CIA activities in Guyana

Main article: CIA activities in the Americas

CIA activities in Guyana refers to the actions of the United States Central Intelligence Agency in Guyana. Information on the CIA's assessment and actions is limited to 1966 and 1967.

Guyana 1966

A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate focused on Guyana's short term concluded that British Guyana would make a smooth transition to independence, but East Indians and people of African descent might have problems with each other within Guyana's political scene.

{{lquote|British Guiana will probably make a relatively smooth transition to independence, but racial suspicions between East Indians and Negroes will continue to dominate Guyanese politics. If these tensions break out again into violence will depend in large measure on the conduct of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party (the PNC), and of Cheddi Jagan, leader of the Peoples Progressive Party (the PPP)." Burnham's moderate government has kept Jagan's side in control. "...new elections are due by late 1968, and between now and then tensions will rise and may at some point get out of hand. Even after British troops depart in October 1966, Guyanese security forces can probably cope with sporadic violence. If violence got out of control, Burnham would probably call for a return of British troops. If US consent were forthcoming and British troops were available, we believe that London would comply. The governing coalition of Burnham, a professed but pragmatic socialist, and the conservative United Force leader, Peter D'Aguiar, will continue to be a tenuous one. Friction between the partners over patronage and fiscal issues will probably be intensified after independence, but chances are that a common fear of Jagan will hold the coalition together. Guyana's economy will need substantial foreign capital, much of it from the US. The need for aid will keep Burnham on tolerable terms with the US, UK, and Canada, though his administration will incline toward a neutralist posture in foreign affairs. If Jagan came to power, he could, because of his Marxist sympathies and his connections in Communist countries, count on some help from these countries. However, they probably would furnish only token quantities of aid.^[1]

Guyana 1967

A covert action was proposed to the 303 Committee, an oversight committee of United States covert operations, which stated: "It is established U.S. Government policy that Cheddi Jagan, East Indian Marxist leader of the pro-Communist People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, will not be permitted to take over the government of an independent Guyana. Jagan has the electoral support of the East Indians, who are approximately 50% of the total population of Guyana. It is believed that Jagan has a good chance of coming to power in the next elections unless steps are taken to prevent this. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, leader of the majority People's National Congress (PNC) in the coalition, is aware of the problem, and has stated that he is fully prepared to utilize the electoral machinery at his disposal to ensure his own re-election. Burnham has initiated steps for electoral registration of Guyanese at home and abroad.

In a meeting (deleted text) on September 16, 1966, Burnham requested money for various political purposes and outlined his plans to issue identification cards to all Guyanans above the age of 10, and to identify and register all Guyanans of African ancestry in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States in order to get their absentee votes in the next elections.

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Conversely, Burnham acknowledged with a smile, East Indians living abroad may have trouble getting registered and, if registered, getting ballots." and has requested financial assistance [deleted text] for the PNC campaign. It is recommended that he and his party be provided with covert support in order to assure his victory at the polls. At the same time, it is believed that support to Peter D'Aguiar and his United Force (UF), the minority party in the coalition government, is also essential in order to offset Jagan's solidly entrenched East Indian electoral support. It is recommended that the 303 Committee approve the courses of action outlined in this paper at a cost of (deleted text)

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According to an April 10 memorandum for the record, the 303 Committee approved this proposal at its April 7 meeting. (deleted text) emphasized during the Committee's discussion the importance of starting early in the implementation of the proposal.

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Problem: To prevent the election of Cheddi Jagan in the next elections in Guyana. Under the Guyana Constitution, new elections for the National Assembly must take place prior to 31 March 1969, and can take place at any time should the Prime Minister bring about the dissolution of the Parliament. Prime Minister Forbes Burnham of Guyana is aware that the U.S. Government is opposed to Cheddi Jagan's assumption of power in Guyana. He is also acutely conscious of the racial factors in the country which work to Jagan's advantage, and he realizes that he must immediately initiate a vigorous campaign if he is to defeat Jagan.

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He has personally undertaken the task of reorganizing the PNC, which has not functioned in many areas since the last elections. He plans to establish campaign headquarters in Georgetown and other urban areas where the African vote is concentrated, and will also send organizers throughout Guyana to re-enlist PNC supporters who have been inactive in party affairs since the last elections. At the same time, Burnham is sending a trusted political adviser abroad to survey the potential absentee vote which he can expect from Guyanese residing in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the West Indies.

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Burnham believes that he would have great difficulty ensuring his own re-election without support from the U.S. Government. He has requested financial support [deleted] for staff and campaign expenses, motor vehicles, small boats, printing equipment, and transistorized public address systems. He also wishes to contract for the services of an American public relations firm to improve his image abroad and counteract Jagan's propaganda in the foreign press. Since we believe that there is a good likelihood that Jagan can be elected in Guyana unless the entire non-East Indian electorate is mobilized against him, we also believe that campaign support must be provided to Peter D'Aguiar, the head of the United Force (UF) and Burnham's coalition partner. See document for non-redacted parts of plan.[2]

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References

1. ^ "NIE 87.2–66 Guyana(British Guiana)", Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, April 28, 1966, XXXII: 418, NIE 87.2-1966, http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html  421. 1
2. ^ "Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee: Support to Anti-Jagan Political Parties in Guyana", Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana, March 17, 1967, XXXII: 418, http://www.guyana.org/govt/US-declassifed-documents-1964-1968.html