Cox v. New Hampshire

Cox v. New Hampshire
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued March 7, 1941 Decided March 31, 1941
Full case name	Cox, et al. v. State of New Hampshire
Holding
Court membership
Chief Justice Charles E. Hughes Associate Justices James C. McReynolds Harlan F. Stone · Owen J. Roberts Hugo Black · Stanley F. Reed Felix Frankfurter · William O. Douglas Frank Murphy

Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941),^[1] was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that, although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech, it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech for the public safety. Also, that every parade or procession on public streets had to have a license and organizers had to pay a fee.

Sixty-eight Jehovah's Witnesses had assembled at their church and divided into smaller groups that marched along sidewalks, displaying signs, and handing out leaflets advertising a meeting. During the march, groups of 15 to 20 people marched in single file down sidewalks in the district, interfering with normal foot travel.

In 1941, all 68 Jehovah's Witnesses were convicted in a New Hampshire municipal court for violating a state statute which prohibited parades and processions on public streets without a license. The defendants claimed that their First Amendment rights were violated including their rights to freedom of worship and freedom of assembly.

Decision of the Court

The Court unanimously upheld the convictions of the Jehovah's Witnesses for engaging in a public parade without a license. With Chief Justice Hughes writing the majority opinion, the Court declared that the ordinance was a reasonable police regulation designed to promote the safe and orderly use of public streets:

Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestrained abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.^[2]

The Court also ruled that the government has an interest in knowing about parades ahead of time so that it can arrange proper security and policing - regardless of the political or religious content of the message of the parade. Thus the government is justified in taking into account the time, manner, and place of a proposed parade in order to determine whether a license may be granted or denied. Further, the license fee did not amount to a fee or tax upon the views expressed in a parade; rather, it was an administrative fee that was needed to cover the extra costs borne by the community when parades occur. The Court thus rejected the claim that the licensing fee infringed on anyone's right to assemble saying, "(n)o interference with religious worship or the practice of religion in any proper sense is shown, but only the exercise of local control over the use of streets for parades and processions."^[3]

Effects of the decision

Prior to the decision in Cox, the U.S. Supreme Court had struck down, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, numerous ordinances imposing permit requirements on expressive activity in public places, such as streets and parks, because the ordinances gave government officials unlimited discretion whether to issue the permits. After Cox, local governments were allowed to regulate competing uses of public forums by using a permit scheme to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on those wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally.

The decision established the right of local governments to require a permit to conduct a parade or procession upon a public street. However, permit decisions had to be made according to uniform, nondiscriminatory standards based upon public convenience and safety to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. Because governments face greater costs in policing and overseeing parades, they are allowed to pass some expenses on to the groups conducting the events - and hence also have some regulatory power over the events.

Requiring licenses was thus found to be entirely consistent with also allowing time and place restrictions to prevent a public inconvenience. Validating permit requirements for parades meant that local governments received advance notice of parades allowing them the opportunity to plan policing activities to minimize disorder and inconvenience to passersby.

In addition, Cox allowed local governments to give a different degree of protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to those who communicated ideas by patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets and highways and those who communicated ideas by pure speech. Permit systems were deemed constitutionally valid so long as the discretion of the issuing official was limited to questions of times, places, and manners, and was not based on the content of the message. The reasonable time, place and manner restriction of Cox was subsequently applied to government attempts to regulate a wide range of religious, social, economic, and political activity.

See also

• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 312

References

1. ^ 312 U.S. 569 Full text of the opinion courtesy of Findlaw.com.
2. ^ 312 U.S. 569, 574
3. ^ 312 U.S. 569, 577

External links