- Individual transferable quota
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) are one of many fishery rationalization instruments. They are defined under the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act as limited access permits to harvest quantities of fish. Fisheries scientists decide the optimal annual amount of fish that can be harvested in a certain fishery, taking into account carrying capacity, regeneration rates and future values. This amount is called the total allowable catch (TAC). Under ITQs, members of afishery are granted rights to a percentage of the TAC which can be harvested each year. These quotas can be fished, bought, sold, or leased allowing for the least cost vessels to be used. ITQs were first implemented inNew Zealand as a "Quota Management System". Along with New Zealand, they can be found inAustralia ,Iceland ,Canada and theUnited States . Only three ITQ programs have been implemented in the United States due concerns about distributional impacts leading to amoratorium supported byTed Stevens on further implementation.History
H. Scott Gordon was the firsteconomist to notice that underopen access situations, fisheries become over-fished and rents become dissipated in the race for fish. Managers increasingly concerned with thetragedy of the commons started setting TACs, and calibrating a fishing season in which it was possible to catch only the TAC. Using technology, fishers were able to beat the system and consistently exceed the harvest plans. Seasons were getting shorter and shorter as harvesters built up capital. Harvesting was becoming more and more expensive and often dangerous. ITQs were proposed to eliminate the need for this race to fish by promising each harvester a portion of the catch and allowing them to catch it at a minimum cost.Distribution issues
ITQs capture the
economic rents of a fishery and end up becoming quite valuable. Creating ITQs is a boon to overall wealth, but where that wealth goes has become a source of contention. Some are worried that large corporations will end up owning all the ITQs. Other industries, such as fish processing, have also tried to claim that they should receive a portion of the ITQ. One of the innovations to bypass these issues has been the formation of fishing cooperatives such as the offshortpollock cooperatives in the Pacific Northwest.Some fisheries require quota holders to be actively participating fishermen, to prevent absentee ownership, and have complex limits to the amount of quota that can be accumulated. In the Alaska Halibut and Blackcod fisheries, one has to be an active fisherman to buy IFQ's, and new entrants may not lease quota out. Positives from IFQ's in the above fishery include vastly improved safety and product quality, a more professional fleet, minimal gear loss or 'ghost fishing'. Since IFQ's were introduced in 1995, the commercial longline fleet has never once exceed the TAC.Effectiveness
In 2008 a large scale study of fisheries that used ITQ's and ones that didn't provided strong evidence that ITQ's can help to prevent collapses and restore fisheries that appear to be in decline. [Costello et al (2008)] [ [http://environment.newscientist.com/channel/earth/dn14762-guaranteed-fish-quotas-halt-commercial-freeforall.html?feedId=online-news_rss20| New Scientist: Guaranteed fish quotas halt commercial free-for-all] ] [ [http://www.economist.com/science/displayStory.cfm?source=hptextfeature&story_id=12253181 A Rising Tide: Scientists find proof that privatising fishing stocks can avert a disaster] The Economist, 18th Sept, 2008.] [ [http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-09/s-nso091208.php New study offers solution to global fisheries collapse] Eureka alert.]
Notes
References
* Gordon, H.S. 1954 The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery. "Journal of Political Economy" 62(2):124-42
* Costello, Christopher; Gaines, Steven D and Lynham, John (2008) [http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/~costello/research/CatchShares/ "Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?"] Science Vol 321, No 5896, pp 1678–1681.
* Costello, Christopher and Deacon, Robert (2007) [http://fiesta.bren.ucsb.edu/~costello/research/papers/MRE_2008.pdf "Efficiency Gains from Fully Delineating Rights in an ITQ Fishery"] Marine Resource Economics, 22: 347-361.
Wikimedia Foundation. 2010.