- Salman Rabeii
Salman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii is a citizen of
Yemen , held inextrajudicial detention in theUnited States Guantanamo Bay Naval Base , inCuba . [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detainee_list.pdf list of prisoners (.pdf)] , "US Department of Defense ",April 20 2006 ] His detainee ID number is 508.The Department of Defense reported that Rabeii was born onJune 30 1979 , inJedda sic,Saudi Arabia .Salman Rabeii is probably a brother of the late
Fawaz al-Rabeiee alias Furqan al-Tajiki, to whom he sent a letter while in Afghanistan. [http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/AFGP-2002-001120-Trans.pdf Three declassified letters] from the Harmony database,United States Military Academy ; see page 14]Combatant Status Review Tribunal
] Three chairs were reserved for members of the press, but only 37 of the 574 Tribunals were observed.cite web
url=http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902
title=Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials
publisher=United States Department of Defense
date=March 6 date=December 2007Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the
Geneva Conventions to captives fromthe war on terror . This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct acompetent tribunal s to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections ofprisoner of war status.Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the
Combatant Status Review Tribunal s. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were "lawful combatants" -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of anenemy combatant .Rabeii chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal. [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/Set_53_3870-3959.pdf#40 Summarized transcripts (.pdf)] , from
Salman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii 's "Combatant Status Review Tribunal " - pages 40-42] Rabeii didn't attend his Tribunal in person. But he dictated responses to the allegations for his Personal Representative to read to the Tribunal.Allegations
The allegations against Rabeii were::""'a. The detainee was associated with Al Qaida. :#"Detainee voluntarily traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to
Afghanistan .:#"Detainee attended the Al Farouq training camp in August 2001.:""'b. The detainee participated in military operations against the coalition.:#"Detainee was captured with other members of his training squad from the
Al Farouq training camp .:#"If released, detainee advised that he should be considered a threat to the United States.Rabeii's response to the allegations
Rabeii told his Personal Representative he was not associated with al Qaeda.He acknowledged he was in Afghanistan, in August, but he denied that he attended the al Farouq training camp.
Rabeii denied he was captured with other. He told his Personal Representative that he voluntarilysought out Afghani authorities in
Jalalabad , and surrendered himself, because he wanted helpgetting back to YemenRabeii totally denied that he had ever threatened the USA.
Dispute over the documents
In the Combatant Status Review Tribunals it is the Recorder's responsibility to act like a Prosecutor, and compile and distribute the allegations against the detainee. The Tribunal members were concerned that the wording of the allegations, as read out, differed from the wording in copies they had been given to read.
Administrative Review Board hearing
Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual
Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.
The factors for and against continuing to detain Rabeil were among the 121 that the Department of Defense released on
March 3 2006 . [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt/ARB_Factors_Set_1_944-1045.pdf#65 Factors for and against the continued detention (.pdf)] ofSalman Yahya Hassan Mohammed Rabeii "Administrative Review Board " -28 January 2005 - page 65]"The following primary factors favor continued detention:
:""'a. Commitment:#"The detainee voluntarily traveled from
Sanaa , Yemen to Afghanistan.:#"The detainee was captured with other members of his training squad from theal Farouq training camp .:""'b. Training:#"The detainee attended the al Farouq training camp in August 2001.:#"The detainee attended the
Malik training camp , commonly used for advanced military training.:""'c. Connection / Association:#"The detainee's name was found on a computer hard drive belong to a high level al Qaida operative listing captured
mujahidin .:#"The detainee's name was found on a document listing324 Arabic names , aliases, and nationalities recovered fromsafe house raids associated with suspected al Qaida inKarachi , Pakistan.:""'d. Intent:#"If released, the detainee advised that he should be considered a threat to the United States.:#"In 2002, the detainee described at length how much he hated America. He also threatened the interviewing agent with bodily harm.
"The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
:*"I am not associated with al Qaida.":*"I never attended any training at the al Farouq training camp in August. I was in Afghanistan, but not at that training camp.":*"I never said such a thing as I would harm or threaten the United States.":*"The detainee noted that his motivation to travel revolved around his interest in earning money. He explained that he could make more money in handouts from al Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan than he could trying to earn an honest wage in his home country.:*"The detainee intended to travel to Afghanistan and undergo training "for kicks", and then return to Yemen with whatever money he might save from "handouts".
References
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