MS Herald of Free Enterprise

MS "Herald of Free Enterprise" was a roll-on roll-off (RORO) car and passenger ferry owned by Townsend Thoresen. She was one of three ships commissioned by the company to operate on the Dover–Calais route across the English Channel. The ferry capsized on the night of 6 March 1987 killing 193 passengers and crew. This was the worst maritime disaster involving a British registered ship in peacetime since the sinking of the "Iolaire" in 1919.

Construction

In the late 1970s, Townsend Thoresen decided to commission the design and construction of three new identical ships for their Dover–Calais route for delivery from 1980. The ships were branded the Spirit class and were named "Herald of Free Enterprise", "Pride of Free Enterprise" and "Spirit of Free Enterprise.

The Dover–Calais crossing of the Channel is the shortest route between England and France, and in 1987 (prior to the opening of the Channel Tunnel) it was the quickest route. To remain competitive with other ferry operators on the route, Townsend Thoresen required ships which were designed to permit fast loading and unloading and quick acceleration. The ships comprised eight decks numbered A to H from top to bottom which contained the following:
*A Deck: Crew accommodation and radio room
*B Deck: Crew accommodation and galley
*C Deck: Passenger areas and galley
*D Deck: Suspended vehicle deck within E deck
*E Deck: Upper vehicle deck
*F deck: Mezzanine level
*G deck: Main vehicle deck
*H deck: Engine rooms, stores and passenger accommodation

Loading of vehicles onto G deck was through watertight doors at the bow and stern. Both sets of doors were hinged about a vertical axis meaning the status of the bow doors could not be seen from the wheel house. Loading of vehicles onto E deck and F deck was through a weathertight door at the bow and an open portal at the stern. Vehicles could be loaded and unloaded onto E and G deck simultaneously using double deck linkspans in use at Dover and Calais.

The ships were constructed by Schichau-Unterweser AG in Bremerhaven, Germany.

Background to the capsizing

On the day the ferry capsized, the "Herald of Free Enterprise" was working the route between Dover and the Belgian port of Bruges-Zeebrugge. This was not her normal route and the linkspan at Zeebrugge had not been designed specifically for the Spirit class of vessels. The linkspan used comprised a single deck and so could not be used to load decks E and G simultaneously. The ramp could also not be raised high enough to meet the level of deck E due to the high spring tides being encountered at that time. This was commonly known and was overcome by trimming the ship bow heavy by filling forward ballast tanks. The "Herald" was due to be modified during its refit in 1987 to overcome this problem. Before dropping moorings, it was normal practice for a member of the crew, the Assistant Bosun, to close the doors, the First Officer also remained on deck to ensure they were closed before returning to the wheel house. To keep on schedule, the First Officer returned to the wheel house before the ship dropped its moorings leaving closing of the doors the responsibility of the Assistant Bosun, Mark Stanley. Mark Stanley had taken a short break after cleaning the car deck upon arrival at Zeebrugge. He had returned to his cabin and was still asleep when the ship dropped its moorings. The captain could only assume that the doors had been closed since he could not see them from the wheel house due to their construction and had no indicator lights in the wheelhouse. There was confusion as to why no one else closed the doors.Fact|date=February 2007

The capsizing

The ship sailed at 6:05pm British time with a crew of 80 and carrying 459 passengers, 81 cars, 3 buses, and 47 trucks. When the ferry reached 18.9 knots (33 km/h) 90 seconds after leaving the harbour, water began to enter the car deck in large quantities. The resulting free surface effect destroyed her stability. Within seconds, at 6:28pm, the ship began to list 30 degrees to port. The ship briefly righted herself before listing to port once more, this time capsizing. The entire event took place in less than a minute. The water quickly reached the ship's electrical systems, destroying both main and emergency power and leaving the ship in darkness.

The ship ended on her side half-submerged in shallow water 1km from the shore. Only a fortuitous turn to starboard in her last moments, and then capsizing onto a sandbar, prevented the ship from sinking entirely in much deeper water. If the Herald sunk in much deeper water, the death toll would have been much higher, because the ship then would have been completely submerged.

A nearby dredger noticed the "Herald"'s lights disappear, and notified the port authorities. A rescue helicopter arrived within half an hour, shortly followed by assistance from the Belgian Navy who were undertaking an exercise within the area.

The disaster resulted in the deaths of 193 people. Many of those on board had taken advantage of a promotion in "The Sun" newspaper for cheap trips to the continent. Most of the victims were trapped inside the ship and succumbed to hypothermia because of the frigid (3 °C) water. Due to the rescue operation of the Belgian Navy the death toll was limited. Recoverable bodies were removed in the days following the accident.

The inquiry

After a public inquiry into the sinking in July 1987, Britain's Lord Justice Sir Barry Sheen published a report that castigated Townsend Thoresen, the ship's owners, and identified a "disease of sloppiness" and negligence at every level of the corporation's hierarchy. It was confirmed that the ferry left port with her bow doors open.

It was apparent from the testimony of crew members that the member responsible for shutting the doors was Mark Stanley, but it was confirmed that when he finished cleaning the car deck after the arrival in Zeebrugge he returned to his cabin for a short break but did not return to the car deck during loading of vehicles and before the ship set sail. When he was questioned, investigators found that at the time when he should have closed the doors, he was still asleep during his break. There was confusion as to why no one else closed the doors. The other crew members expected Stanley to close them because he was scheduled to close them. Before the ship dropped moorings the First Officer should have stayed on the car deck to make sure the doors were closed, but trying to stay on schedule he left the car deck and went to the bridge before the doors were closed. This was normal practice, and the final factor was that from his position on the bridge the captain was not able to see the bow doors clearly, leading him to assume that they were closed.Fact|date=February 2007

A few years earlier, one of the Herald's sister ships sailed from Dover to Zeebrugge with the bow doors open, but she made it to the destination without incident.Fact|date=February 2007 It was therefore believed that leaving the bow doors open alone should not have caused the ship to capsize.

After looking at possible reasons for reduced clearance between the doors and water line, investigators found that there was a problem during the loading of the car decks. The loading ramp at Zeebrugge was too low to reach the upper car deck at high tide. To clear the gap, the captain put sea water into the front ballast tanks to lower the ship's bow. The clearance between bow doors and water line was 2.5 metres. The problem arose due to the fact that Dover-Zeebrugge was not her regular route. Had the "Herald" survived she was to have been modified to avoid this procedure. [Robins, Nick (1995) "The evolution of the British ferry", Kilgetty : Ferry, ISBN 1-871947-31-6, p. 89]

Another factor that contributed to the capsizing was the depth of the water. When a vessel is underway, the movement under it creates low pressure, which has the effect of increasing the vessel's draft. This effect is known as ship "squat". In deep water the effect is small. However, in shallow water it is greater, because as the water passes underneath it would move faster and cause the draft to be increased further. This reduced the clearance between the bow doors and water line to 1.5 meters. Although the bow doors were open and they were 1.5 meters above the water, it was still not enough to cause the ship to capsize, so the investigators looked at the height and volume of water produced by the bow wave.

After extensive tests, the investigators found that when the ship travelled at a speed of convert|18|kn|km/h, the wave was enough to engulf the bow doors. This caused a "step change": if the ship was below convert|18|kn|km/h and not in shallow water, people on the car deck would probably have had time to notice the bow doors were open and close them, but even this did not cause the final capsizing.

Almost all ships are divided into watertight compartments below the water line so that in the event of flooding, the water would be confined to one compartment, keeping the ship afloat. The Herald's design had an open car deck with no dividers, allowing vehicles to drive in and out easily, but this allowed water to flood the whole of the car deck, putting the ship in danger. As she turned the water flooded to one side and the vessel capsized.

In October 1986, a coroner's inquest jury into the capsizing returned verdicts of unlawful killing. Many of the individuals involved at the company were prosecuted for manslaughter, as was the operating company, P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd (for a discussion of the legal issues, see corporate manslaughter). The disaster was one of a number that influenced thinking leading to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. [ [http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ministers/ministers/2000/speeches/mccartney/whistleblowing.html DRAFT WHISTLEBLOWING SPEECH FOR OPENING ADDRESS TO PUBLIC CONCERN AT WORK CONFERENCE: WEDNESDAY 23 FEBRUARY ] ]

The aftermath

A salvage operation, conducted by Dutch company Smit-Tak Towage and Salvage (part of Smit International), was embarked upon almost immediately to refloat the ship. The operation was successfully concluded late in April 1987 allowing the remaning bodies trapped underwater to be removed. The ship was towed to Zeebrugge where its fate was decided. It had originally been assumed that it could be repaired and continue sailing. Eventually no buyer came forward to retain the ship and she was renamed "Flushing Range" and the Townsend Thoresen branding painted over before her final one way trip to Kaohsiung, Taiwan,cite web |url=http://www.faktaomfartyg.se/herald_of_free_enterprise_1980.htm |title=M/S Herald of Free Enterprise |accessdate=2008-02-23 |author=Micke Asklander |work=Fakta om Fartyg |publisher=] for scrapping.

After the incident, the Townsend Thoresen brand had been broadcast on television and in newspapers around the world. P&O quickly decided to rebrand the company as P&O Ferries and repaint their fleet's red hulls in navy blue and remove the TT logo from the funnels. (actually, the "TT" logo on the Herald of Free Enterprise was removed at the start of the salvage operation).

Since the accident several improvements to the design of this type of vessel have been made, these include indicators that display the state of the bow doors on the bridge, watertight ramps being fitted to the bow sections of the front of the ship, and "freeing flaps" to allow water to escape from a vehicle deck in the event of flooding. Some vessels omit the bow door configuration altogether and vehicles enter and exit from rear doors only. New International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations are in place that prohibit an open (undivided) deck of this length on a passenger RORO vessel.

Her two sister ships are still operational, though the ex-"Spirit of Free Enterprise" was extended to increase her cargo capacity during her time under the P&O flag in a process commonly described as jumboisation. The "Pride of Free Enterprise" is still more or less as built. [Koefoed-Hansen, Michael (2007) [http://www.ferry-site.dk/ferry.php?id=7820497&lang=en "M/F Oleander"] , The ferry site, www page, accessed 22 June 2007]

A few scenes of the disaster videotaped live by the media were used by film director Krzysztof Kieślowski as part of the conclusion of his film "Three Colours: Red"that bound together the Three Colours trilogy.

In Britain, a group named Ferry Aid released a charity record.

The Right Hon Nicholas Ridley MP, a government minister at the time, was criticised for alluding to the accident (while speaking on another subject) on 10 March. He was quoted as saying that "although he is the pilot of the Bill, he has not got his bow doors open". He apologised for the remark. [ [http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106763 House of Commons PQs | Margaret Thatcher Foundation ] ]

The disaster was the subject of an episode from Series 2 of "Seconds from Disaster".

Gallantry awards

The following British awards for gallantry on the night of the sinking were gazetted on 30 December 1987: [LondonGazette|issue=51183|supp=yes|startpage=61|date=30 December 1987|accessdate=2007-12-20]
*"Herald of Free Enterprise" crew
**Michael Ian Skippen, Head Waiter, George Medal (posthumous)
**Leigh Cornelius, Seaman, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Stephen Robert Homewood, Assistant Purser, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**William Sean Walker, Seaman, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Thomas Hume Wilson, Quartermaster, Queen's Gallantry Medal
*"Herald of Free Enterprise" passenger
**Andrew Clifford Parker, Assistant Bank Manager, Nippon Credit International, George Medal
*Belgian Navy
**Luitenant-Ter-Zee 1ste Klas Guido A. Couwenbergh, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Luitenant-Ter-Zee 1ste Klas Alfons M. A. C. Daems, Queen's Gallantry Medal
*Royal Navy
**Lieutenant Simon Nicholas Bound, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Able Seaman Eamon Christopher McKinley Fullen, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Chief Petty Officer Edward Gene Kerr, Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct
**Chief Petty Officer Peter Frank Still, Queen's Commendation for Brave Conduct
*Tijdelijke Vereniging Bergingswerken
**Piet Lagast, Diver, Queen's Gallantry Medal
**Dirk van Mullem, Diver, Queen's Gallantry Medal

Footnotes

ee also

*List of RORO vessel accidents
*MV Tricolor, an automobile cargo ship which sank nearby in 2002
*List of United Kingdom disasters by death toll
*Why-Because Analysis of the HoFE accident
*National Geographic "Seconds From Disaster" episodes

External links

* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/6/newsid_2515000/2515923.stm Hundreds trapped as car ferry capsizes] (BBC News)
* [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/8/newsid_2626000/2626265.stm Zeebrugge disaster was no accident] (BBC News)
* [http://www.ferry-site.dk The Ferry Site] (A privately owned site with information on the Herald and her sister ships)

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