Shangdang Campaign

Infobox Military Conflict
conflict=Shangdang Campaign
partof=the Chinese Civil War
place=Shanxi, China
date=September 10 1945 – October 12, 1945
result=Communist victory
combatant1=

combatant2=

commander1=
commander2=flagicon|China|army Liu Bocheng
flagicon|China|army Deng Xiaoping
strength1=~37,000
strength2=~80,000
casualties1=35,000, most of them captured
casualties2=4,708|

The Shangdang Campaign (zh-c|c=上黨戰役) was a series battles fought between the Communist force under the leadership of Liu Bocheng and the nationalist Yan Xishan’s Kuomintang force from September 10, 1945 through October 12, 1945. Like all other communist victories in the clashes immediately after Japanese's surrender in World War II. The outcome of this campaign altered the course of the peace negotiation held in Chongqing from August 28, 1945 through October 11, 1945, resulting in Mao Zedong's favor instead of Chiang Kai-shek.

Prelude

After the end of World War II, the conflict between the communist and Kuomintang intensified and surfaced. Under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek, the commander-in-chief of the second war zone Yan Xishan ordered the commander of the 19th Army Shi Zebo (史泽波) to lead the 19th Army, part of the 61st Army and other units totaled more than 17,000 to invade the communist base in the Shangdang (上党) region of southeastern Shanxi in the mid August, 1945. Three nationalist divisions were stationed in the largest city of the region, Changzhi, while the rest stationed in the following cities/towns: Xiangyuan (襄垣), Changzi (长子), Tunliu (屯留), Lucheng, Huguang (壶关) and other counties, and from these newly established bases, the nationalists planned to take the entire southeastern Shanxi region from the communists. The communists were not to let that happen and mobilized 31,000 troops from the Taihang (太行), Taiyue (太岳), and Southern Hebei (冀南) military districts to prepare for the upcoming battles.The communist commander Liu Bocheng was helped by his political commissar Deng Xiaoping, who was great in political motivation. Many communist troops worried about the safety of Mao Zedong, who was in Chongqing negotiating a peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek. Deng Xiaoping told his soldiers that the greater the victory for the upcoming battle, the safer Mao Zedong would be, and the strong the position communists would have gained on the negotiation table. Deng’s bet was correct. In addition to political motivations, the communists also mobilized an additional 50,000 militia to help the logistics and to fill the vacancies left behind by the regular troops who went off fighting.

First Stage

The campaign officially started on September 10, 1945 when the first shot of the first battle was fired. The communist Taihang (太行) column first attacked Tunliu (屯留), while Taiyue (太岳) and Southern Hebei (冀南) columns prepared for an ambush. One next day, more than 6,000 nationalist troops from Changzhi, but the nationalist commander was extremely careful and once the contact with the communist force was made, the nationalist force immediately withdrew back to Changzhi. Although the communist ambush failed, but they did achieve in taking Tunliu (屯留) on September 12, 1945. On September 13, 1945, the communist played the same trick again, with the Taihang (太行) column attacking Changzi (长子), while Taiyue (太岳) and Southern Hebei (冀南) columns prepared for another ambush. However, the nationalist commander Shi Zebo (史泽波) would not fall for the communists’ trick and did not sent out anymore reinforcement from Changzhi.Realizing that their original plan would not work out, Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping promptly changed their strategy from decimating the nationalist force to retake the lost regions, and consequently took the Xiangyuan (襄垣), Changzi (长子), Tunliu (屯留), Lucheng, Huguang (壶关) and other counties by September 19, 1945, annihilating more than 7,000 nationalist troops in the process. The next day, communist force attacked garrisons outside Changzhi city from the south, east and west. The communists planned to let the nationalists escape to the north and ambush them on the way. Again, the communist plan failed to materialize when nationalist commander Shi Zebo (史泽波) at Changzhi would not fall for the communists’ trick and decided to hold out. When the attack on the city started on September 24, 1945, the communists failed to take the city due to the technical superiority of the nationalist defenders, and a stalemate was reached.

econd stage

After Yan Xishan learned the emergency his commander Shi Zebo (史泽波) at Changzhi had, he sent out reinforcement lead by the deputy commander-in-chief of the 2nd Army Group, Peng Yubin (彭毓斌), who led the 23rd Army, the 83rd Army and other divisions totalling more than 20,000. Learning the news on September 28, 1945, the communists planned an ambush in the area between Tunliu (屯留) and Xianghuan (襄垣) by leaving the Southern Hebei (冀南) Column and local militia attacking Changzhi, while redeploying Taihang (太行) and Taiyue (太岳) columns to the north.

On October 2, 1945, the nationalist reinforcement clashed with the waiting communist forces at a region northwest of Tunliu (屯留) called the Ditch of the Wang's Family (王家渠). After the initial battle, the nationalist reinforcement was besieged at regions along Old Master's Ridge (老爷岭), Nether Millstone Brain (磨盘脑), and Elm Grove (榆林) line. However, when the nationalists were suppressed into small regions, it turned out to be an advantage for them because communications became much more efficient due to shorter distance, and the nationalists were able to concentrate their superior firepower and utilize their technical superiority to the maximum by inflicting heavy casualties on the attacking communist force. The communists were forced to redeploy the Southern Hebei (冀南) Column for reinforcement, leaving only the local militia attacking Changzhi. The communists also changed their tactic by attacking from 3 sides, leaving the north side open so that the enemy would escape to the north and thus be ambushed on the way. The tactic worked and on October 5, 1945, Peng Yubin (彭毓斌) escaped to the north exactly as the communists had hoped. His force was soon defeated, and Peng Yubin (彭毓斌) himself was killed at Siting (虒亭) by the waiting communist Taiyue (太岳) column.

Third Phase

Learning his reinforcements were annihilated, the nationalist commander Shi Zebo (史泽波) at Changzhi planned to breakout to west on October 8, 1945 under the cover of darkness, hoping to reach Linfen. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping immediately ordered Taiyue (太岳) column to move to Horse Wall (马壁) from Siting (虒亭) to intercept the fleeing enemy. On October 12, 1945, the communist force caught up with the fleeing nationalist force at General’s Ridge (将军岭) and Peach River (桃川) regions, decimating the demoralized enemy, capturing the nationalist commander Shi Zebo (史泽波) alive.

Conclusion

The Shangdang (上党) Campaign cost the Kuomintang 13 divisions totaled more than 35,000 troops, with more than 31,000 out of the 35,000 being captured alive by the communists, including the commander, while the communists suffered more than 4,000 casualties. In addition to decimating the numerically and technically superior nationalist force with relatively light casualties, the communist force also obtained an important supply of weapons its force desperately needed by capturing 24 mountain guns, more than 2,000 machine guns, and more than 16,000 rifles, submachine guns, and handguns from its enemy.The campaign had an additional importance to the communists in that it was the first campaign in which the communist force engaged in the regular mobile warfare and succeeded, marking the transition from the guerrilla warfare commonly practiced by the communists.

On the political front, the campaign was a great boost for the communist on the negotiation table at the peace talk in Chongqing just like other communist victories on the battlefield, and Kuomintang suffered accordingly, losing its bargaining chips and losing face in the Chinese public, which strongly urged the Kuomintang to produce results for the peace talk.

ee also

*List of Battles of Chinese Civil War
*National Revolutionary Army
*History of the People's Liberation Army
*Chinese Civil War

References

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*Tang, Yilu and Bi, Jianzhong, "History of Chinese People's Liberation Army in Chinese Liberation War", 1st Edition, Military Scientific Publishing House in Beijing, 1993 – 1997, ISBN 7800217191 (Volum 1), 7800219615 (Volum 2), 7800219631 (Volum 3), 7801370937 (Volum 4), and 7801370953 (Volum 5)