R. v. Chaulk

SCCInfoBox
case-name=R. v. Chaulk
full-case-name=Robert Matthew Chaulk and Francis Darren Morrissette v. Her Majesty The Queen
heard-date=May 29, 30, 1990
decided-date=December 20, 1990
citations= [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303
history=
ruling=Chaulk appeal allowed; new trial ordered
ratio=
SCC=1985-1987
Majority=Lamer J.
JoinMajority=Dickson, La Forest and Cory JJ.
Concurrence=Wilson J.
Concurrence2=Gonthier J.
Dissent= McLachlin J.
JoinDissent=L’Heureux-Dube J.
Dissent2=Sopinka J.
NotPresent=
LawsApplied="R. v. Oakes", [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; "R. v. Whyte", [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3

"R. v. Chaulk", [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303 is a leading decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the interpretation and constitutionality of section 16(4) of the Criminal Code of Canada which provides for a mental disorder defence.Two accused individuals challenged the section as a violation of their right to the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Court upheld the section and provided a basis on which to interpret the section.

Background

On September 3, 1985, 15 year-old Robert Chaulk and 16 year-old Francis Morrissette burglarized a home in Winnipeg, and then stabbed and bludgeoned its sole occupant to death. A week later they turned themselves in, making full confessions.

The only defence raised was insanity within the meaning of section 16 of the Criminal Code. Expert evidence was given at trial that Chaulk and Morrissette suffered from a paranoid psychosis which made them believe that they had the power to rule the world and that the killing was a necessary means to that end. They believed that they were above the ordinary law and thought they had a right to kill the victim because he was "a loser".

They were both convicted of murder by a jury in the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, which was upheld on appeal.

The major questions to the Supreme Court were:
# whether s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code, which provides that "Every one shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have been sane", infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed in s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and if so, it is justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter;
# whether the meaning of the word "wrong" in s. 16(2) of the Code should be restricted to "legally wrong";
# whether s. 16(3) of the Code provides an alternative defence if the conditions of s. 16(2) were not met; and
# whether the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to split its case by presenting its evidence with respect to the sanity of the accused in rebuttal.

Opinion of the Court

There were three opinions:
*Lamer – with Dickson, La Forest and Cory – held that section 16(4) violated s. 11(d) of the Charter, but was saved under section 1. He also held that the judge erred in interpreting the word "wrong" in section 16(4).
*Wilson held that section 16(4) violated 11(d) and was not justified by section 1. She also held that the judge erred in interpreting the word "wrong" and erred in his instructions to the jury regarding the defence.
* Gonthier held that section 16(4) did not violate section 11(d) and that the judge erred in interpreting the word "wrong".The accused were convicted of first degree murder. The only defence raised at trial was insanity, but this defence was rejected by the jury. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. This appeal is to determine (1) whether s. 16(4) of the Criminal Code, which provides that "Every one shall, until the contrary is proved, be presumed to be and to have been sane", infringes the presumption of innocence guaranteed in s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and, if so, whether s. 16(4) is justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter; (2) whether the meaning of the word "wrong" in s. 16(2) of the Code should be restricted to "legally wrong"; (3) whether s. 16(3) of the Code provides an alternative defence if the conditions of s. 16(2) were not met; and (4) whether the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to split its case by presenting its evidence with respect to the sanity of the accused in rebuttal.

Dissent

There were two dissenting opinions:
* McLachlin – with L’Heureux-Dube – held that section 16(4) did not violate s. 11(d) of the Charter, and the trial judge did not err in any way.
* Sopinka held that section 16(4) violated section 11(d) but was justifiable under section 1 of the Charter. He also agreed with McLachlin that the judge did not err.

External links

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* [http://www.mapleleafweb.com/scc/public3/decisions/1990_3scr_1303_02.html summary at mapleleafweb.com]