Bishops’ Wars

The Bishops’ Wars — "Bellum Episcopale" — refers to two armed encounters between Charles I and the Scottish Covenanters in 1639 and 1640, which helped to set the stage for the English Civil War and the subsequent Wars of the Three Kingdoms

Rise of the Bishops

The Scottish Reformation in 1560 was intended to settle the matter of Scotland’s state religion, but controversies lingered in the years that followed. For some considerable time the precise structure and government of the new church remained unclear, though by the 1580s two distinct parties had appeared, the Presbyterians (favoring rule by church courts) and the Episcopalians (favoring rule by bishops). Although the lines of battle cannot be drawn with absolute clarity, the first position tended to be favored by radical ministers in the church, men like Andrew Melville, and the second by the crown. For James VI, who famously said that no bishop meant no king, the episcopal office was an essential adjutant to the crown. From the beginning of the seventeenth century he reintroduced a full panel of bishops into the Scottish church. By the end of his reign in 1625, the Scottish church may have been Calvinist in doctrine, but its hierarchy was much the same as it had been prior to the Reformation.

The ascent of the bishops may have caused concern to committed Presbyterians, but it caused even more concern to the Scottish nobility, worried about loss of power and influence in government. Many had suffered a sharp decline in prestige and status ever since the king moved to London after the Union of the Crowns in 1603, with ever diminishing prospects of office and advancement in Scotland. By the 1630s, the opportunities for a dangerously underemployed nobility diminished still further, as Charles I began to promote bishops to the Privy Council, the executive arm of government in Scotland. In 1635 John Spottiswood, Archbishop of St Andrews, was appointed Chancellor, the highest political office in the land, and the first time a cleric had been appointed since well before the Reformation. Many nobles were left outside the Council in impotent frustration, including James Graham, Earl of Montrose.

Although the situation was far from satisfactory, things may have continued much the same but for the onset of an extraordinary crisis in 1637. Charles decided to introduce a new Anglican-style Prayer Book into the Scottish church—against the advice of the senior bishops, it must be said—without any attempt at consultation. In the crisis that ensued, the anger of the Presbyterians found common cause with the resentments of the nobility, and in February 1638 they produced what might be described as a joint-manifesto in the National Covenant. Although the document says nothing about the office of bishop as such, it rejected all of Charles’ church innovations. The king’s opponents now had a new name: the Covenanters. In November of the same year the General Assembly of the Church in Glasgow, attended by as many noblemen in the guise of elders as ministers, expelled the bishops one by one. Scotland was now officially Presbyterian. Charles demanded that the acts of the Assembly be withdrawn: the Covenanters refused. The only way to break the deadlock was war.

First Bishops’ War (1639)

For Charles, war with the Scots was a risky strategy. In England he had ruled without Parliament for eleven years and simply did not have the resources for a sustained campaign. Calling a new Parliament was potentially dangerous because of past opposition and current hostility to official policy. Instead the king tried to conjure up a coalition of forces against the Covenanters, to include such armed units he was able to gather in England from his existing resources, the domestic opposition to the Covenanters in Scotland, concentrated in the Highlands and the territory of the Gordons of Huntly in Aberdeenshire, as well as troops from Ireland. Scotland was to be enveloped in attacks from without and within.

Charles’ strategy was bold but amateurish: he would advance to the borders of Berwickshire with the royal army, while James, Marquess of Hamilton led an amphibious force into the Firth of Forth, and Randal Macdonnell, Earl of Antrim, advanced from Ireland against Archibald Campbell, Earl of Argyll, a leading Covenanter. Hamilton was given the supplementary aim of aiding the Marquess of Huntly.

But like all such grand strategies the whole scheme fell apart when confronted by the detailed logistical problems that real soldiers always have to face: the men were badly trained and equipped; transport, especially shipping, was a serious problem; there were few secure bases and insufficient stores; and there was no detailed plan of campaign. Thomas Wentworth, Charles’ Lord Deputy of Ireland, did little to disguise his contempt for the mercurial Antrim, and refused to extend the necessary support for the planned invasion of Scotland. The Covenanters, though little better prepared than the king, at least had the advantage of superior morale, defending a cause they believed to be just. All internal resistance to the Covenanters was swept aside in June 1639 when the Gordons were defeated by Montrose at the Battle of the Bridge of Dee, the only serious clash of the whole war.

Charles arrived at Berwick at the end of May, camping with the rest of his army a few miles to the west at a place called Birks on the English side of the River Tweed. Things were far from good. Most of the troops were badly prepared, food was scarce, and disease had broken out. All were tormented by lice, known in the grim humour of the camp as “Covenanters.” When the weather turned bad few had any shelter, and for miles there were no trees from which to build huts. Smallpox was an ever present hazard; desertions were frequent. Thomas Windebank, son of Francis Windebank, the king’s Secretary of State, carried his own frustrations to an explosive extent. The only thing that kept out the cold and the wet, he wrote,

On the other side of the border the army of the Scots, commanded by Alexander Leslie were little better off than their English opponents. As Archibald Johnston of Warriston relates, Leslie was short of money, horses and provisions. The stand-off could not last indefinitely, but the Scots were unwilling to cross the border. Even if they defeated the king in battle, their position would not be secure, as English national passions would be aroused. With neither side willing to advance or retreat, the only alternative was to open negotiations.

Peace of Berwick

At Birks, Charles had reached a dead end. His last hope disappeared when he received a letter from Wentworth, saying he could expect no help from Ireland and urging him to delay his campaign for a year. The Earl of Bristol and several other noblemen told him frankly that he would have to summon Parliament if he wished to proceed with his war against the Scots. Realising that his whole strategy was falling to pieces he decided to accept the Scots proposal for negotiations.

Talks began in the Earl of Arundel’s tent on 11 June, with six Scottish commissioners — headed by John Leslie, earl of Rothes, Johnston of Warriston and Alexander Henderson — facing a similar number of Englishmen. Soon after they began the King appeared in person, frosty at first, then becoming more relaxed. After Charles promised a new Assembly and Parliament to settle the church question, Warriston responded, by accusing him of playing for time. Although Charles expostulated that “The Devil himself could not make a more uncharitable construction,” it is unlikely that anyone believed the peace would be permanent. Both sides agreed to disband their armies, however, and Charles, while refusing to accept the decisions of the “pretended” Glasgow Assembly, agreed to summon a new gathering to meet in Edinburgh on 20 August, followed shortly after by a Parliament. On this basis, the Pacification of Berwick was signed on 18 June. It was only to be a short breathing space.

Confirming a Revolution

As expected, the Edinburgh Assembly confirmed all the acts passed at Glasgow, without mentioning its predecessor by name. But it went even further, uncovering the real causes of the contest with the King. It was no longer only a struggle over confessional differences and church government; it was over secular political power as well. Not only was Episcopacy abolished, but churchmen were also declared incapable of holding civil office. Worse, from the King’s point of view, the appointment of bishops was declared not only wrong in practice but also contrary to the law of God. (Charles had accepted the argument that Episcopacy might be set aside in the Scottish church as a temporary expedient. However, to declare it contrary to Scripture meant that its rejection could not be limited by time or space. If Episcopacy was universally unlawful, how could it be maintained in England and Ireland?) Parliament, which met soon after the Assembly, in effect confirmed a revolution: in Scotland royal power, absolute royal power, was dead.

It was an impossible situation for Charles to accept: he could not rule as a constitutional monarch in one kingdom and hope to retain the powers of an absolute monarch in the other two. For England, the situation was particularly invidious because of its more advanced tradition of constitutional law. For Charles to summon a new Westminster assembly any time before the outbreak of the First Bishops’ war would have been a risky enterprise; after the Edinburgh Assembly and Parliament it was a step fraught with suicidal implications.

econd Bishops’ War (1640)

No sooner had Charles returned to London than he turned to planning a fresh campaign against the Scots. From Ireland he summoned Wentworth, created earl of Strafford early in the new year, who along with William Laud, archbishop of Canterbury, formed the strongest axis on the royal council. Charles now had in his possession what he considered a trump card: a letter from the Scots written some time before to Louis XIII, asking for his arbitration in their dispute with the king. Charles and Strafford considered the letter to be treasonable and were equally convinced that the English Parliament would share this view. When the Short Parliament gathered in April 1640, however, it ignored the letter to Louis, focusing instead on domestic grievances with the King. No support was granted for renewing the war with Scotland, and the assembly was dismissed after three weeks, leaving the King politically, financially, and militarily worse off than ever.

The failure of the Short Parliament provided an enormous boost to the Covenanters’ morale, proving that Charles did not have the support of the English nation. As Charles was making (or attempting to make) preparations for a fresh war, the Scots made theirs. A Convention of Estates—a parliament without royal authority—was summoned and an executive Committee appointed to oversee preparations for “a just and lawful defence of their religion, laws, lives, liberty and country.” Just as in 1639, internal opposition was swept aside, with attacks on the Gordons of Huntly and the Ogilvies of Airlie.

As the weeks passed, and the summer campaigning season began, the King remained in London, gathering all the resources he could. He was not unduly worried, having been told that the Scots army gathering on the border had made no signs of moving. His intelligence was incorrect, however. Rather than waiting for Charles to take the initiative, the Covenanters launched a pre-emptive strike, crossing the border in strength on 17 August, confident that they would not have to confront the King in person. The Scots swept aside the King’s northern forces at the Battle of Newburn, and then occupied Newcastle, placing a stranglehold on London’s coal supply. The Second Bishop’s War was over almost as soon as it had begun.

Peace negotiations opened at Ripon on 2 October. Charles hoped for a personal treaty like the Pacification of Berwick; but the Scots, no longer accepting royal assurances of good faith, insisted that a final treaty would have to involve the English Parliament. A provisional treaty was agreed towards the end of the month: the Scots were to be paid what was — for the King — a crippling £850 a day in expenses and were to retain hold of the northern counties of England, pending the conclusion of a final treaty in London. The transfer of negotiations to London was a particularly dangerous move for the King, allowing close co-operation between the Covenanters and the English Parliament, who assembled in strength for the first session of what was to become the Long Parliament on 3 November.

Peace talks finally ended with the signing of the Treaty of London, ratified by the King in August 1641. Charles undertook to withdraw all his declarations against the Covenanters and to ratify the decisions taken by the Edinburgh Parliament. Reparations of £300,000 were agreed, and the Scots army began its withdrawal from northern England on receipt of the first installment. One set of problems had seemingly ended; another, even more serious, had already begun. By the summer of 1642 Charles, unable to reach agreement with the English Parliament, was drifting towards civil war.

References

Primary

* Baillie, Robert, "Letters and Journals," 1841.
* "Calender of State Papers Domestic of the Reign of King Charles I," 1858–97.
* "The Register of the Privy Council of Scotland", variously edited, 1899–1933.
* Rothes, John Leslie, earl of, "A Relation of the Proceedings of the Affairs of the Kirk of Scotland, from August 1637 to July 1638", 1830.
* Rothiemay, James Gordon of, "History of Scots Affirs from 1637 to 1641", 1841.
* Warriston, Archibald Johnston of, "Diaries", variously edited, 1911–1940.

econdary

* Donald, P., "An Uncounselled King. Charles I and the Scottish Troubles, 1637–1641", 1990.
* Fissel, M. C., "The Bishops’ Wars. Charles I’s Campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640," 1994.
* Lee, M., "The Road to Revolution. Scotland under Charles I", 1985.
* McCoy, F. N., "Robert Baillie and the Second Scots Reformation", 1974.
* MacInnes, A. I., "Charles I and the Making of the Covenanting Movement", 1991.
* Russel, C, "The Fall of the British Monarchies, 1637–1642", 1991.
* Stevenson, D., "The Scottish Revolution, 1637–1644", 1973

ee also

*English Civil War timeline
*Wars of the Three Kingdoms
*Scotland in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms
*Bishops in the Church of Scotland

External links

[http://www.concharto.com/search/eventsearch.htm?_when=January%2C+1639+-+April%2C+1639&_what=First+Bishops'+War&_zoom=6&_ll=54.699234%2C-1.120605&_maptype=3 An interactive map and timeline of the events leading to the First Bishops' War] , the [http://www.concharto.com/search/eventsearch.htm?_when=May%2C+1639+-+June%2C+1639&_what=First+Bishops'+War&_zoom=7&_ll=56.383502%2C0.153809&_maptype=3 events of the war] , and the three main actions of the war: [http://www.concharto.com/search/eventsearch.htm?_when=May%2C+1639+-+June%2C+1639&_what=%22trot+of+turriff%22&_zoom=12&_ll=57.527253%2C-2.438278&_maptype=3 Turriff] , [http://www.concharto.com/search/eventsearch.htm?_when=May%2C+1639+-+June%2C+1639&_what=%22Megray+Hill%22&_zoom=13&_ll=56.986430%2C-2.183704&_maptype=3 Megray Hill] , and the [http://www.concharto.com/search/eventsearch.htm?_when=May%2C+1639+-+June%2C+1639&_what=%22Bridge+of+Dee%22&_zoom=13&_ll=57.117325%2C-2.107143&_maptype=3 Bridge of Dee] .