Battle of Fort Eben-Emael

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Battle for Fort Eben Emael
partof=World War II


caption=
date=10 May, 1940 – 11 May, 1940
place=Fort Eben-Emael, near the city of Maastricht in the Netherlands
result=Decisive German victory
combatant1=flagicon|Belgium Belgium
combatant2=flagicon|Nazi Germany Germany
commander1=flagicon|Belgium Major Jean Jottrand
commander2=flagicon|Nazi Germany Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig
strength1=700+
strength2=85
casualties1=24 killed
61 wounded
677 captured Dunstan 2005, p. 57.]
casualties2=6 killed
18 wounded

The Battle of Fort Eben-Emael was a battle between Belgian and German forces that took place on May 10 and May 11, 1940, and was part of the the Battle of the Netherlands during Fall Gelb, the German invasion of the Low Countries and France. An assault force of German "Fallschirmjäger" were tasked with assaulting and capturing Fort Eben-Emael, a Belgian fortress whose artillery pieces dominated several important bridges over the Albert Canal which German forces intended to use to advance into Belgium. As some of the German airborne troops assaulted the fortress and disabled the garrison and the artillery pieces inside it, other airborne troops simultaneously captured three bridges over the Canal. Having disabled the fortress, the airborne troops were then ordered to protect the bridges against Belgian counter-attacks until they linked up with ground forces from the German 18th Army.

The battle was a decisive victory for the German forces, with the German airborne troops landing on top of the fortress via the use of gliders and using explosives and flamethrowers to disable the outer defenses of the fortress. The "Fallschirmjäger" then entered the fortress, killing a number of defenders and containing the rest in the lower sections of the fortress. At the same time, the rest of the German assault force had landed near the three bridges over the Canal, destroyed a number of pillboxes and defensive positions and defeated the Belgian forces guarding the bridges, capturing them and bringing them under German control. The airborne troops suffered heavy casualties during the operation, but succeeded in holding the bridges until the arrival of German ground forces, who then aided the airborne troops in assaulting the fortress a second time and forcing the surrender of the remaining members of the garrison. German forces were then able to utilize the three bridges over the Canal to bypass a number of Belgian defensive positions and advance into Belgium to aid in the invasion of the country.

Background

On 10 May, 1940 Germany launched Fall Gelb, an invasion of the Low Countries. By attacking through the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium, the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht believed that German forces could outflank the Maginot Line and then advance through southern Belgium and into northern France, cutting off the British Expeditionary Force and a large number of French forces and forcing the French government to surrender. [Harclerode, p. 46] To gain access to northern France, German forces would have to defeat the armed forces of the Low Countries and either bypass or neutralize a number of defensive positions, primarily in Belgium and the Netherlands. Some of these defensive positions were only lightly defended and intended more as delaying positions than true defensive lines designed to stop an enemy attack. [Harclerode, p. 46] However, a number of them were of a more permanent design, possessing considerable fortifications and garrisoned by significant numbers of troops. The Grebbe-Peel Line in the Netherlands, which stretched from the southern shore of the Zuider Zee to the Belgian border near Weert, had a large number of fortifications combined with natural obstacles, such as marsh-lands and the Geld Valley, which could easily be flooded to impede an attack. [Tugwell, p. 47] The Belgian defences consisted of one delaying position running along the Albert Canal, and then a main defensive line running along the River Dyle, which protected the port of Antwerp and the Belgian capital, Brussels. This delaying position was protected by a number of forward positions manned by troops, except in a single area where the canal ran close to the Dutch border, which was known as the 'Maastricht Appendix' due to the proximity of the city of Maastricht. The Belgian military could not build forward positions due to the proximity of the border, and therefore assigned an infantry division to guard the three bridges over the canal in the area, a brigade being assigned to each bridge. [Harclerode, p. 47] The bridges were defended by blockhouses equipped with machine-guns, and artillery support was provided by Fort Eben Emael, whose artillery pieces covered each of the three bridges. [Tugwell, p. p. 51] Having become aware of the Belgian defensive plan, which called for Belgian forces to briefly hold the delaying positions along the Albert Canal and then retreat to link up with British and French forces at the main defensive positions on the River Dyle, the German High Command made its own plans to disrupt this and seize and secure these three bridges, as well as a number of other bridges in Belgium and the Netherlands, to allow their own forces to breach the defensive positions and advance into the Netherlands. [Harclerode, p. 48]

Prelude

Belgian Preparation

The Belgian 7th Infantry Division was assigned to guard the three bridges over the canal, supplementing the troops who garrisoned Fort Eben Emael at the time of the battle. [There appears to be some debate over the number of troops garrisoning the Fort at the time of the battle. Harclerode, p. 47, states that there were 1, 185, whilst Lucas, p. 21, writes that 'The Belgian garrison was said to number 2,000 men'. Kuhn, p.29, however, gives a low number of 1, 200 troops.] The bridge defences consisted of four large concrete pillboxes on the western side of the canal per bridge, three equipped with machine-guns and a fourth with an anti-tank gun; the bunker containing the anti-tank gun was positioned close to the road leading from the bridge, with one machine-gun equipped bunker immediately behind the bridge and two others flanking the bridge a short distance either side. [Tugwell, p. 51] A company position existed on the western bank of the canal by each of the bridges, with a small observation post on the eastern side which could be quickly recalled, and all three bridges could be destroyed with demolition charges set into their structures, triggered by a firing mechanism situated in the anti-tank bunkers. [Tugwell, p. 51] Fort Eben Emael, which measured 200 by 400 yards, had been built during the 1930's, and completed by 1935, by blasting the required space out of granite and possessed walls and roofs composed of five feet thick reinforced concrete, as well as four retractable casemates and sixty-four strongpoints. [Harclerode, p. 47] [Kuhn, p. 29]

The Fort was equipped with six 120mm artillery pieces with a range of ten miles, two of which could traverse 360 degrees; sixteen 75mm artillery pieces; twelve 60mm high-velocity anti-tank guns; twenty-five twin-mounted machine-guns; and a number of anti-aircraft guns. One side of the fort faced the canal, whilst the other three faced land and were defended by minefields; deep ditches; a twenty-feet high wall; concrete pillboxes fitted with machine-guns; fifteen searchlights emplaced on top of the Fort; and 60mm anti-tank guns. [Harclerode, pp. 47-48] A large number of tunnels ran beneath the Fort, connecting individual turrets to the command centre of the Fort and the ammunition stores. The Fort also possessed its own hospital and a number of living quarters for the garrison, as well as a power station that provided electricity to power the guns, provide internal and external illumination, and to power the wireless network and air-purifying system used by the garrison. [Lucas, p. 21] Belgian plans did not call for the garrison of the fort and the attached defending forces to fight a sustained battle against an attacking force; it was assumed that sufficient warning of an attack would be given so that the detachment on the eastern side of the canal could be withdrawn, the bridges destroyed and the garrison ready to fight a delaying action. The defending force would then retire to the main defensive positions along the River Dyle, where they would link up with other Allied forces. [Tugwell, p. 51; Harclerode, p. 48]

German Preparation

The airborne assault on Fort Eben Emael and the three bridges it helped protect was part of a much larger German airborne operation which involved the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Airlanding Division. [Harclerode, p. 48] The 7th Air Division, comprised of three parachute regiments and one infantry regiment, was tasked with capturing a number of river and canal bridges that led to the Dutch defensive positions centered around Rotterdam, as well as an airfield at Waalhaven. [Harclerode, p. 48] The 22nd Airlanding Division, which was composed of two infantry regiments and a reinforced parachute battalion, was tasked with capturing a number of airfields in the vicinity of The Hague at Valkenburg, Ockenburg and Ypenburg. Once these airfields had been secured by the parachute battalion, the rest of the division would land with the aim of occupying the Dutch capital and capturing the entire Dutch government, the Royal Family and high-ranking members of the Dutch military. [Harclerode, p. 48] The division would also interdict all roads and railway lines in the area to impede the movement of Dutch forces. The intention of the German OKW was to use the two airborne divisions to create a corridor, along which the 18th Army could advance into the Netherlands without being impeded by destroyed bridges. [Harclerode, p. 48] General Kurt Student, who proposed the deployment of the two airborne divisions, argued that their presence would hold open the southern approaches to Rotterdam, prevent the movement of Dutch reserves based in north-west Holland and any French forces sent to aid the Dutch defenders, and deny the use of airfields to Allied aircraft, all of which would aid a rapid advance by the 18th Army. [Tugwell, p. 48] 400 Junkers Ju 52 transport aircraft would be used to deploy the parachute elements of the airborne troops, as well as transport the elements of the two airborne divisions not landing by parachute or glider. [Tugwell, p. 47]

The force tasked with assaulting the Fort and capturing the three bridges was formed from elements of the 7th Air Division and the 22nd Airlanding Division, and was named Sturmabteilung Koch (Assault Detachment Koch) after the leader of the force, Hauptmann Walter Koch. [Harclerode, p. 51] The force had been assembled in November 1939 and was primarily composed of parachutists from the 1st Parachute Regiment and engineers from the 7th Air Division, as well as a small group of Luftwaffe pilots. [Tugwell, p. 52] Although the force was composed primarily of parachutists, it was decided that the first landings by the force should be by glider. Adolf Hitler, who had taken a personal interest in the arrangements for the assault force, had ordered that gliders be used after being told by his personal pilot, Hanna Reitsch, that gliders in flight were nearly silent; it was believed that, since Belgian anti-aircraft defences used sound-location arrays and not radar, it would be possible to tow gliders near to the Dutch border and then release them, achieving a surprise attack as the Belgian defenders would not be able to detect them. [Tugwell, p. 52] Fifty DFS 230 transport gliders were supplied for use by the assault force, and then a period of intensive training began. A detailed study of the Fort, the bridges and the local area was made, and a replica of the area was constructed for the airborne troops to train in. [Tugwell, p. 52] Joint exercises between the parachutists and the glider pilots wete carried out in the early spring of 1940, and a number of refinements made to the equipment and tactics to be used, such as barbed wire being added to the nose-skids of the gliders to reduce their landing run, and the airborne troops trained with flamethrowers and specialized explosives, the latter of which were so secret that they were only used on fortifications in Germany and not on fortifications in Czechoslovakia similar to Fort Eben Emael. [Lucas, p. 20] Secrecy was also maintained in a number of other ways. When exercises were completed gliders and equipment would be broken down and taken away in furniture vans, the sub-units of the force were frequently renamed and moved from one location to another, unit badges and insignia were removed, and the airborne troops were not permitted to leave their barracks or to take leave. [Lucas, p. 20]

Hauptmann Koch divided his force into four assault groups. Group Granite, under Oberleutnant Rudolf Witzig, comprised of eighty-five men in eleven gliders whose task would be to assault and capture Fort Eben Emael; Group Steel, commanded by Oberleutnant Gustav Altmann, and formed of ninety-two men and nine gliders, would capture the Veldvezelt bridge; Group Concrete, commanded by Leutnant Gerhard Schächt and composed of ninety-six men in eleven gliders, would capture the Vroenhoven bridge; and Group Iron, under Leutnant Martin Schächter, comprised of ninety men in ten gliders, who would capture the Cannes bridge. [Harclerode, p. 51] The crucial element for the assault force, and particularly Group Granite, was time. It was believed that the combination of a noiseless approach by the gliders used by the assault force, and the lack of a declaration of war by the German government, would give the attackers the element of surprise. However, German estimates believed that this would last, at the most, for sixty minutes, after which the superior numbers of the Belgian forces defending the Fort and the bridges, as well as any reinforcements sent to the area, would begin to come to bear against the relatively small number of lightly-armed airborne troops. [Lucas, p. 21] The German plan, therefore, was to eliminate within those sixty minutes as many anti-aircraft positions and individual cupolas and casemates as was possible, and at all costs to put out of action the long-range artillery pieces which covered the three bridges. The destruction of these guns was expected to be completed within ten minutes; within this time the airborne troops would have to break out of their gliders, cover the distance to the guns, fix the explosive charges to the barrels of the guns and detonate them, all while under enemy fire. [ Lucas, p. 21]

The finalized plan for the assault called for between nine and eleven gliders to land on the western bank of the Albert Canal by each of the three bridges just prior to 05:30 on 10 May, the time scheduled for Fall Gelb to begin. [Tugwell, p. 50] The groups assigned to assault the three bridges would overwhelm the defending Belgian troops, remove any demolition charges and then prepare to defend the bridges against an expected counter-attack. Forty minutes later, three Ju-52 transport aircraft would fly over each position, dropping a further twenty-four airborne troops as reinforcements as well as machine-guns and significant amounts of ammunition. [Tugwell, p. 50] Simultaneously, the force assigned to assault Fort Eben Emael was to land on top of the Fort in eleven gliders, eliminate any defenders attempting to repel them, cripple what artillery they could with explosive charges, and then prevent the Garrison from dislodging them. [Tugwell, p. 50] Having achieved their initial objectives of seizing the bridges and eliminate the long-range artillery pieces possessed by the Fort, the airborne troops would then defend their positions until the arrival of German ground forces. [Tugwell, p. 50]

Battle

For reasons of security, Sturmabteilung Koch was dispersed around several locations in the Rhineland until it received orders for the operation against Fort Eben-Emael and the three bridges to begin. Preliminary orders were received on 9 May, ordering the separated detachments to move to a pre-arranged concentration area, and shortly afterwards a second order arrived, informing the assault force that Fall Gelb was to begin at 05:25 on 10 May. [Lucas, p. 22] At 04:30, forty-two gliders carrying the 493 airborne troops that formed the assault force were lifted off from two airfields in Cologne, the armada of gliders and transport aircraft turning south towards their objectives. The aircraft maintained strict radio silence, forcing the pilots to rely on a chain of signal fires that pointed towards Belgium; the radio silence also ensured that senior commanders of the assault force could not be informed that the tow-ropes on one of the gliders had snapped, forcing the glider to land inside Germany. [Lucas, p. 22] Another pilot of a second glider released his tow-rope prematurely, and was unable to land near its objective. [Harclerode, p. 53] Both gliders were carrying troops assigned to Group Granite and were destined to assault Fort Eben Emael, thereby leaving the Group understrength; it also left it under the command of Oberleutnant Witzig's second-in-command, as Witzing was in one of the gliders forced to land. [Lucas, p. 22] The remaining gliders were released from their tow-ropes twenty miles away from their objectives at an altitude of 7,000 feet, which was deemed high enough for the gliders to land by the three bridges and on top of the Fort, and also maintained a steep dive angle to further ensure they landed correctly. [Lucas, p. 22] As the Ju-52's turned away after releasing the gliders, Belgian anti-aircraft artillery positions detected them and opened fire, alerting the defences in the area to the presence of the gliders as well as they came in to land at their designated objectives. [Harclerode, p. 53]

Bridges

All nine gliders carrying the troops assigned to Group Steel landed next to the bridge at Veldwezelt at 05:20, the barbed-wire wrapped around the landing skids of the gliders succeeding in rapidly bringing the gliders to a halt. [Kuhn, p. 29] The glider belonging to Leutnant Altmann had landed some distance from the bridge, and a second had landed directly in front of a Belgian pillbox, which began engaging both groups of airborne troops with small-arms fire. [Kuhn, p. 29] The non-commissioned officer in charge of the troops from the second glider hurled grenades at the pillbox whilst another of his men laid an explosive charge at the door to the pillbox and detonated it, allowing the bunker to be assaulted and removed as an obstacle. Simultaneously, Altmann gathered his troops and led them along a ditch running parallel to the Bridge until two men were able to reach the canal bank and climb onto the girders of the bridge, disconnecting the demolition charges placed there by the Belgian garrison. [Kuhn, p. 29] The airborne troops prevented the bridge from being destroyed, but were still opposed by the rest of the Belgian defenders, who did not give up their positions until the arrival of a platoon of reinforcements forced them to retire to a nearby village. However, two field-guns located some five hundred metres away from the bridge could not be overcome by small-arms fire, forcing Altmann to call for air support in the form of several Junkers Ju 87 Stukas who knocked out the guns. [Kuhn, p. 30]

Ten of the eleven gliders transporting Group Concrete landed next to the Vroenhoven bridge at 05:15, the eleventh glider having been hit by anti-aircraft fire en-route to the bridge and being forced to land prematurely inside Dutch territory. [Kuhn, p. 30] The gliders were engaged by heavy anti-aircraft fire as they landed, causing one of the gliders to be hit and stall in mid-air, severely wounding three airborne troops when it crash-landed, although the remainder of the troops in the gliders emerged unscathed. The rest of the gliders landed without being damaged. [Kuhn, p. 30] One of the gliders landed near to the fortification housing the detonator set for the demolition charges attached to the bridge, allowing the airborne troops inside it to exit and assault the position, killing the occupants and tearing out the wires connecting the explosives to the detonator set, thereby ensuring the bridge could not be destroyed. [Kuhn, p. 30]

The bridges at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven were captured before they could be blown up. However, the bridge at Kanne was blown up and "Sturmgruppe Eisen" was in engaged in heavy combat with Belgian forces that held onto their position.Vliegen 1988, p. 41.]

"Pionierbataillon" 51, which was to relieve the German paratroopers at Eben-Emael, was unable to cross the Albert Canal. They attempted to cross the Canal by rubber raft but were taken under heavy fire from Eben-Emael's battery "Canal-North". The paratroopers on Eben-Emael tried lowering explosive devices on ropes, in an attempt to create a landslide that would block or obscure the crenel and observation post. Some time later a soldier was lowered with a shaped charge.

One German soldier from "Sturmgruppe Eisen"(Kanne) was taken prisoner by the Belgians. He was later freed by German forces at a Allied POW camp at Dunkirk.

Fort Eben-Emael

Nine of the eleven transport gliders landed on Eben-Emael during the initial glider assault. The tow rope of the transport glider of "Oberleutnant" Witzig broke shortly after takeoff near Cologne, and the towing Ju 52 had to avoid a midair collision. The glider pilot "Feldwebel" Pilz managed to land on a field. Witzig ordered his men to cut down the hedges and take down the fences. He himself rode by bicycle, later by confiscated automobile, to the airfield and readied another Ju 52, tow rope and undercarriage.Vliegen 1988, p. 42.] This time the Ju 52 managed to start with the transport glider in tow, and Witzig landed on Eben-Emael at about 8:00 o'clock. "Feldwebel" Wenzel had led the commando unit in the meantime.

A further transport glider, piloted by "Feldwebel" Brendenbeck, was released too early and landed near Düren. This unit marched on foot with the infantry forces across the border and headed for Eben-Emael by themselves. These eight men reached Kanne and took 120 prisoners, but lost "Unteroffizier" Maier killed in action. His deputy commander Pioner Meier, crossed the Canal by himself and established contact with his comrades on Eben-Emael at 12:30. He failed to cross the water trench because of defensive fire from Block II. However he did make it to the entrance of Block I where he tore a Belgian sign from the wall and returned with this souvenir to Kanne.

Every battle group was given a primary objective as well as a secondary of another group if this group was to fail. The priorities were set as follows, in order of highest to lowest priority: eliminating the anti aircraft defences and destroying the observation cupolas and machine gun emplacements. The next objective was to silence the artillery batteries. The third phase included penetration of the bunkers as well as holding the position. Everything had to happen within the first 60 minutes of the assault because of the expected counter attack.The anti-aircraft emplacements were immediately eliminated. The paratroopers captured or destroyed the following positions within the first 10 minutes of the assault: artillery position "Maastricht 1", "Maastricht 2", "Bunker Middle South", "Bunker Middle North", "Block IV" and partially "Cupola South" (this position later fought back)

All of this was achieved by 56 men, seven groups of eight men each, because two other groups were targeted for the northern sector, which was assumed to be heavily defended. These two groups, led by "Unteroffizier" Harlos and Heinemann, however attacked decoy cupolas, thus their contribution was useless, and they hampered other units. During the course of the early morning battle a few Belgian counter attacks were attempted. They all failed in the face of the defensive fire of the paratroopers.

The paratroopers were later targeted by artillery fire from Fort Pontisse, Fort Barchon, and Fort Evegnée, as well as from the Belgian field artillery, but this barrage only interfered with their own counter attacks. The Pontisse position fired roughly 1,000 shells of 105mm caliber, Barchon expended 250 shells of 150mm caliber, Evegnée 40 rounds of 150mm caliber and the field artillery roughly 900 rounds of 105mm and 75mm shells.Vliegen 1988, p. 43.]

The Germans penetrated into "Maastricht 1", "Middle-North" and "Middle-South" and detonated their shaped charges 40m underground on the middle level of the fortress. The paratroopers ran short of water until they were re-supplied by aircraft. The exhausted paratroopers were well protected insight the Belgian bunkers, but were continuously under fire from Belgian artillery fire of various calibers.

Feldweber Portsteffen of "Pionierbataillon" 51 crossed the water trench with a rubber raft at 7:00 am on 11 May. "Block II" was finally put out of action. Now the leading elements of the relief force were able to approach the fortress. One by one they eliminated the different positions. The last positions to cease fire were "Cupola South", "Canal North", "Canal South" and "Visé 2". Fortress Eben-Emael capitulated at 12:30.

Aftermath

After the German victory and the occupation of Belgium, the fort was evaluated for use as an underground factory for the V-1 flying bomb, but production was never undertaken.

After the war, Fort Eben-Emael was made into a museum, and is open for the public visits.

Knight's Cross awarded

* "Oberleutnant" Gustav Altmann on 12 May 1940 as commander of the Assault Group "Stahl"
* "Leutnant" Egon Delica on 12 May 1940 as deputy commander of Assault Group "Granit"
* "Oberarzt" Dr. Rolf Karl Ernst Jäger on 15 May 1940 for his life saving actions in Assault Group "Beton"
* "Hauptmann" Walter Koch on 10 May 1940 as commander of the Koch Parachute Assault Battalion
* "Leutnant" Joachim Meissner on 12 May 1940 as acting commander of the Assault Group "Eisen"
* "Leutnant" Helmut Ringler on 15 May 1940 as leader of a heavy-machine-gun demi-platoon in the Assault Group "Stahl"
* "Leutnant" Gerhard Schacht on 12 May 1940 as a platoon leader in the Assault Group "Beton"
* "Leutnant" Martin Schächter on 12 May 1940 as commander of Assault Group "Eisen"
* "Oberleutnant" Rudolf Witzig on 10 May 1940 as commander of the Assault Group "Granit"
* "Oberleutnant" Otto Zierach on 15 May 1940 as glider pilot in the Koch Parachute Assault Battalion

References in the Wehrmachtbericht

Footnotes

References

*cite book| last=Bekker| first=Cajus| title=The Luftwaffe War Diaries - The German Air Force in World War II| publisher=Da Capo Press, Inc| date=1994 | isbn=0-306-80604-5
*cite book| last=Devlin| first=Gerard M.| title="Paratrooper" - The Saga Of Parachute And Glider Combat Troops During World War II| publisher = Robson Books| date= 1979 | isbn = 0-31259-652-9
*cite book| last=Dunstan| first=Simon| title=Fort Eben Emael. The key to Hitler's victory in the West| publisher=Osprey Publishing| date=2005 | isbn=
*cite book| last=Harclerode| first=Peter| title=Wings Of War – Airborne Warfare 1918-1945| publisher=Weidenfeld & Nicolson| date= 2005 | isbn=0-30436-730-3
*cite book| last=Hooton| first=E.R.| title=Luftwaffe at War; Blitzkrieg in the West| publisher=Chervron/Ian Allen| date=2007| isbn=978-1-85780-272-6
*cite book| last=Kuhn| first=Volkmar| title=German Paratroops in in World War II| publisher=Ian Allen, Ltd| date=1978| isbn=0-711-0759-4
*cite book| last=Lucas| first=James| title=Storming Eagles: German Airborne Forces in World War Two| publisher=Arms and Armour Press| date=1988 | isbn=0-8536-8879-6
*cite book| last=Tugwell| first=Maurice| title=Airborne To Battle - A History Of Airborne Warfare 1918-1971| publisher=William Kimber & Co Ltd| date=1971| isbn=0-71830-262-1
*cite book| last=Vliegen| first=René| title=Fort Eben-Emael| publisher=Fort Eben Emael, Association pour l'étude, la conservation et la protection du fort d'Eben-Emael et de son site A.S.B.L.n° 8063/87| date=1988| isbn=
*cite book| last=Weal| first=John| title=Junkers Ju 87 Stukageschwader 1937 - 41| publisher=Osprey Publishing| date=1997 | isbn=
* "Die Wehrmachtberichte 1939-1945 Band 1, 1. September 1939 bis 31. Dezember 1941" (in German). München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, 1985. ISBN 3-423-05944-3.

External links

* [http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/?author_id=227 Saunders, Major Tim] . " [http://www.pen-and-sword.co.uk/?product_id=894 Fort Eben Emael 1940] ". Pen and Sword Books Ltd, 2005. ISBN 9781844156177
* [http://www.fort-eben-emael.be/home.php?lang=en Eben-Emael visitor center]
* [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OZK4oxRNK4Y German propaganda footage of Fort Eben-Emael after the battle]