- Acoustic cryptanalysis
Acoustic cryptanalysis is a
side channel attack which exploitssound s, audible or not, produced during a computation or input-output operation by computer workstations, impact printers, or electromechanical cipher machines.History
Victor Marchetti and John Marks eventually negotiated the declassification of CIA acoustic intercepts of the sounds of cleartext printing from encryption machines.citation
first1 = Victor | last1 = Marchetti | first2=John | last2 = Marks
title = The CIA and the Craft of Intelligence
year = 1973] Technically this method of attack dates to the time of FFT hardware being cheap enough to perform the task -- in this case the late 1960s to mid-1970s. However, using other more primitive means such acoustical attacks were made in the mid-1950s.In his book "
Spycatcher ", formerMI5 operativePeter Wright discusses use of an acoustic attack againstEgypt ian Hagelin cipher machines in1956 . The attack wascodename d "ENGULF".citation
title = Spycatcher: The candid autobiography of a senior intelligence officer
first1=Peter | last1=Wright | authorlink = Peter Wright
year = 1987
publisher = Viking]Known attacks
In
2004 , Dmitri Asonov and Rakesh Agrawal of theIBM Almaden Research Center announced thatcomputer keyboard s and keypads used ontelephone s andautomated teller machine s (ATMs) are vulnerable to attacks based on differentiating the sound produced by different keys. Their attack employed a neural network to recognize the key being pressed.By analyzing recorded sounds, they were able to recover the text of data being entered. These techniques allow an attacker using
covert listening device s to obtainpassword s,passphrase s,personal identification number s (PINs) and other security information.In 2005, a group of UC Berkeley researchers performed a number of practical experiments demonstrating the validity of this kind of threat.citation
url = http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2005/09/14_key.shtml
title = Researchers recover typed text using audio recording of keystrokes
first = Sarah | last = Yang
date = 14 September 2005
journal = UC Berkeley News]Also in 2004,
Adi Shamir and Eran Tromer demonstrated that it may be possible to conducttiming attack s against a CPU performing cryptographic operations by analysis of variations in its humming noise.citation
url =http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/
title = Acoustic cryptanalysis:On nosy people and noisy machines]
first1 = Adi | last = Shamir | first2 = Eran |last2 = Tromer]Countermeasures
If you generate sounds that are in the same spectrum and same form as keypresses, this kind of cryptanaysis can be defeated. If you replay sounds of actual keypresses, it may be possible to totally defeat such kinds of attacks. It is advisable to use at least 5 different recorded variations (36 x 5 = 180 variations) for each keypress to get around the issue of FFT fingerprinting.citation
title = Keyboard Acoustic Emanations
first12 = Dmitri | last1 = Asonov | first2 = Rakesh | last2 = Agrawal
organization = IBM Almaden Research Center
year = 2004
url = http://rakesh.agrawal-family.com/papers/ssp04kba.pdf]ee also
*
TEMPEST
*ACOUSTINT References
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