Israeli targeted killings

In the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has employed what they call "focused foiling" ( _he. סיכול ממוקד " [http://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%9B%D7%95%D7%9C_%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%95%D7%A7%D7%93 sikul memukad] ") against those considered proven to have intentions of performing a specific act of violence in the very near future or to be linked indirectly with several acts of violence (organizing, planning, researching means of destruction etc), thus raising the likelihood that his or her assassination would foil similar activities in the future. This article presents a "detailed review" of the Israeli policy of targeted strikes against Palestinian leaders or operatives of fighting groups opposed to the State of Israel or its policies. It is not a general discussion of assassinations, nor a list of Israeli assassinations. The reader is directed to other articles for such information. The article includes the following:

*Methods used to carry out such strikes and general listing and discussion of well known Israeli "hit" operations
*Views of defenders and opponents of such strikes
*Public opinion in both Israeli or the Palestinian territories as to such strikes
*Views on the effectiveness of such strikes in reducing or eliminating Palestinian attacks on Israelis

Israeli strike methods and well known liquidation operations

trike methods

Usually, such strikes have been carried out by Israeli Air Force attack helicopters that fire guided missiles toward the target, after the Shin Bet supplies intelligence for the target. Other strategies employ strike teams of Israeli Intelligence or military operatives. These operatives infiltrate areas known to harbor targeted individuals, and eliminate their assigned targets with small arms fire or use of explosives. Regardless of the method used, intelligence on targets is critical. As regards helicopter strikes, orbiting UAVs or unmanned drones, linked to intelligent monitoring and eavesdropping systems, provide real time targeting data to assigned strike aircraft. Special care must be taken to minimize civilian casualties.

Hit operations

Some of the best known targeted killings by Israeli military were Hamas leaders Salah Shahade (July 2002), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (March 2004), Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi (April 2004) and Adnan al-Ghoul (October 2004), all targeted in the Al-Aqsa Intifada. [Stahl, Adam E. "Questioning the Efficacy of Israeli Targeted Killings Against Hamas’ Religio-Military Command as a Counter-terrorism Tool." http://www.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/2006/2006-winter-5-Israel.pdf] While the term "targeted killing" is mostly used within the context of the Al-Aqsa Intifada by airborne attacks, Israeli security forces have reportedly assassinated top Palestinians in the past, although this was never confirmed officially.

Some of the best known operations include:
* Operation Wrath of God against Black September perpetrators of the 1972 Munich massacre
* Operation Spring of Youth against top PLO leaders in Beirut, Lebanon, 1973
* Abu Jihad (Fatah) in Tunis, 1988
* Fathi Shaqaqi (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) in Malta, 1995
* Yahya Ayyash (Hamas bombmaker, "the engineer") in Gaza, 1996
* Khaled Mashal (Hamas, foiled) in Jordan, 1997While most assassinations throughout the course of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were carried out by the IDF against Palestinian leaders of what Israel claims are terror factions, Israeli minister Rehavam Zeevi was assassinated by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a militant group listed as a terror organization by the U.S. and the EU.

Controversies relating to the targeted killing policy

The exact nature of said proof in focused foiling situations is both controversial and classified, as it involves clandestine military intelligence oriented means and operational decisions made by intelligence officers and commanders rather than being a part of a published justice system executed by lawyers and judges.

Proponents

The IDF claims that targeted killings are only pursued to prevent future terrorism acts, not as revenge for past activities. It also claims that this practice is only used when there is absolutely no practical way of foiling the future acts by other means (e.g., arrest) with minimal risk to the soldiers or civilians. IDF also claims that the practice is only used when there is a certainty in the identification of the target, in order to minimize harm to innocent bystanders. [Stahl, op. cit.] These IDF claims have never been monitored or validated by an independent authority, and the IDF deliberations about the killings remain secret. Moreover, actual injury and death of innocent bystanders, unintended as they may be, remains a strong claim by opponents of these targeted killings.

Defenders of this practice point out that it is in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention ( [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Fourth_Geneva_Convention#Article_28 Part 3, Article 1, Section 28] ) which reads: “The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations,” and so they argue that international law explicitly gives Israel the right to conduct military operations against military targets under these circumstances. [cite news
author = Podhoretz, John
url = http://www.aijac.org.au/updates/Jul-02/260702.html
title = Hamas kills its own
work = Opinion
publisher = New York Post
pages = p.29
date = July 24, 2002
accessdate = 2006-08-05
quote = The Fourth Geneva Convention goes into great and elaborate detail about how to assign fault when military activities take place in civilian areas. Those who are actually fighting the war are not considered "protected persons." Only civilians are granted the status of "protected persons" whose rights cannot be violated with impunity. The Fourth Geneva Convention convicts Hamas and Salah Shehada in one sentence. That sentence makes up the entirety of Part 3, Article 1, Section 28. It reads: "The presence of a protected person may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations." This sentence appears in the Fourth Geneva Convention precisely to deal with situations like the ones the Israelis faced.

"Note: The New York Post link to the article may be found [http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/nypost/access/141316401.html?dids=141316401:141316401&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jul+24%2C+2002&author=John+Podhoretz&pub=New+York+Post&edition=&startpage=029&desc=HAMAS+KILLS+ITS+OWN here] , but it requires a subscription."] [cite web
url = http://www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/20031128.asp
title = What the Geneva Protocols Really Say
accessdate = 2006-08-07
last = Schneider
first = Scott
date = November 28, 2003
publisher = StrategyWorld.com]

Opponents

Opponents of the policy claim that they are illegal under Geneval convention rules which protect civilians from military targeting. They charge that the strikes are not part of an established public judicial system but are rather carried out by extra-judicial means. They hold that such strikes do not reduce terrorism, and are a setback to the Mideast Peace Process.>"Do targeted killings work?", Daniel Byman, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, Volume 85, Number 2, p. 95-112 ]

Israeli public support or opposition towards targeted hits

Targeted killings are largely supported by Israeli society to various extents, [cite paper
author= Steven R. David
date= September 2002
url= http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/david.pdf
format= PDF
title= Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing
publisher= THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES; BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY
accessdate= 2006-08-01] [cite journal
last = Luft
first = Gal
year = 2003
month = Winter
title = The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing
journal = The Middle East Quarterly
volume = X
issue = 1
url = http://www.meforum.org/article/515
accessdate = 2006-08-01] but there are exceptions: In 2003, 27 IAF Air Force pilots composed a letter of protest to the Air Force commander Dan Halutz, announcing their refusal to continue and perform attacks on targets within Palestinian population centers, and claiming that the occupation of the Palestinians "morally corrupts the fabric of Israeli society". This letter, the first of its kind emanating from the Air Force, evoked a storm of political protest in Israel, with most circles condemning it as dereliction of duty. IDF ethics forbid soldiers from making public political affiliations, and subsequently the IDF chief of staff announced that all the signatories would be suspended from flight duty, after which some of the pilots recanted and removed their signature.

Effectiveness of Palestinian attacks and the Israeli response

trong damage caused by Palestinian attacks

Palestinian attacks against Israel have been costly for the Jewish state. IDF reports show that from the start of the Second Intifada (in 2000) to the Year 2005, Palestinians killed 1,074 Israelis and wounded 7,520. These are serious figures for such a small country, roughly equivalent to 50,000 dead and 300,000 wounded in the United States over five years. Such losses generated immense public pressure from the Israeli public for a forceful response, and ramped up targeted killings were one such outcome. ["Do targeted killings work?", Daniel Byman, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2006, Volume 85, Number 2, p. 95-112 ]

tatistics on hit policy effectiveness in reducing attacks

But while Palestinian operations caused strong damage, there is also some evidence that the IDF reprisal assassination policy has been salutory in reducing the "effectiveness" of such attacks. As regards Hamas for example, Israeli deaths dropped as assassination targets were liquidated, from a high of 75 in 2001, to 21 in 2005. Raw attack figures seem to contradict this result, for Hamas attacks "increased" between 2001 and 2005. [Stahl, op. cit.] Nevertheless, even as the total number of Hamas operations climbed, deaths resulting from such attacks plunged, suggesting that the "effectiveness" of such attacks continually weakened. [Byman, op. cit.]

Hits versus other intervening factors in analyzing effectiveness of Israeli strikes

There are several practical reasons why calculated hits may weaken the effectiveness of terrorist activities. Targeted killings physically eliminate skilled terrorists, bomb makers, forgers, recruiters and other operatives, who need time to develop expertise. Targeted hits also disrupt the opponent's infrastructure and organization, and cause immense stress on individual leaders and fighters, who must constantly move, switch locations and hide. This reduces the flow of information in the terrorist organization and reduces its effectiveness. Assassinations may also serve as a demoralizing agent. Targeted individuals cannot visit their wives, children, relatives or families without severe risk, and may even shirk their names coming out in public for fear of liquidation. Israeli killings of Hamas leaders Yassin and Rantisi for example, caused Hamas to not publicly identify their replacement, a necessary step to secure his survival.

Continual diplomatic pressure against the Israeli policy, and the announcement of periodic unilateral cease fires at various times by Hamas, are seen by some as further proof of the policy's efficacy. Some observers however, argue that other factors are at play besides the hit policy, including improved intelligence gathering leading to more arrests, and the construction of the Israeli security fence which has made it more difficult for terrorist operatives to infiltrate. [Byman, op. cit.]

References