CIA activities in Angola

Main article: CIA activities in Africa

Further information: Angolan Civil War, Angola-United States relations, and Reagan Doctrine

As background to the reports of Cuban action, "Castro decided to send troops to Angola on November 4, 1975, in response to the South African invasion of that country, rather than vice versa as the Ford administration persistently claimed. The United States knew about South Africa's covert invasion plans, and collaborated militarily with its troops, contrary to what Secretary of State Henry Kissinger testified before Congress and wrote in his memoirs. Cuba made the decision to send troops without informing the Soviet Union and deployed them, contrary to what has been widely alleged, without any Soviet assistance for the first two months.^[1]

"In a meeting including President Ford, Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director William Colby among others, U.S. intervention in Angola's civil war is discussed. In response to evidence of Soviet aid to the MPLA, Secretary Schlesinger says, "we might wish to encourage the disintegration of Angola.” Kissinger describes two meetings of the 40 Committee oversight group for clandestine operations in which covert operations were authorized: “The first meeting involved only money, but the second included some arms package."^[2] Beginning in 1975, CIA participated in the Angolan Civil War, hiring and training American, British, French and Portuguese private military contractors, as well as training UNITA rebels under Jonas Savimbi, to fight against the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola led by Agostinho Neto.^[3]

John Stockwell commanded the CIA's Angola effort in 1975 to 1976.^[4]

In a meeting including President Richard M. Nixon and Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, Teng referred to an early conversation between Nixon and Mao Zedong regarding Angola. "We hope that through the work of both sides we can achieve a better situation thate. The relatively complex problem is the involvement of South Africa. And I believe you are aware of the feelings of the black Africans toward South Africa." No CIA personnel were present, but this is mentioned in the context of setting US policy toward Angola, where CIA did have covert operations.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger replied, "We are prepared to push South Africa as soon as an alternative military force can be created." Nixon added "We hope your Ambassador in Zaire can keep us fully informed. It would be helpful."

Deng said "We have a good relationship with Zaire but what we can help them with is only some light weapons." To this, Kissinger replied, "We can give them weapons, but what they really need is training in guerilla warfare. If you can give them light weapons it would help, but the major thing is training. Our specialty is not in guerilla warfare (laughter in transcript)?" Deng mentioned that at various times, China had trained all the factions in Angola.^[5]

References

1. ^ Gleijeses,Piero (2003). Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976. University of North Carolina Press. 
2. ^ "US National Security Council Minutes: Angola". June 27, 1975. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses6.pdf 
3. ^ Blum, William (2003). "The Great Powers Poker Game: Angola 1975 to 1980s". Killing Hope. Common Courage Press. ISBN 1-56751-252-6. http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blum/Angola_KH.html 
4. ^ Stockwell, John (1978). In Search of Enemies. WW Norton. 
5. ^ Lord, Winston. "White House Memorandum of Conversation with Chinese Officials, "The Soviet Union; Europe; the Middle East; South Asia; Angola"". George Washington University National Security Archive. National Archives Record Group 59. Records of the Department of State, Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969-1977, Box 373). http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB67/gleijeses4.pdf.