- Panther-Wotan line
The Panther-Wotan Line was a
defensive line partially built by theWehrmacht in1943 on the Eastern Front. The first part of the name refers to the short northern section betweenLake Peipus and theBaltic Sea atNarva .Purpose of the Line
Hitler hoped to repeat the success of the
World War I Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, which allowed the Germans to shorten theirfront line and release many troops for operations elsewhere. In this case theWehrmacht was no longer capable of launching a decisive,strategic offensive against theRed Army , so instead Hitler wanted to force a conclusive draw with theUSSR before the Allied armies in the west would become a major threat.Fact|date=May 2008 It should be noted that with the Panther-Wotan Line, Hitler wanted a return toattrition warfare that was prevalent during theFirst World War which suited Imperial Germany as it was prepared economically for a long conflict, Hitler's order to construct the line inAugust 1943 following theBattle of Kursk and Joseph Goebbels "total war" speech [http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb36.htm from "Nun, Volk steh auf, und Sturm brich los! Rede im Berliner Sportpalast," Der steile Aufstieg (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1944), pp. 167-204] delivered on18 February 1943 , which displays Hitler's abandonment ofBlitzkrieg , and his admission that the Wehrmacht was no longer capable of launching large scale offensive operations against the Red Army. Hitler hoped to "bleed" the Red Army against the Line in a manner similar totrench warfare seen on the Western Front. He hoped the USSR, having suffered appalling casualties during 1941-1942 due to successful Wehrmacht Blitzkrieg would suffer a similar fate against a strong Wehrmacht defensive line. By any measure, the effort of planning, constructing and defending the line was a failure.Planning the Line
The majority of the line ran along the
Dnieper River , from just west ofSmolensk to theBlack Sea . Hitler proclaimed to his generals in September 1943 that the Dnieper defensive line was to be the last barrier againstBolshevism . The line left the banks of the Dnieper only where another majortributary offered similar defensive capabilities, and in the south, where the Dnieper bend (westernDnipropetrovsk Oblast ) to the west and did not offer protection to theCrimea 'sIsthmus of Perekop link with the mainland. In the north, the line was to have been constructed roughly fromVitebsk toPskov , where it then followed the west bank ofLake Peipus , and itsriver delta to theBaltic Sea atNarva .When the order was signed for its construction on
11 August 1943 , the Wehrmacht armies held positions hundreds of kilometres, generally along theDonets River in the south and along a line roughly fromSmolensk toLeningrad in the north. Retreating to the line would give up considerable Soviet territory, including major cities such asSmolensk andKharkov , which had only recently been recaptured in theKharkov offensive operation , as well as smaller cities includingKholm ,Novgorod ,Oryol andBryansk . In addition, theSiege of Leningrad would have to be abandoned.Defending the Line
Confidence in the effectiveness of the line was poor inside
Army Group North , with its commander, General Küchler, refusing to refer to the line by its name, fearing it would instill false hope amongst his troops in its strength [Kaufmann JE, Kaufmann HW: "Fortress third Reich", page 282. DA Capo Press, 2003.] . The line was only partially completed when a general withdrawal was ordered on15 September and January 1944, Manstein's Heeresgruppe Süd had commenced to fall back on it. [p.31, Baxter] The Red Army immediately attempted to break the line to denyOKH time to plan a long term defence, launching theLower Dnieper strategic offensive operation (26 September 1943 - 20 December 1943) along a 300 km front. The line was particularly weak in the area just north of the Black Sea, which allowed the Southern Front to breach it with relative ease, thereby cutting off the German 17th Army on the Crimean Peninsula from its land retreat route. The Red Army casualties were relatively acceptable at 173,201 unrecoverable (11,5%) and 581,191 wounded (total 754,392) [see Krivosheev in sources] , by 1 December, the entire line had been broken fromVelikiye Luki in the north to the Black Sea in the south, with the line north of Velikiye Luki ignored by Stavka planners on the assumption that it would be abandoned under the threat ofencirclement .The only part of the line to remain in Wehrmacht possession was the extreme northern section, the Panther Line between
Lake Peipus and theBaltic Sea atNarva , and would be assaulted during the Battle of Narva, withEstonia remained in German hands well into1944 .References
ources
* Ian Baxter, "INTO THE ABYSS: The Last Years Of The Waffen SS 1943-45, A Photographic History", Helion and Company Ltd, 2006 ISBN 978-1874622598
* Krivosheev, G.F. Colonel-General (Author), Erickson, John (Foreword), "Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century", Greenhill Books, London, 1997 ISBN 1853672807
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