Race to the Sea

The Race to the Sea was a name given to a period of World War I when, on the Western Front, the two sides were still engaged in mobile warfare. With the German advance stalled at the First Battle of the Marne, the opponents continually attempted to outflank each other through north-eastern France. This process brought the forces back to positions prepared under British Admiralty guidance, on the North Sea coast in Western Belgium. The nature of operations then changed to trench warfare, which is very large scale siege warfare. This produced a continuous front line of trench fortifications more than two hundred miles long, which by the following Spring extended from the coast to the Swiss border.

It began in September 1914 in Champagne, at the end of the German advance into France, and ended at the North Sea in November. In the ensuing battles fought in Picardy, Artois and Flanders, neither side could gain the advantage and so, as repeated attempts to find the open flank were made, the line was extended until it reached the coast. The term "Race to the Sea" suggests that all the forces began in Champagne though significant parts of the German Army arrived from Belgium, after the fall of Antwerp, and much of the BEF arrived from England by way of English Channel coast of France. The movement towards the North Sea was the result of continual failed attempts at flanking manoeuvres.

In fact, the eventual "finish line" of the race was already occupied by two forces. The Belgian army, later reinforced by the British Royal Naval Division, had been holding out in Antwerp which finally fell on October 10. The Belgian and British forces had withdrawn to a line on the River Yser ("IJzer") which flows into the North Sea at Nieuwpoort.

The race is deemed to have begun late September 1914 following the end of the Battle of the Aisne, the unsuccessful Allied counter-offensive against the German forces halted during the preceding First Battle of the Marne. The route of the race was largely governed by the north-south railways available to each side, the French through Amiens and the Germans through Lille.

The French Tenth Army began to assemble at Amiens from mid-September and on September 25 began to push eastwards. The German Sixth Army had reached Bapaume on September 26 and advanced to Thiepval on the following day, in the middle of what was to become the Somme battlefield of 1916. The German aim was to drive westward to the English Channel, seizing the industrial and agricultural regions of Northern France, cutting off the supply route of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and isolating Belgium. Meanwhile, six of the eleven German cavalry divisions would sweep through Flanders to the coast.

However, between October 1 and October 6 the German Sixth Army's offensive north of the Somme was halted by the French under the direction of General Ferdinand Foch. The German cavalry encountered the French XXI Corps near Lille and were likewise halted. The only gap remaining was in Flanders with the Belgians on the Yser to the north and the French in Picardy to the south.

Attention now turned to Artois and Flanders where the BEF had begun to redeploy in order to shorten their supply route through Boulogne and Calais. The Germans reached Lille on October 13 and the British reached Balleuil ("Belle") on the next day. The line formed in Artois was established by the Battle of La Bassée between October 12 and October 27; the British held Arras while the Germans were in Lens.

In Flanders, the British 7th Division had moved in to Ypres ("Ieper") on October 14. The Germans had actually occupied the town with a small detachment on October 3 but were forced to withdraw. The British planned to advance along the road to Menen (Menin) but were stopped by a superior German force. On October 21, during the Battle of the Yser, King Albert of Belgium ordered the sea-locks at Nieuwpoort to be opened, creating an impassable flooded marshland up to a mile wide as far south as Diksmuide.

The German effort to achieve a breakthrough now concentrated at Ypres. In what was to become the First Battle of Ypres, the German attack began on October 21. Fighting would continue until late November but, while the British forces were dangerously stretched, no breakthrough came.

While the race to the sea was over when the offensive at Ypres ceased, the Western Front still contained gaps. In particular, no front was established in the Vosges Mountains until early 1915.

The implications seaward

While the BEF was following events to the Marne and returning northwards, there had been coordinated efforts by relatively small forces of the Belgian field and fortress armies, French marines, Royal Marines, the Naval Brigade (sailors half retrained as infantry), the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and vessels of the Royal Navy. The aim was to support Antwerp, so tying up German forces and protecting the coast from occupation which would permit its harbours to be used by U boats and prevent their use in supplying a British army. This much and the importance of Calais and Boulogne-sur-Mer in supplying the BEF were perceived at the time.

It is also true that in order to maintain a British army in France at all, the allies had to control the English Channel. To do this, particularly against U boats, the Strait of Dover had to be controlled. For this, its two coasts had to be occupied by the Allies so that a barrage of vessels, mines and nets could be maintained up to the two coasts. [This is seen in practice in [http://membres.lycos.fr/histopale/the14.htm Hist Opale] , a French language site. ] In the event, this aim of retaining control of the French coast was achieved by coordination between naval and military forces of Belgium, France and the United Kingdom and no French port was lost. How much of this aspect was understood before the event is not clear. It was perhaps, so obvious, in the Admiralty at least, that it was not stated explicitly. Certainly, the U boat threat was well appreciated at this stage but the First Lord's account of the time and its events makes no mention of the need to stop the threat at the strait.

These considerations made crucial the BEF's return to the north before the fluid situation there had solidified into a line reaching the coast west of Dunkirk. On the whole, the German forces significant in this aspect of the 'race' came from eastern Belgium, having been occupied there by operations associated with the resistance of Antwerp.

References

* Churchill, W.S. "The World Crisis 1911–1918" London (1938) Chapter XII

Notes