconstruction of the country as a whole."cite news
title=Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan
url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/ebo_afghan.pdf
publication=Field Artillery
date=January–February 2004
accessdate=2007-02-03 ] United States policy objectives are to create a "government of Afghanistan committed to and capable of preventing the re-emergence of terrorism on Afghan soil." All mission efforts are undertaken with that end-state goal in mind. To coordinate endeavors, the US military maintains a Joint Effects Coordination Board (JECB) chaired by the Director of the Combined/Joint Staff (DCJS) which serves to select and synchronize targets and determine desired effects across branches and operational units. Besides representatives from combat maneuver organizations, staff also is drawn from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Public Affairs (PA). Weekly Joint Effects Working Group (JEWG) targeting team meetings provide recommendations and updates to the JECB based on three priorities:
* Enable Afghan institutions
* Assist in removing the causes of instability
* Deny the enemy sanctuary and counter terrorism.

The result is a three-week-ahead planning window, or battle rhythm, to produce the desired effects of the commanders, as defined in operations orders (OPORDs) every three weeks and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) each week to update the standing OPORDs. Activities include both lethal and non-lethal missions, including civil-military, public affairs, reconstruction, intelligence and psychological operations and feedback as well as conventional combat and fire support missions.

An FA lieutenant, as an “Effects Support Team” (EST) leader, must understand how to employ lethal and non-lethal assets to realize the maneuver company commander’s vision of future operations. He must be able to work with civil affairs teams, special operations, coalition and host-nation forces, as well as NGOs and OGAs.cite news
title=Effects-Based Operations in Afghanistan
url=http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/ebo_afghan.pdf
publication=Field Artillery
date=January–February 2004
accessdate=2007-02-03 ]

This requires a shift away from "hot steel" (artillery fire) as a solution to all problems, and a focus on integration of multiple dimensions and methods to achieve desired results.

A recent study concluded that a contributing factor to the Israeli Defense Force's defeat in the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict in the Summer of 2006 was due in large part to an over reliance on EBO concepts. [Avi Kober, "The Israeli Defense Force in the Second Lebanon War," Journal of Strategic Studies. vol 31 No.1 3-40 (February 2008)16-28 and 37-38. Mat M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, Ks: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 23-38 and 61-65.]

See also

* Psyops
* Military operations other than war
* Systems disruption

References