Engagements on Lake Ontario

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Engagements on Lake Ontario
partof=the War of 1812


caption=
date=1812 - 1815
place=Lake Ontario
result=Indecisive
combatant1=United Kingdom
combatant2=United States
commander1=James Lucas Yeo
commander2=Isaac Chauncey
strength1=1 first rate ship of the line
2 frigates
6 sloops and brigs
4 schooners and gunboats
strength2=2 frigates
6 sloops and brigs
12 schooners and gunboats
casualties1=1 sloop destroyed
2 brigs destroyed
1 brig capturedThese include vessels lost while serving or being constructed as warships only, not transports, tenders etc.]
casualties2=1 brig destroyed
2 schooners sunk
2 schooners captured

The Engagements on Lake Ontario encompass the prolonged naval contest for control of the lake during the War of 1812. Few actions were fought, none of which had decisive results, and the contest essentially became a naval building race, sometimes referred to sarcastically as the "Battle of the Carpenters".

Operations in 1812

When war was first declared, the British had an early advantage on the Great Lakes in that they possessed a quasi-naval body, the Provincial Marine. Although not particularly well-manned or efficient, its ships were initially unopposed on Lake Erie and Lake Huron, and made possible the decisive early victories of Major General Isaac Brock. On Lake Ontario, they possessed the ships "Royal George" and "Prince Regent", the brigs "Earl of Moira" and "Duke of Gloucester", and the schooners "Seneca" and "Simcoe", under the eighty-year old Commodore Hugh Earle. [C. Winton-Clare, "A Shipbuilders' War", in M. Zaslow (ed.), "The Defended Border", p. 167] . The Americans possessed only one brig, the "Oneida" under Lieutenant Melancthon Taylor Woolsey, and a small navy yard at Sackets Harbor, New York. On July 19, five vessels of the Provincial Marine attacked "Oneida" in the First Battle of Sackett's Harbor but were beaten off.

To redress matters, the United States Navy appointed Commodore Isaac Chauncey, then commanding the navy yard in New York, to command on the lakes on September 3, 1812. Although Chauncey was nominally in charge of the forces on Lake Erie also, he took no part in its construction or operations there but concentrated his attention on Lake Ontario. His first ships were hastily purchased or commandeered trading vessels, but he despatched large numbers of carpenters, shipwrights and so on to Sacket's Harbor to construct proper fighting ships. The chief architects were Adam Brown, his brother Noah and Henry Eckford. They launched the first ship, the corvette "Madison", on November 26. The trees from which it was constructed had still been standing in September. [Forester, "The Age of Fighting Sail", p.122]

Chauncey hoisted his broad pendant on November 6 and pursued the British ship "Royal George" into Kingston, Ontario. He too was beaten off, partly by shore batteries and gunboats, and partly because a gun exploded aboard the schooner "Pert", throwing the American squadron into confusion. At this point winter closed in, immobilising the ships of both sides in port. The British began building two corvettes to match the "Madison", one each at Kingston and York.

Operations in 1813

Chauncey had the advantage in ships and men once the ice melted. He and General Henry Dearborn had the opportunity to strike a blow before British seamen and officers could reach Canada and travel up the St. Lawrence. An attack on Kingston would have been decisive, but Chauncey and Dearborn persuaded themselves that it was defended by 5,000 British regulars (there were in fact only 600). They instead attacked York, defeating the outnumbered defenders under Major General Roger Hale Sheaffe and looting the town. They captured the brig "Duke of Gloucester" and also several cannon which were destined for the British squadron on Lake Erie, (which contributed to the later American victory at the Battle of Lake Erie). The British themselves set fire to the ship "Isaac Brock" which was still being built, to prevent it falling into American hands.

Chauncey and Dearborn then defeated the British army at the Battle of Fort George. At both York and Fort George, Chauncey's schooners and gunboats (commanded at the latter engagement by Oliver Hazard Perry) had proved very effective in supporting troops landing from boats. Dearborn and Chauncey had nevertheless left themselves vulnerable to a potentially decisive counter-attack. While they were preoccupied at the western end of Lake Ontario, Commodore James Lucas Yeo had arrived in Kingston to take charge of the British squadron. Embarking troops under the British Commander-in-Chief in Canada, Lieutenant General Sir George Prevost, he almost immediately attacked the American base at the Battle of Sackett's Harbor. Although this was a strategically bold stroke, both Yeo and Prevost attacked cautiously and called off the attack when they met with stiff resistance. The Americans had prematurely set fire to the captured "Duke of Gloucester" and a ship under construction, the "General Pike", but managed to put out the fire when the British withdrew. The "Gloucester" and large quantities of stores were destroyed, but the "Pike" was saved. [J. Mackay Hitsman, "The Incredible War of 1812", pp. 147-9]

While Chauncey was in harbour awaiting the completion of the "Pike", Yeo's squadron assisted in driving the American army on the Niagara peninsula back into Fort George, and captured or destroyed large quantities of stores.

Chauncey's full squadron put out on July 21. They first contemplated an assault on the British defensive positions at Burlington Heights, but found the defenders too well-prepared to risk the operation, and instead they briefly captured York again, this time causing little loss. [Elting, "Amateurs to Arms", p.99] On August 7, they encountered Yeo near Fort Niagara, but the two squadrons spent several days in cautious manoeuvres. Chauncey had an advantage in long guns and waited for calm conditions in which he could engage at long range, while Yeo had the advantage in carronades and wanted to close in heavy weather. On August 8, two American schooners (the "Hamilton" and "Scourge") capsized and sank in a sudden squall. On August 10, Chauncey was caught at a disadvantage by a shift in the wind, and two more American schooners, the "Growler" and "Julia", were captured. [Roosevelt, "The Naval War of 1812", pp. 131-135]

Both squadrons withdrew to their bases for provision. On September 11, there was an indecisive long-range skirmish off the Genesee River at the western end of the Lake. [Roosevelt, "The Naval War of 1812", pp. 135-136] . On September 28, the two squadrons met again in York Bay. This time, the "Pike's" long guns came fully into action, partly dismasting Yeo's flagship, the "Wolfe". Yeo ran before the wind into Burlington Bay. (The Americans later referred to the action as the "Burlington Races".) Most of Chauncey's squadron was left behind in the chase, and Chauncey declined to follow Yeo over the sandbar at the entrance to the bay. He might have destroyed Yeo's squadron but feared that he himself would be trapped on a hostile lee shore and destroyed if the wind strengthened. [Roosevelt, "The Naval War or 1812", pp.136-139]

Nevertheless, while Yeo was able to make hasty repairs before retiring to Kingston, Chauncey effectively controlled the lake. Over the next months, his ships captured five British schooners (including "Growler" and "Julia") which were moving supplies or soldiers westward. Their control of the lake allowed the Americans to move their troops from Fort George to Sacket's Harbour in preparation for their attack on Montreal late that year. Although Chauncey was supposed to blockade the British in Kingston and prevent them interfering, an effective blockade was difficult in the foul weather of late autumn, and amidst the many islets at the mouth of the Saint Lawrence River. This allowed a British force to pursue the American army of James Wilkinson and defeat them at the Battle of Crysler's Farm. [Elting, "Amateurs to Arms", p.142]

Vessels on Lake Ontario in 1813

The following table should not be treated as an authentic list of fighting vessels. Both sides (especially the British) renamed, re-rigged and re-armed their ships several times during the war. Both sides also possessed several unarmed schooners or other small vessels for use as transports or tenders. [Roosevelt, "The Naval War of 1812", p. 125]

Aftermath

After the Treaty of Ghent which ended the war, a separate pact known as the Rush-Bagot Treaty was signed in 1817, to limit the number and strength of warships which could be maintained on the Lakes. On Lake Ontario, Britain and America could keep in commission one vessel each, of no more than 100 tons, and armed with one 18-pounder gun. No other armed ships could be built, and those already built should be dismantled.

In fact, very few of the existing ships were broken up. The British constructed a storehouse, referred to as a "stone frigate", to keep the rigging and other fittings. In theory, they could have recommissioned their entire squadron within a few days. By 1827, all the ships were mouldering, and unfit for service. The stores were auctioned in 1834 and the surviving ships were written off or disposed of over the next few years.

The American squadron also quickly fell into disrepair. It had been acknowledged when they were built that they would last only five or six years, with their green wood and rough finish. One survivor was the unfinished battleship "New Orleans", which was enclosed by a great shed on the slipway, and not sold until 1883. [R.A. Preston, "The Fate of Kingston's Warships", in M. Zaslow (ed.), "The Defended Border", pp. 283-295]

Results

Because neither side had been prepared to risk everything in a decisive attack on the enemy fleet or naval base, the result of all the construction effort on Lake Ontario was an expensive draw. The great demands for men and materials made by both squadrons adversely affected other parts of the war effort.

The Americans had been based at Sacket's Harbor, and this small town was unable to cope with the great numbers of soldiers, sailors and shipwrights there. There were many deaths from cold, exposure and inadequate rations during the winter months, and from disease during the summer. On the British side, the effort required to ship all the ordnance and naval stores up the Saint Lawrence prevented them from deploying decisive numbers of troops in Upper Canada. Prevost once reported paying £1,000 to transport one monstrous cable for the battleship "Saint Lawrence" to Kingston.

Both Yeo and Chauncey have been criticised by historians for their unwillingness to act decisively, and for the long and rambling excuses they made in their despatches for their setbacks. Chauncey has come in for more abuse from American historians than Yeo has from British historians. Roosevelt (and subsequent historians) argued that, since the overall American strategy was offensive, the American forces on Lake Ontario ought to have risked a decisive attack against Kingston, or Chauncey should have sought a decisive action against Yeo's squadron when opportunity offered. [Roosevelt, "The Naval War of 1812", pp. 203-204] Instead, Chauncey (and the Army commanders Dearborn and Wilkinson) repeatedly shied away from any attack on Kingston, while Chauncey failed to pursue Yeo to destruction after the action in Burlington Bay. After the British attack on Sackett's Harbor, Chauncey continually hampered operations against targets other than Kingston. He either kept his vessels in port waiting for more ships, or refused to use them to support the Army's attacks elsewhere (on the Niagara peninsula, for example). [Elting, "Amateurs to Arms", p.188]

By contrast, it has been argued that since the British strategy (under Governor General Sir George Prevost) was defensive, Yeo needed only to avoid defeat, and certainly succeeded in this. [Elting, "Amateurs to Arms", p.94, p.102] However, British (and Canadian) historians such as Forester and J. Mackay Hitsman have argued that he did so at such cost that other operations were curtailed or thwarted. (For example, Yeo's hoarding of men and supplies, and failure to forward sufficient of these to the British squadron on Lake Erie, led to their decisive defeat. Similarly, a far smaller effort on Lake Champlain that that required to construct battleships on Lake Ontario would have made British victory on Champlain certain, and decisive. [C.S.Forester, "The Age of Fighting Sail", pp.187-188] ) From the American side, Roosevelt lauded Yeo's second-in-command (Commander William Mulcaster) as a far more decisive and energetic officer than Yeo, who might have undertaken operations which could permanently thwart American designs.

Notes

References

*colledge
*cite book|last=Elting|first=John R.|authorid=John R. Elting|title=Amateurs to Arms:A military history of the War of 1812|location=New York|publisher=Da Capo Press|year=1995|isbn=0-306-80653-3
*cite book|last=Forester|first=C.S.|authorid=C.S. Forester|title=The Age of Fighting Sail|publisher=New English Library|isbn=0-939218-06-2
*cite book|last=Malcomson|first=Robert|authorid=Robert Malcolmson|title=Lords of the Lake:The Naval War on Lake Ontario 1812-1814|location=Toronto|publisher=Robin Brass Studio|year=1998|isbn=1-896941-08-7
*cite book|last=Roosevelt|first=Theodore|authorid=Theodore Roosevelt|title=The Naval War of 1812|publisher=Modern Library|location=New York|isbn=0-375-75419-9

External links

* [http://www.warof1812.ca/chauncey.htm Chauncey's action off the Genesee River]