German submarine U-125 (1940)

Unterseebooot 125 (usually abbreviated to U-125) was a Type IXC U-boat of the Kriegsmarine. She was commissioned on March 3, 1941. On 7 patrols, she sank 17 ships for a total of 82.873 GRT. She was sunk on May 6, 1943. All 54 men on board died.

Record

U-125 sank 2 British steamers "Empire Avocet" and "Kumsang" in one day, September 30, 1942.

Fate

The U-125 was part of a 'wolf-pack' which was attacking the convoy ONS-5 between April 26 and May 6 1943. This was during a period when the British code-breakers were unable to read German U-Boat signals while the Germans could read British convoy signals, and ONS-5 was intercepted by a strong U-Boat force during an Atlantic storm.

ONS-5 was a 43 ship convoy, 9 miles wide by 2 long, with one destroyer, one frigate, three corvettes and two rescue tugs to defend it. It was attacked by around 30 U-Boats, and lost 13 ships in total, while 7 U-boats were sunk by the escorts and supporting aircraft. It was a particularly bloody battle which marked the turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic (1939-1945), showing that while determined mass attack by U-Boats could break through convoy defences, this would prove too expensive a tactic to make U-Boat warfare a winning strategy for Germany. Admiral Karl Dönitz lost his son in this battle.

Controversy

The sinking of U-125 is a controversial issue, since the crew abandoned ship in sight of British surface ships who did not rescue them, thus violating a deeply-held code of conduct at sea.

U-125 had been earlier rammed by HMS Oribi and was disabled, unable to dive. She was then sighted by the corvettes HMS Snowflake and HMS Sunflower, and as Snowflake manoeveured to attack the crew of U-125, realising their indefensible position, scuttled the ship and abandoned her. The captain of Snowflake signalled the Senior Officer Escort, Lieutenant Commander Robert Sherwood, proposing to pick them up, and received the response "Not approved to pick up survivors." Snowflake and Sunflower thereupon resumed their positions around the convoy, while the crew of U-125 died in the Atlantic over the next few hours.

This decision of Sherwoods is certainly defensible. Danger of submarine attack is usually considered a good reason for failing to stop and retrieve survivors, and the Snowflake was in Radar and ASDIC contact with three other U-Boats at this time, who were not aware that the U-125 had scuttled. A stationary corvette would almost certainly have been torpedoed, thus condemning a corvette crew to death as well as the U-Boat crew they were trying to rescue. The corvettes were also critically needed around the convoy - twenty minutes spent off station could have resulted in the deaths of four merchant ship crews, and the possible disintegration of the convoy.

In many cases the attacks occurred when escorts were out of position pursuing a contact, and in the stormy weather the convoy commander had great difficulty keeping the ships together. Attacks were coming very rapidly and the escort were being overwhelmed.

However, the finality of the signal condemning the U-Boat crew has attracted criticism from many sources, who believe that the decision leaves a black mark on the career of Lieutenant Commander Robert Sherwood. One opinion might be that the decision was a no-win one for Sherwood; on the one hand he was condemning a drowning crew, while if he had stopped he might have lost his convoy.

References

* [http://www.uboat.net/boats/u125.htm U-boat.net webpage for "U-125"]

ee also

*List of U-boats
*List of successful U-boats
*Stalingrad of the U-boat arm