Battle of San Francisco

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle of San Francisco


caption=
partof=War of the Pacific
date=November 19, 1879
place=South America
result="Chilean victory"
combatant1=flag|Chile
combatant2=flag|Peru|1825
flag|Bolivia|state
commander1=flagicon|Chile Col. Emilio Sotomayor
commander2=flagicon|Peru|1825 Gen. Juan Buendia
strength1=6,000 soldiers
30 Krupps rifle
4 La Hitte smoothbore
strength2=7,400 soldiers
18 smoothbore
casualties1=60 killed
148 wounded
casualties2=220 killed
76 wounded
3200 missing
18 smoothboreThe Battle of San Francisco, also known as "Battle of Dolores", fought on November 19, 1879, was the third battle of the "Tarapaca Campaign" in the War of the Pacific. It ended with the defeat of the bulk of the Peruvian forces. A Chilean army commanded by Colonel Emilio Sotomayor successfully held off and dispersed a larger Peruvian army led by General Juan Buendía at San Francisco hill, near the town of Dolores. The Allies lost a huge amount of war material such as cannons, ammunition and weapons. The catastrophe for the Allies was the result of poor logistics, inefficient leadership and the unexpected desertion of the Bolivian Army under the half-hearted command of President Hilarion Daza, known as the "Camarones betrayal".

Prelude

The Chilean forces had disembarked at the port of Pisagua after launching an amphibious operation on November 2nd, separating and isolating the Allied strongholds of Arica and Iquique; encountering merely mild resistance. On the 6th, Chilean cavalry led by Lt. Col. Jose Francisco Vergara almost annihilated the Peruvian Husares de Junin Cavalry Regiment at Pampa Germania. The Chilean Army had taken extreme care in securing water sources - very rare in the dry Atacama Desert - and in adopting high and easily defendable positions. Meanwhile, the Peruvian army under the command of the old yet incompetent General Juan Buendia marched in an attempt to intercept the Chilean forces. It was Buendia's hope that his Bolivian allies commanded by President Hilarion Daza would link up with his forces in order to numerically overwhelm the Chileans entrenched on the hill (cerro) of San Francisco. However, the route from the Bolivian highlands to San Francisco was long and perilous; furthermore, the Bolivians stubbornly marched in full daylight, thus having to endure the scorching heat of the desert sun. Naturally, when the Bolivians reached the creek of Camarones near San Francisco, they were in no condition to fight a battle. Buendia was forced to face the Chileans on his own.

Preliminary situation

Chilean preliminary situation

On November 7th, the "Buin" 1st Line and the 4th Line regiments with the Atacama and Coquimbo battalions, plus an artillery battery marched from Hospicio to Dolores. The next day took the same route the 3rd Line Regiment, the Naval and Valparaíso battalions and another artillery battery. This two forces reunited at Dolores on November 10th. The Chilean forces under the command of Colonel Emilio Sotomayor, had a strength of 6.500 menCite book| author= Mellafe, Rafael; Pelayo, Mauricio| title= La Guerra del Pacífico en imágenes, relatos, testimonios| year= 2004| publisher= Centro de Estudios Bicentenario] .

Peruvian preliminary situation

On November 5th, the Allied Army marched to Pozo Almonte, increasing its numbers with stray soldiers. On the 13th, the Allies leave Pozo Almonte and move towards Agua Santa, reaching it's destination four days later. During this march, the soldiers were haunted by the lack of food and water. The troops marched to Negritos, and thence to Dolores. On the night of the 18th, Gen. Buendía decide to advance to Dolores and engage the Chilean troops posted therecite web |url= http://www.unjbg.edu.pe |author= Basadre, Jorge |title= La verdadera epopeya |accessdate= 2008]

Armies layout

Chilean battle plan and disposition

When a scout group of the Cazadores a Caballo Cavalry Regiment. encountered the marching Allied forces, Colonel Sotomayor - after a bitter discussion with Lt. Col. José Fco Vergara - decided to fortify the position on the top of the San Francisco hill, when the larger number of the Allies represented no advantage whatsoever. Also, the artillery was divided into groups guarded with infantrycite web| url= http://www.geocities.com/blautz_9000/articulos/Dolores.htm |title= Batalla de Dolores |author= Ojeda Frex, Jorge |accessdate= 2008]

The Chilean forces were divided into three groups and deployed as it follows:

On the northern elevation or Dolores hill, and led by the Navales Battalion Commander Col. Martiniano Urriola, the "Buin" 1st Line Regt. of Lt. Col. Luis José Ortiz, the Valparaíso Bn; a six cannon battery guided by Cptn. Roberto Wood and another six mountain cannons led by Cptn. Eulogio Villarealcite book |title= Historia del Ejército de Chile, tomo V |author= Reyno Gutiérrez, Manuel; Gómez Ehrmann, Sergio; Guerrero Yoacham, Cristián |year= 1985 |publisher= Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Chile] .

On the southern edge of the San Francisco hill was set another group commanded by Jose Domingo Amunátegui, Comandant of the 4th Line Regiment, the battalions Atacama and Coquimbo, both led by Col. Juan Martinez and Alejandro Gorostiaga; an eight cannon battery commanded by Sgnt Major Jose Maria de la Cruz Salvo, another six piece battery and 2 Gatling machine guns of Sgnt. Major Benjamin Montoya, this last one set on the southeastern part of this hill.

On the hills San Bartolo and Tres Clavos was deployed the group led by Ricardo Castro, Commander of the 3rd Line Regt, along with a detachment of 50 soldiers from different units, besides some riders of the Cazadores a Caballo Cav. Regt; and two batteries of four cannons each.

Peruvian battle plan and disposition

General Buendía divided his 7.400 troops in three columns. In this plan, Buendía counted on Hilarion Daza's Bolivian troops, but this force after a long and extenouating march, decided to return to Arica.

The three columns were placed under the command of Belisario Suarez, Andres Caceres and Buendia himself. The Suarez' column was formed by the Villamil, Bolognesi and Velarde divisions. This units were composed by the Cazadores de Cuzco Nº5, Cazadores de la Guardia Nº7, Ayacucho, Guardia de Arequipa, Aroma, Vengadores, Victoria and Colquechaca battalions.

Buendia had under his command the Villegas, Bustamante and Davila divisions, formed by the Ayacucho Nº3, Provisional de Lima Nº3, Cerro de Pasco, Puno Nº6, Lima Nº8, Illimani, Olañeta, Paucarpata, Dalance battalions, besides two cavalry squadrons and a six cannon battery.

Finaly, the third column of Caceres was placed on the rear as a reserve.

The battle

The battle started suddenly after a few Bolivian soldiers went to the San Francisco dwell looking for water, and one cannon shot was fired by the Chilean artillery, beginning the battle. Although the Allied officers tried to contain their men, the Peruvian and Bolivian forces attacked in disorder.

Bolivian Gen. Carlos Villegas, with two companies of Puno and Ayacucho battalions, alongside with another two companies of the Illimani and Olañeta battalions started to fire at the Chilean positions causing no damage at all because of the long distance separating them and their enemies. Col. Lavadenz himself with the first company of the Dalance Bn. shortened the distance between them and the Chilean batteries of Amunategui's group, getting close to forty paces away from its objective. Gen Villegas then ordered another Dalance Bn. company to enter into the battle, along with the Lima Nº 8 Bn. and the rest of the Puno Bncite book |title= Las cuatro campañas de la Guerra del Pacífico, Vol. I |author= Machuca, Francisco |year= 1926 |publisher= Imprenta Victoria, Valparaíso] .

Whilst these actions occurred on the Chilean left flank, Gen. Buendia's column headed to Dolores hill, describing a semicircle trying to take the position of Col. Ricardo Castro. Meanwhile as this maneuver was being executed, the Chilean batteries of Frias and Carvallo caught the Allied troops in a heavy cross fire, breaking the Allies formation for a moment. Nevertheless, Buendia's troops reorganized and continued advancing towards its objective, despite the severe loss of men. When the Allied troops got closer, the Chilean infantry posted here - six companies of the 3rd Line Regiment - stopped the attacking forces. Gen Buendia, being shelled from the flank and facing an intense gunfire from the front, retreated until placing his troops out of Chilean fire range.

Villegas, having a part of his troops engaged in battle with Amunategui's forces, advanced with the rest of his soldiers reinforcing Lavadenz and Espinar, and charged against the Sergeant Major Salvo's battery, which was defended only by 56 cannon servants. Salvo spread his troops defending their positions with their rifles, as his soldiers spiked their cannons in an attempt to keep them from falling into Allied hands, waiting for reinforcements.

Two companies of the Atacama Battalion came in Salvo's aid, forcing the enemy to retreat. The attacking forces were rebuilt at hill bottom by another company of the Dalance Bn. and charged again. But this time, another Chilean company of the Coquimbo Battalion reached this position and with the remaining troops of the Atacama Bn. counterattacked this second Allied effort on the hill slope. One last attack took place, but it was rejected once again with a bayonet charge. This time the Allies withdrew definitively.

The Chilean troops didn't chase the Allies in their retreat, staying in their positions at the top of the hill, thinking the Allies would regroup and attack again the next day.

Aftermath

The Chileans lost 208 men between dead and wounded. The Allies had 296 casualties, plus over 3.000 missing troops. This defeat was a very rough blow for the Peruvian Army Southern Command. The remaining troops marched to Tarapacá.

Notes

References

* cite book |title= Las cuatro campañas de la Guerra del Pacífico |author= Machuca, Francisco |year= 1926 |publisher= Imprenta Victoria, Valparaíso

* cite book |title= Historia del Ejército de Chile, Vol. V |author= Reyno Gutiérrez, Manuel; Gómez Ehrmann, Sergio; Guerrero Yoacham, Cristián |year= 1985 |publisher= Estado Mayor General del Ejército de Chile

ee also

* War of the Pacific