Abu Faraj al-Libbi

Abu Faraj al-Libi ( _ar. ISI] on May 2, 2005, in Mardan (30 miles north of Peshawar). Finding al-Libi was a joint effort of the United States and Pakistan. He is now in American military custody in the Guantanamo Bay detention campc] , having previously been held at some secret location [http://edition.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/09/06/bush.speech/index.html Bush: CIA holds terror suspects in secret prisons] , "CNN", 7 September 2006] .

In approximately 2000, he was living in the Karte Parwan district of Kabul, Afghanistan.Shephard, Michelle, "Guantanamo's Child", 2008.]

In August 2004 Pakistani officials stated that al-Libbi (also known as Abu Faraj Farj) had become "number three" in al-Qaeda as "director of operations", a rôle once filled by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1093049611255_6/?hub=TopStories Al Qaeda has new operational chief: analysts] , "CTV", 20 August 2005] [http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5774446/ Hunt on for bin Laden's latest No. 3 man - US Security] , "MSNBC", 7 September 7 2004] . Upon al-Libbi's arrest U.S. and Pakistani authorities continued to claim him as the third most important figure in al-Qaeda.

According to the BBC and VOA reports, he was riding pillion on a motorbike when he and his driver were ambushed by Pakistani agents, some of whom were wearing burqas. A VOA reporter from Mardan said that while being apprehended, al-Libbi tried to destroy a notebook, which U.S. officials are now trying to decode. The events leading up to the ambush began with US agents intercepting a mobile phone call made by al-Libbi. They zeroed in his location to a busy road a quarter of a mile away on the outskirts of Mardan, about 75 miles northwest of Islamabad, and tipped-off Pakistani authorities. Plainclothes Pakistani agents arrived in Mardan and hung out, waiting for him to arrive.

Abi Faraj al-Libbi was named by Pakistani authorities as the main planner of the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot [http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1851859,00.html Pakistan says al-Qaida link to plot found] ", Duncan Campbell, "The Guardian", 17 August 2006] . He is also a suspect in two assassination attempts against Pakistani President General Pervez Musharrafc] . According to the "New York Times", "Mr. Libbi's suspected accomplice in those attacks was a well-known Pakistani militant named Amjad Hussain Farooqi, who was also implicated in the murder of the Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in February 2002. Mr. Farooqi was killed last September in a shootout with security forces in southern Pakistan." [http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/international/asia/05pakistan.html?pagewanted=2 Pakistan Reports Arrest of a Senior Qaeda Leader] , "New York Times", 5 May 2005] . The importance of al-Libi in the ranks of Al-Qaeda and Taliban can also be judged from the fact that as soon his story of arrest was aired on VOA, the correspondent received death-threats from the local Taliban network in Mardan which was so far running underground.

In the early reporting of this capture, there was some confusion between Abu Faraj al-Libbi and another wanted al-Qaeda fugitive Anas al-Liby [http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=741525&page=1 Security Sources: The U.S. Confused "Abu Anas" with "Abu Faraj" al Libi] , ABC News, 5 March 2007] . "Al-Libi" is not a surname, but an adjective, meaning "the Libyan". Such adjectives of nationality are used in nicknames, and sometimes to resolve ambiguity; they often admit several alternative English transliterations.

CSRT-No [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10017.pdf#1 Redacted transcript (.pdf)] , from Abu Faraj al-Libbi's "Combatant Status Review Tribunal" - pages 1-8, March 9 2007] His Summary of Evidence memo was dated February 8 2007.cite web
url=http://www.defenselink.mil/news/ISN10017.pdf#1
title=Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Al Libi, Abu Faraj
date=8 February 2007
pages=page 1
author=OARDEC
publisher=United States Department of Defense
accessdate=2008-01-05]

:"'The following facts support the determination that the detainee is an enemy combatant.::

The transcript for al-Libbi was eight pages long. It said that he did not choose to attend his Tribunal. The first two pages of the transcript were consumed with Tribunal's officers swearing oaths, and the reading out of the Tribunals mandate and authority. He did dictate a statement to be read to his Tribunal.

After discussing the nature of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal with his Personal Representative Al Libbi decided not to attend his Tribunal. According to Al Libbi's Personal Representatitive Al Libbi: "...decided that his freedom is far too important to be decided by an administrative process and is waiting for legal proceedings." — When asked to explain, his Personal Representative paraphrased Al Libbi: "Uh once questions were answered in regards to what was taking place and his representation; he decided to abstain from attending."

tatement

Abu Faraj al-Libbi asked his Personal Representative to read the following statement to his Tribunal:

Mr. President and board sic members of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal; I Mustafa Al Libi thank you for your time. It is my opinion the forming of this Tribunal is a good initial step towards justice and righteousness. I was informed by my Personal Representative that this Tribunal is purely a military administrative procedure and is not based on the Judicial Procedure of the United States. In regards to this issue I offer the following:
*This Tribunal should have been a procedure in accordance with the Judicial Procedure of the United States. I have been held by the United States for over two years without any indication of how the judicial system is going to deal with my situation. This is a very long period of time without being subject to a court of justice.
*The handling and reviewing or determining of my Enemy Combatant status and legality of my detainment by the United States is a judicial matter and not administrative as described in the Combatant Status Review Tribunal are incomplete for the following reasons:
**No lawyer, either assigned to the detainee or by the detainee's choosing, has been made available to the detainee to assist in determining the nature of the evidence against him, its legality and its validity as evidence. The detainee needs legal guidance as to what kind of testimonies and statements are enough to refute the evidence presented against him.
**The lack of protections against detention or other legal or administrative actions make it impossible for me to produce any witnesses in my defense. For example the definition of Enemy Combatant includes the verbiage "supporting the Taliban or al Qaida forces, or associated forces". If I am classified as an Enemy Combatant, it is possible that the United States will deem my witnesses are Enemy Combatants and judicial or administrative action may be taken against them. It is my opinion the detainee is in a lose-lose situation.
**If not classified as an Enemy Combatant the detainee may not get released immediately. I was informed by my Personal Representative that the detainee would be released once arrangements could be made. This means from military custody. It is possible the detainee would still be retained by the United States.
**If the detainee is classified as an Enemy Combatant, he won't be transferred directly to the United States Judicial System but will remain under supervision of the Military. He will then meet the Annual Review Board indefinitedly to review the detention status.

Mr. President and members of the board sic, to summarize, I don't find myself attending the Tribunal unless the above mentioned factors are resolved such as being represented by a lawyer and legal protection for myself or my witnesses. I am extremely keen to exercise my rights fully according to the law of the United States.

This process, the processes associated with my detention are extremely important to me and my family and could prove detrimental to our well being. I am not prepared to have this matter linked to a mere "administrative procedure" where I don't fully understand the ramifications and extent of the process.

Finally, I do not believe the Combatant Status Review Tribunal process is a complete process. The United States Government is fully represented while I have not been given the same opportunities. Mr President and members of the board sic, thank you for your attention and consideration during my statement.

I affirm that these words are my words and truth as I know it, signed and dated.

References

External links

* [http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/09/19/walq19.xml Al Qa'eda third in command 'is running terror cells in the UK'] , "Daily Telegraph", September 19 2004
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2780525.stm Who's who in al-Qaeda] , "BBC news", August 19 2005
* [http://msnbcmedia3.msn.com/j/msnbc/Components/Photos/050504/050504_abunew_vsml_8a.widec.jpgPress handout photo of Abu Faraj al-Libbi] shortly after his capture, from the Pakistan Interior Ministry; photo at MSNBC