Vance v. Terrazas

SCOTUSCase
Litigants=Vance v. Terrazas
ArgueDate=October 30
ArgueYear=1979
DecideDate=January 15
DecideYear=1980
FullName=Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State v. Laurence J. Terrazas
USVol=444
USPage=252
Citation=100 S. Ct. 540; 62 L. Ed. 2d 461
Prior=Terrazas v. Vance, 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978)
Subsequent=Terrazas v. Muskie, 494 F.Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981)
Holding=Loss of U.S. citizenship requires a showing of intent to surrender citizenship. Intent may be expressed in words or inferred from conduct. Congress has power to prescribe the standard of proof in loss-of-citizenship proceedings, but the mere performance of an act designated by statute as being expatriating cannot by itself constitute conclusive proof of intent.
SCOTUS=1975-1981
Majority=White
JoinMajority=Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist
Concurrence/Dissent=Marshall, Stevens
Dissent=Brennan, Stewart
LawsApplied=U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV; Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

"Vance v. Terrazas", 444 U.S. 252 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court decision that established that a United States citizen cannot have his or her U.S. citizenship taken away without proof, by a preponderance of evidence, that he or she acted with an intention to relinquish that citizenship.

Facts

Laurence Terrazas was born in the United States in 1947. Since his father was Mexican, Terrazas held both U.S. and Mexican citizenship at birth.

While a university student in Mexico in 1970, Terrazas applied for a certificate of Mexican nationality. As part of his application, Terrazas signed a statement renouncing "United States citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United States of America."

During subsequent discussions with an American consular official, Terrazas gave conflicting answers as to whether or not he had truly intended to abandon his rights as a U.S. citizen when he applied for his certificate of Mexican nationality. The State Department eventually concluded that he had lost his U.S. citizenship—a decision which Terrazas appealed, first before the State Department's board of appellate review, and subsequently to the courts.

Issue

Before the 1967 Supreme Court ruling in "Afroyim v. Rusk," U.S. law had provided for numerous ways for U.S. citizens to lose their citizenship. In its "Afroyim" ruling, the Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment barred Congress from revoking anyone's U.S. citizenship without their consent. Specifically, the court held that a law automatically revoking the U.S. citizenship of anyone who had voted in a foreign election was unconstitutional and unenforceable.

However, U.S. law continued after "Afroyim" to list several "expatriating acts," the performance of any of which would result in automatic loss of citizenship. The government took the position that performance by a U.S. citizen of an action which Congress had designated as an expatriating act would conclusively and irrebuttably demonstrate (as required by the "Afroyim" ruling) an intent on the person's part to voluntarily relinquish his or her U.S. citizenship.

Terrazas argued not only that his action in applying for a Mexican nationality certificate (including the signing of a formal renunciation of U.S. citizenship) could not be taken as proof of his actual intent to give up his U.S. citizenship, but also that the Supreme Court's ruling in "Afroyim v. Rusk" denied Congress the ability to set a standard of proof in such cases and allowed revocation of his citizenship only if the government could prove by "clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence" that he had intended to relinquish it.

The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Terrazas' favor, holding that according to "Afroyim v. Rusk," Congress had no power to legislate any evidentiary standard for proving Terrazas' intent to relinquish his citizenship that fell short of a requirement of proof by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. The Secretary of State appealed this ruling to the Supreme Court, questioning not only the appellate court's finding on the required standard of proof, but also challenging the finding that a separate intent to give up citizenship was required (as opposed merely to the performance of a designated expatriating act).

Majority opinion

A 5-to-4 majority of the Supreme Court held, first, that it was not enough for the government to prove "the voluntary commission of an act, such as swearing allegiance to a foreign nation, that 'is so inherently inconsistent with the continued retention of American citizenship that Congress may accord to it its natural consequences, i. e., loss of nationality.'" [With only rare exceptions, none of which applied to Terrazas, U.S. "nationality" and U.S. "citizenship" are the same thing.] Rather, the court held that its 1967 ruling in "Afroyim v. Rusk" "emphasized that loss of citizenship requires the individual's 'assent,' . . . in addition to his voluntary commission of the expatriating act" — and that "the trier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not only voluntarily committed the expatriating act prescribed in the statute, but also intended to relinquish his citizenship." On this point, the Supreme Court agreed with the 7th Circuit ruling in Terrazas' favor.

The majority then turned its attention to the question of a standard of proof in loss-of-citizenship cases. Terrazas had argued — and the 7th Circuit had agreed — that the 14th Amendment, as interpreted in "Afroyim," had left Congress without any constitutional authority to set the standard of proof for intent to relinquish citizenship at a level any lower than one of clear and convincing evidence. The Supreme Court majority rejected this claim and held that Congress was within its rights to specify a standard of preponderance of evidence when cases alleging loss of U.S. citizenship were involved.

Finally, the Supreme Court majority upheld the validity of another aspect of the law as enacted by Congress — namely, that it was all right for the government to assume that a potentially expatriating act was performed voluntarily, and that any claim that a person had acted under duress was up to the person involved to establish by preponderance of evidence.

The Supreme Court did not explicitly rule on whether or not Terrazas had lost his U.S. citizenship; rather, it remanded the case back to the original trial court (a Federal District Court in Illinois) for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling.

Minority opinions

The four justices who disagreed with the majority filed three separate dissenting opinions.

Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected the majority's decision that an intent to give up U.S. citizenship could be established by a preponderance of evidence. Arguing that "the Court's casual dismissal of the importance of American citizenship cannot withstand scrutiny", he said he "would hold that a citizen may not lose his citizenship in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that he intended to do so."

Justice John Paul Stevens also argued that "a person's interest in retaining his American citizenship is surely an aspect of 'liberty' of which he cannot be deprived without due process of law," and that "due process requires that a clear and convincing standard of proof be met" in Terrazas' case or others like it. Additionally, Stevens felt that Congress had not adequately addressed the question of specific intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship. "Since we accept dual citizenship," he wrote, "taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign government is not necessarily inconsistent with an intent to remain an American citizen. Moreover, as now written, the statute cannot fairly be read to require a finding of specific intent to relinquish citizenship." Stevens disagreed with the court majority's holding that Congress had required proof of specific intent, as required by "Afroyim."

Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., and Potter Stewart argued that since Terrazas was born a dual national, his having taken an oath of allegiance to Mexico was not in any way inconsistent with his also being a citizen of the U.S. In Brennan's words: "The formal oath adds nothing to the existing foreign citizenship and, therefore, cannot affect his United States citizenship." Brennan argued, in addition, that since "Congress has provided for a procedure by which one may formally renounce citizenship" before U.S. consular officials — a procedure which it was conceded by all that Terrazas had not availed himself of — Terrazas was still a U.S. citizen.

Effect

After receiving Terrazas' case back from the Supreme Court on remand, the district court again ruled that Terrazas had lost his U.S. citizenship. [Terrazas v. Muskie, 494 F.Supp. 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Note that, by this time, there was a new Secretary of State — Edmund Muskie — replacing Cyrus Vance as the government's party to the case.] On subsequent appeal, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed its earlier decision and — this time using a preponderance-of-evidence standard per the instructions of the Supreme Court — ruled against him, finding this time that there was "abundant evidence that plaintiff intended to renounce his United States citizenship when he acquired the Certificate of Mexican Nationality willingly, knowingly, and voluntarily." ["Terrazas v. Haig," 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981). Alexander Haig replaced Edmund Muskie as Secretary of State in 1981.]

Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1986 to specify, as required by "Vance v. Terrazas," that a potentially expatriating act may result in loss of U.S. citizenship only if it was performed "with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality". [Public Law 99-653; 100 Stat. 3655; 1986 U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 6182.]

Although the "Terrazas" ruling left intact Congress's right to specify a preponderance-of-evidence standard for judging intent to give up U.S. citizenship, the State Department in 1990 adopted a policy which, in most cases, pursues loss-of-citizenship proceedings only when an individual affirmatively states that he or she intends to relinquish U.S. citizenship. [67 "Interpreter Releases" 799 (July 23, 1990); 67 "Interpreter Releases" 1092 (October 1, 1990).] When a case involving possible expatriation comes to the attention of a U.S. consular officer, the officer will normally "simply ask the applicant if there was intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship when performing the act. If the answer is no, the consular officer will certify that it was not the person's intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship and, consequently, find that the person has retained U.S. citizenship." [ [http://travel.state.gov/law/citizenship/citizenship_778.html "Advice about Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship and Dual Nationality"] (U.S. State Department web site).]

A bill was introduced in 2005 which sought, among other things, to force the State Department to abolish the above policy on loss of citizenship and reinstate its pre-1990 policy "of viewing dual/multiple citizenship as problematic and as something to be discouraged, not encouraged." [ [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:hr3938: H.R. 3938, 109th Congress.] ] However, this bill never made it to the floor of the House and died in committee when the 109th Congress adjourned.

ee also

*Afroyim v. Rusk
*Multiple citizenship
*United States nationality law
*List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 444

References

External links

*caselaw source
case="Vance v. Terrazas", 444 U.S. 252 (1980)
enfacto=http://www.enfacto.com/case/U.S./444/252/