Amagasaki rail crash

infobox rail accident


Aftermath of the Amagasaki rail crash.
title= Amagasaki rail crash
JR福知山線脱線事故
date= 25 April, 2005, 09:18 local time
location= Amagasaki, Hyōgo Prefecture, near Osaka
coordinates= coord|34|44|29.3|N|135|25|35.7|E|region:JP_scale:10000|display=inline,title
line = Fukuchiyama Line (JR Takarazuka Line)
cause= Driver error (overspeeding)
trains= 1
pax= Approx. 700
deaths= 107
injuries= 555The Amagasaki rail crash occurred on 25 April, 2005 at around 09:18 local time (00:18 UTC), just after the local rush hour. The Rapid Service came off the tracks on the West Japan Railway Company (JR West) Fukuchiyama Line (JR Takarazuka Line) in Amagasaki, Hyōgo Prefecture, near Osaka, just before Amagasaki Station on its way for Dōshisha-mae via the JR Tozai Line and the Gakkentoshi Line (a seven-car commuter train), and the front two carriages rammed into an apartment building. The first carriage slid into the first floor parking garage and as a result took days to remove. Of the roughly 700 passengers (initial estimate was 580 passengers) on board at the time of the crash, 106 passengers, in addition to the driver, were killed and 555 others injured. Most passengers and bystanders have said that the train appeared to have been travelling too fast. The incident was Japan's most serious since the 1963 Yokohama rail crash in which two passenger trains collided with a derailed freight train, killing 162 people.

Cause

Investigators have focused on speeding by the twenty-three-year-old driver, Ryūjirō Takami (who was among the dead), as being the most likely cause of the accident. It is claimed that he overshot the last station on the line before the wreck, causing a ninety second delay. Investigators speculate that the driver may have been attempting to make up this lost time by increasing the train's speed beyond customary limits. Many reports from surviving passengers indicate that the train was travelling faster than normal. In mid-2004, the same driver had been reprimanded for overshooting a station by one hundred meters.

The Japanese culture is quite strict when it comes to punctuality, with commuters often depending on near-perfect timing on the part of trains to commute to and from work on time. This is because at stations (including the train's next scheduled stop, Amagasaki Station) trains meet on both sides of the same platform to allow people to transfer between express and local trains running on the same line. As a result, a small delay in one train can significantly cascade through the timetable due to the tightness of the schedule. Immediately after the rail crash occurred, some of the mass media pointed to the congested schedule of the Fukuchiyama Line as an indirect factor. In fact, cumulative changes over the previous three years had reduced the leeway in the train's schedule from 71 to 28 seconds over the 15 minutes between Takarazuka and Amagasaki stations.

Drivers face financial penalties for lateness as well as being forced into harsh and humiliating "retraining" programs. [ [http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20050723a7.html 1,182 'retraining sessions' at JR West | The Japan Times Online ] ] The final report concluded that the system "Nikkin Kyoiku" was the most probably cause of incident. [ [http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070629a5.html JR, train driver faulted in final report on crash | The Japan Times Online ] ]

The speed limit on the segment of track where the derailment happened was 70 km/h (43.5 mph). A data recorder in the rear of the train (the rear cars were quite new and equipped with many extra devices) later showed that the train was moving at 100 km/h (62 mph) at that point, but investigators estimate that the train would have had to be going approximately twice the speed limit (140 km/h or 87 mph) to spontaneously derail, which is faster than the carriages were capable of propelling themselves. At least one report has suggested investigators examined the possibility there were stones on the line.

Japanese building codes currently do not regulate the distance between train lines and residential buildings due to high confidence in the engineering of the rail system. Railway lines often pass close to residential buildings in metropolitan areas.

Aftermath

Amongst other things, the Ministry of Land and Transportation asked all railway companies to update their automatic stopping systems so that trains brake automatically to slow down as they approach sharp curves.

It is believed that a contributing factor in the accident was the JR West policy of schedule punctuality. As a result of this, Masataka Ide, JR West adviser who played a major role in enforcing the punctuality of the company's trains, announced that he would resign in June 2005 at the company's annual shareholder meeting, with the company's chairman and president resigning in August.

The section where the crash occurred, between Amagasaki and Takarazuka stations, was re-opened for service on June 19, 2005. The speed limits were reduced for the straight and curved rail sections around the accident site, formerly 120 km/h (straight zone) and 70 km/h (curved zone), currently 95 km/h (straight zone) and 60 km/h (curved zone).

According to the investigations carried out by the Hyōgo Prefecture police, out of the 107 deaths, at least forty three (twenty seven men, sixteen women), including the driver, were in the first car, at least forty five (22 men, twenty three women) were in the second car and at least one was in the third car. This information was determined by questioning 519 of the approximately 550 injured passengers.

On December 26 2005, Takeshi Kakiuchi officially resigned from the presidency of JR West in a move that is intended to take responsibility for the accident. Kakiuchi's successor was Masao Yamazaki, who previously served as the railway's vice president, based in Osaka. While Kakiuchi's resignation came a day after another serious accident on JR East, officials at the railway did not make any explicit connection between the recent accident and the resignation.

Although a number of senior officials resigned their posts with JR West, ostensibly in order to take responsibility for the accident, many were later given senior positions with affiliated companies.

A 2008 "The Daily Yomiuri" article stated that survivors of the disaster still faced physical and mental health issues. [" [http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/20080421TDY02309.htm '05 JR West crash victims, families still suffer effects] ." "The Daily Yomiuri".]

Similar accidents

Too fast around sharp curve

* Malbone Street Wreck, 1918 in New York - 98 people killed - too fast around sharp curve.
* Salisbury rail crash, 1906 - 28 killed - too fast around sharp curve.
* Sutton Coldfield train disaster, 1955 - 17 killed - too fast around sharp curve.
* Camp Mountain train disaster, 1947 - 16 killed - too fast (40 mph) around 20 mph curve
* Bruehl train disaster, 2000 - 9 killed - too fast at a turnout in a construction zone at Bruehl station, Germany.
* Waterfall train disaster, 2003 - 7 killed - too fast around sharp curve.
* Morpeth rail crashes, 1969, 1984, 1994 - a total of 6 killed in three separate accidents - too fast around sharp curve at Morpeth, UK.
* Eltham Well Hall rail crash, 1972 - 6 killed - too fast (65 mph) around 20 mph curve.
* Rosedale train crash, 2004 - Australia

Failure to check speed after stop and proceed

* Glenbrook train disaster, 1999 - 7 killed

See also

* List of rail disasters

References

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