Monroe v. Pape

Monroe v. Pape
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued 8 November, 1960 Decided 20 February, 1961
Full case name	Monroe, et al. v. Pape, et al.
Citations	365 U.S. 167 (more) 81 S. Ct. 473; 5 L. Ed. 2d 492; 1961 U.S. LEXIS 1687
Holding
Court membership
Chief Justice Earl Warren Associate Justices Hugo Black · Felix Frankfurter William O. Douglas · Tom C. Clark John M. Harlan II · William J. Brennan, Jr. Charles E. Whittaker · Potter Stewart
Case opinions
Majority	Douglas, joined by Warren, Black, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker
Concurrence	Harlan, joined by Stewart
Dissent	Frankfurter
Laws applied
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 of the "Ku Klux Act" of 20 April 1871
Overruled by
Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), was a United States Supreme Court case that considered the application of Federal Civil Rights law to constitutional violations by city employees.

Background

Nine police officers of the City of Chicago, Illinois broke into the residence of the Monroe family.^[1] The officers roused the parents from their bed and made them stand naked in the living room while other officers ransacked every room of the house, emptying drawers and ripping mattress covers. Mr. Monroe was then taken to the police station and interrogated concerning a two-day-old murder case. He was not allowed to make any telephone calls or to contact a lawyer during his interrogation. He was not charged and was finally released. The police had not acted under authority of a search warrant or an arrest warrant when making the raid.

Plaintiffs Monroe (six African American children and their parents) sued the police officers and the City of Chicago for violating their civil rights under §1983.

The City of Chicago moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it could not be held liable under the Civil Rights Acts for acts committed in performance of its governmental functions.

Opinion of the Court

The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint against the city itself, finding that Congress had not intended the word "person" in section 1983 to apply to municipalities.

This aspect of Monroe was later partially overruled in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) which held that local governments could face liability in federal court for violating individuals' constitutional rights if the official committed the violation pursuant to a policy or custom of the local government.

Monroe remains good law for the proposition that the "state action" language of section 1983 is satisfied by the actions of any state actor at any level of state government.

However, the Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint as against the officials. The Court concluded that Congress "meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by an official's abuse of his position" under section 1983. Furthermore, the federal remedy was available despite Illinois constitutional provisions that provided protections similar to those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1983.

See also

• Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police

References

1. ^ Cornell Law Library, accessed 24 October 2009