Napoleonic tactics

Napoleonic tactics describe certain battlefield strategies used by national armies from the late 18th century until the invention and adoption of the rifled musket in the mid 19th century. Napoleonic tactics are characterized by intense drilling of soldiers, the speedy movement of regiments on a battlefield, combined arms assaults between infantry, cavalry, and artillery, relatively small numbers of cannon, short-range musket fire, and bayonet charges.^[1] Napoleon I is considered by military historians to have been a master of this particular form of warfare. Napoleonic tactics continued to be used after they had become technologically impractical, leading to large-scale slaughters during the American Civil War, Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War.

Infantry Tactics

The infantry was the foundation of Napoleonic tactics, as infantrymen were numerically the largest force on the battlefield in all of the major battles of the era.

The smoothbore, flintlock musket was the standard weapon carried by the vast majority of soldiers. These muskets had scarcely changed since John Churchill, 1st Duke of Marlborough had directed British troops at the Battle of Blenheim in 1704. The flintlock musket had a short effective range for hitting man-sized targets of 50 yards (46 m) to 70 yards (64 m). It was slow to reload compared to modern weapons with highly-trained soldiers able to fire about once every 15–20 seconds until the blackpowder fouled the weapon to the point where it had to be cleaned before it could fire again.

Many of the soldiers on the Napoleonic battlefields were sometimes only kept on it through coercion. To overcome their individual inclination to self-preservation and to provide effective firepower, the infantry regiments fought shoulder-to-shoulder, at least two or three lines deep, firing in volleys. The officers and non-commissioned officers carried swords and halberds which could be used to keep the infantrymen in the firing line. Should a soldier shirk their duty and flee from the field of battle, each army normally had a picket line of cavalry at its rear that could encourage the soldier to return to their regiment. To assist with the command and control of the infantry, each soldier would wear a colorful military uniform that was visible from a distance, even through the clouds of blackpowder smoke that hovered over the Napoleonic battlefields.

Infantry in the battlefield

Most Napoleonic battlefields were made up of farm fields, villages, roads, and streams. Cities, mountains, swamps, and heavy woods were avoided as they were not suited to combat by the forces of the era. Generals normally sought out terrain suitable for their forces, with the Duke of Wellington being particularly noteworthy in this respect as demonstrated at the Battle of Waterloo. The infantry regiments had three primary formations in which they moved and fought. The column formation was narrow and long, suitable for marching down a road or moving quickly towards the enemy across an open field. It was a large target for muskets and cannon, so the regiment would normally change formation as the enemy drew closer. In order to present as many muskets as possible, the line formation was used. It allowed the unit to control a wider portion of the battlefield than a column and to maximize the firepower of the unit. It was composed of two or three solid lines of infantry standing and sometimes kneeling. It was difficult to move the line formation towards the enemy as the long lines would tend to be disrupted by the need to remain solid over long distances. While moving, the regiments in line formation were also vulnerable to disruption from ditches, fences, and trees that were often encountered on the battlefield. Additionally, an infantry line was vulnerable to cavalry charges since the horses could cover the final 50 yards (46 m) while only receiving a single volley of fire from the infantry.

The infantry square was used as protection from cavalry charges. It was 4-6 ranks in depth with a square or rectangular shape in order to not present the rear or sides of the soldiers to cavalry. The unit could move in square, but it was slower than a column. It was vulnerable to musket and cannon fire, so if enemy infantry were a more proximate threat than cavalry, the unit would shift from square to line formation. A fourth formation considered a specialty of the French Army was l'ordre mixte, a mix of line and column used for pressing an attack against enemy infantry. It had some of the "weight" of the column formation for pushing through an opposing line, but some companies in line formation to offset some of the column formation's vulnerability to fire. However this was rarely against the Duke of Wellington, when its use could have changed the outcome of the Peninsular War and the rest of European history.

The light infantry, normally composed of men less than 5 feet, 6 inches in height, would precede their regiment as it approached an enemy unit. Their duty was to harass the enemy with scattered musket fire and to try to force back the enemy's skirmishers attempting to do the same. The light infantry fought as skirmishers, rather than shoulder-to-shoulder, taking advantage of the room between soldiers and all bits of cover to move towards the enemy while firing and reloading. Eventually, the line infantry and grenadier companies of the regiment would overtake the line infantry which would then resume its place in the regimental firing line. The line infantry, typically men 5 feet, 6 inches to 5 feet, 11 inches in height, would normally begin volley fire at ranges of less than 100 yards (91 m). The initial volley was very important as it was the one offering the most visibility and best chance of hitting the enemy. The shock troops of the regiment were the grenadiers, typically men at least 6 feet in height, normally wearing tall headgear such as a bearskin to enhance the effect. They often led a charge or a counter-charge when the fighting was at its most desperate. After some volleys were exchanged, officers would then use their judgement to determine the best time to charge the enemy with the fixed bayonet. After the thunder and casualties of close-range musket fire, the sight of a well-formed infantry unit approaching with bayonets fixed was often too much and a unit would flee the battlefield. As a result of this fear inspired by the shining metal of the bayonet a bayonet charge rarely ever caught much other than the bravest enemy infantry, before the remaining opposition either flees or routs.^[2]

Cavalry Tactics

In this era of warfare, cavalry units had many responsibilities on the battlefield. As they were mounted on horses, they were the fastest-moving forces. They would perform "screening" duties which consisted of identifying the size, strength, and location of enemy forces while trying to prevent the enemy from doing the same.

Cavalry also provided the shock element on the Napoleonic era battlefield, much like a tank in the 20th and 21st centuries. The short effective range, long reload times, and rapid fouling of the smoothbore musket meant that cavalry units could quickly close on infantry units before the horesemen could be overwhelmed with musket fire. Cavalry units were also responsible for fixing enemy forces in place, typically by charging at infantry units which would respond by forming into semi-static "squares". If the infantry unit failed to form square, quite often they would be overrun by the charging cavalry and forced to flee the battlefield en masse. Cavalry units often fought against other cavalry units to essentially neutralize one another. The speed of cavalry units made them capable of surprising enemy forces, especially as these battlefields were often covered in thick smoke generated by the blackpowder muskets, cannon, and howitzer.^[3] Cavalry units also protected generals and marshals since these officers were usually mounted and were likely to move too quickly on the battlefield to be protected by infantry.

Cavalry on the battlefield

Cavalry units required a great deal of logistical support as the horses consumed much forage and would tire quickly galloping in combat. They also were ill-suited for holding terrain as the troopers' smoothbore carbines were very short-ranged and the troopers were primarily trained to fight on horseback. Some of the dragoon units fought both on foot and horseback. Cavalry units were vulnerable to artillery fire as the horses were large targets. Typically when cavalry units would charge artillery, they would suffer many casualties while inflicting few on the artillery in return. The artillery crews would ordinarily fire until the horsemen were nearby and then retreat to the safety of a friendly infantry unit in square. At this point, cavalry were trained to bring along headless nails to "spike" the guns by hammering these nails into the touchhole near the breech of the cannon, thereby rendering it useless on the battlefield.

In popular media

The Battle of Waterloo (June 18, 1815) was depicted in the 1970 movie, Waterloo.

References

1. ^ "Fighting Techniques of the Napoleonic Age 1792– - 1815: Equipment, Combat Skills, and Tactics" by Robert B. Bruce, Iain Dickie, Kevin Kiley, and Michael F. Pavkovic, Published by Thomas Dunne Books, 2008
2. ^ "The Campaigns of Napoleon" by David G. Chandler, Scribner, 1973
3. ^ "Marengo 1800:Napoleon's day of fate (Campaign)" by David Hollins, Osprey Publishing, 2000

External links

• Infantry Tactics During the Napoleonic wars - Musketry