Beagle conflict

The Beagle Conflict was a border dispute between Chile and Argentina over the possession of Picton, Lennox and Nueva islands and the scope of the maritime jurisdiction associated with those islands.

The islands are strategicly located off the south edge of Tierra del Fuego and at the east end of the Beagle Channel. The Beagle channel, the Straits of Magellan and the Drake Passage are the only three waterways between the Pacific ocean and the Atlantic ocean in the southern hemisphere.

After refusing a binding international award giving the islands to Chile, the Argentine junta pushed the controversy to the brink of war in 1978 in order to produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims [See David R. Mares, " [http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GAS_LNGPipelines_SouthernCone.pdf Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone] ", May 2004, Working Paper #29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008] [See Alejandro Luis Corbacho, "Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts", page 6, retrieved 26 August 2008: "When it became clear that the Chileans wanted full acceptance of the [Court of Arbitration] resolution, the Argentine position hardened, and Argentina began to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory"] .

The Beagle conflict is seen as the main reason for Chilean support to the United Kingdom during the Falklands War of 1982 [See [http://www.spyflight.co.uk/chile.htm The Chilean connection] , retrieved on 26 August 2008::"When the Falklands War broke out, Chile still had a long-standing dispute with Argentina over access to the Beagle Channel, making the chance of military co-operation between Britain and Chile a distinct possibility"] .

The conflict began in 1904 with the first official Argentine claims over the islands that have been always under Chilean control. The conflict passed through several status: unknown territories, since 1881 Chilean islands, since 1904 disputed islands, direct negotiations, submitted to a binding international tribunal, direct negotiations again, brinkmanship.

The conflict was resolved through papal mediation and since 1984 Argentina recognizes the islands as Chilean territory. The 1984 treaty resolves also several collateral issues of great importance, including navigation rights, sovereignty over other islands in the Fuegian Archipelago, delimitation of the Straits of Magellan, and maritime boundaries south to Cape Horn and beyond.

Background

For a long time after its first exploration by Europeans, the zone of Patagonia and the Tierra del Fuego-archipelago remained free from colonial settlements because of its inhospitable climate, harsh conditions and sparse local vegetation. After the disaster of Puerto Hambre (1584) during the regency of Philip II of Spain no other attempts of settlements were made in the zone.

On the year 1843 the Chilean government sent an expedition with the appointed task of establishing a permanent settlement on the shores of the Straits of Magellan. The founding act of the settlement of Punta Arenas took place on 21 September 1843.

Argentine Ushuaia was founded by English born Thomas Bridges in 1869.

In 1881, Chile and Argentina attempted to definitively resolve their territorial disputes through a comprehensive agreement known as the Boundary Treaty of 1881. This agreement provided that the border between the two countries would follow:
* (Article I, from north to parallel 52°S) the highest peaks and Drainage divide,
* (Article II, from 52°S to the Straits of Magellan) mainly the parallel 52°S and
* (Article III, south of Straits of Magellan) mainly the meridian 68°34 W and the Beagle channel.

Until 1887 there was no doubt in Argentina and Chile that the islands Picton, Nueva and Lennox belong to Chile::"There can be no doubt that in the immediate post-Treaty period, that is to say from 1881 to at least 1887/88, Argentine cartography in general showed the PNL [Picton, Nueva and Lennox] group as Chilean;" [ See [http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration] , article §148, retrieved on 26 August 2008]

Also the chief of the Argentine exploring commission of the southern territories, Francisco P. Moreno in a memorandum to the British Embassador in Buenos Aires, 1918, saw the Argentine claim as baseless ::"No atino a explicarme por qué el Gobierno argentino pretende hoy soberanía sobre las islas Picton, Nueva, Lennox, etc., fundándose en los tratados vigentes, es decir, en el de 1881 y en el protocolo de 1893, cuando el primero de ellos lo invalida para tal pretensión y el segundo nada tiene que ver con la demarcación en el canal de Beagle. Insisto: la mención en el Tratado de 1881, con excepción de la isla de los Estados, le hará perder un pleito tan malamente planteado … También repetiré que la excepción que hace el Tratado de 1881 con la isla de los Estados, que reconoce como argentina, no permite poner en duda la propiedad chilena de las tierras situadas tanto al sur de la isla de la Tierra del Fuego como al sur del canal de Beagle" [See Fabio Vio Valdivieso,"La mediación de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II", page 111] .:(Transl.:"I can't realize why the Argentine Government claims sovereignty over the islands Picton, Nueva, Lennox, etc., by virtue of the 1881 Treaty and the 1893 Protocol, when the first invalidates its pretension and the second has nothing to do with the demarcation in the Beagle channel. I insist: the mention in the 1881 Treaty, ["] except the Isla de los Estados ["] , will mess up a lawsuit so badly founded … I repeat that the exception in the 1881 Treaty for the Isla de los Estados, that stated as Argentine, does not permit any doubt over the Chilean property of territories located south of the Tierra del Fuego and south of the Beagle channel")

1904 the Argentine government solicited Chile to define jointly which was the deepest arm of the Beagle channel in the zone in order to find the demarcation of the border. On the basis of the international cartography of the zone, the descriptions of the discoverer of the channel, and the discourse of the signer of the 1881 Treaty, Chile initially didn't attach importance to the note [See Sergio Gutiérrez Olivos, "Comentarios sobre el tratado de paz y amistad con Argentina", page 155.] .

The unsolved conflict continued to simmer. During the Snipe Incident, Argentine forces destroyed a Chilean lighthouse on the Snipe islet at the entry of the Beagle Channel installed on 1. May 1958, put up his own and landed marines on the islet, provoking a dangerous buil up. Later both countries agreed to pull back military forces and the lighthouses [See [http://www.argentina-rree.com/13/13-023.htm Algunas cuestiones con los países vecinos] in "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la Repúplica Argentina", retrieved 24 May 2008, in Spanish language:"«Las balizas fueron desmanteladas, estableciéndose que éstas en el futuro no serían de ninguno de los dos países, y se retiraron los infantes de marina.»"] [See also [http://www.mercuriovalpo.cl/prontus4_noticias/antialone.html?page=http://www.mercuriovalpo.cl/prontus4_noticias/site/artic/20080814/pags/20080814235111.html El Mercurio de Valparaíso] , on 17 August 2008, retrieved on 24 September 2008, in Spanish language] .

Beagle Channel Arbitration

In 1971 Chile and Argentina signed an agreement formally submitting the Beagle Channel issue to binding arbitration under auspices of Britain's Queen Elizabeth II. The court that was to decide the controversy was composed of five judges selected by Chile and Argentina from the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The court of arbitration's final decision would be submitted to the British Crown, which was then to recommend acceptance or rejection of the award of the court but not to modify it. On May 2, 1977 the court ruled that the islands and all adjacent formations belonged to Chile. See the [http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf Report and decision of the Court of Arbitration] .

On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the ruling, and attempted via military force to challenge the Chilean commitment to defend the territory, and to coerce Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a maritime boundary consistent with Argentine claims [See David R. Mares, " [http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GAS_LNGPipelines_SouthernCone.pdf Natural Gas Pipelines in the Southern Cone] ", May 2004, Working Paper #29, page 9, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Energy Forum, retrieved on 26 August 2008] .

Direct negotiations

[
thumb|right|100px|Attack_position_of_Argentine_Forces_during_the_Operation Soberania against Chile on 22. Dec. 1978.]

Direct negotiations between Chile and Argentina began after the announcement of the binding arbitration ruling, on 2 May 1977, and ended with the [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/CHL-ARG1979AM.PDF Act of Montevideo] , Uruguay, on 9 January 1979, where both countries accepted papal mediation after Argentina aborted Operation Soberanía.

In the interim, both countries deployed military forces, moving to the brink of open warfare in tandem with a frenzy of diplomatic activity. This was the most dangerous phase of the Beagle Conflict; open warfare seemed a real possibility [See page 7 of Alejandro Luis Corbacho: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1016843 "Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts"] , Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003, retrieved 23 September 2008: "«…There was a real possibility of open warfare…»"]

On 22 December 1978 Argentina initiated Operation Soberanía, an attempt to occupy the islands around Cape Horn, intending to judge from Chile's response whether to advance further. However, the operation was aborted within a few hours because a big storm affected the area of operations.Fact|date=October 2008 Instead, to renew the operation in the next window of opportunity, the junta in Buenos Aires decided to allow the Pope to mediate the dispute through the offices of Cardinal Antonio Samoré, his special envoy.

Papal Mediation

On January 9, 1979 the Act of Montevideo was signed pledging both sides to a peaceful solution and a return to the military situation of early 1977.

1980 Argentina rejected the Pope's proposal (already accepted by Chile).

The detention of prisoners on both sides of the border, the following border closing by Argentina on 28 April 1981, and the Argentine repudiation of the "General Treaty on the Judicial Settlement of Disputes" in January 1982 maintained the danger of war. Six weeks before the Falklands War Argentina provoked the ARA Gurruchaga incident with Chile at Deceit Island [See Newspaper "Convicción", Buenos Aires, 24 February 1982,pages 12 and 13. (Cited in [http://www.cema.edu.ar/ceieg/arg-rree/14/14-057.htm Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores Argentinas] , note 57.)] [See also the article [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/CHILE/CANAL_DE_BEAGLE/LATINOAMERICA/ARGENTINA/Pinochet/ordena/acuartelamiento/tropas/chilenas/conflicto/Argentina/canal/Beagle/elpepiint/19820306elpepiint_4/Tes Pinochet ordena el acuartelamiento de las tropas chilenas por el conflicto con Argentina sobre el canal de Beagle] in Spanish newspaper El País on 06 March 1982, written by J. L. Fermosel in Buenos Aires, retrieved on 26 August 2008::"Los observadores, con quienes coinciden los medios de comunicación social, estiman que la movilización armada se realizó tras comprobarse que la nave de la Armada argentina Francisco de Gurruchaga violó de nuevo la soberanía chilena, desplazándose por el sector de la isla Picton -una de las tres, junto a Nueva y Lennox, que se disputan los dos países en el litigio del Beagle-. En esta oportunidad acompañaban al Gurruchaga otras cuatro embarcaciones."]

The Falklands War

In 1982, Argentina went to war against the United Kingdom in the Falklands War and again both Chile and Argentina deployed their respective militaries to the border [See article [http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/CHILE/ISLAS_MALVINAS/CANAL_DE_BEAGLE/LATINOAMERICA/ARGENTINA/REINO_UNIDO/GUERRA_DE_LAS_MALVINAS_/1982/Chile/teme/Argentina/pueda/repetir/accion/fuerza/canal/Beagle/elpepiint/19820411elpepiint_5/Tes Chile teme que Argentina pueda repetir una acción de fuerza en el canal de Beagle] in the spanish newspaper "El Pais" on 11 April 1982 written by Rafael Urbina in Santiago de Chile, retrieved on 26 August 2008] .

In 1982 Argentina still officially considered Chile an enemy [The "Informe Rattenbach", an Argentine official investigation over the war, confirms that. See §718 part "a" in [http://www.cescem.org.ar/informe_rattenbach/pg055.html Informe Rattenbach] ] . One of the reasons given for the absence of the Argentine Navy and higher numbers of soldiers during the Falklands War was that these forces had to be kept in reserve in case they were needed against Chile. Chile argued that it was not bound to support Argentina against Britain under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance because that treaty was defensive in nature, while Argentina was the aggressor in this case. This stance effectively prevented an Argentine reprisal against Chile after the Falklands War [See Óscar Camilión, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina from 29 March 1981 to 11 December 1981, in his "Memorias Políticas", Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1999, page. 281::"«Los planes militares eran, en la hipótesis de resolver el caso Malvinas, invadir las islas en disputa en el Beagle. Esa era la decisión de la Armada…»":(transl.:"«The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hand, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the (Argentine) navy…»"] Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, "The State, War, and the State of War" Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 052157790X. See also [http://books.google.de/books?id=1ag1riTcc2MC&printsec=frontcover here] On page 160::"Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" accordingto which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed."] See Editorial of Argentine newspaper Rio Negro [http://www.rionegro.com.ar/arch200509/05/n05j10.php En su lógica] by Carlos Torrengo on 01 September 2005 in Spanish Language, retrieved 05 September 2005: :"Chile no ignora que la historia suele pegar brincos insólitos. Argentina -por caso- podía salir airosa del conflicto. Ya por una negociación exitosa para sus intereses, ya por derrotar a los británicos. Si esto sucedía, ¿qué le impediría a Leopoldo Galtieri y compañía apoderarse de las islas del Beagle? ¿O qué los condicionaría a tomar iniciativas de esa naturaleza sobre espacios que, en aquel entonces, eran materia de disputa entre Argentina y Chile?"] See article of Manfred Schönfeld in La Prensa (Buenos Aires) on 2. Juni 1982 about the Argentine Course of Action after the War::"Para nosotros no lo estará [terminada la guerra] , porque, inmediatamente después de barrido el enemigo de las Malvinas, debe serlo de las Georgias, Sandwich del Sur y de todos los demás archipiélagos australes argentinos, ..."All articles of M. Schönfeld in "La Prensa" from 10. January 1982 to 2. August 1982 are in "La Guerra Austral", Manfred Schönfeld, Desafío Editores S.A., 1982, ISBN 950-0205-00-9] . In any event, Anglo-Chilean relations had already deteriorated due to the Sheila Cassidy Affair, the use of British made Hawker Hunter aircraft during the 1973 Chilean coup d'état, and the violations of human rights by the Pinochet regime. During the war Chile provided the UK with "‘limited, but significant information’" [See [http://www.spyflight.co.uk/chile.htm Chilean connection] , retrieved on 26 August 2008] .

Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1984 between Chile and Argentina

Tensions between Argentina and Chile did not subside until the democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín took office in Argentina in December 1983. Still isolated diplomatically due to the War, the Alfonsín administration made great efforts to stabilize the border situation. Without the support of the opposition, Alfonsín called for a national plebiscite on 25 November 1984, and some 80 percent of the Argentine electorate voted to accept the Vatican-mediated compromise: [See article [http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DE7D61638F935A15752C1A962948260 Beagle Channel Treaty Approved in Argentina] in USA newspaper The New York Times, written by United Press International, on 26 November 1984, retrieved on 26 August 2008] :The voting was close only in the territory of Tierra del Fuego, which includes the Argentine sector of the disputed Beagle Channel and many military personnel. The vote there was narrowly in favor of the treaty. On 29 November 1984 Argentina and Chile signed a protocol of agreement to a treaty at Vatican City giving the islands to Chile but maritime rights to Argentina.

Cultural impact

The mountain pass of Puyehue was renamed Cardenal Antonio Samoré Pass for Antonio Samoré, one of the mediators from the Vatican state in the conflict.

Leon Gieco created the song "Sólo le pido a Dios" [See [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=04XLZAKqxJQ youtube] ] ("I only Ask of God") in 1978 as a response to the warmongering in Argentina. Three years later, during the Falklands War, the Argentine junta used the song against the Falklands War after the invasion [See article in [http://www.lanacion.com.ar/archivo/Nota.asp?nota_id=841343 La Nación] , Argentina, 18 September 2006] .

In 2005 the Chilean movie "Mi Mejor Enemigo" (English: "My Best Enemy") was released. The film recreates the story of a simple recruit in late 1978 when both countries were on the brink of war.

Three TV productions about the conflict (in Spanish) focus on Operation Soberanía:
* Chilean Telecast of Televisión Nacional de Chile "Informe Especial", Theme: «El año que vivimos en peligro» ("The year when we lived in danger")
* Chilean Telecast of Corporación de Televisión de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile "annonimos", Theme: «Beagle: La guerra que no fue» ("Beagle: The war that wasn't")
* Argentine Telecast of History Channel: «Operativo Soberanía»

Economic impact

The arms race at both sides of the border after the Argentine Refusal of the decision of the Court of Arbitration caused huge costs for the economy of the countries, until after the Falklands War [See [http://www.caei.com.ar/ebooks/ebook5.pdf Distribución de capacidades en el Cono Sur] , Sabrina Melidoni, Buenos Aires, 2006 (p. 45), retrieved on 26 August 2008.] :
* Costs in Millions of USA Dollars 1979.

Aftermath

The Beagle conflict was argued in legal and juridical terms, although it was eventually resolved as a political compromise.

During the 1990s, under the presidency of Carlos Menem in Argentina and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle in Chile, they resolved almost all of their disputes, e.g. Laguna del Desierto and both countries began to work together both economically and militarily.

A number of prominent public officials in Chile still point to past Argentine treaty repudiations when referring to relations between the two neighbors. [See notes of the Chilean Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza, in [http://www.quepas.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5664_9525990,00.html La Tercera] de Santiago de Chile vom 13. Juli 1998, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Enfatizó que, si bien la situación es diferente, lo que hoy está ocurriendo con el Tratado de Campo de Hielo Sur hace recordar a la opinión pública lo sucedido en 1977, durante la disputa territorial por el Canal de Beagle."] [See notes of Senator (not elected but named by the Armed Forces) Jorge Martínez Bush im [http://www.quepasa.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5664_9511527,00.html La Tercera] de Santiago de Chile vom 26 Juli 1998, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "El legislador expuso que los chilenos mantienen "muy fresca" en la memoria la situación creada cuando Argentina declaró nulo el arbitraje sobre el canal del Beagle, en 1978."] [See notes of the Chilean Foreign Minister Ignacio Walker [http://www.clarin.com/diario/2005/07/22/elpais/p-01901.htm Clarin] de B.A., 22 July 2005, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Y está en la retina de los chilenos el laudo de Su Majestad Británica, en el Beagle, que fue declarado insanablemente nulo por la Argentina. Esa impresión todavía está instalada en la sociedad chilena."] [See also "Reciprocidad en las Relaciones Chile - Argentina" of Andrés Fabio Oelckers Sainz in [http://www.uvm.cl/sitio_iri/monografias2005/RECIPROCIDAD%20EN%20LAS%20RELACIONES%20CHILE%20ARGENTINA%20-%20Andr%E9s%20Oelckers.pdf PDF] , retrieved on 26 August 2008: "También en Chile, todavía genera un gran rechazo el hecho que Argentina declarase nulo el fallo arbitral británico y además en una primera instancia postergara la firma del laudo papal por el diferendo del Beagle"] [See notes of Director académico de la Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Flacso, Francisco Rojas, in Santiago de Chile, in [http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/d000d922.htm La Nación] de Buenos Aires vom 26 September 1997, retrieved on 26 August 2008: "Desde la Argentina, cuesta entender el nivel de desconfianza que hoy existe en Chile a propósito de la decisión que tomó en 1978 de declarar nulo el laudo arbitral"] [See notes of Chilean Defense Minister Edmundo Pérez Yoma im "Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional del Reino de España", apperead in Argentine newspaper [http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/d000d696.htm El Cronista Comercial] , 5 Mai 1997, retrieved on 26 August 2008: " ... Y que la Argentina estuvo a punto de llevar a cabo una invasión sobre territorio de Chile en 1978 ...". These notes were later relativized by the Chilean Government (See [http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/d000d462.htm] [http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/d000d697.htm] )] .

See also

* Falklands War
* Argentina-Chile relations
* Snipe incident

Notes

References

* Beagle Channel Arbitration between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile, [http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf "Report and Decision of the Court of Arbitration"]
* Mark Laudy: [http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/11.pdf "The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis Intervention and Forum Building"] in [http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/frame.htm Words Over War] of Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict.
* Alejandro Luis Corbacho: [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1016843 "Predicting the Probability of War During Brinkmanship Crises: The Beagle and the Malvinas Conflicts"] , Universidad del CEMA, Argentina, Documento de Trabajo No. 244, September 2003
* Rubén Madrid Murúa: [http://www.ejercito.cl/admin/uploads/file_41f0ea4b3b2bd.pdf"La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978"] , Memorial del Ejército de Chile, Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, Spanish Language
* Karin Oellers-Frahm: [http://www.zaoerv.de/39_1979/39_1979_2_b_341_354.pdf "Der Schiedsspruch in der Beagle-Kanal-Streitigkeit"] , Berichte und Urkunden: Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, German Language
* Sergio Gutiérrez Olivos, " [http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_1/doc_1270.html Comentarios sobre el tratado de paz y amistad con Argentina] ", Academia Chilena de Ciencias Sociales, 1985, in Spanish language
* Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: "Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas, La controversia del Beagle". Genf 1979, English and Spanish Language
* Andrea Wagner: "Der argentinisch-chilenische Konflikt um den Beagle-Kanal. Ein Beitrag zu den Methoden friedlicher Streiterledigung". Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt a.M. 1992, ISBN 3-631-43590-8, German Language
* Karl Hernekamp: "Der argentinisch-chilenisch Grenzstreit am Beagle-Kanal". Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, Hamburg 1980, German Language
* Andrés Cisneros y Carlos Escudé, "Historia general de las Relaciones Exteriores de la República Argentina", [http://www.cema.edu.ar/ceieg/arg-rree/14/14-057.htm Las relaciones con Chile] , Cema, Argentina, Buenos Aires. Spanish Language
* Annegret I. Haffa: "Beagle-Konflikt und Falkland (Malwinen)-Krieg. Zur Außenpolitik der Argentinischen Militarregierung 1976-1983". Weltforum Verlag, München/Köln/London 1987, ISBN 3-8039-0348-3, German Language
* Isaac F. Rojas und Arturo Medrano: "Argentina en el Atlántico Chile en el Pacífico". Editorial Nemont, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1979, in spanischer Sprache.
* Isaac F. Rojas, "La Argentina en el Beagle y Atlántico sur 1. Parte". Editorial Diagraf, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Spanish Language
* Carlos Escudé und Andrés Cisneros: "Historia general de las relaciones exteriores de la República Argentina" ( [http://www.cema.edu.ar/ceieg/arg-rree/6/6-090.htm here] ), in spanischer Sprache.
* Fabio Vio Valdivieso: "La mediación de su S.S. el Papa Juan Pablo II", Editorial Aconcagua, Santiago de Chile, 1984, Spanish Language
* Alberto Marín Madrid: "El arbitraje del Beagle y la actitud argentina". 1984, Editorial Moisés Garrido Urrea, id = A-1374-84 XIII, Spanisch Language
* Luis Alberto Romero, "Argentina in the twentieth Century". Pennsylvania State University Press, translated by James P. Brennan, 1994, ISBN 0-271-02191-8
* Divisionsgeneral (a.D.) Juan E. Gugliamelli: "Cuestión del Beagle. Negociación directa o diálogo de armas" (Trans.:"The Beagle-Question, direct Negotiations or Dialog of the Weapons"), in Spanish Language. (Book compiled from articles of Argentine Magazin "Estrategia", Buenos Aires Nr:49/50, enero-febrero 1978, erschienen sind.
* General Martín Antonio Balza und Mariano Grondona: "Dejo Constancia: memorias de un general argentino". Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires 2001, ISBN 9504908136, Spanish Language
* Francisco Bulnes Serrano und Patricia Arancibia Clavel: "La Escuadra En Acción". Chile, Editorial Grijalbo, 2004, ISBN 9562582116, Spanish Language

External links

* Chilean Telecast of Televisión Nacional de Chile "Informe Especial", Theme "El año que vivimos en peligro", (sometimes in [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0T8R46h0DuU YouTube] ), Spanish Language
* Chilean Telecast of Corporación de Televisión de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile "annonimos", Theme: "Beagle: La guerra que no fue", (in [http://de.youtube.com/watch?v=eZD6gNcejOY YouTube] ) in Spanish Language
* Argentine Telecast of Argentine History Channel: "Operativo Soberanía" (in [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6-PfcAxDcQ YouTube] ), Spanish Language
* Special edition of [http://www.emol.com/especiales/tratado_chileargentina/guerra.htm El Mercurio] , Santiago de Chile, 2 September 2005, Spanish Language. There are Interviews with contemporary witness like Ernesto Videla, Jaime Del Valle, Helmut Brunner, Marcelo Delpech und Luciano Benjamín Menéndez. Spanish Language.
* Interview with the (later, in the nineties) Chief Commander of the Argentine Army Martín Balza in [http://www.emol.com/noticias/todas/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=194207 El Mercurio] de Santiago de Chile, 2 September 2005, Spanish Language
* Interview with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Chile's Ambassador in Argentina 1978 to 1982 in [http://www.quepasa.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5714_1663242,00.html La Tercera] , Santiago, Chile, 17 March 2002, Spanish Language
* Interview with Argentine General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez, Commandant of the III Army Corps in [http://www.emol.com/especiales/tratado_chileargentina/entrev_menendez.htm El Mercurio] de Santiago de Chile, (from the Argentine Magazine "Somos"), Spanish Language
* Interview with Pio Laghi, Nuntius in Argentina, 1978, in [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-01001e.htm Clarín] , Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998. Spanish Language
* Interview with the Ambassador of the United States of America in Argentina, Raúl Héctor Castro, in [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-01101e.htm Clarín] Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998, Spanish Language
* Interview with the former Chief of the "Secretaría General del Ejército" (a Think-Tank of the Argentine Army), General Reynaldo Bignone, President of Argentina after the Falkland War, in [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-01102e.htm Clarín] , Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998, Spanish Language
* Article "Cartas desde el Abismo", [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-00701e.htm Clarín] , Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998, Spanish Language
* Article "El belicismo de los dictadores" [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-00401e.htm Clarín] , Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998, Spanish Language
* Article "Beagle: historia secreta de la guerra que no fue" [http://www.ser2000.org.ar/protect/Archivo/d000ce03.htm La Nación] , Buenos Aires, 12. August 1996, Spanish Language
* Article "Historia de la santa mediación" en [http://www.clarin.com/suplementos/zona/1998/12/20/i-00801e.htm Clarín] , Buenos Aires, 20 December 1998, Spanish Language
* [http://www.uvm.cl/sitio_iri/monografias2005/RECIPROCIDAD%20EN%20LAS%20RELACIONES%20CHILE%20ARGENTINA%20-%20Andr%E9s%20Oelckers.pdf Chile-Argentina Relations] , Spanish Language
* [http://www.puc.cl/icp/webcp/img/pdf/defensa/def19.pdf "Toma de decisiones políticas y la influencia de los discursos oficialistas durante el Connflicto del Beagle: Chile - Argentina 1977-1979"] , Spanish Language
* Text of the [http://www.difrol.cl/Paz-Amistad-4.htm "Tratado de Paz y Amistad de 1984"] , Dirección de Fronteras y Límites de Chile, Spanish Language
* Text of the [http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/CHL-ARG1984PF.PDF "Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1984"] , Copy to the United Nations, English Language