Effects of the Turkish-PKK conflict

"This article is about the effects of the Turkish-PKK conflict; for the main article, see Turkish-PKK conflict.

The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) is an armed militant group founded in the 1970s and led, until his capture in 1999, by Abdullah Öcalan. cite web|url=http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/actions/20040112.shtml|title=U.S. Treasury - Recent OFAC Actions: 01/12/2004|publisher=United States Department of the Treasury - Office of Foreign Assets Control|accessdate=2007-07-15 ] The PKK's ideology was founded on revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. The PKK's goal has been to create an independent socialist Kurdish state in a territory which it claims as Kurdistan, an area that comprises parts of south-eastern Turkey, north-eastern Iraq, north-eastern Syria and north-western Iran.cite web | url = http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) - Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)|title=Fas.org ] cite web| url= http://web.archive.org/web/20060516010407/http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/kurds.htm|title=Navy.mil Web archive ] It is an ethnic secessionist organization that uses force and the threat of force against both civilian [cite news|title=PKK baskınına uğrayan Kürt köyleri ABD gazetesine haber oldu|language=Turkish|publisher=Milliyet|date=2007-07-07 |url=http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/07/son/sondun06.asp] and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by a number of states and organizations, including the USA, NATO and the EU.cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12535.htm|title=Foreign Terrorist Organizations List|publisher=United States Department of State|accessdate=2007-08-03 - USSD Foreign Terrorist Organization] cite web|url=http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2000/20000011.htm|title=Terrorism Act 2000|publisher=Home Office|accessdate=2007-08-14 - Terrorism Act 2000] cite web|url=http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm|title=Council Decision|publisher=Council of the European Union|accessdate=2007-08-14]

Economy

Total cost

By looking at the number of teachers killed and schools destroyed in can be determined that PKK’s second target in the region was education. PKK sees it as indoctrination. The use of the Turkish language in state schools is mandatory.

It can be seen from the distribution of activities concerning teachers that PKK aimed to keep the educational system in the region under threat. The threat of losing a child during a conflict inside or around a school created a dilemma between the state and the public. Primary education is mandatory and families who do not send their children to school are punished with jail time. It was impossible for the security system to negotiate with a parent under these conditions and jail time to a parent would be prosecuting the parent for the failures of the state. Even if students were forced to go to the institutions, they could not be forced to get involved with educational activities.

Another interesting point from this table is the situation in Tunceli. This province had the highest casualties. There are two apparent reasons for being a target. First, Tunceli has the highest education rate in that region, as most the Kurds in that region are Alevi. Second, this province has the smallest population, under the correct conditions that could be easily turned into a province that can be claimed.

Psychology

A system with future social expectations, such as a secure place for next generations, or an ability to solve social conflicts without violence, has to develop social, medical and criminal mechanisms to control the extent of unwanted behavior. A good example from Turkey is driving points. If a member of society constantly drives badly, the system suspends their license for a given time. In this respect the concept of an agent "leaving violent behavior" is very simplistic. A person who had lived in training camps and had been involved in raids cannot say, "I'm off", and became a law abiding, socially reliable person. The expectation of victimization ending with the cessation of crime is unrealistic.

* It is estimated by a veteran organisation that during the conflict Turkish Military used two million soldiers for operations against the PKK. This number does not specify active engagements and it is only a rough estimate that also includes logistics and other functions. There is no specific number for the clinically diagnosed and treated patients for Post-traumatic stress disorder, both from the Turkish Military, the PKK and Kurdish civilians.
* We assume, or build our own concept of a normal person who refrains from engaging in behaviour that violates international values of human rights. PKK members are not crazed fanatics or psychopaths. When we look at them, they have developed a justification and rationalization toward their actions. PKK used training programs to teach moral disengagement to its followers. In the Turkish medical system, there is no rehabilitation program for moral disengagement. It is reported that people who engage in violent activities have a hard time regaining their ability to empathise with others.
* PKK agents, which number in thousands, given training are not simply criminals. The rehabilitation of these people cannot be performed in isolation from society, but they are a high risk group. Turkey's experience has shown that these agents turn back to crime. In the criminal system, there is a law that demands government guidance for these agents. However, the opposite side of the equation is missing. There is no system that informs common people about the risk levels. There are no Uniform Crime Reports that inform the common people about their neighborhood status. A form of reporting system that assesses and classifies the nature and extent of the roles played by individual agents is needed. This should be developed as a preventive measure.
* PKK generated regions in Turkey that have high rates of the population involved with crime. In stable and peaceful societies, joining a violent group should be seen as a dramatic, alien and highly deviant action. There are programs to economically improve these regions, but there are no programs to produce hope and curb despair. This should be covered as a preventive measure.

Fear of weapons of mass destruction

There were two cases that radically shifted the attitude of the public, as they involved non-conventional methods.

* March 28, 1992 (no arrest): A lethal dose (50 mg/l) of cyanide was added to three water tanks in Istanbul that were mainly used by the Air Force.
* August 27, 1996 (Emin Ekinci): 20 containers of mustard gas and a container of sarin were found in Istanbul.

Political/Justice

According to the PKK, its methods are unilateral self-help from covertly inflicted mass violence by the Turkish state on the Kurd identity. The PKK presented its methods as a form of social control on their life (Kurd identity) to achieve a life (in Kurdistan) that is beyond the deviant behaviors of the Turkish State (it added Iraq, then Iran, then Syria to this equation). PKK perceived that the deviant behaviors of the Turkish state was the result of its political and judicial system.

From the onset in 1924, the Turkish political system believed that democracy could not survive in the face of “ethnic divisions”. The government should be built on Milliyetcilik the spirit of which being that everyone should be treated the same. Aligned with that idea, the Turkish State gave high priority to representation. The ratio of candidates originating from their own constituency, accepted as the sign of regional representation, is very high from the onset of the state. This ratio fell between 1935-1951, which was attributed to World War II and the Milli Şef period. The Turkish parliament has never lacked parliamentarians with Kurdish origins.

Representation is only one side of democracy, the other side being group affiliation. After four decades, the 1961 constitution marked a separation between “ethnic divisions” and “ethnic groups”. The 1961 constitution created more space for political parties showing religious and ethnic colours. During the 1960s the New Turkey Party (1960), YTP, received 30% of the votes coming from the region and 14% from the country, and the majority of them are of Kurdish origin. It was formed mainly by local landlords from southeastern Turkey. The Workers Party of Turkey (1961), or TIP was a left wing organisation and it was interested in the newly generated section of the Kurdish society; the workers. In its 1970 congress, TIP openly talked about the southeast regional problems. The TIP first named this the “Kurd problem”. As defined by TIP and recognised by the governments of the 1970s, the “Kurd problem” was the question of living standards and expression of self.

HEP/DEP/HADEP

During the 1970s, a look at the urbanization values ref|table_urbanization show that it was apparent that there was a need for new formations in Turkey's political representation. Under social changes, the government systems could only do limited planned activities. The real driving factor originates from political processes concerning the needs of the region through social participation. They were shaping the region in the late 1960s. During the 1970s they were aligned with the region's transformation from its tribal structure to a more urban one. However, during the 1980s and early 1990s it was shaped by the PKK and their fights against other Kurdish organizations (see Urban War). PKK claimed "no other Kurdish organization can play a significant role, or have a different view" on regional issues. By the late 1990s, aligned with the PKK's termination of activities against the regional people, PKK become undisputed.

The importance of HEP/DEP/HADEP can be explained with what happened after 1980. It was with the PKK that the “Kurd problem” was defined as an ethnicity problem associated with communist separationist ideology. It brought the “ethnic division” issues over Kurdish ethnicity. The 1982 constitution wrote specific articles to protect the state under the perceived separationist movement. These laws have received much criticism. The Turkish security system at that period perceived any terminology associated with “Kurd problem” as the manifestation of separationist ideology, and rejected even using the phrase. In the 1990s Turgut Özal's presidency tried to divide the ethnic separationist problem and the ethnic problem. The famous “I recognise the Kurdish Reality” was stated under these conditions. However the existence of a regional political party, that is tied to a territory, embracing only part of the state, with goals of mobilising ethnic support, would end up promoting the right to secede. The problem that the Turkish political establishment had in the 1990s was trying to bring Kurdish expression to the parliament (as an ethnic group) without the suggestion of secession or regional autonomy. The movement of HEP/DEP/HADEP is shaped under interaction of these issues.

The path that enabled HEP/DEP/HADEP was passed through the concept of civil society. Civil society has a life of its own, different from the state and lies beyond the boundaries of the family, clan and locality. By referring to activities during the 1970s, the 1982 constitution had emphasized the state factor. However, civil society lies short of state, but not as close as the constitution was demanding. The end of the 1980s showed the problems with civil society were getting apparent. The region was falling behind the developments in the country. The politics originating from the region and the economics of the region were deformed. The SHP report on July 1990 demanded suspension of military measures and a limited decentralization of administration and reinforcement of the communication between government and people. The report pointed out that the government, in its pursuit for establishment of security, should not force people to take sides. The spirit of the report was without the civil society there and there could not be any healthy discussion or realistic conclusions. The report was followed with the 1991 terrorism law, and Turgut Özal's support behind this law was significant. Another interesting development after these discussions was the increase in the numbers of NGOs.

On the political front, to find a solution within Turkey's parliament failed. The political party associated with the PKK, the Democracy Party, was banned from operating as a political institution. Some members, most prominently Leyla Zana, were arrested and charged with treason and membership in the PKK but were released 10 years later in 2004.

Non Governmental Organisations (NGO)

The Turkish government, in theory, should be transparent to cultures. The Turkish system depends on NGOs to perform cultural and social functions.

However, there are groups of NGOs that played a large part in communication between the state, the public and PKK. These organizations generally have names relating to human rights or freedoms. They are organized by province, and their organizational structure and goals reflect those of their western counterparts.

Liberalism in the Turkish system implies a voluntarist framework for social organization. The organization should be biased only toward its goals. Also, human rights and freedoms demand that Ankara should protect the rights of prisoners performing hunger strikes. However, after 22 years of the act, if an NGO gives a press release "saluting the martyr of ... hunger strike", it bring questions regarding the purpose of the NGO. Any NGO distances itself from others who are also in need by taking a political side. Turkish human rights organizations are becoming interested in issues related to a wider base. Crimes against females were brought to public attention through NGOs. This change might be a sign that leadership of these organizations is moving away from communitarian (Marxist) and ethnic concepts of the nation, to a human-centered concept with a goal to improve living conditions.

It is only fair to say NGOs had, and still have, a significant effect in the extension of state activity in the region. In a violent situation, NGOs helped the system sort out cases and performed a checking function.

Another issue related to NGOs in Turkey was the limitations imposed on them by the 1982 constitution.

Language Act Ban

Terrorism Law (1991)

During the 1980s, the social polarization between the government and the PKK was not conductive to social control through law, especially when the PKK turned itself into an international entity. Inability to deal with terrorism through criminal law was apparent even before 1980, and this was stated among the reasons of the coup. In the 1970s and 1980s defending its existence as a nation state through Turkish law had produced results on terrorists and their supporters that were very hard. PKK’s terrorism is not merely a form of crime, so trying to define it through criminal justice was unrealistic.

The primary aim of the 1991 law was to bring coherence to a set of laws that had been used to deal with terrorism (primarily by the PKK) under criminal law. This terrorism law was passed to define the structure and organise the response of the government, in addition to specifying rules of punishment. This law defined an organised crime section that was handled before within the individual sections of the criminal law that deals with the crime itself.

This law is significant as the Turkish government claimed that it would not deal with terrorism through military coups, though it accepted the idea that terrorism would be part of life in Turkey for a while. The terrorism law created a specific set of regulations and powers to deal with terrorists and their actions. Turkish parliament, with the knowledge of the inability to combat the sources of the terrorism through coups, brought extra measures from previous coups in its laws.

Amnesties

Turkey, as explained in this text, classified the PKK's activities as another category other than ordinary crimes. As elaborated in article on Syria, criminal trials were very hard to explain, with the mothers of the accused outside crying whilst members had their own rhetoric inside. This separation opened a way to treat them differently from ordinary criminals. Ordinary criminals were punished for failing to respect the right of the members of society, but the terrorism law recognizes that they fail to respect the state. This opened a reconciliatory approach which is amnesty.

Administrative

One of the administrative decisions was to implement village guards against the PKK insurgency. The goal was twofold; the villages that were in hard to reach areas would not be left without protection and it showed the size of the resistance against the PKK insurgency. At one point the amount of guards reached 150,000Fact|date=January 2007.

References