Melian dialogue

The Melian Dialogue, contained in Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, is an account of the confrontation between the people of Melos, a small island in the southern Aegean Sea, and the Athenians in 416–415 BC. Melos was a neutral island, lying just east of Sparta; the Athenians wanted to conquer the island to intimidate the Spartans. In general, “the Dialogue is formally not about the morality of the eventual execution, but about the Melian response to the Athenians’ first demand, that Melos should submit.”^[1]

Thucydides

Thucydides monitored and recorded events of the Peloponnesian War.

Thucydides; cast of a bust at Holkham Hall (Pushkin Museum)

Most likely born in Athens, he supported the Athenian cause and wanted to help; however, he caught the Plague “sometime between 430 and 427 BC and initially was prevented from joining the war effort. Upon his recovery, he was appointed general and given command of a small squadron of ships.”^[2] It was quite exceptional for him to survive such a deadly disease. Thucydides fell out of favour with the Athenians, and was exiled in 424 BC, which allowed him plenty of time to write about the ongoing Peloponnesian War. Thucydides’ high social status and family wealth granted him the leisure needed to work on writing the History of the Peloponnesian War.

Thucydides writes that the two sides held a meeting where they presented their arguments for and against the invasion. This was held between "the governing body and the few," not before the people, leading the Athenians to imply that the Melian elite was afraid that the people might support the Athenian position. Many political philosophers have interpreted the dialogue, as written in the History, as reflecting Thucydides' personal views concerning the attack on Melos, whether or not it accurately reports the specific speeches delivered at the meeting.

Context

The historical background of this portion of the History is the invasion of the island of Melos by Athens in 416 BC during a brief lull in the Peloponnesian War. Just after the Battle of Mantinea in 417 BC, the Athenians moved on the Melians and demanded that they join the Delian League, thus effectively becoming part of their empire. The Melians had always resisted the influence of the Delian League, and resisted this invasion as well. D.M Lewis states, “The Dialogue is formally not about the morality of the eventual execution, but about the Melian response to the Athenians’ first demand, that Melos should submit.”(or give in)^[3] Thucydides created the Dialogue in order to represent the actual events of the Athenians speaking to the Melians. His use of speeches in The History of the Peloponnesian War allowed readers to understand the way in which Athens created their empire. The Athenians sent the League's fleet to Melos to await the time to attack if Melos did not come to a peaceful agreement to surrender to the Athenian representatives.^[4] However, since her forces were ready to fight Melos, it was as though Athens already knew Melos would not give in.

The Athenian conquest of Melos was ironic because the Athenians wanted to prove their strength, but got their power by destroying the weakest and most vulnerable communities in the Aegean. It is completely indicative of the principal problem with democracy—the "tyranny of the mob"—that the Athenian assembly would favour such a move, which cannot be said to have been of great strategic benefit.

Arguments

The Athenians, in a frank and matter-of-fact manner, offer the Melians an ultimatum: surrender and pay tribute to Athens, or be destroyed.

The Melians argue that they are a neutral city and not an enemy, so Athens has no need to crush them. The Athenians counter that, if they accept the Melians' neutrality and independence, they would look weak: people would think they spared Melos because they were not strong enough to conquer it.

The Melians argue that an invasion will alarm the other neutral Greek states, who will become hostile to Athens for fear of being invaded themselves. The Athenians counter that the Greek states on the mainland are unlikely to act this way. It is the more volatile island states and the subjects they have already conquered that are more likely to take up arms against Athens. In Thucydides’ account, the Melians stated, “If such hazards are taken by you to keep your empire and by your subjects to escape it, we who are still free would show ourselves great cowards and weaklings if we failed to face everything that comes rather than submit to slavery.”^[5]

The Melians argue that it would be shameful and cowardly of them to submit without a fight. The Athenians counter that the debate is not about honour but about self-preservation.

The Melians argue that though the Athenians are far stronger, there is still a chance they could win. The Athenians counter that only the strong have a right to indulge in hope; the weak Melians are hopelessly outnumbered.

Another reason for the Melians’ refusal was their confidence in having help from the gods; however, the Athenians feel that the gods are on their side as well. Thucydides stated, “We trust that the gods will give us fortune as good as yours, because we are standing for what is right against what is wrong.”^[6] The Athenians counter that gods and men alike respect strength over moral arguments; the strong do as they can and the weak suffer what they must.

The Melians insist that their Spartan kin will come to their defence. The Athenians argue that the Spartans have nothing to gain and a lot to lose by coming to the Melians' aid – mere kinship will not motivate them.

The Athenians conclude the argument by saying there is no shame in submitting to a stronger enemy. The Melians do not change their minds and politely dismiss the envoys.

Analysis

The Melian Dialogue opened up many arguments about the morality of destroying Melos. One of the arguments in the Melian Dialogue is whether or not the destruction of Melos was a humanitarian act. The destruction of Melos was not humanitarian, but the preceding discussion with Melos to have them surrender before anyone had to get hurt was humanitarian. A.B. Bosworth represents both points of view. He argues that the Melian Dialogue was not humanitarian at all because of the brutality the Athenians used against Melos.^[7] However, he also argues that it could be humanitarian because, "they could only confront them with the reality of their position in the bluntest terms. Harsh their language undoubtedly is, but it has a humanitarian end, to convince the Melian oligarchs of the need to capitulate and save themselves and the commons the horrors of a siege."^[8] The Melians were put in quite the predicament: to save themselves and surrender or have their nation completely destroyed for the sake of independence.

As for Thucydides’ point of view, it would seem that he may have had a bias in favour of the Melians because of his exile from Athens. W. Liebeschuetz argues that the Athenians were “wrong and deluded” because of their lack of morality in Melos’ destruction but also that “the Athenians were also perfectly right that the Melians’ own interest required that they should yield to the Athenians since they had not the strength to resist successfully.”^[9] However, D.M. Lewis declares that, “Thucydides, with his strong feeling for the power and glory of Athens, may have seen this differently and regarded the Melians’ heroics as foolish and unrealistic; and the fact that they had been offered a relatively painless alternative might affect his view of the massacre.”^[10] Lewis also questioned how much of a reaction Thucydides wanted to get from his readers, based on the cruelty the Athenians showed the Melians. This was because “judgments about the Athenian empire is certainly in large part due to the attention that Thucydides’ Dialogue has focused on it, but the feeling he displays elsewhere about that empire makes it questionable if he intended to produce the revulsion which most readers of the Dialogue feel.”^[11] The Melian Dialogue garners a lot more attention in The History of the Peloponnesian War because of Athens’ hostility than Thucydides might have intended.

The main reason the Melians refused to surrender to the Athenians was because of their strong sense of independence. Moreover, they did not want to be regarded as cowards for surrendering so easily and submitting themselves to slavery. Slavery was the ultimate term of alliance, which would mean that Melos could no longer take their neutral stand. Alliance meant Melos’ subservience to Athens. Slavery also meant extinction of their community, instead of living as an oligarchy. Citizenship for the men would no longer be an option. To lose that right would mean the loss of a sense of themselves.

Results

Ultimately, Melos refused to surrender to the Athenians. The Athenians immediately besieged Melos, as threatened. Thucydides writes, “Our decision, Athenians, is just the same as it was at first. We are not prepared to give up in a short moment the liberty which our city has enjoyed from its foundation for 700 years.”^[12] With this decision, the Athenians now had the excuse they needed to destroy Melos, even though the Melians offered them peace at the end of the Dialogue by saying, “‘We invite you to allow us to be friends of yours and enemies to neither side, to make a treaty which shall be agreeable to both you and us, and so to leave our country.’”^[13] The Athenians killed the men and enslaved the women and children, and further, repopulated it as an Athenian colony. Liebeschuetz makes a good point on irony in the Melian Dialogue: "The Athenians look at the present and can see nothing will save Melos. They are right. The Melians look to the future. They are right too. Melos is destroyed. But the very next sentence in the history begins the story of the decline of Athens and the justification of the Melians."^[14] This is incredible because both groups, the Melians and Athenians, predicted outcomes that both came to pass at a later time. Overall, Melos was one of the few islands in the Cyclades that stood up for itself despite the negative repercussions.

See also

• Battle of Melos
• Neutral country
• The Law of the Jungle

References

1. ^ D.M., Lewis. The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. V. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 444.
2. ^ Thomas J., Sienkewicz. Ancient Greece Vol. 3. (Pasadena: Salem Press, Inc., 2007), 838.
3. ^ Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, 444.
4. ^ Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War. (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1972), 400.
5. ^ Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 403
6. ^ Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 404.
7. ^ A.B., Bosworth. “The Humanitarian Aspect of the Melian Dialogue.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 113 (1993): 31, http://www.jstor.org/stable/632396, (accessed January 28, 2010).
8. ^ Bosworth, “Humanitarian Aspect,” 33.
9. ^ W. Liebeschuetz. “The Structure and Function of the Melian Dialogue.” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 88 (1968): 75, http://www.jstor.org/stable/628672, (accessed January 28, 2010).
10. ^ Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, 445.
11. ^ Lewis, Cambridge Ancient History, 446.
12. ^ Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 407.
13. ^ Ibid., 407.
14. ^ Liebeschuetz, “Structure and Function,” 76.

External links

• The Melian Dialogue